World War II: Pacific Theater--Air Campaign


Figure 1.--.

The Pacific War was fought on the largest battlefield in history. This would make the range of aircraft to be an imprtant factor. The air war in the Pacific began as in the European theater with mastery of the skies by the Japanese. The Chinese air force was vitually non-existant. The Japanese conducted terror bombing raid, first on Shanghai and then on other Chinese cities. Japanese aircraft, especially the Mitusubishi A6M Zero, were so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the United States beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Zero was fast and maneuverable and had an impressive range. This continued throughout much of 1942 and only with the arrival of new American 56L Hellcat in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was another factor. New American aircraft brgan reaching the fleet (January 1943). The Gruman 56L Hellcat would be the mainstay of the U.S Navt during the Pacific War. Gradually American flyers had planes with capababilities well beyond those of the Zero. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers brought the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The initial raids were inclonclusive. General Curtis LeMay devised a strategy of fire bombing which caused massive destruction in Japanese citis crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. When Japan refused to surender after the Yalta Conference, President Truman ordered the use of tha Atomic Bomb in August 1945. The Japanese surendered in September.

Japanese Aviation Industry

Americans in the 1930s thought of Japan as a rather bavkward industrial power. Most Americans bought chrap Japanese toys and china in dime stores. There was no realization, even in upper echelons of the military that Japan had an advanced aviation industry that could produce high performance military aircraft. Even when Clare Chanaulte's Flying Tigers submitted reports of modern Japanese aircraft they were encountering, these assessments were largely discounted in part because of the low esteme Americans had for Japanese manufacturing. In fact Japan had one of the most advanced aviation industries in the world, heavily financed by the Japanese military. Because of this the Japanese entered World war II with one of the best fightersof the War--especially the Mitsubihi A6M Zero fighter. The Army later received the Nakajima Ki-43 Oskar, another excellent fighter with inovative fatures like butter-fly wings. The Japanese also have effective torpedo planes, dive bombers, and various types of other bombers. The Zero was superior in many characteristics to any fighter in the American arsenal when the Japanese launched the War. The Japanese fighters were light, fast and highly manunervable. It also had a range of 1,150 miles, an important capability on the vast Pacific theater of operations. They had some weakenesses, however, such as light armoring to potect the pilot and the absence of self-sealing fuel tanks. (Given the great effort the Japanese put into pilot training, the failure to protect them was short sighted and proved a great mistake.) The Japanese planes were developed with minimal foreign assistance. The Zero demonstrated the potent capabilities of Japanese aviation industry. The fact that at the time the Japanese surrendered (1945) that it was still their first-line fighter demonstrates the limitations of that industry.

The Panay (1937)

American involvement in China did not begin with the Japanese invasion and the Roosevelt Administration. American naval vessels began cruises on the Yangtze River in 1854. The mission of these early cruises was to show the flag and support American consular officers. The naval mission grew ever more complex as the authority of the Imperial Government deteriorated in the late 19th century and became an important instrument of American foreign policy. Operations included putting landing parties ashore on occassion to protect U.S. interests. The U.S. Navy after the turn of the 20th century began to conduct the patrols in a more organized fashion. The Navy deployed purpose-built gunboats and began coordinting operations with the Britidsh Royal Navy. The U.S. Navy was also deployed in anti-piracy patrols off the Chinese coast. Japnese forces were moving up the Yangtze River toward the Chinese capital which had been evacuated from Peeking to Nanking. Two U.S. Navy gunboats were at Nanking, the U.S.S. Luzon and the U.S.S. Panay. Chinese officials notified the American Embassy on November 27, 1937 that it must evacuate. The Ambassador and most of the Embasy personnel departed the net day on the U.S.S. Luzon. The rest of the Embassy staff remained another week. Ambassador Grew notified the Japanese government on December 1 that the U.S.S. Panay would be departing. Panay took on Embassy officials and some civilians and began upriver. It escortied three Standard Oil barges. Two Royal Navy gunboats and some other British boats followed. A Japanese artillery position commanded by a Colonel Hashimoto fired on the ships, hoping that it might precipatate a war with America and end civilian influence in the Japanese Government--finalizing the "Showa Restoration." Panay flew an American flag as well as had Americn flags painted on the awnings and topsides. December 12 was a clear, sunny day with perfect visability. At about 1330, three Japanese Navy bombmers attacked Panay followed by 12 more planes that dive-bombed and 9 fighters that strafed. The attack was deliberate lasting over 20 minutes. As Panay began sinking, the Japanese sraffed the lifeboats and river bank. Two sailors and civilian were killed. there were 11 sailors seriously wounded. passenger died of their wounds; eleven officers and men were seriously wounded. [Morrison, pp. 16-18] There was no outcry in America for war. The Japanese Government which had not ordered the attack, promtly appolgized and offered compensation. The attack was, however, coordinated by military officers. Both the American public and the Roosevelt Administration were releaved that war could be overted. [Freidel, pp. 290-291.] The Japanese when they arrived in Nanking proceeded to conduct one of the greatest attrocities in their campaign in China--known to history as the Rape of Nanking". The Panay was also involved in intelligence collection. The Admistration for a while considered economic sanctions against the Japanese. The Navy gunboats missions continued through 1941 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese carfully avoided any further incidents. The Japanese officers responsible, however, got what they so ardently desired nearly 4 years later.

