* war and social upheaval: World War II Hitler's desperate actions








Invasion of the Reich: Hitler's Last Desperate Actions


Figure 1.--Because of increasing Red Army competence and numerical and material superority in addition to Hitler's disasterous tactical management as the Soviets and Allies prepared to enter the Reich in 1945, the only reserves that Hitler had were boys anf older men. In many cases they did not have uniforms and weapons. Here the man has a rifle. We can't make out the arm band. The Hitler Youth boy is holding an 'OT' arm band -- Organization Todt. We assume that means that he is being assigned to a labor brigade rather than a combat unit. Notice the loudspeakers for public announcements. We have since learned that this is a movie--'Decision before Dawn'. We will evetually replace the image.

Hitler launched the War wth a fraction of the manpower of the nations that he wanted to conquer and destroy. Vivtory would require a series of perfevtly managed German campaigns and military competence on the part of his adversaries. This is what occurred at the start of the War, but beginning after the fall of France (June 1940), Hitler began making serious errors. And invading the Soviet Union he began to wrecklessly commit Germany's limited mapower. Refusing to allow the 6th Army to break out of Stalingrad was just one such insane of German soldiers and refusal to listen to competent military professionals. This insane waste meant that Hitler would have to turn to poorly trained and equipped boys and oldmen to defend the Reich in thee final desperate months of the War. Hitler and top NAZIs were deperate to stop the oncoming Allied Armies. Hitler was under no illusions of what would happened if Germany fell. Some of his associates like Himmler and G�ring deluded themselves with the idea that negotiation might be possible, but they were well aware of their complicity of the enormous crimes committed in Germany's namre. with massive Soviet and Allied armies poised on the German eastern and western frontiers, Hitler authorized Himmler to take two desperate measures, form a Home guard to defend the Reich (the Volkssturm) and form a resistance group (the Wehrwolfs). Hitler had long ago lost confidence in his generals and was rapidly losing confidence in even his closest assoiciates. For both of these actions he turned to Himmler.

No Retreat Order

Hitler launched the War wth a fraction of the manpower of the nations that he wanted to conquer and destroy. Vivtory would require a series of perfevtly managed German campaigns and military competence on the part of his adversaries. This is what occurred at the start of the War, but beginning after the fall of France (June 1940), Hitler began making serious errors. And invading the Soviet Union he began to wrecklessly commit and deploy Germany's limited mapower. The most damaging of Hitler's orders was his no retreat order. The order was first given to General Franz Halder, the new commander in chief of the German Army (Secember 20, 1941). Having replaced his commanders reeling from the Red Army offensive before Moscow, Hitler ordered the Army to stand and fight. He informed Hadler that there will be no retreating from the disentegrating Russian front near Moscow. Hasler managed to stabillize the front and some cut off units were even supplied by air. Some military historians believe that this may gave saved the Germans. Stalin's faulty management of the offensive may have also been a factor. Historians f=debate this, but one matter is more clear. It et in Hitler's mind tht tghe Germans could prevail by will and that he had to stop the generals from retreating when the genrals lost their nerve. Refusing to allow the 6th Army to break out of Stalingrad (November 1942) was just one such insane use of German soldiers and refusal to listen to competent military professionals. The Sixth Army ws on the Volga abd Hitler was not going to take one step back. The adoption of Fortress Cities tactics and the reful to break out of the Courland Pocket are other examples. This insane waste meant that Hitler would have to turn to poorly trained and equipped boys and oldmen to defend the Reich in the final desperate months of the War. Hitler and top NAZIs were deperate to stop the oncoming Allied Armies.

Silesia

Silesia has been Polish territory until the Polish Partirions (18th century). Prussia and Austria fought over Silesia and Prussia got most of it. This province helped to make Prussia an important European power and a match for Austria in the stryggle for German unification. Silesia was resource rich and would be heavily industrailized. Much of the province was Germanized. By the end of 1944 the Red Arny was ready to attack into Silesia, conducting two separate Silesian Offensives (February and March 1945). This was in part to protedt thge flank of the principal Red Army effort--the drive on Berlin. The Selesian Offensives and the build up for the drive on Berlin delayed that offensuce by 2 months. The Lower Silesian Offensive was conducted (February 8-24, 1945), and the Upper Silesian Offensive (March 15-31). The Red Arny in driving the Germans our of Silesia eddectively precluded any attack on the flank of the forces preparing to attack Berlin. Soviet sources report that the Gerams expeienced 54,000 casualties, mostly men killed as a result of the stand and fight orders. [Korovnikov, Lebedev, and Polyakov] Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front after completing the Vistula–Oder Offensive was ordered westward toward Silesia with the expressed objective of protecting the left (southern) flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, which was making the war-winning advance poward Berlin. Two of the major battles in Silesia was the fight for Lauban and Breslau (now Wrocław). Lauban in Upper Silesia was the site of the last NAZI victory in World War II. The Red Army took the city (February 16). About the same time as Breslau. The Germans counterattacked and retook the city (March 8). [Wilczyński] Breslau in Lower Silesia wascdesignated a Firtress City and was the scenrv of a 3-month-long siege lasting to the end of the War (February 13 to May 6). There were other bitter fights in Silesia, but none as protracted as Beslau.

