*** war and social upheaval: World War II strategic bombing campaign Japanese civilian evacuations

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World War II: Pacific Bombing Campaign--Japanese Civilian Evacuations

Japanese World War II evacuations
Figure 1.--When the Japanese began evacuting children and the elderly from the cities, they at first went to stay with family and friends in the countryside. When the bombing actually began, the authorities tarted to evacuate children in large numbers. Those children who did not have family in the countryside were evcuated in school groups. Here is an unidentified group we think in 1945, obviously during the summer. This would have been shortly bfore the atomic bombs were dropped.

The Japanese began bombing Chinese cities (1931) even before actually invAding the country (1937). As China had a very small air force, the Japanese militarists who launched the war did not think their own cities were threatned. And subequently the same men who launched the Pacific War believed that the vast distances of the Pacific would prevent the United States from bombing the Home Islands. It was one of many horendous miscalculations of the War. . Japan's wood and paper cities were the most vulnerable of all the beligerant powers--giant tinderboxes. Some 8.5 million Ja-*panese civilians would be displaced from Japan's cities as the Pacific war began to go aginst Japan. The United States from an early point began to see strategic boming as the way of defeating Japan. At first the Home Islands were beyond the reach of American bombers. But American successes and the development of the long rnge B-29 bomber changed this. The Japanese began voluntary evacuations of school children, women, and the elderly (December 1943). Most adults were expected to stay in the cities and continue oprating the war plants. Some of older students evacuated were recruited to work in factories. There were no factories in the countryside. There were, however, some in the towns surrounding the larger cities amd in the outskirts pf the cities. Some of the work recruits may have even been drawn back into the cities to work in factories there. This was all part of the Government 'Labor Mobilization Policy' and 'Student Mobilization Policy'. In most cases students were genuine volunteers who petitioned their teachers and school principals as a group to allow them to work in factory complexes that could accept them. Students then entered dorms near the factory complex; strict daily schedules ensured that the children woke, cleaned their quarters, ate meals, went to and from their work shifts, and had time for evening hygiene in cohorts. Parents for the most part were reluctant to protest because it was believed that the military-funded factories could provide the children with more nourishing meals and because such protests would draw the attention of the secret police and suspicions of disloyalty or subversion. [Ohnuki-Tierney, p. 15.] The American air campaign which was at first designed to be launched from China encountered a series of problems. As a result, the bombing campaign achieved very limited success during 1944. This began to change with the American seizure of the Marianas Islands (June-July 1944) and the arrival of a new commader, Curtis Lemay, with new tactics. The systematic destruction of Japanese cities ensued (1945). Inititially only small numbers of children were involved, but when the bombings began and the goverment more firmly encouraging families to evacuate their children.

Japanese Strategic Bombing

Ironically it was the Jpanese who bean strategic bombing. The Japanese began bombing Chinese cities in Manchuria and other Chinese cities, most importantly Shgnghai (1931). This was 5 years before the Germans and Italians began bombing Spanish cities during the Spnish Civil War. This all occued even before Japan actually invading the country (1937). As China had a very small air force, the Japanese militarists who launched the War correctly calculated that their own cities were threatned. And subequently the same men who launched the Pacific War calculated that the vast distances of the Pacific would prevent the United States from bombing the Home Islands. This was one of many monumrntl miscalculations in military history. Japan's wood and paper cities were the most vulnerable of all the beligerant powers--giant tinderboxes. Some 8.5 million Japanese civilians would be displaced from Japan's cities as the Pacific war began to go aginst Japan. The United States from an early point began to see strategic boming as the way of defeating Japan. At first the Home Islands were well beyond the reach of American bombers. But American successes and the development of the long rnge B-29 bomber changed this. The United States Army Air Corps as it was becoming clear that Japan was planning a Pacific War that their Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress would not have the range needed. As a result, Boeing began work on pressurized long-range bombers (1938). All of this was a result of Japan's aggressive actions.

Planing in the Cities

Japan conducted almost comicsl ir raid drills even before the Pcific wr, fighting firs with buckts bd hnbd punps. There was little attention give to civil defense even fter Pearl Harbor. Japanese thinking was for civilians o remain in cities with war olants and ton use them to help fight fires. Thy eould be organized by neighborhood associations. [Havens, pp. 155–56.]

