Figure 1.-- |
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The small U-boat fleet, however, proved a major challenge to the British. Early in the War, U-boats sank three British cruisers, astounding the public both in England and Germany. The Germans backed down from unconditional submarine warfare when America protested the sinking of the Lusitania (1915). There were 1,201 civilians, including 94 children killed. Among them were Americans and American public opinion was incensed. Although the British denied it, historians have since established that the Lusitania was carrying weapons and amunition. [Massie] The invasion of neurtal Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania combined to create
the image of Germans in the American mind as modern day Huns. Making another effort to win the War, Germany in 1917 reimplemented unrestricted submarine warfare (March 1917). The Germans feared the entry of America into the War, but in the end concluded that they could force the British and French to seek terms before the American Expeditionary Force could be created and brought to France. It proved to be a huge miscalculation. As a result, America declared war on Germany (April 1917). The U-boat fleet succeeded in sinking 5,000 ships. That was an amazing 25 percent of the Allied merchant fleet. The Allies attempted to determine how to sink U-boats and developed the depth charge. It was, however, the introduction of the convoy system that defeated the U-boat. The World War I U-boat was really a surfacre vessel that could sumbmerge. Against esorted convoys, World war I era U-boats had little chance of success. In the end the German Navy only served to bring Britain and America into the War, ensuring Germany's defeat. An embittered German naval office, Karl Donnietz, confined in a British POW camp in 1918 was already planning Germany's strategy in the next war.
Britain after Nelson's victory at Trafalgur (1805) dominated the seas. No other country during the 19th century challenged Britain's dominance. The Japanese victory at Toshima (1905?) convinced naval planners that heavily armored big-gun battleships were the the ultimate in naval power. Admiral Jackie Fisher sought to reform the Royal Navy. The big-gun Dreadnaught rendered all existing ships obsolete. The Germans saw it differently as Dreadnaught rended the existing British fleet obsolete. The Germsnd accepted the challenge and began building their own Dreadnaughts. The resulting naval arms race played a major role in shaping the Germans as an enemy in British eyes. Naval planners in the years leading up to World War I believed that a naval war would be determined in an epic massive fleet action between heavily armoured big-gun dreadnots.
Few naval experts saw a significant role for the submarine. This was because panners appreciated the potential impact that submarince could have on commerce or the possibility that a Europeans would conduct a protracted war of attrition. The submarine was conceived as a scout and potential challenge to capital ships in naval engagements. The idea of sinking merchant ships on a large scale and attempting to blockade Britain was not seriously consisered. The submarine was still a relatively new class of vessel. In addition, the virtually unanimous opinion of military experts was that a war, in the unlikely prospect that it came, would be a war of movement that would be quickly resolved. No obne expected an extended war of attrition in which blockades would play an important role.
The Germany Navy as planned by Admiral Tripitz was designed to compete with the presitiogs German Army dominated by Prussian aristocrats. He wanted pretigious modern battleships and cruisers that could demonstrate Germany's industrial prowess. As a result, only limited expenditures were devoted to submarines. The Royal Navy likewise devoted only limited attention to submarines. Ironically, it was the French that were the most enthusuastic about sunmarines. Here the reason appears to be less tactical calculations, but a way for the left-leaning Republican government to dilute the power of conservative fleet admirals. Germany began the war with only 30 operational U-boats. They had limited ranges and carries only a few torpedos.
The only real challenge had been that of France. At the same time, the British had close ties with the Germans, seeing France as Britain's mortal enemy. This view had been forged in the Hundred Years War and in the wars resisting Louis XIV's expansion. Britain had been severely threatened dutrung the Napolepnic wars. During the wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon, Britain had fought with the German states. This world view was still dominant in Engkand in the mid-10th century. In addition the British royal family was of German origins, ties which were strengthened when the young Princess Victoria married a German prince--Albert. Many Britons were concerned about France under Napoleon III. The British view did not begin to shif until after the unification of Germany (1871). The change in the publuc mind was significantly affected when Kaisser Wilhelm II rose to the throne (1881). The belicose young kaiser soon dismissed BNismarck and persued an expasionist foreign policy. The kaiser also decided to build a highseas navy. Britain was prepared to accept Germany as the dominant Euopean power. It was not prepared to accept German continental dominance dominance along with naval dominance. Thus when Tripitz and Kaiser Wilhelm set out to build a modern highsea fleet to chanllenge Britain's dominance it significantly affected how Britain viewed the Germans, especially given the the Kaiser's belicouse behavior.