Axis Technical Cooperation

Notably the Germans, despite the Axis alliance, made no effort to supply the Japanese with any of their advanced aircraft technology. In the early stages of the War the NAZIs thought that they had essentially won the War and saw no need to share military secrets with a potential future ally. This was in sharp contrast to Allied cooperation even before America entered the War. I have no details on talks between the Japanese and Germans on technical cooperation, but as far as I know, through 1943 there was no serious technical cooperation between these two Axis partners.

American Isolationism

There has always been a strong isolationist strak in American political life. Americans separated by two great oceans have since the Revolution seen ourselves as different and apart from the rest of the World. From the beginning of the Republic, President Washington warned of entagling foreign alliances. For much of our history, Britain was seen as the great enemy of American democracy and Manifest Destiny. World War I was America's first involvement in a European War and the United States played a critical role in winning that War. Had the Germany not insisted on unrestricted sunmarine warfare, in effect an attack on American shipping, it is unlikely that America woukd have entered the War. Many Americans in the 1920s came to feel that America's entry into the War was a mistake. There was considerable talk of war profiteering. Many were detrmined that America should avoid war at any cost. This feeling was intensified with the Depression of the 1930s and the focus on domestic issues. With the growing military might of a a rearmed Germany, others such as Charles Lindburg, thought that America could not win another war. Many not only opposed American envolvement, but even military expenditures. Aginst this backdrop, President Roosevelt who did see the dangers from the NAZIs and Japanese militaists, with great skill and political courage managed to not only support Britain in its hour of maximum peril, but with considerable political skill managed to push through Congress measures that would lay the ground work for turning American into the Arsenal of Democracy, producing a tidal wave of equipment and supplies not only for the American military, but for our Allies as well in quantities that no one especially the AXIS believed possible.

Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941)

The Japanese in 1941 had 13 aircraft carriers to 3 American carriers in the Pacific. At the time the carrier was still not preceived as the most powerful instrument in naval warfare. Thus the extnt of the Japanese superiority had not yet been fully perceived. The Japanese also had the best fighter in the Pacific--the Mitusishi A6M Zero. Navy planners believed that the Japanese were preparing a strike, but more likely in East Asia or perhaps the Philippines. There were several reasons for this, but one was that carrier aircraft were nelieved to be inferior to land-based planes. Thus it was considered suisidal for Japanese carriers to approach Pearl which was well defended with Army Air Corps bases. The first wave of Japanese planes focused on the air bases, where most of the American planes were destroyed on the ground. This left the Japanese free to attack the battleships and carriers at Pearl. The Japanese found the battleships there, but to their surprise the carriers were not there.

Early Japanese Campaigns

Japanese aircraft, especially the Mitusubishi Zero, were so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the United States. They destroyed substantial numbers of the aircraft on the ground, especially in the Philippines. Then land and sea offensives overran airbases. Another factor was the superb training of the Japanese aviators and their fast, manueverable Zeros.

