Figure 1.--We note countless images in German World War II scrapbooks of Russian peasants. We are not entirely why German soldiers took these photographs. We think most came from the first year and Operatiin Barbarossa. One reason was that the Russian peasants were so exotic--almost a people from another world. But another reason was the Germans without good maps, needed to ask directions. The memoirs of German soldiers mention this.

The German Wehrmacht that entered the Soviet Union was an experienced and highly professional force. Much more experienced and professiinal that the Red army it encountered. In many ways the Red Army was similar to the Polish Army in 1939 and British, French, and smaller (Norwegian, Dutch, and Belgan) armies in 1940. They were all inexperienced peace time armies unprepared for war in general and Blitzkrieg in paticular. What was different in the Soviet Union was the size of the Red Army and the scale and conditions of the Soviet battlefield. The Soviet Union presented the Wehrmacht with a battlefield unlike anything it had experienced in Poland or Westrern Europe. The campaigns in Poland and the West had been fought within about 150 miles of the borders of the Reich or occupied areas. In fact, a great deal of the fighting took place within areas that until 1918 had been German territory. The terraine and geography was very familiar to the German officers who planned and conducted the battles. They had fought there before and war gamed battles on the terraine. The rivers and mountains were well known as were the best crossings and passes Dtailed maps were readily available. In addition there were excellent, well maintained road systems over which the Germans could quickly move their panzers and other vehicles. Maps were readily available. [Citino, p. 296.] The small area over which the battles were fought allowed the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe to concentrate overwealming force. Eveeything about the Soviet Union was different. The Wehrmacht rapidly penetrated deep into the country and thus were fighting at great distances fromm the Reich. The Luftwaffe could no longer operate from well prepare fields. The Panzers no longer were ooerating on modern roads. Maps were not available and those that existed were often out of date or inaccurate. The Germans began to encounter major rivers that they were unfamiliar or totally unknown. And the size of the battlefield made it difficult to amass forces capable of destroying the Red Army as they had the smaller adverseries in the west. The Wehrmacht was experiencing significan problems well before the October rains and November frost.

Military Forces

The German Wehrmacht that entered the Soviet Union was an experienced and highly professional force. The Wehrmacht was well equipped. It wasc not fully mechanized, but it was more movile than the ponderous Red army it faced. It had powerful Panzer Division which oprtrated in close coordinatioin with the Luftwaffe--the essence of Blitzkrieg. The Wehrmacht was much more experienced and professiinal that the Red Army it encountered. In many ways the Red Army was similar to the Polish Army in 1939 and British, French, and smaller (Norwegian, Dutch, and Belgan) armies in 1940. They were all inexperienced peace time armies unprepared for war in general and Blitzkrieg in paticular. To make matters worse, Stalin in the Great Purges had decimated the Red Army officer corps. What was different in the Soviet Union was the size of the Red Army and the scale and conditions of the Soviet battlefield. Stalin had thrown away this great advantage bu moving the Red Army forward to the western boundaries which mean tht it was especially vulnerable to Barbarossa.

Western Battlefields

The campaigns in Poland and the West had been fought within about 150 miles of the borders of the Reich or occupied areas. In fact, a great deal of the fighting took place within areas that until 1918 had been German territory. The terraine and geography was very familiar to the German officers who planned and conducted the battles. They had fought there before and war gamed battles on the terraine. The rivers and mountains were well known as were the best crossings and passes Dtailed maps were readily available. In addition there were excellent, well maintained road systems over which the Germans could quickly move their panzers and other vehicles. Maps were readily available. [Citino, p. 296.] The Luftwaffe could largely operate from its well prepared and supplied air bases in the Reich. The small area over which the battles were fought allowed the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe using Blitzkrieg tactics to concentrate overwealming force so that it could achieve decisive victories. Logistics did not prove to be a signigicant factor in the brief western papaigns conducted largely near the boundaries of the Reich.

Soviet Battlefields

The Soviet Union presented the Wehrmacht with a battlefield unlike anything it had experienced in Poland or Westrern Europe. Large areas of the western Soviet Union presented the Germans with flat terraine--perfect tank country. Everything about the Soviet Union was different, howver, than the small countries of Western Europe. The Wehrmacht rapidly penetrated deep into the country and thus were fighting at great distances from the Reich. Logistics thus became an increasing problem the furthur the Wehrmacht moved East. And unlike Western Europr the Soviet Union had an extremely primitive road system. Luftwaffe penetrated into the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe could no longer operate from well prepare fields. The Panzers no longer were operating on modern roads. Maps were not available and those that existed were often out of date or inaccurate. The Germans began to encounter major rivers that they were unfamiliar or totally unknown. And the size of the battlefield made it difficult to amass forces capable of destroying the Red Army as they had the smaller adverseries in the west. The Wehrmacht was experiencing significan problems well before the October rains and November frost. There were few signs in the Soviet roads which were often unimproved waggon tracks which had a way of just running out. One German officer trying to cross a swap found that the roads simoly ran out. He writes, The occupants of the wretched huts , which we came across here and there, apparently equally bewildered when we requested them to make a circle around the swapy area and lead us to a village that was marked on our obsolete maps as being located on our line of march. These people were not familar with the names with which the village was labeled on our maps, because the name had been changed decades earlier. Often we were relying soley on our compasses and our instincts." [Raus, p. 46.]

Sources

Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2005), 428p.

Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of Erhard Raus, 1941-45 (New York: Da Capo, 2003).

Created: 3:54 AM 8/16/2008
Last updated: 4:58 PM 11/1/2008