Both Britain and Germany were vulnerable to naval blockades. Both were highly industrialized countries which had to import both food and raw material. Britain as an island was the country most obviouly vulnerable. Britain was dependent on imports for about one-third of its food supply. The only major raw material Britain did not need to import was coal. Britain paid for these imports with the output of its factories. And to carry out the necessary trade, Britain had the world's largest merchant marine. And this was the target of the German U-boats and other commerce raiders.
Germany as a land power was less obviously vulnerble, but it was vulnerable. Except for trade with Scandanavia which coulf be conducted in the Baltic, Germany had only a smll North Sea coast through which its foreign trade could flow. Here the major port was Hamburg. This made it relatively easy for the British with the powerful Royal Navy to effectively blockade Germany. Blockading the Channel was an easy matter. The North Sea was more complicated, but effectively executed with naval patrols and mine fields.
The sibmarine was not developed to be used in a commerce war. Rather the submarine was seen as a means of delivering torpedoes in fleet engagements. The Germans first used them in an even more tactically aggressive mode. Contrary to all expectations, both among British and German plannets, the small German U-boat fleet, however, proved a major challenge to the British. Early in the War, a U-boat engaged the British 7th Cruiser Squadron off the Hook of Holland. The U-9 sank three British cruisers, astounding the public both in England and Germany. Helping to set the image of the U-boat as a dishonorable weapon, the captain of the U-9 sank the British cruiser Aboukir and then sank two other cruisers (Houge and Cressythat were attempting to rescue the survivors. A British Admiral described the action as "Underhand, unfair, and damned un-English". [Parrish] The action also forever altered naval calculation. The U-boat was a small, relatively inexpensive ship, manned by a handful of men. ThevU-9 had a crew of 26 men. Yet it was caopable of siking major naval units.
After the British implemented a naval blockade of Germany, the Germans sought to blockade the British isles. As the War evolved in a protracted struggle, a war of attrition, these blockades began a major part of the conflict. Naval commerce with America and the Dominions played a major role in the British war economy. Here Germany employed both armed merchant raiders and U-boats, but the major threat was the U-boat. The Germans waged a guerre de course--a commerce war against Britain. The German U-boats at first stpped ships and followed internationally accepted Prize Rules. Neutral hips like American vessels were inspected. Allied ships were sunk, but the Germans allowed the crew and passangers to be evacuated before sinking it. This was often done by using the deck gun so as to save precious torpedos. To be effective, however, the World War I U-boat had to strike without warning. Stopping the merchant vessels put the U-boatsc at risk. Not only could the merchant vessel radio the location of the U-boat, but many surface vessels were armed and could fight it out with a sufaced U-boat. This issue came to a head when the U-20 sank the British luxury liner Lusintania (1915). There were 1,201 civilians, including 94 children killed. Among them were Americans and American public opinion was incensed. Although the British denied it, historians have since established that the Lusitania was carrying weapons and amunition. [Massie] Public opinion in America and Britain saw the German action little short of murder. The Germans backed down from unconditional submarine warfare when America prepared to sever relations. President Wilson was prepared to deploy the American Navy which would have inevitabled led to war.
The invasion of neurtal Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania combined to create the image of Germans in the American mind as modern day Huns. I President Wilson and most Americans, however, wanted no part in the War. Wilso oproclaimed that America was "to proud to fight". Former President Roosevelt called Wilson a coward.