The Philippines (1941-42)

Any look at a map tells you that the Japanese would have to attack the Philippines. Their primary interest was obtaining access to oil, especially after the United States embargoed oil exports. This meant tht they needed the Dutch East Indies (DEI) with its important oil resource. But the Philippones stood beyween the Japanese Home Island and the DEI. Thus after the U.S.Pacific Fleet was destroyed at Pearl Harbor, the Philippines would have to be seized. General Douglas MacArthur preparations for defending the Philippines were premesed on holding off the Japanese until releaved by the Pacigic Fleet sorteeing out frpm Pearl. An important part of the Islands defenses were Army Air Corps instalations. General Douglas MacArthur was immediately informed of the Japanese attack on Pearl. No preparations were taken for a Japanese air attack. The Japanese struck 9 hours later with land based bombers from Formosa (Taiwan). MacArthur did not think this was possible. American air power in the Philippines was destoyed on the ground. This forced the limited naval forces in the Philippines to withdraw. It meant that MacArthur could nit oppose the Japanese landings and the American and Philipino forces had no air support. MacArthure decided to withdraw to the Batan Peninsula abd conduct the defense of the Philippines from Correidor. He thought he could hold out until rleaved by the Pacific Fleet, not understanding the extent of the Japanese success at Pearl. While he managed to get most of his men to Batan, he failed to get adquate supplies there needed to suustain them.

Coral Sea (May 1942)

The first important Allied effort to stop the Japanese sweep through the Pacific occurred in the Coral Sea. The Japanese planned to seize Port Moreseby, completing their conquest of New Guinea and a smaller operation in the Solomons at Tulagi. Port Moresby would have provided a launching pad for an invasion of Australia itself. (At the time, most of the Australian Army was in North Afric fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps.) The Japanese landing force was escorted by the front-line carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. The Japanese naval task force en route to seize Port Moresby was intercepted by an American carrier force, alerted by American code breakers. It was the first carrirer to carrier engagement in history. The Japanese launched an attack on the Americans, but found only a destroyer and oiler. In the meantime the Americans sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho (May 7). The next day the two carrier forces fought a major engagement. The Japanese succeeded in sinking Lexington and heavily damaging Yorktown (May 8). The Americans heavily damaged Shokaku and devestated the air crew of Zuikaku. The substantial Japanese pilot casualties was very signigicant. Despite the American losses, the Japanese invasion force turned back, the first major Japanese reversal of the War. The Japanese assessment of the battle was that not only was Lexington sunk, but that Yorktown was either sunk or so badly damaged that it could no longer be deployed. This affected planning for the Miday operation. The engagement appears to have convinced Japanese naval planners that the American carriers were no mach for the Japanese carriers. The Japanese failed to preceive that the American carriers effectively fought the battle or that the surprise appearance of the American carrier in the Coral Sea to oppose the invasion of Port Moresby resulted from American code breaking. It also meant that they had lost a carrier, and large numbers of planes and pilots. This effectively removed two front line carriers from the Japanese order of battle. This reduced the available carriers for the Midway operation. Combined with the British damage to the First Air Fleet in the Indian Ocean, Admiral Yamamoto had allowed their carrier forces to be significantlseriously weakened in operations of marginal importance. This was critical because if Japan was to win the War it had to be done in 1942 when they had overwealming superiority in the Pacific. If the War developed into a war of attrition, the far greater indusstrial resources of the United States would prevail.

Doolittle Raid

The news from the Pacific was an unrelenting series of disasters. America needed a victory. The only intact offensive force in the Pacific was Americais carriers. Army Air Corps pilot with B-25s trained for carrier take offs. The B-25 was a medium bomber never intended for carrier use. Carrier commander Afm. "Bull" Halsey led a taskforce made up of Hornet and Enterprise. It was a risky operation as it committed half of the Pacific fleet's carrier force to a very dangerous operation. The B-25s took off from Hornet. It was the first blow to the Japanese home islands. The raid was led by Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle. The physical damage was inconsequential, but the psychological impact was immense. Most of the Amrican aviators crash landed in China and were helped to reach saftey by Chinese Nationalist guerillas. The Japanese reprisals were savage. A estimated 0.5-0.7 million Chinese civilians were murdered. The Japanese Navy was so embarassed that they rushed forward Admiral Yamaoto's plans to bring the desimated American Pacific Fleet to battle at Midway Island.

