*** Allied Around the Clock bombing campaign 1943








Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign (1943)


Figure 1.--The War turned disatorously against Germany (late-1942. The British struck at El lamein. An Anglo-American force landed in North Africa. And the Red Army cut off The Sixth Army in Stalingrad. The surviving Germans surrendered in Stalingrad (January 1943). And President Roosevelt and Primemiister Churchill at Casablanca announced the around-the-clock strategic bombing of the Reich. Until 1943 most of the death and destruction of World War II had occurred in the countries Germany invaded. The strategic-bombing campaign in 1943 finally brought the War home to the German people. One of the many targets was Kassel. The primary targets in Kassel were the Fieseler air craft plant and the Hendchel works. The RAF bombing at night at first had trouble finding Kassel, but when it finally succeeded, it struck Kassel with a vengence (October 23-24, 1943). When the people of Kassel emerged from the bomb shelters, their city had been largely destroyed. About 10,000 people were killed and half the city made homeless. Scenes like this occurred throughout Germany, although the effective Luftwaffe defenses exacted a terrible toll on Allied airmen. The Germans were able to maintain, but not increase, war production. But the Luftwaffe also suffered losses and in December 1943 with the appearamce of P-51 long range escorts those losses began to increase substantially.

There was agreement on the major targets: 1) the Ruhr in western Germany, 2) major cities in the interior of Germany, and finally 3) Nerlin. [Rumpf, p. 61.] Bombing campaigns on these targets unfolded as 1943 progressed. Operations were not limited to these targets. There were strikes at Norwegian targets and German coastal cities, especially those with shipyards building U-boats. The devestasting raid on Hamburg shocked the Germans. Hitler refused to give civil defense a priority, but the Luftwaffe developed more effective fighter tactics. The Americans also targeted Ploesti in the first attempts to concentrated on Germany's petroleum supply. Allied air crews sustanined terrible casualties. It soon became apparent that the American bombers could not fight through fighter defenses without unacceotable losses. The 8th Air Force suffered appauling casualties in attacks on Schweinfurt and other interior cities. Fighter escorts were needed. In addition, the Luftwaffe developed increasingly effective night fighting techniques and equipment. A British attack on Peenem�nde sets back the German production of V weapons. The ballance of power in the skies over Germany only began to change at the end of the year when fighter escorts finally began to be deployed. G�ring assured Hitler that this was not feasible. The Allied escorts were still limited during 1943, but this was to change in 1944. The British ipened the campaign against Berlin in laste 1943, but the target proved difficult for Bomber Command. Berlin unlike many other German cities would not burn.

Wilhelmshaven (January 27, 1943)

Some of the bomber crews on the morning of January 27 sensed something big was up--they got real eggs for breakfast. The briefer spoke emphatically, "Gentleman, today the target is Germany." After a 1 year build up and small raids on German targets in occupied Netherlands, Belgium, and France, the Americans were going to hit Germany for the first time. The Americans opened their full-scale daylight bombing campaign on January 27, 1943 with an attack on Wilhelmshaven. This North Sea port was not far into Germany, but it was in Germany. It was chosen because its shipyards were building U-boats. The Battle of the Atlantic was reaching its climax in early 1943 and U-boat Wolf Packs were reaking havoc with Allied shipping. Thus U-boat facilities and shipyards were prime targets. The American force consisted of 91 B-17s and B-24s. Only 53 actually bpmbed the target, but cloudy skies impaied bmbing. They were met by Luftwaffe fighters which shot down 3 bombers. The Americans returned February 26, this time shooting down 7 bombers. Reporters were taken aboard the bombers for the first time. One of those was Walter Cronkite.

The Battle of the Ruhr (February 5-June 29)

