Figure 1.--Some of the fierest fighting in World War II took palce around this sculpture of Russian children in the middle of Stalingrad. The children are wearing their Young Pioneer uniforms.
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Figure 1.--Some of the fierest fighting in World War II took palce around this sculpture of Russian children in the middle of Stalingrad. The children are wearing their Young Pioneer uniforms. |
The battle of Stalingrad is generally seen as the turning point in the Second World War. The German summer 1942 offendive aimed south at the Ukraine, the Causeses, and reaching the Volga at Stalingrad. The massive winter losses had significantly reduced the capabilities of the Wehrmacht. They simply were unable to accomplish the assigned objectives. The Wehrmacht no longer had the strength to launch a massive offensive all along the Eastern Front. They decided to strike in the south toward Stalingrand and the Caucuses where Hitler was especially interested in the oil resources. The powefull, well equipped 6th Army was assigned the task. Initially they achieved startling successes. The shatered elements of the Red Army fell back accross the Don and were persued by the 6th Army. German inteligence, however, failed to appreciate the ability of the Russians to form and arm replcement armies. Hitler refused to even listen to estimates of Soviet strength. Hitler here made a deadly error. He dividing his forces, weakening 6th Army in an effort to seize the oil rich Caucusses. The Red Army withdrew accross the Volga when the 6th Army reached Stalingrad on August 19, but mainatined forces needed in the city to steadily bleed the Germans. Stalingrad was an important industrial city and a major transportation center for southern Russia. Hitler was also attracted by the name of the city. He felt seizing the city would be a propaganda blow to Stalin and his regime. By fighting in the city, however, the 6th Army's powerful mobil striking potential was negated by determined Red Army soldiers. The Soviet counter-offensive surrounding the 6th Army in Stalingd came as a complete suprise to the Germans. The result when Hitler refused to let the 6th Army break out was the complete loss of the Army, the most powerfull unit in the German order of battle (December 1942-January 1943).
The battle of Stalingrad is generally seen as the turning point of World War II.
Hitler launched Opperation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941. Massive Panzer encirclements destroyed whole Sovietvarmies. The losses were astonishing. The Soviet losses were so massive that Hitler and many Wehrmacht generals were convinced that Germany had won the War. The NAZIs had, however, failed to appreciate the dimensions of the Russian reserves. When finally stopped before Moscow, the Germans had seized many of the largest Russian cities, virtually destroyed the Soviet Air Force, and killed or captured about half the Red Army. . The Russian counter-offensive and bitter Russian Winter caused very substantial losses in men and material. This seriously reduced the strength of the Wehrmacht. Many front line German divisions had been reduced to a thirsd of their strength. Huge quantities of heavy weapons had been destoyed or abandoned. One Wehrmact estimate in early 1942 indicated that of 162 German divisions, only 8 were fully combat ready. Thus the German offensise in 1942 had to be much more limited than Barbarossa in 1941.
Stalin had by 1928 established his dominance over the Soviet Union. He had an almost incaluably suspious, vindictive mind. Under Stalin the aparatus of the Soviet state was extended into every facet of Russian life. During the 1930s he oversaw an emense industrial exansion focusing on heavy industry and military production. He institude purges expanding labor camps to unpresendent proportions. Rivals were purhed, but arrests and executions were carried out of unbelievable proprtions designing to terrify the average Soviet citizen into unquestioning obedience. In 1937 that purge had reached the military. One of the reasons for the German successes in the early stages of Barbarossa during 1941 was the degree to which the Red Army cadre of professional officers had been weakened. The role of the Comisariat wand secret police in the army was expanded, further weakening morale. Many of Red Army dissasters in 1941 were the result of Stalin's refusal to allow restreat. Although Stalin had been silent during the initail stage of the German invasion, he proceeded to enforce a ruthless policy of shootig officers who retreated or failed to perform successfully.
The Wehrmacht had seized Kharkov in October 1941. The Russians buoyed by their suucessful Winter in Spring 1942 offensive launched an offemsive to retake the strategic city. Marshall Timoshenko in Spring 1942 attacked toward Kharkov and encountered the main German striking force. The Soviets had assumed that the NAZIs would resume the offensive toward Moscow and had not anticipated forces of the strength in the south. The Soviet offensive proved to be a disaster. The Soviet forces were shatered. The Germans launched a counter offensive. The Germans launched a counter offensive on May 12. German Panzers cut off several Soviets armiesand began the systematic reduction of the Kharkov pocket which they achieved by the end of May. More than 70,000 Red Army soldiers were killed and 200,000 men taken prisoner. There were also huge losses of equipment. The entire southern wing of the Russian line had been shatered. The Red Army in the South by May 1942 had exhausted its offensive capability. The Wehrmacht was, however, not fully aware of the waekness of the Soviet position. The Germans seized the Crimea after valliant fighting in Sevastrpol. Thec Donets industrial basin was virtually undefended. The Germans advanced into the Caususes, threatening the Soviet Union's most important source of oil. Army Group A took Rostov (July 23). Now the Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies struk for Stalingrad.