Midway (June 1942)

Midway proved to be the turning point of the Pacific War. It is notable because it was the only major Allied victory in whivh the opposing forces were superior. Admiral Yamamoto was determined to bring the American Pacific fleet to battle before America's industrial might could redress the strategic ballance. Yamamoto reasoned that Midway was an assett of such importance that Nimitz would have to commit his remaining assettscto defend it. The Japanese had many advantages. Unknon to them, however, surprise was not one of the advantages. The same American code breaking operation that had learned of the Port Moresby operatioin also warned Admiral Nimitz that the next target was Midway. Admiral Yamamoto was convinced that the remaining American carriers could be brought to battle and destroyed at Midway. The Japanese plans were based on achieving an element of curprise and on the fact that two American carriers had been destoyed in the Coral Sea, in fact the Yorktown, although heavily damaged had not been sunk. American code breakers had alerted the Ameicans to the Jaspanese plans. Admiral Nimitz positioned Enterprise and Hornet, along with the hastily patched up Yorktown northwest of Midway to ambush he Japanese. The American carrier victory at Midway dealt a crippling blow to the Imperial Navy. The Americans sank four first-line Japnese carriers, killing most of the well-trained crews. The weakness of the Japanese in fire saftey and fire supression was notable. While the Imperial Navy still held an advantage, it was no longer an overwealming one. Meanwhile American shipyards were turning out the new Essex class carriers that would engage the weakened Imperial Navy in 1943. The stunning American carrier victory at Midway, significantly reduced the strike capability of the Imperial Navy.

Technical Air Intelligence

General MacArthur was ordered from Corregidor shortly before the Japanese who had already taken Batan. He managed to get out through the Japanese naval patrols by PT-boat reaching airbases in the southern Philippines that had not yet been taken. Upon reaching Australia hhe pledged to the people of the Philippines in his first public statement pledged, "I shall return." (In typical MacArthur style it was "I" not "We".) Japanese airpower had played a major role in their victory in the Philippines. One of the erly actions MacArthur took after receiving the command of American and Austrlian forces was to establish a Technical Air Intelligence (TAI) group to compile information on Japanese planes. There was no alternative as America had no inteligence gatering operation in Japan. There was great confusion about the Japanese planes and an almost total lack of knowledge about their technical capavilities. The first TAI group was set up on a shoe stringin Hanger 7 near Brisbane in northern Australia. TAI teams were sent into the jungles of New Zealand to try to retrieve the remnants of crashed Japanese planes . IUt proved to be a daunting task. Luckily a PBY in the Aleutians found an almost undamaged Zero (July 1942). Asca result of this effort, the United States had detailed information on Japanese plane types by the late 1942. This was important in both developing new air craft types as well as developing tatics to be used in engaging the Japanese.

South Pacific


The Solomons (1942-43)

The first American offensive of World War II occurred at Guadacanal in the southern Solomons. American air reconisance aircraft detected a new air base the Japanese began building on the island. An airbase there could help cut the sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand where America was buildung up its forces. The American invasion force initially encountered only weak Japanese resistance. The Japanese did not think the Americans were capable yet of an offensive counterstroke. They had not garisoned the island strongly. And the closest air base was at Rabaul. Here Japanese aircraft could reach Guadacanal, but were on the outer limit of their effective range. Japanese aircraft struck the small Marine beachhead and threatening the transports. The Japanese naval victory in the nighttime Battle of Salvo Island forced the transports to withdraw. Meanwhile the Americans seized the airfield and rushed it to completion using Japanese contruction equipment. Within 2 weeks it was operational. They named in Henderson Field in honor of a Marine pilot killed at Midway. The small marine air force which operated there played a key role in the defense of the Marines on Guadacanal. It became known as the Cactus Air Force. (The America code name for Guadacanal was Cactus.) The Marines flew in Grunman 4F Wildcat fighters and Dauntless dive bombers. They faced a much larger Japanese force at Rabaul which targeted Henderson field. The Marine Wildcats came into service in 1937 and by 1942 were largely obsolete by 1942, but it was all the Navy and Marines had. They were not as fast as the Zero and were not as manuerable, but they were armored and had greater fire power, Henderson field was essentially a carrier and the Cactus Air Force made it very costly for the Japanese to supply the substantial troop strength they were building on the island. The Cactus AirvFirce targeted Japanese naval ships and the Tokyo Express. Evebntually it became just too costly for the Japanese to continue contesting possession of Guadacanal. With Guadcanal secured, the Americahns began moving up "The Slot" to secure more island air bases as part of a strategy of building "Rings atound Rabaul".