Berlin was the capital, but the industrial heartland of Germany at center of war production was the Ruhr. The Ruhr River meets the Rhine at Duisburg. Wedged between the Ruhr and the Rhine is the Ruhr District. This is the most intensly industrialized area in Europe and was the most significant German industrial area supporting the NAZI war effort. Antracite coal mines there supported the German steel industry and other industrical sucgh as the chemical industry. It is an area of almost continuous urbanization, including Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, and Gelsen-kircgen. As such it was a prime target for Allied air bombers. The British had targeted Essen and other Ruhr targets in 1942 without much success. The Ruhr was assugned a high priority by the Allies for 1943. The Germans recognizing the importance of the Ruhr strenghtened the air defence. Other than Berlin and Ploesti, the Ruhr was the most heavily defended target in Europe. A British observer wites, The towns of the Ruhr "are literally fortresses. .... The bomber crews who venture near themgo into the jaws of death." Spaight, pp. 80-83.] The Ruhr city most heavily targeted was Essen. The Ruhr raids were conducted primarily by the British who sustained substantial casualties. Bomber Command losses in April alone include 200 heavy bombers and 1,500 air crew. The cities of the Ruhr were heavily hit with city centers burned out, but the British did not suceed in reducing production. Production steadily climbed even while the cities of the Ruhr were being reduced to ruins. [Rumpf, p. 63.] The production increases were in part because of German steps to improve industrial efficency. It is not clear what production would have been without the bombing. Bomber Command by June began to spread out their attacks away from the Ruhr, in part because they concluded that focusing on the Ruhr had enabled the Luftwaffe to effectively concentrate it fighter defenses.

Essen (March 5, 1943)

Bomber Command during early 1943 repeatedly hit the U-boat facilities in France with limited results against the hardened sites. British aircracft plants were providing Bomber Command with an increasing number of the heavy Lancasters that Harris so admired. Bomber Command launched 367 bombers against Essen a major industrial cuity in the Ruhr Valley. It was a city that had been on Bomber Command's target list for a long time. Bomber Command raids during 1942 had repeatedly attacked Essen with very limited results. Many bombers even failed to find he city. The RAF had lost 201 bombers in attacks on Essen because of the dense Flak batteries and fighter protection. The British had worked on the problem of finding targets. For the attack on Essen a Pathfinder group was employed. This consisted of a force of fast DeHavillamd Mosquitos followed by a lead group of heavies. Using Oboe (a target finding device operating off of signals from Britain), the pathfinders marked the city for the main force. The result was that 600 acres of the city were virtually obliterated. This was followed by four more RAF raids which also found the city. A high priority target was the Krupp steel complex in Essen. When the patriarch of the family, Gustav Krupp surveyed the damage he had a stroke from which he never recovered. The attack on Essen signaled the begnning of a concentrated British campaign against the Ruhr.

Vegasack (March 18, 1943)

One of the most successful American raids on Germany during the early phase of the campaign was the attack on Vegasack (March 18). Vegesack was a port with important shipyards building U-boats, still a priority target. The Americans attacked with 97 bombers. The results were impressive, the bombers damaged 7 U-boats and destroyed two-thirds of the shipyard. The results were attributed to General Le May's tactics and a new device--the AFCE. This put control of the plane in the hands of the bombider when the plane made the final run on the target.

Bremen (April 1943)

A force of 115 B-17s hit Bremen. This was an unusually large American force at this stage of the war. The target was a aircraft factory. Flak and Luftwaffe fighters shot down 16 bombers--a huge loss for the still relatively small 8th Air Force.

Ruhr Dams (May 16, 1943)

One of the most celebrated Bomber Command operations was the celebrated attacks on the Ruhr Dams (Eder, M�hne, an Sorpe). Air Ministry planners concluded that destroyng these dams would deny water and electricity to Ruhr industrial plants. Harris objected but was contermanded. Dams might seem an easy target to a layman, but actually are a very difficult target to conventional bombers. Strikes to the top of a dam can be easily repired. To destroy a dam, it needs to be hit well below the surface and the explosion has to take place very close to the dam. This makes it a very difficult undertaking. An imaginative aeronautical engineer< bares Wallis, worked out how it could be done, by low altitude skip bombing with barrel-shaped bombs. The attack involved flying Lancasters only 60 feet off the water on the bomb run--a remarable feet of flying. After the Essen raid (May 1942), a group of habnd picked crews were trained under Eing Commander Gut Gibson. The group of 19 Lancasters left England on a specially chosen niight with clear skies anf good moon light (May 16). Gibson's group brreached the M�hne after repeated passes. Gibson's group than hit and breached the Eder. He and his crew watched in amazement as the torrent of water released put out lights. The Sorpe was also hit, but not breached. The cost was high. Gibson lost 8 of his 19 Lancasters. The results were disappointing. Speer after the War estimated that if the Sorpe had been breached the damage would have been much more extensive. Work crews were mobilized to repair the damage including 7,000 workers from the atlantic wall. The Germans in the end repaired the damage within 3 months.