Stalin was in early 1942 prinmarily concerned with Moscow, understandable given how close the Wehrmacht had come to taking it in 1941. Moscow was a prize of emense sreatehic importance. Not only was the capital, but in the Soviet system of centalized rule it was
as the nerve center of the Soviet Union, for the erconomy, the government and the military. Thus Stalin concetrated the bulk of the Red Army around Moscow, convinced that the Wehrmacht would again strike at the capital. The southern wing of the Russian defense line was the weakest, especially along the Don Steppe and the Caucasses.
It was in the South that Hitler decided to attack, lured primarily by economic consideration and the the resources--especially the oil resources of the Caucausses. Hitler in the early military campaigns had allowed the Wehrmacht generals to conduct the campaigns without undue interfearence. The military successes increased his prestige to the extent that he gave less and less credence to the Wehrmacht commanders and relied increasingly on his own personal judgements, lacking no moral compunctions and often colored by vicious racial hatred. The Wehrmacht failure to take Moscow in 1941 was largely due to his interfearence in the campaign. Failing to apprecaite this, he made himself Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht in 1942 and proceeded to interfere even more in operations. He fired many competent officers and ignored the adbise of others. Those around him like Keitel and Jodl usually did not even attempt to interceed once they knew what he wanted.
The Germans having failed in their objectives for Barbarossa in 1941 could no longer lauch a massive offensive all along the front. Faced with the prospect of a longer war than he had inmagined, Hitler decided to focus on the south where the richest economic prizes could be found: the grain of the Uktaine, the minerals of the Don Blass, and the oil of the Caucussess. He was convinced that Germany with possession of these resources could wage war indefinitely. As a result. Equipment and replacements as well as actual units were shifted south from Army Groups North and Center to Army Group South.
The German summer 1942 offensive was code named Operation Blue. Blue aimed south at the Ukraine, the Causeses, and reaching the Volga at Stalingrad. The Germans planned to anchor their southern line on Stalingrad while they completed the conquest of the Caucausses. The massive winter losses had significantly reduced the capabilities of the Wehrmacht. They simply were unable to accomplish the assigned objectives. The Wehrmacht no longer had the strength to launch a massive offensive all along the Eastern Front. They decided to strike in the south toward Stalingrad and the Caucusses where Hitler was especially interested in the oil resources. To achieve this, Hitler assessmbed 74 divisions. There were 59 German divisions (9 armored and 7 motorized). Despite the lessons of the successful Blitzkrieg operayions in 1939-41, the German armored units were not concentrated, but rather dispersed among the various German formations. Combining infantry and armour sttrngthed the German units, but it also serious slowed operations and limited mobility. There were 8 more German divisions being assembed in the rear. The rest were divisions of AXIS allies, much weaker formations supplied by Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia. There was also the Spanish Blue Division composed of volunteers. Half of the Luftwaffe strength in the East was assembled unfer the Fourth Air Fleet. They wre faced by 15 Soviet armies. (Soviet armies were organizationally smaller than Wehrmact armies, sometimes composed of as little as 2-3 divsions.) The Soviets were assembling 10 additional armies further west. The bulk of the Red Army, however, was further north still expecting an offensive aimed at Moascow.
The Wehrmacht launched Blue on June 28, 1942. Waves of Luftwaffe bombers ponded Soviet positions. Panzers sliced through Red army units weakened by the failed Kharkov offensive. The Russians wre unprepared for the strngth of the NAZI onsluught, having expected an attack further north ainmed at Moscow. The initial strike was east from Kursk toward Voronezh. These were followed in early July with additional units attacking further South. Other German units attacked south east toward the Don Bend. Other units attacked east toward the Caucasus. The Germans by July 5 had reached the Don. Initially the Germans achieved considerable success. The shatered elements of the Red Army fell back accross the Don and were persued by the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army. The Wehrmacht failed, however, to achieve the massive encirclements that had characterized Barbarossa in 1941. The Germans concluded that this was because the Red Army had been fatally weakened. It was in fact because the Red Army was laerning how to fight a modern war. German inteligence failed to appreciate the extent of the Sovier reserves and the the ability of the Russians to form and arm replcement armies. Hitler refused to even listen to estimates of Soviet strength. He was, however, was delighted with the accomplishments of the campaign. When Speer Hitler at his Vinnista headquarters, he found an optimistic, if not enthusiastic man already planning the next campaign. He explained to Speer. "I have had everything prepared. As the next step, we are going to advance south of the Caucuses and help the rebels in Iran and Iraq against the English. Another thrust will be directed along the Caspian Sea toward Afghanistan and Ondia. Then the Englih will run out of oil. In two years we will be on the borders of India. Twenty to thirty elite German divisions will do. Then the British Empire will collpase. They've already lost Singapore to the Japanese. The English will have to look on impotently as their colonial empire falls to pieces." [Speer, p.50.]
