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Agricultural production after impressive gains durng the NEP of the 1920s declined in the 1930s. This was in sharp contrast to rising industrial production and wholly the result of Stalin's decession to end individual peasant propretorship (1929-31). We do not fully understand Stalin's thought processes here. There may have been an element of idelogical purity involved. The organization of the collective proved useful in fighting the NAZI invasion. The principal reason, however, appears to be that private proprietors were an independent interest group outside his control and he wanted total control of not only the Sovet state, but of Soviet society as well. The mechanisms used were brutal. Successful peasants were vilified as Kulaks. Most were forced into collectives others were deported to Siberia where many died. Resistance flared. Many peeasants slaughtered their livestock rather than turn it over to the collectives. [Wells, pp. 960-961] The Soviet livestock industry did not recover until well after World War II. Resistance was espcially pronounced in the. and was brutally supressed by the NKVD. The center of resistance was the Ukraine. There a terrible famine not only resulted, but was enginered by Stalin.
The Blshecicks were a minority among the revolutionary forces that overthre the Tsar. They were, however, the best organized and under Lenin's ledership the most resolute. They offered bread to the prople and land to the pesants that work the great estates of aristocratic landlords. They also offered peace to war weary country. The Tsar's largely peasanted army was descimated by the Germans. Some rebelled to join the Revolution. Many deserted to return to the crumbling estates and seize their piece of land. The Bolshevicks at the time did not hint at collectivization. Most had no clearly thoughout plan of government, in part because Marxist theory foresaw the Revolution coming first in the heavily industrialized countries of Western Europe.
The Russian economy was devestated by first World War I and then the Civil War which followed the Revoultion. Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Soviet War Communism, the seizure of factories and other productive facilities caused further disruptions. The NEP was designed as a temprary porogram to reintroduce limited private owenership back into the Soviet economy. The NEP was a considerable success. It was replaced by the First Five Year Plan (1928).
Nowhere was the NEP more sucessful than in the countryside. As a result of the Revolution, the Bolseevicks had given the long-suffering peasantry actual ownweship of their land. Serfdom was ended by Tsar Alexander II, the liberator Tsar, (1861). Even so the peasantry continued to be exploited laboring on hufe rural estates owned by aristocrats. The Bloshevicks and desering soldiers had disposed of the landlaords, often brutally, if they had not fled. The NEP had in essence granted the Soviet peasant economic freedom. The NEP essentially gave the peasant in large measure the right to sell his crop as he saw fit. Here there were limitations with bost priceing and taxing policies, but during the 1920s the Soviet peasantry under the NEP experienced considerable propsperity and Soviet agricultural production reached impressive levels. The land and the wealth produced from it was in the hands of the person who tilled it. [Conquest, p. 13.]
Joseph Stalin is undeniably one of the most important figures of the 20th century. His impact on the devolopment of the Soviet state and society and the international Communist movement was immense. He is also one of the most evil figures in world history and was directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of millions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a death toll even exceeding that of Adolf Hitler. Even so, the Russian peple are deeply conflicted about his legacy. Stalin soon after Lenin's death (1924). He began to elimminate the opposition (1926) and was soon in control of the Soviet state (1929). It is at this time that he launced his essentially genocidal assault on the Soviet peasant. No one knows precisely the number of peeasants Stalin murdered, but one historian estimates the figure at 14.5 million people, during 1930-37. . Some estimates are higher. [Conquest] Estimates in the Ukraine alone are 5-7 million people.
