** World War II -- aftermath in Germany economic collapse








World War II Aftermath in Germany: Economic Collapse (1944-48)

German economic collaose
Figure 1.--Germany began World War II as the most heavily industrilized country in Europe. As a result of the War, industrial Germany was obliterated. This photo was taken in Berlin (1946). It could have been taken in any Germn city after the War. The children are iblioous tgo it as it was just party of their war. The German economy n\began to collapse late in the War (Fall 1944). After the War tghere were no jobs and war-time rationong of both food and consumer goods was continued. Economists estimated tghat it would take a generation or more for Germany to recover.

Germany began World War II as the most heavily industrilized country in Europe. Britain and France combined had a greater industrial output, but only the United States had a greater industrial base. (Soviet industrial capcity is more difficult to assess, but was probably comprable to German production.) Germany's industrial infrastructure was not just severely damaged by the Allied strategic bombing campaign, it was virtually obliterated. The damage in the cities, especially the large industrial cities, was devestating. During the battle of Britain, a German raid of medium bombers was notable. For the Allies by 1944, raids with 1,000 heavy bombers was not unusual. Most German cities were left vast mounds of rubble. Germany's industry at the time was located in the cities, in part because the workers had to live near the factories. Cars in Germany, and the rest of Europe, were beyond worker's incomes. The bombers primarily targeted industry and specialized targets like the synthetic fuel plants which were not located in the cities. World War II began at a time that that air force commanders had still not worked out how best to employ their assetts. The Germans worked out tactical methods. It took longer for bomber commanders to work out the best use of their assetts. Allied commsanders noy only grasped the Germam Achieles heel--petroleum, but had a huge bomber force to hit virtuslly any target in force. Thus the synthetic plants along with the transportation netweork became priority targets. The introduction of the long-range P-51 escorts not only allowed the Allies to escalate the bombing, but the fighters on the way home went down to the ground and began hitting smaller targets, especially the transportation network outside the cities. Much of the destruction took place fairly late in the war, especially after the D-Day breakout when General Eisenhower relinquished control of the American and British bomber forces. The German war ecoinomy proved resiliant throughout most of the war, but finally began to collapse under the weight of the bombing and loss of occupied countries to plunder (November 1944). Some damage was caused by the fighting as Allied ground forces closed in on the Reich. Except for Berlin, however, this was limited compared to the descrution resulting from the strategic bombing campign. Hitler at the end of the War ordered that the infrastructure that survived the bombing to be destroyed as the Allied forces approached, the same burnt earth strategy persued by the Soviets. Speer and some other NAZI officials tried to prevent the implementation of this order or ignored orders from Berlin. After the NAZI surrender, some NAZI diehards planned a campaign of sabatoge. This did not occur, but in fact there was not a lot left to sabotge. And in the Soviet occupation zone, much of what survived the bombing, was loaded on rail cars and shipped east as war reparations. The Soviet zone was the least indistrialized area of Germany and the reparations would contribute to East Germany's inability to compete with West Germany. As a result, Germany's industrial infrastructure would have to be essentially rebuilt from scratch. Most observers at the time thought that it would take more than a generation. What had not ben desttroyed was Germany's tremendous reservoir of industrial expertise and intelectyal talent. In the end this proved more important than the destroyed factories.

Pre-War Industry

Germany began World War II as the most heavily industrilized country in Europe. Britain and France combined had a greater industrial output, but only the United States had a greater industrial base. (Soviet industrial capcity is more difficult to assess, but was probably comprable to German production.) Germany even after World War I had the largest industrial establishment in Europe. It was that industry that was the backbone of the Central Ppwers war effort. The War had not been fought on German territory and except for the Saarland and Rhineland, Germany was not occupied by the Allies. Germany did loose some territory as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaty, but the country's industrial complex was left largely intact. The country's scientific establishment supporting that industry was also intact. The strength of that establishment can be seen by the number of Noble Prizes German scientists were awarded, One loss to German's industrial capacity was the disolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This meant that the Skoda arms complex was now in Czechosolvakia, a new independent democratic country, orieted toward Britain and France. While Germany remained the most important industrial country in Europe, one area that Germany did not persue intensively was the automobile industry. Germany of course had some notable automobile manufacturers (Mercedes and Porch), they did not mass produce cars like American automobile companies (Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Stutabaker, and others). The average german worker could not afford cars, especially the expensive cars made by German manufactuers. There were also weaknesses in the German industrial economy, the need to import raw materials. The most notable being petroleum. Nor did Germany have anywhere near the capability to build aircraft that its poptential opponents have.