The Wehrmacht split the expanded Army Group South into two elements, Army Group A and B. Hitler here made a deadly error. Having learned nothing from the 1941 offensive, Hitler planned to seize both Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Important Wehrmacht commanders including Jodl argued against dividing the limited forces. In some cases Hitler shouted them down and refused to hear data undemining his decission. He thus duvided the German forces, weakening Army Group B's powerful 6th Army, in an effort to move south and seize the oil rich Caucasus. The front had begun over a line of 500 miles, the objectives would mean a front of 2,500 miles. Instead of focusing his attack, Hitler was again dangerously dispersing his forces. [Fest, pp. 659-660.] Hitler dissatisfied with the progress Army Group A in the south was making toward the oil fields in Caucausses, decided to detach armour forces from Army Group B moving east through the Don Bend toward Stalingrad. This was a blunder of emense proprtions which his generals argued against. The Soviets had expected the Germans to strike in the north and renew the drive on Moscow. The Soviets were thus surprised at the German offensive in the South and as a result in July did not have the forces to mount a successful defense of Stalingrad. A focussed German attack at this time probably would have taken the city. In addition, the attack on the Don Bend and Stalingrad was over flat, open ground perfect for tank warfare and would have allowed the Wehrmacht to have employed its armour to maximum effect. In contrast the drive into the Caucauses was over teriane much less suited to tank warfare. Thus for much of the crucial battle for Stalingrad, major elements of Army Group South were diverted south into the Caucsses and not engaged with important Red Army units.
The German stook Rostov on July 23, but the Russians executed a fighting retreat and the Wehrmact failed to inflict major losses. The 6th Army resumed its offensive in the Don Bend in late July and firece fighting is reported in early August. The Germans have trouble eliminating Russian ressistance and the Red Army manages to hold on to pockets on the west bank of the northern Don Bend. The 6th Army on August 19-21 crosses the Don at positions closet to the Volga and prepares to drive on Stalingrad. The 16th Panzer Division on August 23 lunches a major offensive toward the Volga. The Luftwaffe 4th Air Fleet begins its offensive on Stalingrad. Luftwaffe attacks reportedly kill 40,000 people, mostly civilians on the first day of these attacks. The 18th Panzer Division on August 23 reached the Volga north of Stalingrad, but it confronted with Soviet attacks on its northern front. The Germans on August 29 attempt to encircle Red Army units west of Stalingrad, but pressure on its northern flank precents the 16th Panzer Division from participating in this offensive on time and the Red Army units withdraw in good order toward Stalingrad. Marshall Zukov takes over command of the southern armies at the end of August. In early September, the Germans ring around Stalingrad begin to close. By mid-September the Soviet Volga crossings supplying the Stalingrad come under artillery fire.
Only weak Red Army units defended the Caucasus. Major German formations in Army Group A crossed the lower Don and poured into the Caucusus. The Red Army did not seiously contest this offensive and fell back in good order. This mean that powerful German formations were diverted from the climatic battle of the War which ws to be fought in and around Stalingrad. Maikop, the one oil field north of the Caucuss Mountains, was so completely destroyed that it took a year to bring it back into production. The bulk of the Soviet oil fields were south of the Caucuss Mountains. This was a major barrier in which the Panzers were useless. German mountain units probed the few mountain passes and on August 21 planted the swastica flag on Mount Elbrus. The terraine, however, enabled small Red Army units to fight off superior German forces. The passes were easily defended and in October when the cold weather began were impassable. Thus Army Group B with its strong Panzer forces was uselessly deployed while the 6th Army and Fourth Panzer Army struggled for Stamingrad far to the north. In the end, the massive offensive into the Caucusses failed to net meaningful quantities of oil for the NAZIs and only served to weaken the drive on Stalingrad.