The Ruhr (May 16-17, 1943)

Bomber Cpmmand continued to focus on the industrial center of Germany--The Ruhr. Attacks on the Ruhr, especially Essen had proved very costly to Bomber Command in 1942. New tactics and equipment finally enabled Bonber Command to strike Essen in force. It was the first really successful attack on Ruhr cities. The RAF on May 16-17 began targeting other German industry in the Ruhr in force. The Ruhr campaign would prove costly to both the British and the Germans. Bomber Command would lose 872 planes and 5,000 crewmen during the Ruhr campaign. For Germany, the cost was much greater. The hearts of several Ruhr cities were burned out and left piles of rubble.

Saint-Nazaire, France (June 1944)

The Allies also continued to hit German targets in the occupied countries. The growing strength of the 8th Air Force was permitting increasing large bomber forces for stikes both in Germany and the occupied countries. U-boat facilities were still a priority target. The Americans sent a force of 191 bombers to attack the U-boat pens at Saint-Nazaire, France. This was a heavily defended target. To confuse the Luftwaffe, a diversionary force of 50 bombers was assigned a Luftwaffe base near Brussels. Crews attacking targets in occupied countries were under orders to take much greater care to avoid civilian casualties then crews attacking targets in Germany. Crews attacking German targets in the occupied countries would often fly over major cities because the Germans rarely deployed significant Flak batteries to defend occupied cities. On the boming run at the Luftwaffe base the lead plane accidentally dropped its bombs over the city and the rest of the formation followed his lead. The bombs tore a huge swath of destruction through a park and residential area. The unit was devestated at the tragic accident. Later it was learned that German troops had been billited in the park and Germans were billited in the houses by the park. The raid resulted in 1,200 German caualties and only a few Belgian civilians. The Belgian resistance and German authorities considered it to be a success of Ameican percission bombing.

Cologne (June-July, 1943)

Cologne was an industrial city on the east bank of the Rhine;and. Located in the west, it was one of the most vulnerable German cities. The Germans report 262 air raids oe of the most frquently bombed cities of the War. These were almot all British RAF night raids. Some 35,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the city. Air raid alarms sounded early in the War as British bombers passed overhead (winter srring 1939-40). The first bombs were dropped (May 12, 1940). The most destructive raid was the RAF's first 1,000 bomber raid (May 30-31, 1942). Cologne was not Harris's first choice for his firrst 1,000 bomber raid--Operation Milinneium. He wanted it to be Hamburg. Adverse weather conditions made Hamburg a bad choice. Dr. Basil Dickins, head of RAF's Bomber Command's Operations research, advised Harris to select Cologne, which was within GEE range. This was the first time Harris used the RAF 'bomber stream' tactic. The tactics used for this attack on Cologne remained the standard Bomber Command operations for the next 2 years. Harris was disappointed with the results. One report indicated, "Instead of falling prey to the hysteria expected of them, the citizens of Cologne displayed the same sort of stoicism that so many British civilians had shown in the earlier blitz of London and other cities.Within two weeks of the May 30 bombardment, life in Cologne was functioning almost normally, though the population had been reduced considerably by the evacuation of many young and old people to less vulnerable areas." [Tetheway] The RAF retuned again in 1943 with several big raids. This included 212 bombers (June 17-18), 608 bombers (June 28-29), 653 bombers (July 3-4), and 288 bombrs (July 8-9, 1943). It was in July that the new Jagdgeschwader 300 used the Wilde Sau tactic in single engined fighters for the first time.

German Night Fighters

The Luftwaffe through 1942 was not very sucessful at interdicting British bombers at night. Until 1943 Bomber Command did not have an adequate firce of Lancs to really hammer German cities. By 1943 Bomber Command had the force needed and the results were devestaing. The Germans redoubled their efforts at night tome interduction. The Germans put a great deal of effort into developing the tactics and equipment, especially radar for the aircraft, that would enable them to find the British bomber streams at might. The British night raid on Cologne was opposed by a New Luftwaffe night-fighting group, the Wilde Saurs (Wild Boars). A variety of planes were used as night fighter, actually interceptors. They included the Messerschmitt Bf-110G, the Junker Ju-88G6, the Dornier Do-217J and the Heinkel He-219A Uhu (Owl). The Me/Bf-110 was a disappointment as a fighter, but as an interceptor not being exposed to Allied fighters, in prived an excellebt platform. Towards the end of the war, a night fighting version of the Me-262 was used. The night interceptors and new tactcs performed well and the Lufwaffe began expanded the program. The Germans would eventually suceeded in takin out about 10 percent of Bomber Command streams. This would be the situation until thevarrival of the P-51 Mustang (December 1943). In the following months he Luftwaffe was largely desstroyed as an effective force. This ooened the way into the heart of Germany for both the British and american bombers, although the final assault had to awit the D-Day landings. after Eisenhower obtaind control over both Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force to preoare for the landings and breakout.

