** NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact Molotov mission Berlin 1940








NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact: Molotov Berlin Mission (November 12-13, 1940)


Figure 1.-- Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister) V.M. Molotov visited Berlin for talks on their alliance formed August 1939. There were a range of issues to be discussed. He arrived November 12, 1940. Hitler attended the talks. The Germans assured Molotov that the British were basically defeated. A British air raid forced them to adjoirn to a bomb shelter. German plans to invade the Soviet Union had already begun. Molotov's intransigent demands irritated Hitler. He was not used to taling to leaders who stood up to him. The talks only confirmed Hitler's decision to invade. Stalin took a different view on their alliance. He decided that the alliance should be expanded and deepened so that they could partition areas outside of just Europe. And he wanted to join the Axis. Here Molotov is saying farewell to his German counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop at the Tempelhof Airport November 13. We are not sure who the other peoole were, but the man with the glasses would have had to be a translator. Ribentrop did not share Hitler's determination for war with the Soviet Union, but of course it was Hitler who made the decisions. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1991-0207-505 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

NAZI and Soviet military actions had been so successful that the two powers now bordered each other and had overlapping interests in other areas. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov came to Berlin to iron out differences resulting from their spectacular successes and to discuss a broad range of political and economic issues. Molotov met with both Ribbontrop and Hitler. The meeting with Hitler is fascinating. Hitler had already decided to invade the Soviet Union and ordered his generals to prepare the plans. (The final orders to the Wehrmacht had not been given, but there can be little doubt that Hitler had made up his mind. Not all historians agree with this assessment, but we believe that the destruction of the Soviet Union and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East had been central to his thinking since the 1920s. His commanders delivered the draft invasion he requested 3 weeks after his meeting with Molotov. He then issued Directive No. 21 Operation Barbarossa 2 weeks after that.) Despite this, Hitler invited Stalin to join the Tripartite Axis Pact. As an inducement he was offered important parts of the British Empire, namely India. (Hitler was adept at attracting allies by offering other country's territories.) Hitler assured Molotov that Britain was a defeated country. (British air raids while Molotov was in Berlin did not help with this asertion.) He suggested that thus decessions about the division of the Empire needed to be made. Hitler told Molotov that Germany and Italy were interested in Africa, the territory south of Europe. He suggested that the Soviet Union might also want to move to the south against British India. In effect a renewal of the Great Game. What Hitler surely was thinking is that to the extent Stalin moved south and engaged Britain, it would weaken Soviet forces in Europe where he planned to attack. Molotov did not dismiss the suggestion, but his focus was on Eastern Rurope. He wanted to discuss Finland and the Balkans, two areas where Soviet and NAZI interests overlapped. Stalin had fairly cosistently persued a policy of regaining the Tsarist boundaries whivh included Finland. And of course Stalin shared the Tsarist concern in extending Russian interests in the Balkans. Hitler was unwilling for Stalin to expand further in Finland in part or racial reasons. In the Balkans Hitler was unwilling to accecpt significant Soviet expabnsion, primarily because the Ploesti oilfields were Germany's principal source of petroleum. One area to the south that did interest the Soviets was Iran. The Molotov-Hitler agreement (November 26, 1940) addressed the Soviet demand that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." This of course meant Iran. Interestingly at a time when there was considerable support for the NAZIs in Iran, the same NAZIs were colluding with the Soviet Union in effect to develop a new colonial empire in the Middle East. Hitler was more than willing to agree because it furthered his interest in enducing the Soviets to move south and engage the British.

