*** World War II air campaign -- Battle of Britain the Blitz London








World War II Air Campaign: Battle of Britain--the Daylight Blitz on London (September 1940-October 1940)


Figure 1.--After day raids became too costly, the Luftwaffe began night raids on London. Here in September 1940 children return from the bomb shelter in the morning to find their home in ruins. A caption probably written by an American descibes the location as 'eastern suburb of London', probably meaning the battered East End. Source: National Archives 306-NT-3163V.

At the time of World War II, modern air doctrine had not been worked out. The Germans believed that no country could withstand aerial bombarment and they had the Luftwaff, the most powerful air force in the world. And this fit perfectly withB Hitler abnd Göring mindset. Apply brute force and distruction to any country That resisted them. And it seenmed to work. The Czechs decided to accept the Munich Diktat rather than have Prague destroyed (September 1938).. Poland put up a valiant fight, but eventually surrendred with Warsaw reduced to rubble (September 1939). The Dutch surrendred after Rotterdam was bombed, unwlling to see their other Dutch cities destroyed (May 15, 1940). The French withdrew from Paris (June 14), unwilling to see their beautiful cuty destroyed. Within daus they had surrebdered to the Germans (June 22). Thus Hitler and Göring elieved thar bombing would force the British to make peace. Hitler for klargely racial reasons wanted the Britih as an ally. Göring believed that the RAF had been virtually destroyed and that the air battle was won and virtually over. The Lufwaffe command was not at all comvinced, but dutifully implement Hitler's instructions. The initial air battle was aimed at desroying the Rioyal Air Force. After concluding that the RAF was no longer and that bombing London wouls end the War. The Germans and British had targeted cities, but not London and Berlin. London became the German's primary target. The Luftwaffe staged the first big attack on London (September 7). The attacking Luftwaffe force included 300 bombers and 600 escorts. This was the beginning of what the British called the Blitz. The RAF was unprepared for the change in target, presuming RAF airdield weere still the orimary Herman target. Thus most of the attacking force reached London. The target was the London docks, but the surronding residential area was also heavily hit. he London docks had been built with homes nearby to make it easy for workers to get to war. London's East End burned. American Ambassador Kennedy sent a diplomatic dipsatch to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, "There's hell to pay here tonight." [J.P. Kennedy, September 6.] Both Hitler and Goering believed that this show of force would quickly break the will of the British to resist. Few East Enders had homes with cellars and there were no shelters for huge numbers of persons. Finally the Tube stations were opened up for people. The followup day a smaller attack on September 8 hit electrical power plants and railway stations. What was to follow was 65 days if incessent bombing. Ambassador Kennedy wrote is wife, "The last three nights have been simply hell. Last night I put on my steel helmet and went up on the roof of the Chancery and stayed up there until two o'clock in the morning watching the Germans come over in relsays every ten minutes and drop bombs, setting terrific fires. You could see the dome of St. Paul's silhoutted against a blazing inferno that the Germans kept adding to from time to time by flying over and dropping more bombs." [J.P. Kennedy, September 10.] The Germans were pleased to see London burning. Hoebbels put it on the front page of German newspaoers. It was in fact a huge mistake. The Luftwaffe was making headway in desroying the RAF. The were military targets in London, but much of the bombing simply destroyed British houses--hardly a priority military target. This gave RAF Fighter Command the iopoportunity to recover from the pasting they had been taking. And attacking London made the GFerman formations more vulnerable because of the limited range of their Me-109 escorts.

