Sino-Soviet Split (1960)



Figure 1.--

One might expect the Soviets to have been strongly supportive of the Chinese Communists. Stalin's early relationwith the Chinese Communists were mixed. There were a range of crosscurrents that complicated fraternal ideological afinity. National interests led Stalin to question the growth of a strong Chinese state which would border lightly populated Siberia. And Stalin sensed from an early stage that he would not be able to control the Chinese Communist Party, unlike the Communist parties in Europe and other countries. And as concern with the Japanese grew, Stalin saw the Kumoingtung as a way of resisting Japanese military expansion. The Comminist victory in the Civil War was, however, presented to the world as another step in the inevitable triumph pf Communism. Mao traveled to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (1950). China under the agreement confirmed certain rights to Soviet Union. One example was continued use of the naval base at Luda in Liaoning Province. The Soviets committed to military support, shipments of modern weapons, and a major economic and technological assistance program. This included technical advisers and machinery. China did not question Soviet leadership of the world communist movement. Many Chinese Communists at the time saw the Soviet Union as the model for development, especially because the Soviets turned largely rural Russia into an industrial power. China's participation in the Korean War (1950-53) strengthen China's position in the Communist world as they and not the Soviets intervened directly to support the North Koreans. The U.N.-sponsored trade embargo forced China to trade primarily with the Soviet Bloc. At this stage in their relationship, the Chinese were more closely associated and dependent on a foreign power than at any early period in history. Gradually strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance gradually began to surface. A range of issues were involved, including ideology, security, and economic development. Ironically one factor was the death of Stalin (1953). While Stalin's approach was to control other Communist movements, in China Stalin had immense prestige because of his defeat of Hitler and confrontaltional approch to the Western capitalist countries. Chinese leaders were disturbed by Nikita Khrushchev policies, especially deStalinization announced at the 20th Party Congress (1956). The idea of peaceful coexistence with the Capitalist West was another problem. The Soviet Sputnik launch seems to have strongly impressed Mao as did other early Soviet successes in the Space Race. Like many in the developing world, Mao saw these Soviet achievements as proof that Marxism was a scientific system and that because of this, the world balance of power had shifted in the communists' favor. As he phrased it, "the east wind prevails over the west wind". As a result, rather than Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence, Mao wanted a more militant policy toward the Capitalist West. And other aspects of the Soviet relationship alienated Mao and other Chinese leaders. High on the list was what was seen as a lack of support for the recovery of Taiwan. The Soviets made no effort to placate the Chinese. A Soviet proposal for a joint naval arrangement offended the Chinese (1958). It was couched so as to put China in a subordinate position. The Soviets (who had close relations with India) maintained strict neutrality during the Sino-Indian border disputed (1959). And centrally, the Soviets proved reluctant to honor its commitments to provide nuclear weapons technology. One indication of declining Soviet influnence was Mao's Great Leap forward, a significant departure from the Soviet economic model (1957-60). The first major step in the break between the two Communist powers was the Soviet decesion to withdraw military and technical advisers (1960). For China, the break with the Soviets was not unlike its break with the West after its victory in the Civil War. The Chinese were determined to pursue a policy of self-reliance and independence of action. This was more important than the benefits of technical and economic assistance. And Mao no longer was willing to be seen as Moscow's junior partner.

Initial Soviet Policy

One might expect the Soviets to have been strongly supportive of the Chinese Communists. Stalin's early relationwith the Chinese Communists were mixed. There were a range of crosscurrents that complicated fraternal ideological afinity. National interests led Stalin to question the growth of a strong Chinese state which would border lightly populated, resource-rich Siberia. And Stalin sensed from an early stage that he would not be able to control the Chinese Communist Party, unlike the Communist parties in Europe and other countries. And as concern with the Japanese grew, Stalin saw the Kumoingtung as a way of resisting Japanese military expansion.

Civil War Victory (1948-49)

The Comminist victory in the Civil War was, however, presented to the world as another step in the inevitable triumph pf Communism.