NAZI and Soviet Aggressions

The Soviet aggresions permitted under the Non-Aggression Pact were extensive. The Germans had been most active in the west, but had not been inactive in the East. They had seized Czechoslovkia, part of Lithhunia (Memel), and western Poland. They also had developed close relations with Romania and Bulgaria and were attempting to do so with Turkey, Iran, and Japan. They also had begun to arm Finland. NAZI and Soviet military actions had in fact been so successful that the two powers now bordered each other and had significnt overlapping interests in other areas. Thus there was a need to iron out differences that had arrisen. Hitler of course was already set on attacking the Soviet Union and had begun to move forces east. He simply wanted to keep a lid on the relationship and ensure that Soviet oil and other raw material shipments continued. Stalin for his part had no doubt that there would be war with Germany, but he did not think it would be eminent as long as the British supported by the Americans continued the War in the West. He believed that after the World War I debacle, Germany would never fight a two-front war again. Hitler had said this over and over. Stalin also underestimated the striking power of Hitler's new Wehrmacht. He saw the need to build up the Red Army, but thought it was more than capable of defending Soviet frontiers and the Non-Agression Pact had bought him the time needed to do this even though the prolonged fishing in the West had not resulted. .

War Arrangements

Molotov and Ribebentrop not only met to negotiate he Non-Aggression Pact before the war, but they also met after the war began to iron out the details of their alliance and issues rising from their sucessful invasion of Poland. Commercial agreemets meaning vital raw materils needed by the NAZI War Machine detailing the deliveries were discussed by Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov (September 28, 1939). A final agreement was reached a few months later, the Memorandum on the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (February 11, 1940). The Soviets agreed to immediately begin deliveries of strategic materials and agreed that industrial goods from Germany would be delivered on a longer time frame, meaning that the NAZIs never paid for most of the Soviet deliveries.

Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov was a leading Soviet politician and diplomat amd staunch supporter of Josef Stalin. He was born in Kukarka (now Sovetsk in Kirov Oblast). His father was a shop clerk--not the best credetials for a Soviet leader. He developed revolutionary ideas at an early age. Molotov like Stalin was a revolutionary nom de guerre. He was also one of the few Old Bolsheviks to die a natural death. He beame a leading figure in the Soviet government as a devoted protege of Joseph Stalin (1920s). Molotov served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) (1930-41). As such, it wasMolotov as Primier who announced Stalin's Collectivization Program leading to the murdereous NKVD campaign against the peasantry and the Ukranian Famine. He then served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stalin appointed him because he wanted to explore a possible temprary alliance with Hitler and the NAZIs (May 3, 1939). Hitler was clearly going to launch a war and Stalin did not want to fight the Germans--at least not yet. The British and French at the time were seeking an alliance as well. Stalin dismissed Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov who because he was Jewish was not the best person to deal with the NAZIs. (Litvinov would go on to play a key role in the World war II Lend Lease program.) It would be Molotov that would cut the Non-Aggression Pact with NAZI Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. It is commonly called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Purpose of Mission

Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov came to Berlin to iron out differences resulting from their spectacular successes and to discuss a broad range of political and economic issues. Molotov met with both Ribbentrop and Hitler. The Pact had been a sweeping success. Hitler conquered much of Western Europe and Stalin got his share--much of Eastern Europe. There were, however, significant issues developing between the two totalitarian titans. Hitler objected to further Soviet inroads in Finlnd nd in fct hd begin to arm the Finns which Stalin found disturbing. Hitler was willing to temporarily conceed Estonia and Lithunia, but not Lithuania which Stalin was in the process of annexing. The greatest problem was Stalin's seizure of northeastern Romania--placing the Red army uncomfortably close to the Oloesti oil fields, Germany major source of oil. Hitler wanted more raw materials because he was preparing Germny for the masive Barbarosa offenive. Stalin was disassisfied with the German deliveries of manufactured products promissed in exchange for the Soviet raw materials being shipped to the Reich.

Hitler's State of Mind

The meeting with Hitler is fascinating. Hitler had already decided to invade the Soviet Union and ordered his generals to prepare the plans. The final orders to the Wehrmacht had not been given, but there can be little doubt that Hitler had made up his mind. Not all historians agree with this assessment, but we believe that the destruction of the Soviet Union and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East had been central to his thinking since the 1920s. His commanders delivered the draft invasion he requested 3 weeks after his meeting with Molotov. He then issued Directive No. 21 Operation Barbarossa 2 weeks later.