Air Doctrine

At the time of World War II, modern air doctrine had not been worked out. Bombers were developed in World War I, first by the Germans. The War ended, however, before major bombing campaigns were launched. The Allies were planning a strategic boming camopaign in 1919, but the Germans asked for an arn=mistice (Novenber 1918). The Germans believed that no country could withstand aerial bombarment and they had the Luftwaff, the most powerful air force in the world. And this fit perfectly with Hitler's and Göring's mindset -- apply brute force and distruction to any country that resisted them. Thic and other Axis policies is why, unlike World War I, most of the casualties of the war weere civilsns. And it seenmed to work. The Czechs decided to accept the Munich Diktat rather than have Prague destroyed (September 1938).. Poland put up a valiant fight, but eventually surrendred with Warsaw reduced to rubble (September 1939). The Dutch surrendred after Rotterdam was bombed, unwlling to see their other Dutch cities destroyed (May 15, 1940). The French withdrew from Paris (June 14), unwilling to see their beautiful cuty destroyed. Within days they surrendered to the Germans (June 22). Thus Hitler and Göring confluded that bombing would force the British to make peace.

Hitler and the British

Hitler for largely racial reasons admired the British and wanted the Britih as an ally. This is not to say he wanted to share power wityh them. He sais that he wanted to leave ritain its empire in excahnge for a free hand in Europe. This of course was nonsence. He waned to make the decisions. And witha Europe cintrolled by Hitler, there would be no security for Britain. He could not understand why after the fall of France, Britain would not make peace. Of course, the Britush had tried to make peace . Prime-Miister Chasmberlains effort at the Muich Conference (September 1938). Hamberlain had thjought he had made 'Peace in Our Time'. Hitler 6 months later tore up the Agreement and invasded what was left of Czechoslovakia. Making peace with such a man of course made no sence. It is curious why Hitler did not undrtstasnd why the British would not make peace. At any rate, this is why when Prime-Minister Churchill refused to make peace. Hitler with the Panzers stopped at the Channel only weeks after the French surrender launched the Battle of Britain with the Channel Kampf (July 1940). The Lufwaffe then began an assault on the RAF (August). This went far slower than expected. Reichmarshal Hermann Göring launcvhed Adlertag aand boastred of victory within days. This did not occur. Ad when the Germans accidentally bombed London and the British responded by bombing Berlin, an enraged Hitler gave new orders -- a masive bombing campaign focused if not fixated on London.

German Assessment

Göring believed that the RAF had been virtually destroyed and that the air battle was won and virtually over. The Lufwaffe command was not at all comvinced, but dutifully implement Hitler's instructions. The initial air battle was aimed at desroying the Royal Air Force. After concluding that the RAF was no longer and that bombing London would end the War. The Germans and British had targeted cities, but not London and Berlin. London became the German's primary target.

London

London was not just any city. It was the capital of an empire that governed about a quater of the world an spanned the globe. It was a major financial center and also a city that played an important role in art, fashion, science, and industry. NAZI triumphs had until June had been relatively small coyntries and cities unfamilar to most Americans. This changed with German troops marched down the Champs-Elysée and Hitler danced in front of the Eifel Tower (June 1940). Paris was an iconic city. Americans were shocked, even isolationists in Congress and American attitudes and policies began to change. London was also an iconic city. The British spoke English and had connections with America beyond any other city. Whether they thought it through or not, most Americans instinctively knew that if London could be bombed, the same kind of brutality could be visited on New York and other American cities. Radio would bring the brutality of the NAZI attacks into American homes night after night. The impact was incalcuable. While not obvious at the time, it was ikn those same American living rooms that Britain's future would be decided. London was not only an iconic city--it was also very large, one of the largest city of the world, in both population and area. London did not have skyscrapers like New York. Instead of up, London grew out. The size of the city made it a very diffivult target for the Luftwaffe. It meant that a very large area would have to be bombed. And the Luftwffe would have to do it with medium bombers--meaning bombers swith relatively small payloads. And London was not a Channel port or RAF fields in Kent. This meant that the bombers had longer to go and the fighters would have a relatively short time over London before they would begin to run short of fuel. There were some stratehic targets in London such as the docks. But more than anyrging London was a city of homes without major industrial plants. Thus Hitler had essentially committed a valuable military assett (the Luftwaffe) to destroy London homes--an assett of little strategic importance.