Rabaul

Rabaul was the main Japanese base in the South Pacific. The Japanese effort to retake Guacanal was launched from Rabaul. The Americans after securing Guadcanal began moving up the Slot. This brough Rabaul into range of land-based bombers and fighters. The Essex Carriers and new Hellcats joined the assault (November 11, 1943). The carrier assault destroyed 20 Japabese planes and a destroyer. The Japanese retailiated with a strike on the carriers and lost 35 more planes. This subsantially reduced the air capability of Rabaul. This potent base was never assaulted directly, but it was surounded and cut off becoming useless to the Japanese.

American Aviation

American planners were surprised that Japan would dare attack because of the massive industrial potential of the United States. No where was the American polential prove to be so important than in the air war. Japan introduced the Zero in China (1940). Five years later it was still their main-line fighter. The U.S. Navy at the time of Pearl Harbor was using the Gruman F45 Wildcat. It was slower and less maneuverable than the Zero. It had a limited range of only 770 miles. Its only real asset was it was heavier armored and more durable than the Zero. The inadequate performance and the greater numbers of he Zero enable the Japanese to dominate the skies of the South Pacific during 1942. American aviators developed tactivs to oppose the Zeros, but they wre only partially successful. Even before Pear Harbor, Grunan wa working on a new fighter--the 56L Hellcat (June 1941). After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy and Gruman rushed development of the Hellcat. The first protype was flown (June 1942). `It was to be the primary American carrier plane of the Pacific campaign. The Hellcay by the end of the War was being replaced by the even more capable Corsair. The U.S. AirForces also deployed the Lockeed ?? and the North American P51 Mustang. The Air Force also deployed a range of bombers. It was the B-15 Mitchells that first struck Tokyo. The B-19 Flying Fotresses and the B-24 Liberators played important foles, but the B-20 Super Forts that would eventually win the War. These planes had capabilities far beyond those of the comparable Japanese planes and they were produced in numbers that dwarfed Japanese production.

Yamamoto Shootdowm (April 1943)

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was an early proponent of naval aviation. As commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, he mastermined the Pear Harbor attack. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific Fleet decoded an intercepted Japanese Navy transmission. They learned that Yamamoto was preparing to inspect three front-line bases near Bougainville Island. The Americans after securing Guadacanal was moving up the Slot toward Rabaul. Yamamoto hoped that they could be stopped on Bougainville. The intercepted message included precise details as to when the Admiral would becarriving and departing each base and the planes that would be used for both transport and fighter cover. Admiral Nimitz after receiving White House authorization ordered that an effort be made to shoot down Yamamoto. Nimitz's decesion was made on the basis of Yamamoto's capability as well as revenge for the Pearl Harbor attack. Nimitz also decided it would adversely affect Japanese morale. The operaion was ordered by Admiral Halsey who had taken over command of the Solomon's campaign. A squadron of 18 Army P-38 Lightnings got the assignment. This was the only American fighter with the needed range, although added fuel tanks were needed. The Americans received added incentive when they leaened that the Japanese beheaded three of the Doolitle flyers. The squadron took off from Henderson Field (Guadalcanal) (April 18). Yamamoto was noted for his pubtuality which gave the American squadron some hope of success, even so it was a longshot given the vageries of weather and other factors. The operaion came off precisely as planned. The P-38s encountered the Nakajima G4M2 "Betty" bombers and six Zero fighters escort. The P-38s shot down the Admiral's plane which crashed into the jungle. A Japanese Army search party found the Admiral's remains the following day. The Japanese government delayed announcing the Admiral's death (May 21). The Americans came up with a cover story involving civlian coast watchers to protect the secret that the Japanese code had been broken. Yamamoto's ashes were returned to Tokyo aboard the giant battleship Musashi--the Admiral's last flagship. He was given a state funeral (June 3). He was promoted to Fleet Admiral and awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, First Class. Thousands of mourners came to Nagaoka City so they could pay their respects. At the time of his death, Japan had lost Guadacanal, but the Imperial Navy was still a poweful force. The crushing American naval victories, incliuding the destriction of the Navy Air Arm would not come until 1944.