British Air Raids

Hitler assured Molotov that Britain was a defeated country. British air raids while Molotov was in Berlin, however, did not help with this asertion. The climatic engagements of the Battle of Britain had been 2 months earlier (September 1940). Göring's Luftwaffe had failed to break the RAF. Without air superiority, Hitler was force to cancel Operstion Sea Lion. And the Luftwaffe had tobshift to nightime raids to pound British cities. The British also continued to bomb Berlin and other targets at night. Bomber Command did not yet have a strategic bombing force with long range heavy bmombers. The Lancaster was just coming on line. But even their obsolete British bombers could bomb Berlin at night, albeit pinprick attacks. Neither the Luftwaffe or the British had yet developed night finders cpable of engaging bombrs at night. Molotov arrived during one of these attacks.

German Thinking

Hitler despite his developing plans to invade the Soviet Union, invited Stalin to join the Tripartite Axis Pact. As an inducement he was offered important parts of the British Empire, namely India. (Hitler was adept at attracting allies by offering other country's territories.) He suggested that thus decessions about the division of the Empire needed to be made. Hitler told Molotov that Germany and Italy were interested in Africa, the territory south of Europe. He suggested that the Soviet Union might also want to move to the south against British India. In effect a renewal of the Great Game. What Hitler surely was thinking is that to the extent Stalin moved south and engaged Britain, it would weaken Soviet forces in Europe where he planned to attack. Molotov did not dismiss the suggestion, but his focus was on Eastern Rurope. He wanted to discuss Finland and the Balkans, two areas where Soviet and NAZI interests overlapped. Stalin had fairly cosistently persued a policy of regaining the Tsarist boundaries whivh included Finland. Molotov reportedly told the Germans tht the Soviet Union plnned to smash Finland. He sought clearance from Hitler to apply the "Bessarabia solution" to Finland. (Bessarabia was an area of Romania that the Soviets had annexed.) This meant the annexation of large areas of Finland. Hitler who by this time had signed cooperation agreesments with Finland, vetoed Russian annexation. [Schmidt, p. 240.] And of course Stalin shared the Tsarist concern in extending Russian interests in the Balkans. Hitler was unwilling for Stalin to expand further in Finland in part or racial reasons. In the Balkans Hitler was unwilling to accecpt significant Soviet expabnsion, primarily because the Ploesti oilfields were Germany's principal source of petroleum. One area to the south that did interest the Soviets was Iran. The Molotov-Hitler agreement (November 26, 1940) addressed the Soviet demand that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." This of course meant Iran. Interestingly at a time when there was considerable support for the NAZIs in Iran, the same NAZIs were colluding with the Soviet Union in effect to develop a new colonial empire in the Middle East. Hitler was more than willing to agree because it furthered his interest in enducing the Soviets to move south and engage the British.