London Day Light Blitz (Sptember 7)

The Luftwaffe staged the first big attack on London (September 7). The attacking Luftwaffe force included 300 bombers and 600 escorts. It was the beginning of what the British called The Blitz. The RAF was unprepared for the change in target, presuming RAF airfields were still the primary German target. The Britisg Chain Home Network looked outward and thus did not register the German change of direction. Thus most of the attacking force reached London. The target was the London docks, but the surronding residential area was also heavily hit. he London docks had been built with homes nearby to make it easy for workers to get to war. London's East End burned. American Ambassador Kennedy sent a diplomatic dipsatch to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, "There's hell to pay here tonight." [J.P. Kennedy, September 6.] Both Hitler and Goering believed that this show of force would quickly break the will of the British to resist. Few East Enders had homes with cellars and there were no shelters for huge numbers of persons. Finally the Tube stations were opened up for people. The followup day a smaller attack on September 8 hit electrical power plants and railway stations. What was to follow was 65 days if incessent bombing. Ambassador Kennedy wrote is wife, "The last three nights have been simply hell. Last night I put on my steel helmet and went up on the roof of the Chancery and stayed up there until two o'clock in the morning watching the Germans come over in relsays every ten minutes and drop bombs, setting terrific fires. You could see the dome of St. Paul's silhoutted against a blaxzing inferno that the Germans kept adding to from time to time by flying over and dropping more bombs." [J.P. Kennedy, September 10.] And all of this would be brought into Anerican living rooms by CBS radio corresondent Edeard R. Murrow. [Murrow] The impact of his broadcasting can not be overestimated in the grady=ual turning of American public opinion.

Importance

The Germans were pleased to see London burning. Propaganda Minister Goebbels put the image of St Paul's engulfed in fire and smoke on the front page of German newspapers. One wonders how many Germans thought at this stage of the posibilty that British bombers might do this to German cities. Reichmarshall Göring assured the German people it would never happen. That aside, itwas in fact a huge mistake. The Luftwaffe was making headway in severely damaging the RAF. The were military targets in London, but much of the bombing simply destroyed British houses--hardly a priority military target and as it proved out, not a way to win a war against a now determined and well-armed foe. It suited Hitler's murderous mindset, but not the German war effort. Göring for his part was primarily concerned with is relationship with Hitler. He knew how to please Hitler and flattening London was what Hitler wanted. He was furious that the British were not only resisting him, but dared to bomb Berlin. The change of targeting gave RAF Fighter Command the opoportunity to recover from the pasting they had been taking. And attacking London made the German formations more vulnerable because of the limited range of their Me-109 escorts. Atacking further north also meant that the German formations were now within range of 12 Group's Big Wing. The Result was what is now known as Battle of Britain Day (September 15).

Climax (September 15)