Russia honored its alliance with France and a Russian offense in the East preventing the Germans from concerntrating the full strtength of its army on the Western front. Had it been able to do so, the Germans would have won the War in in the early months of the conflict. The Russians suffered dreadfully on the Eastern front. Russian soldiers were not well equipped. Many soldiers did not even have riles and there were no gas masks for protection from gas attacks. A Revolution overthew the Tsar. The Germans seeing that the Russians were fattaly weakened increasingly believed that they could finally win in the West. And when the the Bolsheviks in the climax of the Russian Revolution overthrew the Provisional Goverment and sought terms with the Germans. This provided substantial forces that the Germans were convinced could be used to end the deadlock on the Western front.
Germany had practical strategic problems. The Allied blockade and the mounting attlefield losses were undermining the German war effort. German commanders increasingly began to think that war-weariness would force German to sue for peace. Commanders began to believe that their best chance of winning the War or at least achieving an advantageous peace would be to cut Britain off from America and the Dominions which were sustaning the British war effort. The German Highsea fleet was incapable of doing this. The only option was the U-boat fleet. The problem was the United States. President Wilson had kept America out of the War, but had made it clear that unrestricted submarine warfare could mean war. German commanders by 1917 were prepared to gamble that unrestricted submarine warfare would force Britain out of the War before an outraged America could recruit, train, and transportan army to France. German commanders even believed that their U-boats could prevent the U.S. Army from reaching France. The German Navy had chafed under the restrictions imposed on U-boat operations. Alfred von Tirpitz was an early advocate of unresticted submarin warfare. German Admiral Capelle, Secretary of State for the Navy, assured the German Parliament, "They will not even come because our sunmarimes will sink them. Thus America from a military point of view means nothing, again nothing, and for a third time notthing," [Keegan, p. 372.] At the time the American Army totaled only slightly more than a 100,000 men. Capelle would not be the last German official to under estimate the Americans. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Chief of the GermannNaval Staff, argued that only unrestricted sunmarine warfare could impair British maritime commerce suficently so the war in the West could be won before the British blockade crippled the German economy. [Keegan, p. 351] German naval intelligence estimated that unrestricted submarine warfare would enable the U-boats to sink600,000 tons of shipping monthly. This was twice the tonnage sunk in cruiser' warfare. Another factor was the weather and war related bad harvests that Europe experienced in 1916. It had affected the Central Powers and the Germans believed that it left the British particularly vulnerable. Navy commanders calculated that
starvation would force Britain out of the War in 5 months.
German commanders by 1917 not only thought that they could win the War through unrestricted submarine warfare, but the Navy now had a more substantial U-boat fleet which could be used to wage a campaign in the North Atlantic. The Germans had a fleet of 46 large, modern U-boats capable of operating in oceanic waters. The Germans in addition had 23 smaller U-boats which could be deployed in coastal waters.
The major question concerning the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare America was the United States. America was the one major power that had not declared War. America was neutral, but this did not mean that America dod nor affect the War. The Royal Navy control of the sea mean that Briitain hd access to American raw materials and industrial production. The Royal Navy blockade men that Germany was cut off from trade with America and other overseas countries. This was what unrestricted submarine warfare was designed to achieve, cut off Britain from America and the Dominuions. The threat of course was that not only would America's ebntry in the War give the Allies even more access to American oroduction, but that an American Army would be dispatched to France to bolser the Western Front. And given the population of the United states, it would be a huge army that a war-weakened Germany could probably not stop. Germans commandrs believed that with unrestricted submarine warfare that they could starve the British before America could effectively interbene. Military commanders. most with little knowledge of the United States, convinced themselves that America would not enter the War. Many saw American neutrality as an act of national cowrdice by a polygot nation and just assumed that such a nation would never dare war with Germany. They were also correctly aware that America did not have a substantial azrmy, futher confirming their assessment tht American would not enter the war against Germany. German politicans, especially the Socialists, were not at all sure about the Army's assessment. German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg from an early point of the War had been concerned about America. Opinion in the Reichstag, however, had swung to support for unrestricted submarine warfare. The Germans were divided about the entry of America into the War, but in the end concluded that they could force the British and French to seek terms before any American Expeditionary Force could be created and brought to France. It proved to be a huge miscalculation. A calculation another generation of German leaders will repeat.