Soviet Demands

The Soviets unlike other countries that the Germans were used to dealing with were not supplicants or wiiling to meekly accede to German demands. Reich Marshall Göring after the War and in U.S. Army custody provided an assessment of Soviet demands prosented by Foreign Minister Molotov. Of course any thing Göring had to say cannot betaken at face value. He was clearly trying to place blame for the War on the Soviets, but it does provide an interesting view of the negotiations. "By the beginning of 1941, the Russian threat had begun to loom as a very real danger. Russia was bringing up large forces and making preparations on the frontier. If an agreement had been reached with [Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav] Molotov in February 1941, and the Russian danger had not been so real, we should certainly have carried out my plan in the spring of 1941. .... Hitler feared a military attack. Molotov made the following demands in February 1941: a second war on Finland, to result in Russian occupation of the entire country; invasion of Romania and occupation of part of the country; strengthened Russian position in Bulgaria; solution of the Dardanelles question (none of us wished to see Russia there); and the question of the Skagerrak and the Kattegat. This made us fall out of our chairs, it was so incredible. This was the last straw; Molotov was not to be heard any further. Germany would not even discuss it. We would have no objections to Russia having a sphere of influence in Finland, but Hitler felt that if Russia occupied the whole of Finland, she would reach out to Swedish iron ore mines and the port of Narvik, and we did not want the Russians as our northern neighbors, with troops in Scandinavia. The German people were also very sympathetic toward the valiant Finns. The Russian move northwest would have tended to outflank Germany. Similarly, the Russians in Romania might not necessarily go south, but might move westward to encircle Germany on that side. By denying us the nickel of Finland and the grain and oil of Romania, Russia could have exerted economic pressure against us, and in 1942 or so proceeded to direct military action. These were the main reasons that kept us from arriving at any agreement. In November 1940, when the first alarming reports came from the east, Hitler gave his first orders to OKW regarding the steps which would have to be taken if the situation with Russia became dangerous. Provision had to be made for the eventuality of a Russian attack. In March 1941, Hitler made up his mind to launch a preventive attack on Russia as a practical matter. I had favored making more concessions to Molotov, since I believed that if Russia invaded Finland and Romania, the differences between her and Britain and the United States would have become insuperable. Hitler, however, was personally distrustful of Russia all the time and saw in her, with the mighty armaments she had been piling up for 10 years, the great future enemy of Germany. Hitler's inward mistrust remained deep even though not expressed. He wanted to reject all of Molotov's demands in February 1941, whereas those of my opinion felt that a second Finnish war and a Russian drive on the Dardanelles would rupture the already tense relations between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers. In the long run, Russia might then fight England and not against us. What Stalin's real intentions were, we don't know whether he wanted to move toward the Dardanelles, or to attack Germany. If we had granted Russia's demands, we might have had her join with us in a four-power pact, replacing the Three-Power [Axis] Pact. I did not want to attack Russia. I wanted to carry out the Gibraltar plan, and I also did not want to see my Luftwaffe split between the Eastern and Western fronts. Russia was developing a position completely and finally contradictory to the interests of the British." [Göring]

America

The subject of America came up as well it might. America was the only country that couid have saved Britain abd resored a balance between the German-Soviet alliance and the democracies. Hitler had some good things to say about America and was aware of it's industrial power. [Hitler, Mein Kampf] Hitler fought against American troops on the Western front. And must have been aware of both the fighting caoability of American soldiers and thee fact that the American Expeditioinary Force was put together in only a year. His opoion of America was shifting. Only a few yearsmlater he was much more dimissive. [Hitler, Second Book] Apparently he was increasingly convinced by his speeches. Incredably he told Molotov at the Berlin summit that the earliest the Americans could field a substantial militry force in Europe was 1970. [Roberts] Just where he got this idea from we do not know. We do know that when he made a decision, he would defend it even or probably more accyurately when it went disdasteroiuly wrong. The only individual in the NAZI hierarchy who had any first hand knowledge of Amrerica was Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. He had a brief stay in America as part of an unsucessul attempt to sell champaign. And while Hitler did not have a very high opinion of Ribentrop, he listen to him when he talked about America, probably because he liked what he heard.

Sources

Göring, Herman. In Gilberto Villahermosa. World War II Magazine (September 2006). Göring was interogated immediuately after the War in Prisoner of War Camp No. 32 (July 25, 1945). Major Kenneth W. Hechler of the U.S. Army Europe's Historical Division asked the questions. Captain Herbert R. Sensenig served as the translator. While Göring is an unrelible source, the jest of what Molotov presented at the conference does seem creditable.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf (1925).

Hitler, Adolf. Ed. Gerhard Weinberg. Hitler's Second Book (2006). This nook was written in 1928 as a sequel to Main Kampf, but only publishd long afrer the War.

Roberts, Andrew. "Why Hitler lost the war: German strategic mistakes in Workd War II," (June 29, 2012).

Schmidt, Paul. Hitler's interpreter, Memorandum, p. 240 in Paul Schmidt Sontag, Raymond J. and James S. Beddie. Eds. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, GPO, 1948), 362p.







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Created: 2:43 AM 6/14/2008
Last updated: 2:09 AM 10/29/2021