The 6th Army reached the suburbs of Stalingrad on September 13. The Red Army withdrew accross the Volga, but mainatined just enough forces in the city to steadily bleed the Germans. Small units of the Red ASrmy crossed the Volga under fire at night to reinforce the garrison. Stalingrad was an important industrial city and a major transportation center for souther Russia. Hitler waslso attracted by the name of the city. He felt seizing the city would be a propaganda blow to Stalin and his regime. By fighting in the city, however, the 6th Army's powerful mobil striking potential was negated by determined Red Army soldiers. The battle for Stalingrad proper began in October. The struggle in Stalingrad was some of the fiercest and most brutal in World War II. Nor quarter was given. Prissoners were not taken. Without crossing the Volga, the city could not be surrounded. The 6th Army was ordered to take the city. Fighting ensued from house to house and factory to factory. The Red Army's resistance was legendary. The city center had been reduced to rubble by the Luftwaffe, but te rubble offered cover for the defenders. The Germans met determined if not suicidal Russian ressistance. In the caulderon of Stalingrad all of the advantages of German mobility and superior tactics were lost. In the brutal house to house combat that ensued the courage and resourcefulness of the Red Army soldier proved to equal the NAZI supermen if not surpass them. The front lines was somryines marked by an interior building wall or the fllor of a building. The Whrmacht which in 1941 might advance 50 kilometers in a day, now measured in gains in meters.
At the end of September the 6th Armyshifts its assaults from the southern and norther sections of Stalingrad to the northern sector where there were three emense concrete factories, including the Red October Plant producing tanks. At this huge tank factory, construction continued at one end even after the Germans had entered the other end. On October 3 the 6th Army opens an offensive along a 3 mile front to finally seize the now largely destroyed city. By October 14 the Germans are within meters of the Volga and control 90 percent of the city. To accomplish this, Paulus committed the lastreserves of the 6th army and left his flanks protected only by relatively weak Romanian divisions. Then the first frost sets in and wiffs of snow begin to appear.
The only other active land camaign in 1942 was in North Africa. The number of men involved dwarfed the titantic struggle in the East, but was of considerable straegic importance. Rommel's Africa Korps had stunned the British by taking Tobruk on June 21. He was stopped by the 8th Army at El Alemein on June 26, 1942. Churchill gave command of the 8th Army to Montgomery. American supplies flow to the 8th Army Allied naval forces cut Rommel's supplies to a trickle. The superior industrial capacity and resources of the Allies began to impact battlefield results. Montgomery is thus able to strike Rommel with overwealming force at El Alemein October 24-November 4 smashing the Africa Korps. [Fest, p. 662.] Montgomery preceeded his attack with an artileru barage lasting 10 days. He then pursues s Rommel west. This is followed by surprise American and British landings in Morocco and Algeria--Opperation Torch on November 8-December 1. Hitler inexplicably at a major phase of the Battle for Stalingrad orders element of the German strategic reserve and large numbers of Luftwaffe transports used in a futile effort to save Tunisia.
Zukov during October husbands his resources, only commiting the minimal amount of men to Stalingrad to prevent a German victory and to continue bleeding them. He begins assembling about 1 million men, artillery, and tanks north and south of Stalingrad. The Soviets struck in mid-November. This time Marshall Zukov had engineered a massive encircling operation, clear evidence that the Russians had learned the basics of modern mecganized warfare that the Germans had introduced. Zukov struck the weak Romanian armies north and south of the city. The offensive was launched on November 19 south of Stalingrad in a driving snow storm with a massive artillery barage, obliterating whole Romanian units. [Fest, p. 662.] Then Zukov on November 20 strikes northwest of Stalingrad into the Don Valley Ismas again obliterating whole Romanian units. German units had been committed to the battle in Stalingrad and the flanks had been protected only by the Romanians. The two wings of the Russian forced joined 3 days later, surrounding the 6th Army and units of the 4th Panzer Army in Stalingrad.
NAZI Germany began World War II with the most powerful airforce in the world. Much of Germasny's early success can be ttributed in part to its air superority. The NAZI's first failure, however, came in the Battle of Britain, a Luftwaffe operation. This affected Göring's prestige with the Führer. Lufwaffe Commander Field Marshall Goering, after the Red Army surprise offensive, promissed Hitler that the 6th Army cut off in Stalingrad could be supplied by air. This appears to have been bluster and not based on any real assessment. He wanted to regain loss prestiuge. He had no idea, however, of the 6th Army's requirements or the Luftwaffe's cargo lift capability. To make matters worse for the Luftwaffe, the Allies at the same time struck in North Africa. Hitler decided to maintain the Afrika Korps in Tunisia and the Luftwaffe would also have to supply it because so many of the Axis (mostly Italian) merchant cargo vessels were being sunk. The Luftwaffe would have had diffiulty accomplishing either goal. In the end they were unable to do either. Paulus estimated that the 6th Army would require 500 t of supplies a day. The Luftwaffe was able to deliver less than 100 t per day. The lack of supplies redered the 6th army increasingly less effective an inmobile as the siege went on. Goering's pledge to supply the 6th Army by air was a illusionary as his pledge that German cities would bever be bombed or that the RAF would be desimated. A HBC reader as a GI in Germany after the War met a youth named Hans who as a Hitler Youth boy flew a combat mission in the Luftwaffe Komet
rocket plane. His brother was killed flying supplies into Stalingrad where the 300,000 men of the 6th Army were trapped.