29 Super Fortress

Among the new American aircraft was the B-29 Superfortress. The American B-17 and B-24s which could reach Germany from bases in Britain did not have ranges which could be used to reach Japan. An entirely new plane was needed. That plane was the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. Boeing submitted the prototype for the B-29 in 1939, before the United States had even entered World War II. The B-29 was the most advanced aircraft propeller aircradt used in World War II. It was also the most expensive weapons system of the War, costing more than even the Manhattan Project. It had had many sophisticated features. The guns could be fired by remote control. The crew areas were pressurized and connected by a long tube passing over the bomb bays. The B-29 was rushed into production so fast that testing had not yet been completed. The Army Air Force established modification centers where last-minute changes could be made without slowing production lines. The most remarkable aspect of the B-29, however. was its range. It had a range of 2,850 miles and a cruising speed of 358 mph at 32,000 feet. The bomb load was 20,000 tons. Production lines for the new B-29 Superfortress began operating (early-1944). We are not sure how the Japanese learned of the B-29. Details may have been published in newspapers. They seem to have learnened by early 1944. The response was to plan an offense in China and to prepare plans to commit the fleet in the defense of the Marianas. This would be the first appearance of the Imperial Fleet in force since the Solomons campaign. They were right to be concerned. The B-29 proved to be the most effective weapon system of World War II and it arrived just at the time in the War that America seized bases that brought the Japanese Home Islands into range. An estimated 90 percent of the bombs dropped on Japan would be dropped by the B-29s (147,000 tons).

Early Evacuations (1943)

We are not sure when the Japanese learned about the B-29, but by 1943 when the America Central Pacific offensive began and American air activity in China increased, the Japan officials began to realize that the Home islands would be bombed. Covilian officials developed plans to evacuate non-essential personnel from Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and cities in northern Kyushu demed the most vuknerable. Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō initially, however, refused tgo nmplement these plans. He belived thr they would damage morale and family cohesion. he was eventully comvinced tht it was necessary to minimize civilian casualties. [Dear and Foot, p. 484.] The Japanese Cabinet formally apprived an evacution plan (October 15, 1943). [Havens, p. 161.] The Japanese began voluntary evacuations of school children, women, and the elderly (December 1943). This was not a governmnt-supported effort. The idea was for non-essentisal people not involved in the war effort to find friends and relatives in rural areas to take them in and stay in their homes. The Government provided next to no assistance. [Daniels]

War Factories

Most adults were expected to stay in the cities where the war plants were located and continue oprating the war plants. Some of older students including mosdt teengers were recruited to work in factories. There were no factories in the countryside. There were, however, some in the towns surrounding the larger cities amd in the outskirts of the cities.

Mobilizations

Some of the work recruits may have even been drawn back into the cities to work in factories there. This was all part of the Government 'Labor Mobilization Policy' and 'Student Mobilization Policy'.

Volunteers

In most cases students were genuine volunteers who petitioned their teachers and school principals as a group to allow them to work in factory complexes that could accept them. Students then entered dorms near the factory complex; strict daily schedules ensured that the children woke, cleaned their quarters, ate meals, went to and from their work shifts, and had time for evening hygiene in cohorts. Parents for the most part were reluctant to protest because it was believed that the military-funded factories could provide the children with more nourishing meals and because such protests would draw the attention of the secret police and suspicions of disloyalty or subversion. [Ohnuki-Tierney, p. 15.]

American Strateghic Bombing Campign

The United States was intent on bombing Jpn from the moment the bombs began fallin on Perl Harbor. The Pacifuic is, however, a vast expanse. nd ti=o bomb Japan you neeed bases within range of the Home Islands. The B-29 solved part of the range problem. The American air campaign which was at first designed to be launched from China encountered a series of problems. The Himalayas created a huge logistical ptoblem. Supplies had to b flown in over The Hump. As a result, the bombing campaign achieved very limited success during 1944. And then the Japande Ichi-Go offensive seized many of the bases. The problem was solved with the American seizure of the Marianas Islands (June-July 1944), Initial the results were disapooointing. The arrival of a new commader, Curtis Lemay, with new tactics, Jpnese cities begn to burn. The systematic destruction of Japanese cities ensued (1945).

The Marianas (June 1944)

The invasion of Saipan was one of the key confrontations of the Pacific War. Just as Midway was designed to force the Pacofic fleet to battlr, The Marianas Campaign would force the Imperial Fleet to battle.The Japanese defenses were centered on Saipan abd Rota. Earlier Pacific Island invasions were stepping stones. The Marianas were different. With the new B-29 bomber, air bases in the Marianas would bring the Home Islands wihin range of strategic bombardment and destoy Japan's ability to make war. Conquest of the Marianas would breach the Japanese inner defensive line. It was clearly the tipping point of the War. The Americans knew it and so did the Japannse. And unlike the earlier American landings, this one would be opposed by the Imperial Fleet--the first major Japanese fleet action since the naval bloody actions in the Sollomoons. Previous landings had made it clear that the Japanese soldiers would not surrender no matter how great the forces availed against them. American planners concluded that if the Japanese would fight to the death on isolated Pacific islands, that they would resist to the end in the defense of the Home Islands. The casualties of an invasion of the Home Islands would be horrendous. It was thus important to bring the Japanese Home Islands within the range of American bombers so that the Japanese war making power could be smashed. There was a Japanese civilian population on Saipan. While the Americans expected the military to resist to the bitter end, they expected the civilians to surrender. Japanese authorities, however, urged the civilians to kill their children and commit suiside. Many did just that. After the Americans secured the island, the Japanese civilians were interned, but in realtively comfortable circumstances. Just as Midway was designed to force the Pacofic fleet to battlr, The Marianas Campaign would force the Imperial Fleet to battle.