Japanese Pilots

The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was another factor in the decline of Japan as a major air power. Japan began the War with a cadre of extensively trained pilots. They were some of the finest pilots of the War. The training program was, however, very extensive, inadequate for waging an extended war against a major power. Japan never adopted a training program to create large numbers of skilled new pilots. In addition, pilots were expected to fly until they were killed. Particularly skilled polots were thus gradually lost and with them their invaluable skills. The United States would bring back paticularly skilled pilots to help train new pilots. By 1943 Japan was not only facing improved American plane types, but the replacement pilots flying the ageing Zeros were often poorly trained and unprepared to deal with the increasingly skilled American pilots.

Anti-Submarine Effort

Japan decided on war in part to secure the raw materials needed by its industry and military. One of the key resources was the oil of the Dutch East Indies. The American sunmarine campaign which targeted the Japanese merchantmrine (maru) fleet was beginning to become effective (mid-1943). The Japanese aircraft industry came up with some novel approaches. One was the Pheonix aie tanker. Air freighting oil over long distnces in quantity was not feasible, but the tankers showed the potential of the Japanese aircraft industry. The Kyaba Engineering Corporation developed an advanced auto-gyro/helicopter, the KA-1, for artillery spotting and ant-submarine warfare (ASW). This program was derailed when an American sunmarine (USS Queenfish) sank the Japanese Army carrier Akitsu which had many of the Japanese KA-1 force. The carrier had been assigned to help supply isolated Japanese Pacific garrisons. American naval intelligence was completely unaware of the KA-1. Both of these efforts proved unsuccessful, but are examples of an advanced aviation industry.

American Buildup

After Pearl Harbor the American fleet that would win the war had to be built. Operations in 1942 suceeded in stoping the Japanese advances and securing Australia where the Army under General MacArthur could begin a land campaign in New Guinea. The Navy victory at Midway (June 1942) had cost the Imperial Fleet four of their first line carries. After Midway the Japanese still had the most powerful navy, but it was no longer so powerful that it could overwealm Allied positions. This gave America the time to build the new Essex fast carriers and the new Hellcat fighters. The Hellcats began reaching the fleet (January 1943). The Japanese after losses in 1942 also began a buildup. Confrontations between the two fleets were limited in 1943. The desivie naval battles of the Pacific War were fought in 1944 and naval aviation, especially the Hellcat would play the decisive role. A entire factory was devoted to theHellcat and it tuned out 20 planes a day. The Hellcat with its 2,000 horsepower engine had the capabilities that the Wildcat lacked. It also had the range needed for the extensive Pacific battlefield. The Essex carriers that the Bavy began deploying in 1943 had a complement of 36 dive bombers, 18 torpedo planes, and 36 fighters.

Wake Island (October 1943)

Japanese air superority continued throughout much of 1942 and only did the arrival of new American aircraft and Essex class carriers in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. Wake Island after stiff resistance was seized by the Japanese in the opening weeks of the Pacific campaign. The Americans struck back (October 5, 1943). This was the first use of the new Hellcat fighters and rthe results showed that the Zero was now outclassed. The Hellcat had about the samne range of the Zero, but outclassed it in climbing potential, speed, maneuverability, armour protection, and durability.

Tarawa (November 20-23, 1943)

After the American invasion of Guadacanal, the Japanese responded forcefully from Rabaul. The American pounding of Rabaul had so reduced the capabilities of the Japanese base that they were unablre to come to the aid of the garison on Tarawa. The actual Tarawa invasion of a bloody affair that showed the Marines just what they would face in their drive across the Central Pacific.

The Carolines (February 1944)

The Japanese had received the Caroline Islands in the World War I peace settlement. They set about building a major naval base at Truck. By the time of World War II it was a major fleet bastion. The Japanese thought it was impregnable and referred to it as the Gibralter of the Pacific. The Truck Atol was protected by a barrier reef. It had a important air defenses. The U.S. Navy launched a 2-day carrier strike (Debruary 26-27, 1944). The first day was a fighrt sweep. A six carrier task force launched 72 Hellcats which destroyed much of the Japanese air defenses. This was followed on the second day by a desvestating attack by the dive bombers. This and subsequent strikes reduced Truck to a useless surround base for the Japanese.