Hamburg (July 24-August 2, 1943)

Hamburg on the Elbe is Germany's most important port and second largest city. At the time of World War II it was a city of 1.5 million people. Harris sr out to uterly destroy the city. His plan was named Operation Gomorrah--revealing the British mindset at the time. The plan called for a 10-day bombing campaign. For the first time Americans and British formations would coordinate operations and pursue around-the-clock bombing on the same target. Bomber Command at this stage of the War has a daily operational strength of over 600 bombers and the 8th Air Force had expanded to about 300 bombers. The Allies now had the massive force needed for needed for devestating raids and the numbers of bombers were growing steadily. Bomber Command employed two new devices. The H2S scanning radar would help locate the city and Window (bundles of aluminum foil) would be used to confuse the German defenses. Window had been used for sometime, but the growing effectiveness of German night fighters now equipped with airborn radar prompted Churchill to approve its use on the Hamburg raids. The first RAF bomber stream of 740 planes crossed the Channel (July 24). Dropping Window confused the German radar stations which saw bombers seemingly "reproducing themslves". Only 12 bombers were lost. The RAF attack was followed by 68 B-17s attacking Hamburgs's shipyards and U-boat facilities (July 25). Then 53 B-17s hit the city's Neuhoff power plant (July 26). Then the RAF struck again, A force of 722 bombers guided by fires still burning n the city hit again (July 27). The earlier raids had burst water mains. The well-organized Hamburg civil defence system had nothing with which to fight the mew fires. The RAF dropped incendiary bombs and soon new fires merged with the still buring fires from the earlier raids. Hot air rising from these huge fires drew in cooler air creating firestorms with winds up to 150 miles an hour. These are winds greater than that of a tornado and they were suoerheated. The British had experienced this in Conventry, but on a smaller scale. The firestorms sucked trees, vehichles, sections of buildings, and people into the conflagerations. Temperatures in the center of the fire storms reached 1,800°F. At that temperature asphalt streets burned. Those not killed by the bombs and flames were suffocated by the smoke and lack of oxygen. This included those in bomb shelters that were protected from the blasts. Harris sent his bombers over Hamburg again (July 29) and finally (August 2). The results were unlike any other attack to that point of the War. The devestation in Hamburg was on a unimaginable scale. An amazing 10 square miles of the city no longer existed. Half of the builings in the city were completely destroyed or damaged. No precise death toll exists because thousands of bodies were never recovered. It is believed 50,000 people were killed. Among them were a disproprtionally high numbr of women and 7,000 children. Another 10,000 children lost one or both parents. [Rumpf, p. 84.] (By this stage of the War, adult men had been concripted. Thus caualties included deproprtionste numbers of women, childrem and the elderly.) Compare this with the relatively small number killed as a result of Harris' 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. One million refugeees poured out of the devestated city. The Allies now knew how to destroy German cities and had a growing bomber force for this purpose. The raid on Hamburg was by far the most devestating attack during 1943. Even with the massive destruction, however, the city within 5 months has restored 80 percent of its productivity. [U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey]

??? (July/August ? 1943)

The growing bomber force allowed the Americans to hit aircraft plant nerar Berlin while Hamburg was still burning. This helped to prevent the Germans from concentrating their fighter defenses on Hamburg.

Trondheim, Norway (July/August ? 1943)

The Americans also targeted the German naval base at Trondheim in occupied Norway. The raid was to weaken German efforts to interdict supplies flowing to the Soviet ports at Murmansk and Arcangel. It also was seen as helping to keep German fighter forces dispersed.

