Figure 1.-- |
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An invasion of France had been the primary goal of American military planners and President Roosevelt and the American Army since the entry of America into the War (December 1941). The President was a strong proponent of retentering Europe through a cross-channel invasion at the earliest possible date and driving acrross the plain of northern Europe to Berlin. The Allies during 1942, 43, and early 44 argued heatedly over War strategy. The cross-channel invasion of France was one of the major issues. Much of the dispute was between the Allied War leaders and Stalin. Roosevelt and Churchill, however, were not in agreement ober the invasion of France. The relative weakness of the Allies made an invassion in 1942 impossible. Churchill and the British had a more realistic assessment of German capabilitids. He convinced President Roosevelt to shift the focus to the Mediterranean (1942) which further postponed the invasion, but enabled the new American Army to gain much needed combat experience. This was probably fortuitous as the Germans in 1943 may well have been strong enough to have defeated a cross channel invasion. Stalin was outraged the Allies did not invade in 1943 and raised major objections at Teheran. Roosevelt insisted on an invasion in 1944 and Churchill eventually was persuaded although still holding doubts about the Allied capabilities. German Stalin had complained that the Allies had not even chosen a commander for the operation. President Roosevelt in a suprise move chose General Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. This was not just a prestigious title. Eisenhower was given control of the entire Aalied command, including naval and aurforces. Reich Führer Adolf Hitller after the Americans entered the War began preparing for an Allied invasion. He ordered the creation of a Festung Europa and huge resources were expended to fortify the coast from Norway to the Bay of Biscay. He brought veteran commander Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt out of etirement to command the German forces in the West. Hitler did not give him the authorirt Roosevelt and Churchill the same authority. He did not have operational control over major elements in German order if battle.
An invasion of France had been the primary goal of American military planners and President Roosevelt and the American Army since the entry of America into the War (December 1941). The President was a strong proponent of retentering Europe through a cross-channel invasion at the earliest possible date and driving acrross the plain of northern Europe to Berlin. The relative weakness of the Allies made an invassion in 1942 impossible. Churchill and the British had a more realistic assessment of German capabilitids. He convinced President Roosevelt to shift the focus to the Mediterranean (1942) which further postponed the invasion, but enabled the new American Army to gain much needed combat experience. This was probably fortuitous as the Germans in 1943 may well have been strong enough to have defeated a cross channel invasion. Stalin was outraged the Allies did not invade in 1943 and raised major objections at Teheran. Roosevelt insisted on an invasion in 1944 and Churchill eventually was persuaded although still holding doubts about the Allied capabilities. German Stalin had complained that the Allies had not even chosen a commander for the operation. President Roosevelt in a suprise move chose General Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. This was not just a prestigious title. Eisenhower was given control of the entire Aalied command, including naval and aurforces.
Churchill was less convinced about a cross-channel invasion. And largely at urging, the first joint Allied offensive was in the Meditteranean. Churchill would have initially like to have post-poned ever further. His concern was casualties. Here his experience at Galipolli must have affected his thinking. The growing importance of America in the Allied war effort meant, however, that Churchill no matter how serious his misgivings would have to defer to the Americans on this issue and he realized that the Allies at some point would have to retrn to the Continent..
Soviet dictator Marshall Stalin vorcifiously backed by Communist Parties and symphathisers demanded a second front. He argued with obvious truth that the Red Army was bearing the brunt of the War effort against Germany. He charged that the Western Allies were holding back their forces while the Red Army was bled by the Wehrmacht. Stalin had considerable reason to think this because this was precisely HIS War strategy. This is why he had approved the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 1939), hoping that the NAZIs and Western Allies would bleed each other on the Western Front and he could dominate Europe in the aftermath. Left unsaid was the fact that during 1939-41 that the Stalin had been a virtual ally of Hitler. The Allies responded with their assessment of the difficulties of breeching the Atlantic Wall and pointed to the devestating and costly air campaign that had been unleased on Germany. The Americans also pointed to the vast quantities of supplies that were being delivered to the Soviets through Lend Lease. There were also the North African and Italian campaigns.
The Anglo-American war effort was perhaps the closest military alliance in history. There was close cooperation in both the development of strategy, scientific reserach, and tactical operations. Whenever an American was given a command, his deputy was almost always a British officer. This was the case for D-Day. This close cooperation was in sharp contrast to Axis war planning. The unity in Allied planning was also in contrast to the difference among German commanders in how to defend France. This is of course striking given the stress the NAZIs placed on Führer principle and the advantages the NAZIs believed an all-powerful leader would confer on Germany. Curriously while General Eisenhower after his appointment quickly established his authority, it was the German command was divided. Hitler as part of his gocerning policy used competition among subordinates to maintain power. In France this meant dividing responsibility between Rommel and von Rundstedt. These commanders had different udeas on how to defend against the invasion. Not only was the military command divided, but Hitler reserved the final decession on the commitment of the panzers to himself. As a result of this disagreement and divided opinion, the Allies encountered a much less effective resistance than might have been the case. It was one of the ironies of history that Germany imbued with the Führer principle fought this key battle without a unity of command or direction while the Allies had one single commander fully supported by Churchill and Roosevelt.
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