Figure 1.--

It became clear in 1943 that raids on targets in the Reich were unsustainable without fighter esort. The American bombers were acompanied to the borders of the Reich where they had to turn back because of limited range. The principal American fighter in 1942 was the P-47 Thunderboldt. The pilots reported seeing the Luftwaffe fighters forming up to attack the bombers just as they had to turn back. Some German cities, especially Hamburg suffered devestating attcks, but the Luftwaffe in 1943 proved that American bombers could not sustain unescoted attacks deep into Germany and by the end of the year was also taking terriblr toles on British bombers during night raids. Göring assured Hitler that the Allied fighters did not have the range to escort the bombers. That was the case in 1943, but it was also what the Allies were were working hard to rectify. Hitler's failure to give priority to the Luftwaffe and the Allied emphasis on air power was to radically change the course of the War in 1944.

Round-the-Clock Bombing (1943)

The Casablanca Directive instructed RAF Bomber Command and the American 8th Air Forces to begin Around-the Clock bombing of the Reich. It became clear that raids on targets in the Reich were unsustainable without fighter esort. The American bombers were acompanied to the borders of the Reich where they had to turn back because of limited range. The principal American fighter in 1942 was the P-47 Thunderboldt. The pilots reported seeing the Luftwaffe fighters forming up to attack the bombers just as they had to turn back. Some German cities, especially Hamburg suffered devestating attcks, but the Luftwaffe in 1943 proved that American bombers could not sustain unescoted attacks deep into Germany and by the end of the year was also taking terrible tolls on British bombers during night raids.

Göring

Göring assured Hitler that the Allied fighters did not have the range to escort the bombers. That was the case in 1943, but it was also what the Allies were were working hard to rectify. Legendary Luftwaffe pilot Adolf Galland was the first to notice this. He found spare fuel tanks on P-47 Thuundebolts that had been shot down near Aachen (September 1943). Galland immediately understood the significance. At a subsequent meeting with Hitler to discuss actions to deter the Allied bombing raids, Gallad stressed the need to expand the Luftwaffe fighter force. Galland estimated that to prevent the American day-light raids that a fighter force three to four times the bomber force was needed. Galland was one of the most respected fighter commander in the Luftwaff and one of the few military commnders Hitler at tghis stage of the War allowed to speak fratkly to him. Galland added that even more fighters would be needed if the Americans began sending fighter escorts to accompany the bombers into the Reicvh. Hitler remained passive when Galland was estimating the fighter force needed, but objected when Galland began discussing the possibility of fighter escorts. He interupted Galland and pointed out that Göring (Galand's commander) had assured him that the Allies did not have fighters which had the capability to escort the bombers. Hitler then dismissed Galland. Later that day Galland called on Göring. Speer who was present recorded the encounter. Görng of course was furious because his Lufwaffe had repeatedly failed the German WAr eefort and now Galland was further undermining his esteem. Galland was surprised to find that he was furious and demanded to know why he had warned Hitler about American fighter escorts. Galland pointed out it was already happen and would become an increasing problem. The two argued. Finally an exasperated Göring shouted, "I herewith give you an official order that they weren't there! Do you undrstand? The American fighters were not there!" Galland replied sarcastically, "orders are orders, sir." Of course Göring could not order the American pilots.

Hitler

Hitler's failure to give priority to the Luftwaffe and the Allied emphasis on air power was to radically change the course of the War in 1944.

American Fighters

The top-line American fighters in Europe during 1943 were the P-38 tein engie Lighting and the the P-47 Thunderbolt. Both were excellent fighters, but had limited ranges. They could extend their range with drop tanks, but still had limited ranges--primarily because they were both big-heavy plains. It was the P-51 Mustang that proved to be the sollution to the Allied escort problem. The P-51 is generally considered to be the finest piston-driven fighter of the War. The P-51 in many ways symbolizes the Anglo-American war-effort. The plane was an American design, but performed poorly with the under-powered Allison engine. The plane had been available as early as 1941. The British deployed it first as the Army Air Corps was not impressed with it. Upgraded with the British Rolls Royce Merlin engine, the performance was spectacular. With drop tanks it had a range equal to that of the Allied heavy bombers. They could not only reach targets anywhre in the Reich, but they could accompany the bombers to targets as far east as Poland. The reason was that the P-51 was a relatively light plane and thus used fuel must more efficently than ether the P-38 or P-47. The 8th Air Force began to receive the new P-51s at the end of 1943. American planners as late s early 1943 were convinced that the bombers had the armament to fight through to the targets alone. They also thought the air-cooled Merlin made the plane susetable to emnemy fire. As the losses in the skies over Germany escalate, these assessments chnged and a priority was gioven to the production og P-51s. The first P51s arrived in England during late November 1943, not long after Galland's encounter with Hitler and Göring.

Bomber Escorts

Göring's order by early 1944 was moot. The American bombers were entering the Reich with fighter escorts. At first the escorts were primarilt P-47s and to a lesser extent P-38s. These escorts covered much of the bomber stream. It was the 51s, however, that would be with the bombers all the way to the target. At first the number of P-51s was limited, but they were arriving from the States in ever increasing quantities. The American bomber crews called them "Little Friends". Luftwaffe pilots called them "Indianer"--referring to the savage Indians of the American frontier. (German boys grew up reading stories about the Wild West and playing Cowboys and Indians. Western films wre also popular.)

Defeat of the Luftwaffe (1944)

The nature of the air war changed dramatically. Three principal factors were involved. First was the steadily expanding strength of the Allied air forces. The 8th Air Force was steadily expanded in 1943. By 1944 the 8th Air Force was reaching parity with Bomber Command and was now capable of 1,000 bomber raids. Second was the deployment of fighter escorts for the bombers. Techniques were developed for using existinf fifghters (P-38 Lightenings and P-47 Thuunderboldts) and the arrival from America of the improved long-range P-51 Mustangs. Third was a shift in targeting from aircraft plants to the German petroleum industry. In the end the Luftwaffe never run out of planes. It did run out of trained pilots and fuel. The turning point in the air war was Big Week (February 1944). The Luftwaffe sustained such severe losses that they could no longer strongly oppose all Allied bombing raids. After Big Week German fighter opposition even on raids targetting Berlin steadily declined (March 1944). The Luftwaffe became increasingly cautious, declining major confrontations with the growing number of fighter escorts. The American escorts began to go down to ground level to attack Luftwaffe bases (April 1944).

Created: 6:37 AM 6/25/2005
Last updated: 6:38 AM 6/25/2005