War Industry

The German war ecoinomy proved resiliant throughout most of the war, but finally began to collapse under the weight of the bombing and loss of occupied countries to plunder (November 1944)

Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign (1944-45)

Germany's industrial infrastructure was not just severely damaged by the Allied strategic bombing campaign, it was virtually obliterated. Most iof the industrialm plant was located in the large cities which is why the cities wee targeted by Allied bombers. Germany's industry was located in the cities, in part because the workers had to live near the factories. Cars in Germany, and the rest of Europe, were beyond worker's incomes. The damage in the cities, especially the large industrial cities, was devestating. During the battle of Britain, a German raid of medium bombers was notable. For the Allies by 1944, raids with 1,000 heavy bombers was not at all unusual. Most German cities were left vast mounds of rubble. The bombers primarily targeted industry and specialized targets like the synthetic fuel plants which were not located in the cities. World War II began at a time that that air force commanders had still not worked out how best to employ their assetts. The Germans worked out tactical methods. It took longer for bomber commanders to work out the best use of their assetts. Allied commsanders noy only grasped the Germam Achieles heel--petroleum, but had a huge bomber force to hit virtuslly any target in force. Thus the synthetic plants along with the transportation netweork became priority targets. Much of the destruction took place fairly late in the war, especially after the D-Day breakout when General Eisenhower relinquished control of the American and British bomber forces.

Transportaion System

The introduction of the long-range P-51 escorts not only allowed the Allies to escalate the bombing, but the fighters on the way home went down to the ground and began hitting smaller targets, especially the transportation network outside the cities. Transportation hubs in the cities were heavily bombed, incuding ril marshelling yards and docks. Remainuing merchant shipping in the Baltic were sunk, in many cases by Red Navy shipyards. The P-51s and other Allied aircraft went after smaller targets throughout the countryside. This included railways and bridges. The planes went after anything that moved ion the rails, destroying largev numbers of liovomotives and rollling tick. Barges in canals, of some importance in Germany, were also attacked.

Ground Fighting

Some damage was caused by the fighting as Allied ground forces closed in on the Reich. Except for Berlin, however, this was limited compared to the descrution resulting from the strategic bombing campign.

Nero Order / Nerobefehl (March 19, 1945)

Hitler at the end of the War ordered that the infrastructure that survived the bombing to be destroyed as the Allied forces entered the Reich, the same burnt earth strategy persued by the Soviets. It was issued as the Western Allies were crossing the Rhine and the Red Army began closing on Berlin. His armies shattered and German cities vast piles of rubble, even Hitler realised he had lost his War--although he blamed the failure on the German people rather than himself. Hitler order the Wehrmacht and NAZI authorities to destroy Germany's infrastructure so that there would be nothing left of value when the Allies occupied the defeated Reich March 19, 1945). The order has become known as The Nero Order after the Roman Emperor who was accused of burning Rome. Of course this meant that the German people would suffer even more, but Hitler's attitude was that the German people had failed him and did nor deserve to survive the War. The official order was titled 'Demolitions on Reich Territory' (Befehl betreffend Zerstörungsmaßnahmen im Reichsgebiet). Hitler explained the Order without admitting that the War was lost, " It is a mistake to think that transport and communication facilities, industrial establishments and supply depots, which have not been destroyed, or have only been temporarily put out of action, can be used again for our own ends when the lost territory has been recovered. The enemy will leave us nothing but scorched earth when he withdraws, without paying the slightest regard to the population." Fortunately for the German people, who were already living in the shambles of bombed out cities, one official, Armaments Minister Albert Speer, was apauled. He insuisted on being given full resposibility for carrying out the order, but actuall not only refused to execute the order, but actively intervened with Whermacht commanders who while willing to destroy cities in the East, were less disposed to do the same in the Reich. It was virtually suicidal to openly defy the Führer, but Speer began a series of delays and stalling tactics. Hitler was unaware of this for some time. Speer's enemies in the bunker reported this to Hitler. Speer flew into Berlin to see Hitler one last time (April 23). Hitler did not bring up the issue, but Speer thinking it might mean his arest and execution did bring it up. Hitler who had great affection for Speer apparebntly had lost interest in the issue. Speer writes, "During the last months I had hated him at times, fought him, lied to him, and deceived him, but at this moment I was confused and emotionally shaken. In this state, I confessed to him in a low voice, to my own surprise, that I had not carried out any demolitiions but had actually prevented them. For a moment his eyes filled with tears. But he did not react. Such questions, so important to him only a few weeks before, were now remote." [Speer, p.606.] He was clearly no longer concerned. is thoughts by this time were increasingly focused on his end and suicide.

NAZI Diehards

After the NAZI surrender, some NAZI diehards planned a campaign of sabatoge. This did not occur, but in fact there was not a lot left to sabotge.