The Luftwaffe launched its largest and most concentrated attack on London (September 15). The change in Luftwaffe strategy at first caught the RAF off guard (September 7). The British quickly adjusted for the defense of London. In contrast to other Luftwaffe terror attacks, London was not an unprotected target. The climax of the Battle of Britain came appropriately in the skies over London on a Sunday (September 15). The massive Luftwaffe attacks were meant to settle the Luftwaffe's daylight campaign. Göring based on Luftwaffe intelligen assessment was confident of victory. he Lufwaffe launched its largest and most concentrated attack on London in the hope of both destroying the spirit of the now battle hardened citizery and to draw up what was left of Fighrer Command so the coup de grace could be delivered in a battle of annialtion. The main target was the London docks again. This would be the same tactic that American fighters would use to destroy the Luftwaffe (early-1944). The outcome over London was very different. Some 1,500 aircraft took part in the air battles that took place over London and southeast England and would continue until dusk. [Bungay, p.319.] The Luftwaffe bomber pilots had been told that Fighter Command was down to its last remnants of a defeated force--less than 200 opeational fighters. Fighter Command had 650 front-line fighters. The Germans were horrified to find RAF Fighter Command intercepting them in large numbers and because they were attacking London, the fighters with a more limited range, could not give them much protection. The longer flight times to London meant that Luftwaffe fighters had little fuel with which to engage the RAF fighters. 11 Group committed all of its squadrons. Prime-Minister Churchill who was at Fighter Command Headquarters with 11 Group commander Keith Park asked "Where are the reserves?" He was told, "Sir, there are none." The attacks on London rather than the forward RAF air fields in Kent and along the coast brought the Luftwaffe bombers in range of 12 Group's and Lee Malory Big Wing which had not been weakened by previous Luftwaffe attacks. By attacking London, Lee Malory had time to form 12 Group's Big Wing, bringing more fighrers into the fight over London. Many German bomber formations had been broken up and savaged by RAF fighters. Some German formations dropped their bombs before getting to London and turned back. Some bombers got theough and encountered swarms of RAF fighters. Helping Londoners was a cloudy sky making it difficult to target the city. Thus the damage on London was minimal. In the aftermath of the raid, Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion. Having been defeated in daylight, the Luftwaffe turned its attention to The Blitz night campaign which lasted until May 1941. [Murray, p. 54.] The result was the climatic day with huge German losses. RAF fighters destroyed almost one quarter (57) of the attacking German bomber force and more were badly damaged. Londoners observed the desperate fight in the sky over the city. Previously, the fight had beenn primarily to the southeast of the city over Kent ans Sussex where the Fighter Command 11 Groupn air fields were located. The Battle of Britain would shift from a daylight campain targeting RAF Fighter Command into a nighttime campaign targeting British cities and civilians. This meant that a NAZI invasion was no longer eminent. With the Royal Navy in the Channel and the RAF in tact, Operation Sea Lion was no longer possible. Hitler fid not formally postpone Operation Sea Lion until the following month (October 12). September 15 is today celebrated as Battle of Britain Day--the annual commemoration of the Battle of Britain.

Hitler Postpones Operation Sea Lion (September 17)

Göring wanted to continue the fight and that Operation Sea Lion was still possible. He did not want to admit thatr after Dunkirk, his Lufwaffe had failed again. Hitler understood the battle was lost. He met with Göring and Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (September 17). Based on his own information and what they told him, it was clear that the Luftwaffe had failed and control of the air had not been achieved, meaning that an invasion was not viable. Hitler ordered the invasionn be postponed and the dispersal of the invasion fleet which was being attacked by the RAF. [Wright, p. 32.] Hitler postponed, but did not cancel Sea Lion. His intent was to return to deal with Britain after he conquered the Soviet Union. Of course, this not come to pass, although the V-Weapons gave him anoyher chance to batter London. .

Casualties and Accomlishments

In purely military terms, the Battle of Britain was more of a blow to the Germans than commonly understood. Perhaps most importantly is thst Hitler experienced his first defeat abd the War was not going to be the short one he was seeking. And the World War I-like war of attrition that Germany was not going to win was shaping up. The most obvious accomlishment of the Germns was killing 40,000 civilians and destroying or damaging 2 million homes. The losses were tragic, but wars are not won by killing civilians and destroying homes. The German bombing did not significantly impact the British war economy which would soon be bolstrered by Anerican Lend-Lease. In exchange for dubious success in killing civilians, the Luftwaffe was seriously danaged. During the initial phase of the battle (July-October 1940). The aircraft losses were relatively comparvle--nearly 2,000 German planes as opposed to nearly 1,750 British planes. Planes could be replaced and by the time of the battle, the Brits were out producing the Germans. And the American Arsenal of Democracy was just gearing up. Air crews were a very different matter. Nearly 2,600 German air crews were killed. Compared to only about 550 British air crews. The primary reason for this disparity was that the German attacking force was primarily multi-crewed bombers, which the defendung British aircradt were singke seated fighters. Even so, the Germans lost a substabtial portion of their nest trained and experienced air crews. But for the Germans the numberrs were even worse. As the War was fought over Britain, some 925 German air crews were captured and 735 seriously wounded. British flyers shot down unless serious wounded, were within days back into the fight. Sone 420 British flyers were wounded. The importance of all of this was the impact on the decisive campaign of the War--the Ostkrieg. At the outset of Barbarossa, the Germans had the most powerful invasion force ever assembled. Some 3 million men and far more and better tanks and artillery than ever before, in part because of the vast resources the Soviets were providing their NAZI ally as part of their evil alliance (1939-41). The exception to this was the Luftwaffe. This was important because the most important assett the Germans had in their stunning victories was the Lufwaffe. The Germans had managed to replace (but not increased) the number of planes. The experienced aircrews lost were not so easily replaced. The result was that the Ostheer moving east had far less air support than any of the previous German campaigns. In contrast, the RAF had more and better planes than before the battle. And never again would the British be so pressed for trained aircrews, this would become the Luftwaffe's major problem.