The Marianas

The Marianas was the key target of the U.S. Navy's Central Pacific campaign. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers which would bring the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The Japanese knew this. They had hoped that the heavily defended bastions in Central Pacific (The Gilberts, and Marshals and especially Truk, which they considered the Gibraltar of the Pacific would stop the Americans. The Imperial Navy did not contest the American nslaught and the islands fell one after antoher. Even Truk was devestated, although it was not invaded. With the Marianas the Imperial Navy would finally deploy its carrietrs to stop the Americans.

German Secret Technology (1944)

The NAZIs had highly developed weapons systms that would have been of enormous aid to the Japanese, such as radar. The Japanese were very interested in obtaining access to that technology. We do not hve details on efforts by the Japanese to obtain access to this technology. Clearly NAZI battlefield revrses in Russia and North Africa convinced the Germans that they had no choice but to provide the Japanese some of their most closely guarded secrets. The NAZIs finally provided technical details and actual examples of several weapons systems (mid-1944). We do not have informastion on the full extent of the material involved, but we know that it included jet and rocket aircraft. Two Japanese submarines (Satsuki and Matsu) depart kiel cramed with NAZI military secrets (Mid-Summer 1944). Allied code breakers knew of the effort to ship military technology, but not just what was on the sunmarines. The Allies managed to sink Satsuki. The Matsu reached Singapore (July 1944). The Japanese were working on jet proppulsion. but the German plans, parts, and other material helped the Japanese engineers solve major problems. The Japanese thius began to produce a number of weapon systems that American TAI was completely unaware.

Kamikazes

Kamikaze means Divine Wind. It refers to the Mongol invasion of 1281. The Mongol Emperor of China was Kublan Kahn introduced to the West by Marco Polo. China at the time wa the most poweful country in the world Mongul armies had conquered China and then swept all opponents and pushed into the Middle East and Eastern Europe. When the Japanese Shogun refused to pay homage to the Mongol Emperor, Kubla Khan launced a massice invassion in 1281. The invasion fleet was made up of 4,200 ships and 142,000 men--larger than the D-Day invasion at Normandy. It was, however, destroyed by a typhoon which the Japanese came to call the divine wind. This became the foundation of a holy myth, buttressed in the next century by a Samari General Kusunoke who launched the hopeless battle of Minegawa at the order of theJapanese Emperor. As a result, his obedience and sacrifice came to be lionized in Japan and a holy natianal myth was built around him. His life was seen as the basis for the Kamikaze campaign. And inded the letters, diaries, and poemsof the Kamikaze pilots wre filled with references to him. Interestingly, the Kamikaze was not conceived by the Japanese General Staff. Rather it was a tactic demanded by junior officers who saw that they could not match the rising power of American air and naval power. Only reluctantly did the Generl Staff adopt the tactic. Junior naval officers wrote to the General Staff in thei own bolld demanding hat Kamakazi units and operations be employed. Admiral Onishi, anaval aviator, wa the driving force behind the Kamikaze pilot attacks. Kamakazi attacks had resulted from individual acts of Japanese pilots. After the loss of the Philippines, however, it was adopt as a major defense policy. It was central to the Japanese plan to defend Okinawa.

Strategic Bombing Campaign

The United States to adress the limitations of its two heavy bombers (the B-17 and B-24), built the B-29. It had a longer range, carried a heavier load, and was presurized so it could operate at jigher altitudes. It was the single most complicated weapons system of the War. By the time it arrived in Europe the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command had obliterated almost all important targets in Germany. Thus the B-29 was primarily in the Pacific where its long range was needed to strike the Japanese Home Islands. Japan was within range of air fields in China. Operating from Chinese air fiekds required a huge logislical effort because all supplies had to be flow over "the Hump"--the towering Himilayas from bases in India. The Army Air Corps began the strategic bombing campaign in November 1944. The initial bombing raids were inclonclusive. The air crews had very limited impact, in part because the Jet Stream had high altitudes affected nomber operations. The American conquest of the Marianahas Islands provided new bases from which the B-29s could reach the Japanese Home Islands. General Curtis LeMay who played an important role with the 8th Air Force in Europe devised new tactics. He took out the persurizing equipment amd most of the guns. The crews were ordered to bomb at low levels, thus avoiding the Jet Stream. The bombers were also armed with incendiaries. The result was massive destruction in Japanese cities crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. Major cities like Tokyo were devestated. The resulting fire storms caused thousands of civilian deaths nd significantly disrupted the Japanese war economy.