Expanded Evacuation

Inititially only small numbers of children were involved, but when the bombings began and the goverment more firmly encouraging families to evacuate their children and the civilkns began taking the danger more seriously. The first American raid hit Yawata, a city on Kyushu (June 1944). We believe these bombers came from Chinese bases. This was where the B-29 was going to be used. Logidtic proiblems, the Jpnese Ichi-Go offensive, and the Marianas campign shifted the boming effort to the mariunsd (Hune 1944). The Goverment began bracing for Americn bimving. They urged parenta more strongly to evacute their children. As a result some 460,000 children were evacuated. These were children sent to stay with familie and froends. [Daniels] Authorities also began evacuting school groups with their teachers. As a result, some 333,000 children had been relocated to rural areas. Theh continued their education in inns, temples and other public buildings. Another 343,000 civilans had to leave their homes when the Governmnt bgan creting firebreaks im the cities. These were not hust the children nd the elderly. This included people who moved in with rural family members or lived in temporary facilities near their factories. [Dear and Foot, p. 484.] It took some ime bfore the boming could bagin in atrength. But as it did evacuatioins expoanded (1945). And when the Mjor rids begn, the vcutiins rurned into a tidal eave of civilians nd not h=juyst the children and elderly. One historian describs the tidal wave of people fleeing the cities becoming "one of history's great migrations". [Havens, p.167.] Tokyo was bombed in the greatest strikes of the War Msrch 9-10, 1945). The fire bombing killed more peoople thn either of the two atomic bombs. It demostrted wht Gen. LeMay's new tactics could do. The Japanese had no effective defenses, just what Japan had been doing for more than a decade in China, but with far greater force. We wonder how many Japanese reflected on the fact that it was their country that had begun bombing civilians--unprotected Chinese cities. The Govenment began conducting even more evcustioins ni longer promoting, but ordering evacutions. All children in the 3rd-6th grades were ordered out of Japan's large industrial cities. The youngr children required too much supervision. The older children could be used un the war fctiries. An estimted 87 percent of these children in the msjor cties had beenn evacuated (by early April). with the American firebombing campaign reaching more cities, millions more Japanese civilians fled from their wood And paper homes into the countryside. Authortities in he countrysdide and rural villages were overwhelmed. There were no plans or resources to deal with a population movement of this scale. [Dear and Foot, p. 48] These were not organize evacutions. People fled, often on foot with lkittle more than the clothes on their back. There was no way to house or feed the evacuees. Millions of Japanese civilians were made homeless (by June). Japanese war industries were running out of eaw nmarterials by the American naval blockade. The air raids and the evacuation now meant that fctories were running out of workers. [Craven & Cate, p. 643.] Unlike the Germans, Japaese air defences were so ineffectual that the americans becam warning civlians that raids were coming (June 1945). Bombers began dropping propaganda leaflets warning civilians that they would be bombed. The Japanese were losung confidence in the military leaderes that had led them ntio the war and took the warings seriously. It also had an unexoected impact. Some Japanese civilians, in contrast to what militay leaders were telling them, saw the Americans as trying to minimize civilian casualties. [Szasz, p. 537.] Thnaks to the leaflets and news of the bombing, isome 120,000 people in Hiroshima, a city with a oopulation of 365,000 had left the city when theatmon bomb fell (August 1945). By the end of the War, some 8.5 million Japanese civilians fled Japan's cities as a rsult of the bombing. Tha was over10 percebt if the population.

War Industries


Ending the war

Whole Japsanese cities were essentially consumed by fire well before the atomic bombs were dropped. It was not the extent of th destruction that was phnomenal. And Japan did npt have an air defense that could stiop the unfolding distruction. The militry leaders who decided to wage war watched their country's cities be devoued by flame and were still intent on contuning the War. Despite what the hate Anmeruca crowd repeat enlessly, the military leaders were intent on resisting and contunuing their blead the Americans strategy. Certainky wanted to end the War, but they were intent on avoilding surrender nd submitting to occuopatiion. The civilan keadershio were willinh. But it was the military that still controlled the country. It was the ability of the Americans with one lone plane and one single bomb to destroy a city in an instabt that finnllyh gave the emperor vthe ability to stnd uop to military ledership.

Sources

Craven, Wesley and James Cate. The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki Vol. 5 The Army Air Forces in World War II. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1953).

Daniels, Gordon. "Before Hiroshima: The bombing of Japan 1944–45," History Today Vol. 32, No. 1 (December 31, 1981).

Dear, I.C.B and M.R.D. Foot, eds. (2005). The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford University Press: 2005).

Havens, Thomas R.H. Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (New York: Norton, 1978).

Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

Szasz, Ferenc Morton (2009). "'Pamphlets Away': The Allied Propaganda Campaign Over Japan During the Last Months of World War II," The Journal of Popular Culture Vol. 42, No. 3 (2009), pp. 530–40.







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Created: 8:40 PM 6/3/2017
Last updated: 11:44 AM 8/15/2022