Fortress Cities--Festugen

Hitler as the War began to go wrong for him developed the strategy of creating fortress cities--Festungen. The forces and civilians within these cities were ordered to stand and defend them at all costs, fighting to the death. It is unclear just how Hitler conceived this tactic. Stalin had used the tactic, often disaterously such as at Kiev (1941). But it had worked at the three key Soviet cities--Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow. This aspect of the War is not as well known in the West as other aspects of the War, because it was primarily used in East in its more draconian implementation. And Hitler abhored giving up territiry lost. Some believe hat his World war I experience in which he believed tht the German Army had never been defeafted all played a role in his decesion as well as his growing contempt for the generals advising tactical withdrawls. As a result, cities in both the East and West were selected as Festungen. The first Festugen were in the occupied area. The surrounded Stalingrad pocket was the first designated fortress city. The result of course was disaterous. Some Fortress Cities made sense. The best examples were the French ports which the Allies critically needed after D-Day. Most did not make sense. The best known frtress cities were those in eastern Germany during the last year of the War which Hitler ordered to resist the Red army drive west. Hitler had not yet accepted defeat, but was lucid enough to realize that desperate measures were needed. He hoped that buying time could enable the deployment od secret weapons or allow the alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviets to unravel. Some of the most important fortress cities were: Warsaw, Budapest, Kolberg, Königsberg, K�strin, Danzig and Breslau. Some actually held out until Hitler committed suiside and the NAZIs surrendered (Breslau and Alderney). The great German advantage in the opening years of the War was the mobility at the heart of Blitzkrieg tactics. This resulted in the encirclement of major elements of the oppoing forces, most notably in the Soviet Union during Barbarossa (1941). The Wehrmacht gradually lost its mobility as vast mumbers of vehicle were destroyec in the East and fuel supplies becnme increasingly short. At the same time the Red Army receiving American Lend Lease tactics became increasingly mobile. The Festungen were in part a reaction to these shifting fortunes of war. But they essentially played into the Russian encirclement operations. The Soviets were able to cut off important German formations, essentially creating vast self-imposed POW camps. This is what happened in Courland. The Germans were isolted and without supplied essebntially neutralized. The Red army could thus press on west an deal with the defenders at their convenience. Hitler concepotualized the Festungen as an economy of force measure. Some were manned by second-rate or immobile troops who would might have been lost in a withdrawl, especially retreats that Hitler often delayed until the last minute. The Red Army would then have to besige the Festungen. Festung Posen, for example, was surrounded and assaulted by Chuikov's Eighth Guards Army. Most were less strategically placed and more easily bypassed by the Red Army. And many soldiers were lost that could have been more effectively used in the defense of Belin which was to a substantial degree ws defend by youths and older men--the Volkstrum.

The Volkssturm (November 1944)

Hitler authorized Himmler to form the Volkssturm (November 1944). Boys like the youth here (figure 1) and old men were inducted for military service to shore up Germany's crumbling defenses. Hitler Youth boys, along with old men, were hastily trained, ill-equipped and not terribly well led were the major recruits for the Volkssturm in the closing months of the year. The HJ boys, however, went into battle with a fervor even beyond that of the Waffen SS. Many accounts exist of battle hardeneded Wehrmacht and and SS troops who met these boy soldiers on the way to battle. Their advise was almost often "Its over. Go home!" The boys, however, armed with a few anti-tank weapons like Panzerfauts and perhaps a machinegun if one could be found, these Hitler Youth schoolboys went into battle. Often they performed amazingly well, even when given hopeless assignments. A book and movie addressing this is The Bridge. Many HJ boys, of course, did not survive. For many, their commiment to Hitler was absolute, even in the boys involved in the hopeless defense of Berlin (April-May 1945).