The first major program of Stalin's leadership was the First Five Year Plan. Stalin announced a "revolution from above" (November 1927). The two basic goals were: 1) rapid industrialization and 2) collectivization of agriculture. It meant an end to the NEP. Stalin was determined to end the vestiges of capitalism that had been permitted under the NEP. Stalin's goal was to transform the still largely agrarian Soviet Union into an ideologically pure socialist society as well as create a fully industrial economy. Stalin saw with considerable clarity that the Soviet Union's future and military security required industrialization as rapidly as possible. A matter of no regard to Stalin was the human cost of this transformation. The Party now under Stalin's control agreed to the Plan (1928). The goals set by the plan were extrodinary and unobtainable. Stalin ordered a 250 percent increase in industrial production and a 330 percent increase in heavy industry. The Plan involved both the nationalization of factories as well as small shops offering services. Central planners set production quotas and factory managers were responsible for meeting those quotas. The nature of trade unions were fundamentally changed. Rather than organizations to persue worker interests, they becane state agencies to maximize worker output or productivity. The Plan involved building whole new industrial centers, especually in the Ural Montains. These new facilities would prove crucial in World war II as they were beyond the reach of NAZI bombers. The Soviets built thousands of new industrial plants, several of massive size. The unachievable production goals led to a variety of problems. The emphasis on heavy industry led to shortages of consumer goods. The primary aspect of agricultural policy was collectivization.
Stalin's thought processes with collectivization may not be readily apparent. It was closely associated with the drive to industrialize which Stalin saw as key to the Soviet Union's survival. Ironically the peasantry held the key's to the success of the industrialization effort. First, the Soviet Union's most imprtant export was the agricultural production of the peasantry. These export earnings were needed to finance industril expansion. Second, the peasantry's agricultural production would be needed to feed the expanding urban insustrial workforce. The peasntry had to be motivated to produce as much as possible. In an market economy this would be one by paying them high prices for their produce,but this would mean that less capital would be available to finance the industrial program. And in 1928 grain shortages were developing because peasants were not bringing their prduce to market. Stalin's solution was to simple, seize the farms. There may have also been an element of idelogical purity involved. We believe that Stalin like some other Soviet planners thought that collectivization would make Soviet agriculture more efficient. The killing that resulted may have been Stalin's reaction to opposition. The organization of the collective proved useful in fighting the NAZI invasion. The elimination of the independent peasantry had another advantage. The peasants were an independent interest group outside his control and he wanted total control of not only the Sovet state, but of Soviet society as well. We are unsure if this was part of Stalin's thought processes. It is more likely that his brutal actions wwre a reaction to the peasantry's resistance to collectivization.
Stalin's First Five-Year Plan sought to fundamentally change the organization of agriculture. The individual peasant-owned farms would be combined into a system of state-owned collective farms. The theory was that collectivization would make Soviet agriculture more efficient and the production increases would help finance industrial expansion and feed the resulting expanding urban population. In addition, as collectivization was seen as more efficient, Soviet planners believed that fewer peasants would be needed to work the land, making more workers available for industrial projects. The initial goals were reallively modest. The First Five Year Plan called for collectivi zing 20 percent of peasant families. The draconian measures enployed by Stalin, however, sent in motion a process that once set in motion essentially destroyed peasant agriculuture. By the time that World War II begam estimates suggest that 97 percent of peasant families had been collectivized.
We have little information at this time as to the new collective farms. We are not sure just who was put in charge of the collectives. We do not know what kind of facilities were built or accomodations for the families. Apparently there was some attemp at mechanizing agriculture through the new collectives. This woulld seemingly increase production. More significant apparently was the elimination of many competent farmers (the kulaks) and undermining the work ethic created by actual ownership. The new collectives had schools, but we know little about them at this time. There are pripaganda impages of the collectives, but we have not yet found reliable reports about conditions on these collectives.