Continuing Fixation

He still had, however, a huge victiorious, and very expensive army, parked at the Channel with nothing to do. He began to turnn his attentio tohis major objective -- the destruction of the Soviet Union snd the murder of European Jews. These became his primary obsession. It should not be thought that he gave up on Sea Lion. He decided that only hope of Soviet intervention was keeping Britain in the War. So the destruction of the Soviet Union and Red Army, would force Britain to make peace. Actually, he was right about that. The conquest of the Soviet Union would have left the British position untennable and any D-Day impossible. But he was wrong that all he had to do was "kick in the dorr and the Bolshevik regime would fall like a house of cards"--very wrong. So he changed his mind about a cardinal belief--that the Kaiser's great mistake in World War II was a debilitating two-front war. So he commited the NAZI regime to another two-front war. Preparations began (October 1940). The Ostkrieg would gain Germany Lebensraum, all the resources needed to wage war (especially oil), and more Jews to kill. The British had defied him, and he wanted revenge. But in the fighting to come, he never gave up on his desire to destroy London. The Bedecker Raids, and the V-weaons were all aimed primarily at London. The principal reason Hitler authorized the enormous resources for the V-weapon programs was that they enabled him to strike London. Notice that the V-1s were not aimed ast the Chasnnel ports wherecthey might have affected the flow of supplirs to the Normsndy neachhead, but at London where they miostly destoyed houses, having no impact in the War.

Shift to Night Raids and Provincial Cities

The critical phase of the Luftwaffe onslaught ended in September. This led to the fourth andc final phase of the Battle of Britain. The Lutwaffe eventually was forced to shift to nightime raids. Night bombing made it impossible to hit actually military and industrail targets, only cities could be targetted. Hitler was still not convinced that the bombing would not force the British sue for terms. "He told an Italian visitor pn October 14, 1940, "Let's wait and see what London looks like 2 or 3 months from now. If I cannot invade them, at least I can destroy the whole of their industry. [Gilbert, p. 345.] Hitler was always anxious to teach his enemies a lesson. A British air raid on Munich on the night of the aniversary celebration for his abortive beer hall putch enfuruated him. Retribution was a night strike on Conventry with 500 bombers (November 14). The target was the factories around Coventry. The raid was one of the most notorious and significant of the War. The raid did extensive damage to war plants, but the center of the gistoric old city had been destroyed. Estimates suggest that 60,000 of the 75,000 buildings in the city center were killed. The Germans began using a new word--" Koventrieren " meaning to Civentrate or totaly demolish. It was a word they would soon need. There were 564 people killed at Cobentry, high for the time, but modest given the damage. So many fires were created that a "fire storm" was created. Air Marshall Harris, not yet assigned to Bomber Command later expalain that the raid taught RAF planners the starting "so many fires at the same time". [Gilbert, p. 352.] In 1940 it was British cities that were burning, but that would soon change. German cities like Hamburg and Dresden would feel the consequences ofvthe lesson taught by the Luftwaffe. In those two cuties alone over 100,000, most inocent civiluans, would pay the consequences of Hitler's punishment raids. There were major attacks on British cities throughout 1941. Here the major goal was to devestate British cities. It was not just London. Every important British city was targeted. The center of Conventry was destroyed in a night. About 100 acres of the city center were destroyed, including the rnowned cathedral. Bristol was especially heavily damaged. The fourth phase lasted for several months. It was conducted at night.