American Invasion Plans


Japanese Secret Airforce

The Japanese secret airforce is much more than an trivial historical footnote. An appreciation of the existence of the force is important in fully understand the ending of the War. Japan is often described as a defeated country in 1945. This represents a failure to reasonably appreciate the strategic situation. Japan even after the fall of Okinawa still had a sizeable airforce. American intelligence at the time did not fully appreciate the strength of the Japanese air force. Japan is a very mountanous country. After it became clear that the Americans planned to initiate a strategic bombing campaign, the Japanese military began to move its aircraft production facilities into caves, abandoned mines, and railwat tunnels where they could not be hit by American bombers. Using these fcilities Japan managed to amass a secret airforce of 12,000 combat planes that were to be used against an AZmerican invasion fleet. American intelligence had no idea of the dimensions of the force being prepared to oppose the landings. Noit only was a large force being prepared, but the Japanese aided by NAZI technology were building planes that were mre advanced than anything in the American arsenal. Some of these planes include the Japanese Army's Kario (Fire Draggon) which was based on the Luftwaffe ME-262 jet fighter. The Japanese used plans for the jet engine to be used for the Henkel He-162 Volksyager (People's Fighter). It was a simplified engine that was quicker and easier to mass produce. The Japanese version was the NE-20. It was ot just a copy, but an improved version. The Japanese avy also developed a jet fighter, the Kika (Mandrin Orange Blosom). The Navy began flying an operatioinal version (August 7, 1945). The Japanese also produced a fighter to target the B-29 bombers that were vesestating Japanese cities. The plane was the Suswi and was an improved version of the Luftwaffe ME-163 Komet. The Japanese Navy began operational flights (July 1945). There was also the Oka rocket suiside bomber. It was of limited use in Okinawa because it had to be brought into range by slow mombers, but might have proven effective in the defense of the Home Islands. TheJapanese also developed the R2Y (Beautiful Cloud) jet bomber. A prototype was flown (April 1945), but with propellar engines as the engines were not yet ready. Many of these aircraft were very complicated and thus a challenge for the Japanese to produce in numbers. They were not ready in August 1945. Some of them, however, would have been available by Spring 1946 when the American invasion was schheduled. Combined with the hug number of conventional aircraft that had been built, the American invasion could have been a very costly undertaking.

Atomic Bomb (August 1945)

The American Manhattan Program was initiated by President Roosevelt when work done by German physicists led to concern that the NAZIs might build an atomic bomb. Jewish and oher refugees fleeing the NAZIs made a major contribution to the success of the Manhattan Program. The first bomb was successflly tested at Alamagordo, New Mexico on July ??, 1945. The Allies met in a Berlin suburb after the NAZI surrender to make dcisions about the occupation of Germany and defeating Japan. The Allied powers 2 weeks after the bomb was tested demanded on July 27, 1945 that Japan surrender unconditionally, or warned of "prompt or utter destruction". This became known as the Potsdam Declaration. The Japanese military was prepared to fight on rather than surender. The Japanese Government responded to the Potsdam Declaration with "utter contemp". The Japanese military continued feverish pland to repel the Ameican invasion of the Home Islands. Many Whermacht generals at the end of the War were anxious to surrnder to the Amreicans. One German General commanding forces westof Berlin after the War said, "We wondered why they didn't come." This was not the attitude of the Japanese military. I know of know memoir written by an important Japanese military officer expresing similar sntiments. Truman was not anxious to use the atomic bomb. He was anxious to end the War and limit Ameican casulties. For Truman the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration made up his mind. There have been many books and aticles published in both Japan and America about the atomic bomb. Japanese scholars have reserched the decission making process that led to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Almost always the focus is on Truman and Ameican military leasers. Rarely do Japanese authors address the role of Japanese political and military leaders. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, and the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 8.

Japanese Surrender (September 1945)


Individual Accounts

A Japanese reader, Fujioka Keisuke, has kindly provided HBC some of his boyhood memories, both before and after the War. We note large number of Japanese readers visiting HBC and we hope some of those readers will provide us additional accounts.






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Created: January 18, 2003
Last updated: 11:07 PM 4/16/2008