Agricultural production after impressive gains durng the NEP of the 1920s declined sharply in the 1930s. This was in sharp contrast to rising industrial production and wholly the result of Stalin's decession to end individual peasant propretorship (1929-31). Soviet planners were to learn that ideology could not bend the iron laws of economics. Throughout the Soviet era beginning with the First Five Year Plan, agriculture would prove to be a great failure. The initial disruptions associated with collectivization might have been expected. Killing off 1 million of the country's best farmers explain in part why agricultural production did not recover. But even after World War II, agricultural harvests continued to disappoint, suggesting that there were inherent weaknesses in the collective system itself and the concept of state managed agriculture. This was in sharp contrast to agriculture in the United States where the problem was over abundant harvests forcing the state to pay farmers not to produce. While farm productivity declined, it was wholly in the state's control and could be used to finance and support the country's industrialization. The question arises is if the Soviets would have better better off without collectivization. Certainly production would have been higher, but it would also have been more difficult to extract as much from an independent peasantry. The Sovieets in effect reduced rural income and transferred this to industrial workers. Actual farm oroductioin declined substantially and would not recover until many years after World War II. Of course production was not only affected by collectivization, but also by the terrible destruction occurring during the War. And even after harvests began to increase, there was no longer a surplus available for export. Soviet agriculture was unable to even satisfty domestic demand.
Successful peasants were vilified as Kulaks. These were not families that managed large estates. In many cases they were simply the better farmers and harder workers. Stalin persued a policy of dekulakization. The so-called kulaks not only had their land taken over by the state, but they and their families were deported. Stalin directed terrible retribution on the wealthier peasants. Wealthy of course was a matter of degrees. Historians estimate that about one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported. This was a virtual death sentence for the entire family. The peasants that resisted were no match for the NKVD, but the result was massive declines in agricultural production in sharp contrast to what Stalin and other Soviet officals expected. Most were forced into collectives others were deported to Siberia where many died. Resistance flared. Many peasants slaughtered their livestock rather than turn it over to the collectives. [Wells, pp. 960-961] The Soviet livestock industry did not recover until well after World War II. Resistance was espcially pronounced in the Ukraine and was brutally supressed by the NKVD. The terrible famine was enginered by Stalin.
One of the greatest crimes of the Stalinist era was horific famine in the Ukraine. The famine area included both the Ukraine and the Soviet northern Caucasus, as well as Russian areas in the lower Volga River basin. Famines are historically primarily the results of natural events such as drought, heat, diseases, insect infestations, and other natural causes. The Ukrsanian famine was primarily caused by Stalin's program of collectiving Soviet agriulture, especially the forced collectivization of the Ukraine. The Ukraine had been the bread basket of Russia. It was the prize sought by the Germans in two world wars. The rich, well watered soil made the Ukraine the most productive agrivcultural area of the Soviet Union. Two issues merged which resulted in dissaster for the Ukranian people. Not only did the Ukranian peasantry resist collectivization, but there was a strong Ukranian national spirit, especially in the western Ukraine. Stalin was determined to both bring agicultural under central control, but to crush Ukrainian nationalism at the same time. Stalin not only used the famine to crush the spirit of the Ukranisn peole, but he also purged the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Stalin even purged the Ukrainian Communist party. At the cost of millions of lives, many of them children, the famine succeedded in breaking any organized redsistance on the part of the peasantry to collectivization. Stalin's purges also succeeded in smashing the Ukranian national movement. Stalin's actions in the Ukraine were not without costs beyond the deaths of Ukranians. Agricultural production plummeted. Soviet agricultural became one of the most inefficent agricultural operations in the world. Stalin bought Ukranian agricultural under his control through collectivization, he also signicantly reduced the output of Soviet agriculture.
We note that many authors suggest that collectivization was a useful step in the industrialization of the Soviet Union, albeit at a terrible cost. We do not think this is the case. Rather a healthy peasant agricultural sector would have been a far greater assett, producing a surplus that could have helped finance industrialization. If any thing, collectivization impeded the industrialization of the Soviet Union. From Stalin's point of view, however, it probably was a success because it brought this important sector of the Soviet economy under his control. One aspect of collectivization that does appear to have proven beneficial was resistance to the NAZIs when Hitler launched Barbarossa (June 1941). This is, however, a topic that we have not fully accessed.
Conquest, Robert. The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine.
Webs, H.G. The Outline of History: The Hole Story of Man (Doubleday & Company: Ne York, 1971), 1103p.
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