Figure 1.--. |
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Western historians constantly refer to the affect of Munich on Stalin's psyche. This is undoubtedly true, although there is no way of knowing just what went through Stalin's mind. Even his cloest associates were often not sure and of course there is no memoir, not that they would have been very revealing had they been written. In fairness, however, we often do not know what the calculations Roosevelt was making. We can only guess at Stalin's calculations. Munich was undoubtedly a factor. Another factor was Stalin's suscpicious nature. He not only believed that the Allies were unreliable, but their purpose was to push im in a war with Germany. Thus an arrangement with Hitler would deflect the German armies west. In effect, Stalin was doing to the Allies what he thought the Allies were trying to do to him. Now as President Roosevelt pointed out, a German defea of France would be disastrous for the Soviet Union. Stalin's calculation was, however, that war in the West would not end in a few days. Most at the time credited the French army as a powerful force. Stalin would not have imagined that the French would collapse within only 5 weeks. Rather he reasoned that war in the West would significantly weaken the Germans. Also Stalin had no idea how much his purges had weakened the Soviet military. He had spent vast sums in building the largest army and air force in the world. And as a result of the agreement with Hitler, he was able to push the Soviet bounfaries west, providing a buffer around the Russian heartland of the Soviet Union. In fact even though the NAZIs in Barbrossa penetrated to Lenningrad and Moscow, most of the fighting in the East was in the Balics, White Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine and not in Russia itself.
The next target was Czecheslovakia which had beeen created by the Versailles Peace Treaty. After the Anchluss, Hitler began to escalate his tirades against Czecheslovakia, claiming that the erhnic Germans in the Sudetenland were being mistreated. The NAZI rearmament program, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anchluss with Austria came as a shock to Czecheslovakia. Even more so, the lack of response from Britain and France. The Czechs who had defensive alliance with France were prepared to fight. Even with the Anchluss, many Europeans chose to see the NAZI actions as domestic German matters. This changed with Hitler's next target--Czecheslovakia. Hitler in 1938 demanded the Sudetenland in Czecheslovakia which had a minority German population. Neville Chamberlin, the British Prime Miniister mused how terrible it was that war should be threatened by a "... quarel in a far away country by people of which we know little." A prominent member of the British parliament displayed even more ignoramce when he told the press, "Why should we bother with those gypsies in the Balkans?", meaning the Czechs who were of course not located in the Balkans. In the end, The British and French gave in at talks held in Munich. Chamberlain flew back to London and stepping off the plane waved the agreement signed ny Herr Hitler which he assured the waiting repoters guaranteed "Peace in our time." Churchill was apauled. Most British anf French people were releaved. One European leader, Soviet Marshall Stalin, who was not at the conference drew the conclusion that the British and French could not be trusted as potential allies against Hitler and that they were trying to engineer a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Western historians constantly refer to the affect of Munich on Stalin's psyche. This is undoubtedly true, although there is no way of knowing just what went through Stalin's mind. Even his cloest associates were often not sure and of course there is no memoir, not that they would have been very revealing had they been written. In fairness, however, we often do not know what the calculations Roosevelt was making. We can only guess at Stalin's calculations. Munich was undoubtedly a factor. And as the Allies proved when the NAZIs attacked Poland (September 1939), they were not reliable Allies. The French were unwilling to attack east outside the protection of the Maginot Line. The French reaction in World war II was very different to the Russian reaction in World War I when the Germans attacked France.
Another factor was Stalin's suscpicious nature. He not only believed that the Allies were unreliable, but their purpose was to push im in a war with Germany. Thus an arrangement with Hitler would deflect the German armies west. In effect, Stalin was doing to the Allies what he thought the Allies were trying to do to him.
Now as President Roosevelt pointed out, a German defea of France would be disastrous for the Soviet Union. Stalin's calculation was, however, that war in the West would not end in a few days. Most at the time credited the French army as a powerful force. Stalin would not have imagined that the French would collapse within only 5 weeks. Rather he reasoned that war in the West would wage for months if not years and significantly weaken the Germans.
Also Stalin had no idea how much his purges had weakened the Soviet military. He had spent vast sums in building the largest army and air force in the world. He anticipated the Red Army and Air Force performing much better if the NAZIs invaded then they at first did.
As a result of the agreement with Hitler, Stalin was able to push the Soviet bounfaries west, providing a buffer around the Russian heartland of the Soviet Union. In fact even though the NAZIs in Barbrossa penetrated to Lenningrad and Moscow, most of the fighting in the East was in the Balics, White Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine and not in Russia itself. The benefits of this buffer have been debated by military historians. Some argue that by pushing the Soviet boundaries west that Stalin bought more land and space in which to dekay the NAZIs. Other military experts argue that the Red Army had well prepared defensive positions along the old Soviet border and that Stalin by moving the Red Army west out of these well prepared positions exposed the Red Army and made it vulnerable to the NAZI Blitzkreieg.
A Russian reader has provided his assessment of the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact. He discusses many of the same issues that we present here. It is interesting to view a Russian view of the Pact. Our reader makes many valid points, although we take issue with some of his assessment.
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