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (1950)

Mao traveled to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (1950). China under the agreement confirmed certain rights to Soviet Union. One example was continued use of the naval base at Luda in Liaoning Province. The Soviets committed to military support, shipments of modern weapons, and a major economic and technological assistance program. This included technical advisers and machinery. Mao did not question Soviet leadership of the world communist movement at the time. Mao respected Stalin. Many Chinese Communists at the time saw the Soviet Union as the model for development, especially because the Soviets turned largely rural Russia into an industrial power, ignoring the fact that under Tsarist ruke Russiawas aklready becoming an industrial power. At the time there was no understanding just how inefficent and uncompetive Soviet industry was.

Korean War (1950-53)

China's participation in the Korean War (1950-53) strengthen China's position in the Communist world as they and not the Soviets intervened directly to support the North Koreans.

Trade Embargo

The U.N.-sponsored trade embargo forced China to trade primarily with the Soviet Bloc. It is not clear just how interested Mao was in tradung with the West. At this stage in their relationship, the Chinese were more closely associated and dependent on a foreign power than at any early period in history.

Strains with the Relationship

Gradually strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance gradually began to surface. A range of issues were involved, including ideology, security, and economic development.

Stakin's Death (1953)

Ironically one factor was the death of Stalin (1953). While Stalin's approach was to control other Communist movements, in China Stalin had immense prestige because of his defeat of Hitler and and the NAZIs and confrontaltional approch to the Western capitalist countries. One of Mao's biographers tells us, "It was only after Stalin's death in March 1953 that Mao began to distance himself from the Soviet leadership. He came to view Khrushchev as an untrustworthy buffon whom he deliberately trated with contempt." [Pantsov]

De-Stalinization (1956)

Chinese leaders were disturbed by Nikita Khrushchev policies, especially deStalinization announced at the 20th Party Congress (1956). The idea of peaceful coexistence with the Capitalist West was another problem.

Space Race

The Soviet Sputnik launch seems to have strongly impressed Mao as did other early Soviet successes in the Space Race. Like many in the developing world, Mao saw these Soviet achievements as proof that Marxism was a scientific system and that because of this, the world balance of power had shifted in the communists' favor. As he phrased it, "the east wind prevails over the west wind".

Major Issues

Mao rather than Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence, Mao wanted a more militant policy toward the Capitalist West. And other aspects of the Soviet relationship alienated Mao and other Chinese leaders. High on the list was what was seen as a lack of support for the recovery of Taiwan. The Soviets made no effort to placate the Chinese. A Soviet proposal for a joint naval arrangement offended the Chinese (1958). It was couched so as to put China in a subordinate position. The Soviets (who had close relations with India) maintained strict neutrality during the Sino-Indian border disputed (1959). And centrally, the Soviets proved reluctant to honor its commitments to provide nuclear weapons technology. One indication of declining Soviet influnce was Mao's Great Leap forward, a significant departure from the Soviet economic model (1957-60).

Rupture of Relations

The first major step in the break between the two Communist powers was the Soviet decesion to withdraw military and technical advisers (1960). For China, the break with the Soviets was not unlike its break with the West after its victory in the Civil War. The Chinese were determined to pursue a policy of self-reliance and independence of action. This was more important than the benefits of technical and economic assistance. And Mao no longer was willing to be seen as Moscow's junior partner.

Soviet Concerns

Relations between China and the Soviets did not improve after Khrushchev's removal. In fact they deteriorayed further. One author writes, "In the late 1960s Sino-Sovuiet relations became so tense that the Soviet leadership had even begun to examine the options of carrying out armned intervention in the affairs of the PRC, undertaking an atomic attack against the PRC's industrial cebnters or blowing up Chinese atomic sites." [Pantsov]

Sources

Pantsov, Alexander V. Mao: The Real Story (2012), 736p.







HBC





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Created: 1:11 AM 4/22/2006
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