Ploesti, Romania (August 1, 1943)

Germany did not have any significant petroleum resources. Synthetic fuel factories were built to supply the war effort, but they never supplied the vast quantities of petroleum needed by the Wehrmacht to wage a modern, mecanized war. The most important source of natural fuel for the Germans were the Romanian oil fields around Ploesti. America air bases in Libya brought Ploesti within range of B-24s. Allied war planners were increasingly looking at petroleum as a weak point in the NAZI war effort. A force was put together from the 9th Air Force in North Africa (two groups) and others dispastched from the 8th Air Force (3 groups) on loan for a quick decisive effort. It was to be a surprise attack with the American planes flying at ground level. It proved to be a disaster. Some of the groups got lost and the attack was poorly executed. The Luftwaffe early warning system picked the raiders up early. The Germans realized that the Allies would eventually target Ploesti abd it was one of the most heavily defended targets in Europe. And the raid was one of the mot disstrous American raids of the War. The attacking force consisted of 177 B-24s lost 53 planes and 55 planes that managed to made it back to Libya were so bady shot up that they had to be junked. The raid had destroyed 40 percent of Ploesti's capacity, but as it was not operating at capacity, deliversies to the Germans were not impaired and repair work was begun immediately. The Americans would have to return to Ploesti, but the initial force was so desimated that it would be some time before another attack could be mounted. While the Ploesti attack was not the knock-out blow they expected, this and other raids forced the Germans to devote significant forces to defense at a time when important battles that were deciding the outcome of the War was being fought on the Eastern Front, especially the critical battle at Kursk. The fighter forces around Ploesti for example had been there for some time for that one day of fighting. This was hardly the kind of economy of force that Germany could afford. The Luftwaffe was, however, encouraged by the toll of American bombers shot down.

Ragensburg and Schweinfurt (August 17, 1943)

The American raids on Ragensberg and Schweinfurt (August 17) were the most important up to that stage of the war. Regensburg amd Schweinfurt were nearby cities in northern Bavaria. Regensburg was the location of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 aircraft factory and an oil refinery. Schweinfurt was the location of plants like the Schweinfurter Kugellagerwerke which produced most of Germany's ball-bearings. Ball bearings are used in vehicles like tanks and trucks as well as aircraft. The results were not what the American air commanders had antiipated. American air planners conceived of a strategy of striking deep into Germany targeting the Messerschmitt plant at Ragennsberg and ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt. This was the deepest penetration yet for the 8th Air Force. Both cities were located in southern Germany. About 30 percent of the Luftwaffe's single-seater fighters were built at Regensburg. German production of ballbearings was centered at Schweinfurt, about half of the country's production was built there. Virtually every important German weapon required ballbearings. Without ballbearings the German war machine would theoiretically grind to a hault. The 8th Air Force launched strikes. Fighter escorts could only accompany the bombers to Aachen near the German frontier. Beyond Aachen the bombers were on their own. The attack consisted of two waves. The first wabe of 146 B-17s bombers headed for Regensburg. They were to be followed closely by 230 B-17s. The idea was that the German fighters would have to return to base for amunition and fuel aftr engaging the first wave. Unfortunately the second wave attacking Schweinfurt was delayed 3 hours by fog and the Luftwaffe was rearmed and refueled and waiting for them. The result was carnage. The Luftwaffe shot down 60 American bombers while losing only 25 fighters. Another 47 bombers were so damaged that they could not be used again. These were losses that the 8th Air Force could not sustain. It would have been worse, but the First wave instead of returning to England along a route where Luftwaffe fighters were waiting, flews south to Algeria. The Messerschmitt plant was heavily damaged. Every important building in the complex was hit, disrupting production. Unknown to the Americans at the time, machiery to produce ME-262 jet parts was destroyed, delaying the arrival of the jets. The ball bearing plants were not hit as hard. The Luftwaffe fighters devestated the unaccompanied bombers. The losses were so high that rhe 8th Air Force discontinued the attacks. After the War, Speer indicated that a few more American day-time attacks and British followup night raids would have devestated the German war effort. Even so, the impact on the jet program and the Luftwaffe were major accomplishments. The deployment of the ME-262 earlier could have significantly boosted the German war effort. Also the strategic bombing campaign not only bleed the Lufrtwaffe, but forced it to disperse its effort and defend German cities. This meant that the Luftwaffe could not concentrate its forces in the crucial 1943 battles on the Eastern Front.

