Figure 1.--The Red Army soldier in June 1941 was not equipped or prepared to defeat the German Wehrmacht. The tenacity of the Red Army soldier, however, made it possible to stop and defeat the Wehrmacht before Moscow. The defeat of Barbarossa bought the time that the Red Army needed to regroup and reorganize for the liberation of their country. The war became a war of attrition with the Wehrmact--the kind of war Germany was not prepared to wage. This idealized poster in many ways perhaps unintentionally expresseses a not fully understood aspect of Hitler's war. It was not just a war against Bolshevism, but a racial war against the Slavs. Hitler's goals was to eliminate a large portion of the Slavic people and repopulate the East with Germans. The Red Army which drove out the NAZIs from Easern Europe did not truly liberate them, but did prevent the genocide that the NAZIs were planning against the Slavs. Click on the image for a discussion of the poster.

Barbarossa had achieved some starteling successes. Panzer arimies had spaerheaded ememse encircling maneuvers that had killed or taken over 6 million Red Army soldiers. Great quantities of military equipment had been destroyed or captured. An emense swath of European Russia was in German hands. Even so, it had failed in its principal objective. It did not destroy the Soviet Union. The Red Army had not been destroyed and Russian war industries continued to produce. As a result. The Wehrmacht by the beginning of 1942 had been seriously weakened. It was the failure of Barbarossa to destroy the Red Army in a swift, Summer campaign that doomed NAZI Germany. Htler's strategy was to destroy his opponents piecemeal before they were prepared and before an effective coalition could organize. The Soviets by defearing Barbarossa accomplished three critical goals. First, more than anything they bought time. This allowed them to move critical war industries and begin to set up for expanded production. Second, they succeeded in badly mauling the Wehrmacht. Third it helped the Red Army begin to learn how to fight the NAZIs. Once the Wehrmacht was bogged down in Russia, the Western Allies (principally the United States, Brirain, and Canada) had the time to build an effective military that could enter the European continent and attack NAZI Germany from the west. Not only did Hitler now face the prospect of a two-front war, but a war against opponents with far great resources than the Reich. The failure of Barbarossa also left the Wehrmacht in aposition to launch a much less powerful offensive in 1942, one that could only be conducted with force in the South and which culminated at Stalingrad.

NAZI Accomplishments

Barbarossa had achieved some starteling successes. Panzer arimies had spaerheaded ememse encircling maneuvers that had killed or taken over 6 million Red Army soldiers. Great quantities of military equipment had been destroyed or captured. An emense swath of European Russia was in German hands.

Failure

Even so, it had failed in its principal objective. It did not destroy the Soviet Union. The Red Army had not been destroyed and Russian war industries continued to produce.

Soviet Accomplishments

As a result. The Wehrmacht by the beginning of 1942 had been seriously weakened. It was the failure of Barbarossa to destroy the Red Army in a swift, Summer campaign that doomed NAZI Germany. Htler's strategy was to destroy his opponents piecemeal before they were prepared and before an effective coalition could organize. The Soviets by defearing Barbarossa accomplished three critical goals.

Buying time

First, more than anything they bought time. This allowed them to move critical war industries and begin to set up for expanded production. It also allowed Lend Lease supplies from America to arrive. Once the Wehrmacht was bogged down in Russia, the Western Allies (principally the United States, Brirain, and Canada) had the time to build an effective military that could enter the European continent and attack NAZI Germany from the west.

Mauling the Wehrmacht

Second, they succeeded in badly mauling the Wehrmacht. Wehrmact losses in Russia were staggering. Huge quantities of equipment were lot or wornout in the process of Barv=barossa. The emese distances combined with the lack of roads and the weather chewed up trucks, tanks, and mechanized equipment. The Red Army offensive before Moscow resulted in huge losses of both men and equipment. These were losses that the Germans could not begin to replace and meant that the 1942 Summer offensive would have to be far more limited than Barbarossa.

Leaning modern tactics

Third it helped the Red Army begin to learn how to fight the NAZIs. This is an often poorly addressed topic in assessments of Wrld War II. Many accounts stress the superiority of the German equipment. This was a factor, but an even more important factor was the superiority of the Wehrmacht tactical doctrine--Blitzkrieg. Even after Blitzkrieg was show cased in Poland (1939), the Allies (British and French) took no significant steps tgo change their tactical doctrine to confront the Germans. France fell (1940) bedofe changes could be made. The British even after Dunkirk had not fully learned the needed lessons which were reflected in both Greece and the Western Desert (1941 and early 1942). Rommel ith a smaller German force was able to defeat a larger and better equipped British force. The American Army at Kasserine (January 1943) showed that it had not learned needed battlefiekd tactics. The Red Army had still not fully learned the lessons of modern war. Red Army offensives in 1942 resulted in staggering losses which made possible the German drive to the Volga and Caucusses. Here Stalin's interference and an officer corps depleted by the pre-War purges were key factors.

Lend Lease

The Red Army's defeat of Operation Barbarossa was a Russian victory. It was accomplished by the tenacity of the Russian soldier and by Soviet military equipment. Much of the Soviet equipment was inferior to the German equipment. But much was high-quality equipment and higher quality equipment in 1942 began to come off Soviet production lines. In addition, the defeat of Barbarossa made possible the immense industrial and agricultural resources of America to be felt on the battlefield. Lead Lease quipment began to arrive from America in 1942. This included a wide range of equipment and supplies. Some of the most important military equipment was aircraft and trucks. The Soviets also rserved large quantities of non-military supplies such as food stuffs. Few Red Army veterans will not recall the spam that played a key role in army provisions.

NAZI Asessments of the Russians

Hitler assured the Wehrmacht planners thatvthe Soviets would collapse with in a few weeks undervthe shockmof Batbarossa. He convincedchimself that the Soviet Union would collapse like a house of cards. He was convinced that Jews and Slavs could not resist Teutonic war making. NAZI attitudes after the failure of Barbarossa were very different. The racial hatred was still there, but the arrogance was gone. Goebbels wrote in his diary, "The incidents that Sepp Dietrich related to me about the Russian people in the occupied areas are simply hair-raising. They are not a people, but a conglmeration of animals. The greatest danger threatening us in the East is the stolid dullness of this mass. That applies both to the civilian population and to the soldiers. The soldiers won't surrender, as is the fshion in Western Europe, when cimpletely surrounded, but continue to fight until they are beaten to death. Bolshevism has meerly accentuated this racial propensity of the Russian people. In other words, we are facing an adversary about whom we must be careful. [Left unsaid of course is the fact that it was Hitler who converted an ally into this dangerous adversary by breaking the non-Agression Pact.] The human man cannot possibly imagine what it would mean if this opponent were to pour into western Euroipe like a flood." [January 27--Goebbels, p. 52.]

Aftermath

Not only did Hitler now face the prospect of a two-front war, but a war against opponents with far great resources than the Reich. The failure of Barbarossa also left the Wehrmacht in a much weakened position. As a result, the Wehrmact in 1942 was able to launch a much less powerful Summer offensive. The NAZI Summe 1942 offensive could be conducted with force in only one sector of the front. Stalin expected Hitler to resume the drive on Moscow. Hitler chose the south. He wanted the agricultural resources of the Ukraine and the oil of the Caususes. With this he was cnvinced that he could wage war in perpetuity. The initial results of the southern 1942 offebnsive were impressive, but they led the Wehrmact's poweful 6th Army to Stalingrad.

Sources

Goebbels, Joseph. ed, Louis B. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: New York, 1948), 566p.

Created: 6:00 PM 2/15/2005
Last updated: 5:58 AM 8/28/2008