Bethmann-Hollweg attended a meeting at Pless (January 9, 1917). He found at the meeting that both the Army and Navy were insisting on unrestricted submarine warfare. And they had convinced the Kaiser. It was at this meeting that the Grmans decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. The German Navy launched the campaign that they thought would win the War (February 1).
The German invasion of neutral Belgium (1914) and the sinkling of the Lusitania along with effective British propaganda had created a dreadful image of Germany in the American mind.
The German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare did not bring about an immediate American declaration of war. President Wilson thought that the Germans could perhaps be convinced to rescind the orders has had been the case in 1915. The President broke off diplomatic relations with Germany (February 3). This was a clear warning that war was possible. The Germans did not flinch. The President ordered that American merchant ships be armed (March 9). German U-boats sank seven American merchant vessels (by March 21). Secretary of War Newton Baker activated the first National Guard troops (March 25).
Once Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare and began sinkling American vessels, war was probably inevitable. It was at this time a starteling revelation appeared in American newspapers (March 1). British intelligence intercepted a message from German Foreign Minister Zimmerman to the German Embassy in Mexico (January 16, 1917). The message was sent a week after Germany decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Zimmerman instructed the German Ambassador in Mexcico City to attemp to enduce Meico to enter the Zimmerman authoruzed the Ambassador to offer the return of the American southwest. The Zimmerman Telegram convinced those Amrericans still wavering that Germany was a threat to American. British agents intercepted the telegram earlier, but delayed the release so that a cover story could be concocted to protect British code breakers. The Zimmerman telegram infuriated Americans and it came just as the Germans ammounced the resumption of unrestricted sunmarine warfare.
The Constitution assigns the responsibility of declaring war with the Congress. As American Government evolved over time, formal Declarations of War were only passed at the request of the president. With the sinking of American ships, President Wilson finally decided that war could not be avoided. The President summoned a Special Session of Congress (April 2, 1917). President Wilson delivered a War Message asking Congress to declare war on Germany (April 6). Congress overwhelmingly passed the President's War Resolution. The vote was 373 to 50. A second War Resolution declaring war on Austria-Hungary followed (December 7, 1917). The German military was wrong that America would not enter the War. It remained to be seen if America could marshall its forces in time to save the Allies. The Allied public were surprised to find that a large country like the United States did not have a substantial standing army that could be immediately dispsatched to France.
The British were slow in developing effective measures to counter the U-boat threat. Only gradualy were needed counter-measures developed. Some of those measures included: mine barrages, Q-ships, zig-zag manuvers, Huff-Duff directional finders, sonar and depth charges. It was the mine barriers that roved most deadly to the U-boats. The primary Allied U-boat counter measurs included: mine barriers (48 u-boats), escort depth charges (30), rammings (19), and British submarines (17). It was, however, the introduction of the convoy system with escorts that defeated the U-boat. The admiralty had long oppsed convoys seeing the large numbers of ships to be protected as beyond the capability of the Royal Navy. Only the U-boat toll in 1917 after the resumption of unresticted submarine warfare forced the Admiralty to adopt the convoy system. The World War I U-boat was really a surfacre vessel that could sumbmerge. It could only sumerge for short periods and once sumerged was very slow. Against escorted convoys, World War I era U-boats had little chance of success.
Germany commission 365 U-boats during the war and lost 178. This was about half of the force--a terrible loss rate. The Germany Navy during the War achieved substatial results. They sank 4,837 Allied merchant ships, mostly British. This exceeded 11 million tons of shipping. U-boats were responsible for most of the sinkings and primarily in 1917-18 after the resumption of unrestriced submarine warfare. That was an amazing 25 percent of the Allied merchant fleet. Most of the vessels sunk were ships sailing individually and not part ofconvoys.
In the end the German Navy only served to bring Britain and America into the War, ensuring Germany's defeat. An embittered German naval office, Karl Donnietz, confined in a British POW camp in 1918 was already planning Germany's strategy in the next war.
Keegan, John. The First World War (Knopf, 1999), 475p.
Massie, Robert K. Castles of Sea: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea (Random House, 2003), 865p.
Parrish, Thomas. The Submarine: A History (Viking, 2004), 576p.
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