Peenemünde (August 17, 1943)

Peenemünde is a small village ion the Baltic island of Usedom at the mouth of the Peene river. The Germans located their Heeresversuchsanstalt research facility there (1937). It was a top secret facility that worked on cruise missles, rockets, and missles. Both research faciliries and test ranges were located there. The research team headed by Wernher von Braun and Walter Dornberger began work at Kummersdorf, south of Berlin. The Kummersdorf facility proved inadequate, especially for testing. Peenemünde proved a perfect site as the weapons could be launched out over the Baltic in relative secrecy. The island/peninsula location also allowed the Germans to easily restrict access. The researcher teams at Peenemünde developed many of the most advanced weapons used n World War II. The best known are the V-1 Buzz Bombs which were the first cruise missles and and the V-2 which was the first balistic missle. Test firing of the V-1 project began in early 1942 and the V-2 project (called the A-4) on October 3, 1942. Both the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht were nvolved. The v-1 was a Luftwaffe project and the V-2 a Wehrmacht project. The full story of the Peenemünde raid has not been writtem. The Polish underground reported on the worked at Peenemünde as did a Danish pilot. RAF reconnaissance also found the site. Kammhuber learned of a major British raid through a RAF intercept, but did not know the target. He prepared a substantial force to oppose the attack. The British carefully prepared the attack--Operation Hydra. It was one of their largest 1943 raids. The sent a decoy Pathfinder group of Mosquitos to drop flares over Berlin. This was normal procedure, the first step of a raid. At this time Kammhuber communication line in the Netherlands was cut, presumably by the Ressistance. German ground controllers cut off from Kammhuber, scrambled the bulk of the night fighter force to Berlin. When they arrived the Berlin Flak batteries opened up them. In the meantime the British force of 597 bombers attacked Peenemünde. Some of the Luftwaffe fighters saw the glow from flares and bombs to the north and asked for permission to head north. They were refused permission, but some defied orders and caught the final British wave and succeeded in shooting down many of the 40 British bombers lost in the raid. Mamy facilities at the research facilities survived the raid. The British did hit the housing areas and camps for foreign workers. About 700 staff members were killed, this included Walter Thiel, the head of engine development. The Germans as a result moved the production of the V weapons to secret underground facilities deep into Germany.

Berlin (August 23)

Heavily defended Berlin was a British target in 1943. It was considered to heavily defended for day-light raids. The British attacked with a force of 727 bombers. The Luftwaffe ground controllers successfully assessed the target and fighters we concetrated over Berlin. The Germans using their new tactics lit up the city with incadesent rockets fired by the Flak batteries in addition to spolt lights. Britishh flares and then fires added to the light. It was a surreal experience for any Berliners because a strict black out had been imposed for several years. The British lost 56 bombers. The British came twice ore in the next 2 weeks and lst an additiuonal 67 bombers. The Wild Bohrs were credited with many of the kills.

Shorter Range Attacks (August-September 1943)

The Americans as a result of the lossess sustained over Ragensberg and Schweinfurt (August 17, 1943) for about 2 months focused on targets in the occupied Netherlasnds, Belgium, France, and targets in western Germany which could be attacket with fighter escorts.

Marienburg (Octobr 9, 1943)

Not all raids were short range. The VIII Bomber Command's Mission Number 113 was a raid conducted by the 410th Bomb Squadron, 94th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Nearly 100 American B-17 heavy bombers hit the Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau AG aircraft factory at Marienburg, East Prussia, now Malbork in Poland). This was a factory building the FW-190 fighter was built. Notice the factory runway. When the British began bombing, the Germans instituted a range of measures to to compendate. One of those was to disperse aircrasft production. Notice the rural sarea when the FW plant was built. In addition, the Germans believed that Marienburg was beyond the range of Allied bombers. A major priority in 1943 was aircraft factories. And the FW-190 was Germany's most effective fighters. The Grermans built 20,000 some 16 different variants. This was not a target Bomber Command ooperating at night and using area bombing tehniques could hit. Here the Americans have smashed the factory in an impressive duisplay of precission bombing. Two B-17s were lost with 13 more damaged. This was a exceotionally low loss rate for deep penetration raids into the Reich. Three American air crews were men were wounded and 21 listed as Missing in Action. The bomber gunnerrs claimed shooting down 9 Luftwaffe fighters and 2 probably destroyed. While the Eighth Air Force was losing planes and crews, the Luftwaffe was also taking losses. It would not be until figher escorts were possible that the German losses became unsustainable. A reconsiance miss in flown by a RAD Mosquito rrcorded the imopact. The target assessment estimated that some 15 FW-190 fighters were destroyed on the ground in and asround the plant. Casualties among the factory workers was believed to be high. Of the 669 workers, 114 were killed and 76 injured. (We are not ure how such a precise estimaste was made, it suggests access to a German report. British Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, described the Marienburg raid as the “... most perfect example in history of the accurate distribution of bombs over a target."