Hitler Descends into the Berlin Fuhrerbunker (January 1945)

Hitler returned to Berlin and because of the Allied bombing dscended into the Fuhrerbunker under the Reich Chancellry that had been prepared for him (January 16). What could have been a greater contrast to the Berghof from which he began thewar. He would remains there for 105 days until commiting suicide. He hd already decided to remain in Berlin for the last great battle of the War. The bunker was 55 ft under the Chancellery and bomb proof. He spent most of his waking hours micromanaging what gradually became largely imagined forces. He entertaining his NAZI colleagues, men like Hermann Goering, Heinrich Himmler, and Joachim von Ribbentrop. As the Soviets closed in on VBerlin, these visits became les common. Only {ropaganda Ninister Josef Goebbels brought his family into the bunker to stay at his side. His beloved German Sheperd Blondi was his constant companion. Eva Braun joined Hitler in the Fuhrerbunker just before the Soviers encircked the city (April 15). She refused to leave in spite of his orders. She protested to the Bunker staff that she was the only person still loyal to him to the bitter end. "Better that ten thousand others die than he be lost to Germany." Goebbels moved his family into the Fuhrerbunker (April 22).

Himmler Given Comand of Vistula (January 1945)

With the failure of the Bulge offensive, Hitler now faced the converging Soviet and llied forces with no reserves left. In desperation he returned to SS Commander Heinrich Himler to command the forces facing the adbancing Soviets on the Oder -- Army Group Vistula (Heeresgruppe Weichsel) (January 25). Himmler had promoted the formation of the Waffen SS, but he had no experience in military command. Murdering helpless Jewish civilians was far different han military command. Competent professional commanders loke Guderian were appalled. Guderian appointed General Walther Wenck, an experienced staff officer, to serve as his chief of staff. Himmler set up his headquarters command at Schneidem�hl, using his special train, Sonderzug Steiermark. It was absurd. The train had only one telephone line, inadequate maps, and no signal detachment or radios with which to establish communication and relay military orders. Himmler had no idea what to do. He seldom left the train, or never venturd out to deal with his men or commanders. Incredibly given the most important military command in Germany, he only worked about 4 hours daily and insisted on a daily massage before beginning work as well as a lengthy nap after his lunch. The situation continued to worsen and Himmler failed to devise any response to the Red Army attacks or report or provide Hitler any positive reports. Hitler was, however, unwilling to admit that he had made a mistake in giving Himmler a military command. Guderian demanded a change in command of Vistula. But finally began blaming Himmler for the failure to stop the Red army. Finally Hitler replaced him with General Gotthard Heinrici as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula. Himmler was actully releaved as he could no longer be held responsible and headed in his train for a sanatorium. After Guederian spole bluntly to him, Hitler fismissed him. Heinrici began preparing a defense of Berlin, but with the resources avilable it was hopeless.

The Werwolfs

Propaganda Ministrr and Gauleiter of Berlin, Joseph Goebbels, was perhaps Hitler's most loyal supportr. He was the only top NAZI to stay at his side in Berlin as the Soviet Red Army advanced. Among all his normal duties, Goebbels nthusiastically promoted the Wehrwolf effort,at least over the radio. He set up a new Werwolf radio station which operated for a few weeks. And he tried to to found a newspaper. It is unclear just to what extent a Wherwolf organization was created. Some historians dismiss the Werwolfs as a Nazi hoax. It was something that concerbed SCHAEF, but has little impact, unlike the reports of a NAZI Alpine redoubt. Werwolf is most associated with the English werewolf meaning 'man-wolf', but Wehrwolf actually was a German word meaning 'defense' or 'war' wolf. The term has been used to mean irregular warfare in Germany. A novel by that titlewas a sympathetic treatment of peasant guerrillas in northern Germany during the 17th century. The novel was promoted by the NAZI government, especially the Hitler Youth. The NAZIs preferred, howeverm, the werewolf spelling, in part because one of the right-wing groups that the NAZIs had to ncompete with in the 1920s was the Wehrwolf Bund. [Biddiscombe] And Werwolf sounded more intimidating.

Negotiation

Hitler was under no illusions of what would happened if Germany fell. He thus saw negotiation as useless. Some of his associates like Himmler and Göring were less amxious to die. They deluded themselves with the idea that negotiation might be possible, but they were well aware of their complicity of the enormous crimes committed in Germany's name. with massive Soviet and Allied armies poised on the German eastern and western frontiers, Hitler had long ago lost confidence in his generals and blamed them for the disasters for which he was largely responsible. Fot the final desoerate defense of the Eich he turned to Himmler. In the final desperatedays in the Bunker, Hitler would larn that both Himmler and G�ring were planning to negitiate with the Allies. Hitler who referred to Himmler as "der treue Heinrich" (the loyal Heinrich) was shocked. This perhps ,ore than anything broke his spirit in the Bunker.

Sources

Korovnikov I.T., P.S. Lebedev P.S., and Ia. G. Polyakov On three fronts: The combat path of the 59th Army>/i> (1974).

Wilczyński, Arkadiusz. Lubań 1945: The Last Victory of the Third Reich" (Lubań 1945: Ostatnie Zwycięstwo III Rzeszy)









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Created: 7:00 AM 4/2/2012
Last updated: 7:20 PM 5/17/2020