Soviet Reparations

After the NAZI surreder (May 1945), the different occupation powers quickly assumed authority in their respective zones (by June 1945). The initial plan was for Allied and Soviet powers to adopt and pursue a common occupation policy, focused. Some policy goals were shared by Allies ans Soviets, such as denazification and demilitarization. The Allies and Soviets had, however, very different objectives. Allied policy as it developed was to prepare Germany to eventual joining Europe as a responsible, independent and democratic nation. Nothing could have been more different than Soviet (meaning Stalin's) objectives. The Allies were not in complete areement on occupation policies, but all three of the Allies were differed fundamentally with Soviert objectives. It did not take long for the idea of a unified occupation policy to collapse. The Soviets and Allies developed their own policies. Besides the political differences, one of the major differences was the issue of reparations. The Soviet Government persued a policy of reparations which included shipping whole factories to the Soviet Union. The NAZIs had devestated the western Soviet Union, Along with apauling attrocities, the NAZIs implemented a scorched earth policy, destroying factories, schools, hospitals, public buildings, as well as homes as they retreated west. The Soviets sought to use German factory equipment to help rebuild the Soviet economy. In the Soviet occupation zone, much of what survived the bombing, was loaded on rail cars and shipped east as war reparations. The Soviet zone was the least industrialized area of Germany and the reparations would contribute to East Germany's inability to compete with West Germany. The Western Allies decided against reparations, although France needed some persuading on this issue.

Food Situation after the War (1945-48)

The Germans even before launching the War began planning to destroy millions of people by starving them to death. And they did just that, although not nearly as many as they hoped to starve, primarily because the Whermacht failed to destroy the Red Army. At the end of the War, it was the Germans who were hungary. The food situation began to deteriorate in late-1944 before the NAZI collapse and end of the War. The Allies when occupying Germany did not not intentd to starve the German people. There was a wide spread conviction, however, that the German people should be made to experience the conditiions that they had imposed on the people they had occupied during the War. This was never entirly done in that the Allis did not seize the German food supply as the Germans had in occupied countries. The Allies fed the occupation forces with imported food shipped into Germany. The allies dud, however, refuse to supply food aid to the Germans. Extensive food aid went to the victims of German aggression, the countries Germany had invadeds and occupied and to Displaced Persons (DPs) in camps throughout Germany, but not to the German people. The United Srates even restricted the mailing of CARE packages to individual Germans. The United States did provide food to the women who began clearing up the piles of rubble that chocked German cities. This helped feed not only the women, but their children as well, but massive food aid to the Germans was prohibited. Along with the collapse of the German economy came the almost total disappearance of consunmer goods. And by far the most serious shorages were food. Germany before the War was not seld suffucent in food, after the War, the situation was far worse. It was not that German farnms were heavily damaged, but the War adversely affected farmers and food production in a varirty of ways. First, the agricultural labor force was substantially reduced. Many farmers and even more so their sons had been drafted. Many have been kulled or wounded in the fighting or held in POW camps. If in Soviet hands, it would be years bfore they would get back to Germany. Production had been maintained during the War by using POWs and foreign slave labor. With the eturn home of these men abd women, there was a severe shortage of farm labor. Second, the destruction of German industry meant that farm equioment was difficult to obtain. Third, workers without jobs did not have the money to buy food. And the situation was made worse by hyperinflation, especially beginning about December 1944. Fourth, while farms were not bady damaged, Germany's food processing industry was. The destruction of grain mills reduced Germany's ability to prcoess giaun harvests. The canning industry was also affected. The Allies did not target these industries, but much of these facities were located in the cities whuch were targeted. Fifth, gvernment price controls and an overvalue currency discouraged farmers from producung. Fifth, with the destruction of the transportation network, it was difficult to get food from the countryside into the cities. Most small towns and rural villages had not suffered much damage, the destruction of the transportation system, especially the rail system, left the countryside economically isolated from the cities. Even a year after the War, the rail system was still oerating far below pre-War levels. The barge and canal system was not as throughly destroyed as the rail system And if all of this was not bad enough, the weather affected harvests, especially the year after the War. Summer 1946 had been both hot and dry. Many farnmers experienced drought conditions and the result was an unusually poor harvest. Then suddenly the weather turned unusually cold (November 1946). Temperature sank and Germany experienced one of the most severe winters in living memory. The cold reached minus 30° Celsius. Record cold temperperatures persisted until Spring (March 1947). Rivers froze, including sections of the Rhine. This further restricted trasport of food and coal which had been disrupted by the destruction of the rail system. The result was the German Hunger winter. The Germans called it the 'Weisser Tod' (white death) and the 'Schwarzer Hunger' (black hunger). The situation was especially severe in the cities. People died from the cold and hunger, even thirst. Many perished because they lacked of strength to fight illness. Children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable.

German and Allied Economic Policies



Building from Scratch

As a result, Germany's industrial infrastructure would have to be essentially rebuilt from scratch. Most observers at the time thought that it would take more than a generation. What had not ben desttroyed was Germany's tremendous reservoir of industrial expertise and intelectyal talent. In the end this proved more important than the destroyed factories. And Gernmany in just a few years as the German Economic Miracle took hold found it had the most modern industril base in the world.

Sources

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich (Avon, New York, 1970), 734p.





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Created: 10:32 PM 1/31/2013
Last updated: 6:02 PM 11/2/2019