Münster (October 10)

The losses from the August raids on Ragensberg and Schweinfurt caused American commanders to rethink their strategy. Some wanted to shift to the British area bombing campaign. Opinion was mixed. The first raid resulting from this approach was a raid on Münster by 138 planes (October 10). The skies were clear, but the Münster raid was the first of a series of American area bombing raids. Both Eaker and Arnold were still committed to precession bombing, but area attacks were a away of using the 8th Air Force when weather (cloud cover) over Germany might have otherwise grounded the bombers. Radar could be used to find cities, but it was so imprecise that a radar attack was essentially ara bombing. Eaker believed that bombing through cloud cover was es[pecially demoralizing for the Germans. Arnold also still favored precession bombing, but thought that the radar attacks helped to keep the pressure on the Luftwaffe. He was focused on smashing the Luftwaffe before the D-Day landings. [Schaffer, pp. pp. 66-67.]

Schweinfurt: Black Thursday (October 14)

Schweinfurt with its ball bearing plants remained a target that the Americans really wanted. The 8th Air Force attacked the city with 291 bombers, more than in the first raid (August 17). The city is located in Bavaria and thus this was a deep-penetration raid. The Luftwaffe scrambled 300 fighters scrambled to attack the American bombers. Bad weather in England undid plans to mitigate German fighter resistance. The Americans reported the most intense German opposition yet experienced. The Germans shot down 60 bombers, the largest Ameucan losses of the War. The Luftwaffe lost 38 fighters, but mamy of the pilots bailed out and returned to duty. The B-17s had crews of 10 men. This 600 flyers were killed or taken prisoner. The American named the day Black Thursday because of the disterous losses. Initial reports from the airmen indicated much higher German losses. The ball bearing plants were hit, but back in production in 6 weeks. Despite the American focus on ball bearings, the German armaments industry was not disrupted by a ball bearing shortage. The factories were repaired and substitutes were found. Ball bearings were also imported from Sweden and Switzerland. Speer estimated that persistant attacks on the ball bearing plants could have disrupted German war production. The German defennses, however, were too strong and the 8th Air Force bombers to vulnerable to continue the attacks. Eaker finally concluded that deep penetration raids were not feasible without fighter escorts wjhich were not yet available. The British were planning Opperation Berlin, but would have to do so without American deep-penetration raids for support.

Kassel (October 22-23)

Kassel was a medium sized German city with a population of only about 0.25 million, but by 1943 the Allied strategic bombing campaign was beginning to reach even medium sized German cities. The primary targets in Kassel were the Fieseler air craft plant and the Hendchel works--priority targets. Henschel was a major German industrial company manufacturing locomotives, engines, and trucks. A subcamp of Dachau was established nearby to supply workers to Henschel. Kassel was primarily a RAF opperation. There were two raids in 1942, one in August was moderarely heavy and did some damage to the Hendchel works. The British returned a year latter and targetting Kassel in force. RAF bombers failed at first to find the city and then hit only the western suburbs and nearby villages (October 2-4). Targeting was a major problem when bomving at night. Finally the RAF struck the center of the city (October 22-23). Radio sopoofing as part of Operation Carona and a diversiojnary attack on Frankfurt were used to confuse the Luftwaffe night fighters. A force of 569 heavy bombers dropped 1,800 tons on the Kassel. This included nearly 0.5 million magnesium incenduary fire sticks designed to to ignite fires. Hiting specific targets at night was virtually impossible so the RAF set out to destroy the city ahnd largely suceeded. Damage to the city's water system made it difficult to fight the fires. Among the civilian casualties were large numbers of wounded soldiers recovering in several hospitals. About 10,000 people were killed. Estimates suggest that about half the city's population were made homeless. Kassel demostrated that the allies had the capability of destroying whole cities. And as soon as long range escortsere available, there would be no limit on the destruction which could be wreaked in the Reich.