Impact

We note a modern tendency to marginalize the Battle of Britain. In fact, it was a major turning point of the War. Hitler in fact was playing a weak hand. His only chance of success, like the Kaiser before him was an early victory before the war turned unto a brutal sar of attition that the Germans were unlikely to win. And the Battle of Britain was the furst time Hitler was stopped. Not only was he stopped, but it convinced him that he need to go ahead with hus primary gial--invading the Soviet Union. It also cinvined President Roosevelt that Britain was not defeated and he began a seies of actions leading to Lend-Lease, essentially wetiting Britain a blank check. Thus essentuially guaranted Britain's survival and the War in the West. The Russians today believe that they singled habndely defeated NAZUI Germany abnd the War in the West was a side show. And they point out asccurately that German MANPOWER was primarily deployed in the Ostkrieg--something like 80 percent. But that any competent military historian will tell you, manpower is only one part of military power. A very important part, but only one. And incredably, while German men were primarily in the East, the German WAR ECONOMY was primarily focused on the War in the West. This mismatch was a major factor in the failure of the Deutsche Ostheer. The primary reason thastb it was so poorly supplied and supported. The Ostheer that Hitler mobilized was largel unmotorized infantry moving East on foot with horse-drawn carts. There were powerful highly obile Panzer Division, but this was a small part of the Ostheer. Something like 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmobilized infantry. And invading the vast Soviet Union on foot with a limited logistical capability was hardly a war-winning move.

War Leadership

One continuing debate in World War II historiography is comparing the war leadership of the major war leaders, Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Prime Ministrer Winston Churchill played a very active role in the direction of the War constasntly frustrating his military advisers, especially Field Marshall Brooke. He never, however, went against the advise of the War Cabinet. German Führer Adolf Hitler had the weakest hand and played it brillantly accurately assessing Allied commitment to appeasement. This changed with the fall of France. He then made serious mistakes, although he was boxed into a situationn of his own making. Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin made huge mistakes resulting in catrostrophic losses, especially his assessment that Hitler was not going to invade and supressing reports of such preparations as British disinformation. Of all the major World War II leader, American President Franklin Roosevelt interfeared in military matters the least. But when he did he was invarably correct. Suppotng Britain to the hilt was one of those decisions. Gen. Marshall who wanted the limited rmaments production for the American military advised against it. British success in the Battle of Britain, especially the Blitz helped strenghen Roosevelt's hand with the military. Before the Basttle iof Britain Roosevelt himself was unsure Britasin could hold out. He sent Harryb Hopkins, his closest adviser, to Britain in the middle of the Blitz to assess Britain's determination to resist the NAZIs. Edward's Murrow's reporting during the Blitz was a factior in changing American public opinion, also aided the Presidentin his commitment to aiding Britain leading to the all important Anglo-American Alliance.

Sources

Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000)

Gilbert, Martin. A History of the Twentieth Century Vol. 2 1933-54 (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1998), 1050p.

Kennedy, Joseph P. Sr. "Diplomatic Dispatch, September 6, 1940. In Amanda Smith, ed. Hostage to Fortune (Viking: 2001), 764p. I believe Kenndy may have been using Zuku or Washington, D.C. time and the message was sent September 7 in London.

Kennedy, Joseph P. Sr. "Letter to Rose Kennedy, September 10, 1940. In Amanda Smith, ed. Hostage to Fortune (Viking: 2001), 764p.

Murray, Willamson (1983). Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1935–1945 (Princeton, New Jersey: University Press of the Pacific, 1983).

Murrow, Edward R. This Is London.

Wright, Gordon (1968). The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945 (New York: Harper & Row.)






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Created: June 11, 2003
Last updated: 6:29 PM 10/9/2022