Operation Berlin (November 18, 1943-March 30, 1944)

Berlin as the capital of NAZI Germany and thus seen by many as the hert of the ememy. Actually Berlin before the NAZI take over had not been a center of NAZI strength. Now as the NAZI capital it became a target of considerable importance. Air Marshal Harris from an early stage wanted to hit Berlin. The Blitz on London was etched deeply on him and many other RAD commanders. The British had conducted small raids on Berlin and the Berlin area, but deep in Germany and heavily defended, it was a difficult target. Harris wrote Churechill, ":We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the U.S. Army Air Forces will come in on it. It will cost between us 400 and 500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war" (November 3). The 8th Air Force was still recovering from Schweinfurt. American planners were also beginning to think about the upcoming 1944 cross-Channel invasion and thus increasingly interested in targetting the Luftwaffe. The British remembering the enormous casualties of World War I, still desperately wanted to believe that Germany could be bombed out of the War. The campaign against Berlin called "Operation Berlin" would be a British affair. The British by this point in the War had built up a powerful stategic bomber force and Harris was determined to hurl it at Berlin. Harris launched the campaign (November 18, 1943). There would be 35 raids averaging 500 bombers. Only about half or 16 raids hit Berlin. The other raids hit other important German cities to prevent the Germans from concentrating the bulk of their defenses around Berlin. Harris' goal was to hit Berlin like Hamburg "untul the heart of NAZI Germany ceases to beat". The RAF did not, however, achieve the same results over Berlin that they had at Hamburg. There were several reasons for this. Hamburg was an older city than Berlin with many wooden buildings as well as narrow streets. Berlin was a sprawling city with buildings constructed of brick and stone. Also their were wide avenues and streets which acted as firebreaks. British directional and bombing systems (Oboe and H2S) did not work well because of the distance and sprawling layout. The Germans built decoys and their increasingly effective night-defense system took a terrible toll on the British. The Luftwaffe shot down 43 bombers over Magdeburg (January 21, 1944), 43 bombers over Berlin (January 28), 78 over Leipzig (February 29), and 72 over Berlin (March 24). About two-thirds of the kills were achieved by Luftwaffe night fighters and the rest by Flak batteries. This varied from night to night. The Flak batteries were especially effective during the March 24 raid n Berlin, accounting for about 50 of the 72 bombers shot down. The last raid od Operation Berlin was flow against Nuremberg (March 30). This was not a major industrial city. It was, however, the German city most associated with the NAZIs because of the annual Party Congresses held there. It was an especially large raid with 795 bombers. Harris dispatched a decoy force of obsolete Halifaxes which dropped Window, but the German ground controllers correctly deduced the target. The result was the nost costly night of the War for bomber command. And many of the attackers entirely missed the city. The Germans shot down 95 bombers. Overall RAF lossess in Operation Berlin was 1,047 bombers. Harris had not bombed Germany out of the War. In fact the Luftwaffe demonstrated the capacity to make raids without fighter escort to costly even at night. The Luftwaffe with limited resources had during a year of around-the-clock bomving, actually improved their control of the skies over Germany. Operation Berlin ended after the Nuremberg raid. It was not only the cost of these raids, General Eisenhower had obtained operational control over Allied air forces to concentrate on missions aimed at support the cross-Channel invasion.

Long-Range Figter Escorts (December)

The B-17 received its name, the flying fortress, because of all the protective armament. The Army Air Corps believed it could penetrate German defenses and bomb during the day. This proved a miscalculation. As the Allies built upntheir bomber forces, the Germans improved their air defenses. Flak batteries were elarged, butvthis meant that large numbers of the German feaed 88-mm tank killers were not available to the soldiers fighting Soviet armored collums. The most effective air defense, however, was the Luftwaffe fighters. It soon became obvious that day light-light bombing without fighter escorts would be extremely costly. Allied escorts like the P-47 Thindeboldt were effective, but even with drop tanks could not accompany the bombers all the way into Germany. For a while in late 1943 after the Schweinfurt raid the 8th Air Force had to suspend major raids on the Reich. The Luftwaffe also suffered losses, but not as severe. This finally began to change with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang which could accompany the bombers all the way even to Berlin. The first P-51 squadrons were deployed at the end of the year (December 1943). From this point 8th Air Force losses plummeted and Luftwadd losses increased to a point that pilots could not be replaced. The planes could be replaced, but not the pilots. Reich Marshall Göring after the War stated that when he saw the P-51s over Berlin, he knew that the war was lost. And he must hav known his influence wuthn Hitler was permanently broken.

Sources

Rumpf, Hans. Edward Fitzgerald, trans. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1962), 256p.

Schaffer, Ronals. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272p.

Spaight, J.M. Bombing Vindicated (London: 1953-55).

Teetheway, Max G. "1,046 bombers but Cologne lived," New York Times (June 2, 1992).

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report.






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Created: 8:03 AM 6/21/2005
Last updated: 5:24 PM 1/9/2024