Hitler ordered Paulus to move his headquarters into the city and form a defensive perimeter. Speaking at the annual commemoration of the beer hall putch, Hitlerv proclaimed, "There will no longer be any peace offerings coming from us." Contrasting the situation with Imperial Germany, he assured Germans that there stood at the head of the Reich a leader "who has always known nothing but struggle and with it only one principle: Strike, strike and strike again!" [Domarus, p. 1935.] The Russian offensive came as a complete suprise to the Germans.
Hitler refused to let the 6th Army break out which it probably could have imediately after the initial Soviet encirclement. Paulus asked for permission three times. Each time he was refused. Conferences were held to discuss the issue. Keitel knowing Hitler wanted to hear proclaimed, "Mein Führer, Stand at the Volga!" Goering pledged to supply the 6th Army by air. Jodl reccomendee waiting. The pleas from Paulus and other commanders were pushed aside. [Fest, p.664.] Hitler was determined to turn Stalingrad into a fortress. His refusal to allow retreat may have saved the Germany army before Moscow in 1941. At Stalingrad it was a huge mistake. [Davidson, p. 440.]
Von Manstein assembled a Panzer force to relieve the Stalingrad pocket. This was Operation "Wintergewitter" (Winter storm). He assembled forces from XIV Panzer Corps and attempted to relieve the 6th Army from the southwest. Von Manstein's force was in adequate and complicated by his reluctance to abandon Stalingrad. Hitler gave Von Manstein the impression that his orders were to link up with the 6th Army that would try to break out of Stalingrad. Hitler never, however, issued orders to Paulis to attempt such a breakout. In fact he order Paulis to stay put and hold Stalingrad at all costs. In any case the 6th Army was increasing less able to execute even if Hitler gave the order. The German equipment had deteriorated to the point and the fuel problem was so severe that much of the 6th Army would have had to retreat from Stalingrad on foot.
Von Manstein moved forward in the face of an intense blizzard. Gradually Red army resistance intensified and Von Manstein had increasing problems obtaining supplies. He was stopped by the weather and the Red Army on December 19 about 80 kilometers from Salingrad. Mainstein realized that he did not have the forces need to break through. He hoped, however, that Paulus would disobey Hitler's orders and break out to meet him. He did not. Manstein's force held its position for 5 days under increasing Russian pressure and brutal weather conditions. Finally he turned back, in part to avoild being encircled himself.
Meanwhile another Russian offensive destroyed an Italian army, endangering the entire German possition in southern Russia. Mainstein is forced to withdrawl. Army Group A is ordered on December 24 to begin to withdraw from the Caucausses. The Russians in January pressure the Stalingrad pocket. Another Russian offensive west of Stalingrad January 12, 1943 obliterated the Hungarian army. Thus elimating virtually all of the Axis satellite armies that had accompanied the Wehrmacht into Russia.
The Russians by January 22 had reduced the Stalingrtad pocket to one-third of its original size and seized the last usable airfield. Red Army units on January 25 broke through to the Stalingrad bridgehead along the Volga, cutting the 6th Ary into two pockets.
Hitler on January 31 promoted Paulis to Field Marshall assuming he would shoot himself rather than surrender. No other Field marshall in German history had surrendered. Paulus after encouraging his commanders to do this, decided to surender the same day when Red Army uniys reached his headquarters. The northern enclave fought on for 2 more days until February 2. Many German soldiers, often near starvation, fought on until their amunition was exhausted.
The consequences of the battle were enormous. The result in the end was the complete loss of the entire 6th Army, the most powerfull unit in the German order of battle. There were 20 German divisions destroyed and more sevely damaged. War material equal to 6 months production of German war plants was lost or destroyed. These were losses that the Germans simply could not replace. Military historians debate just where the turning point of the War occurred. While there is no unanimity, many historians believe that the Russian offensive before Moscow (December 1941) ended any real hope of Germany winning the War. Not winning and losing awar or two vert different outcomes. The loss of the 6th Arny at Stalingrad probably ensured the defeat of NAZI Germany now that America had entered the War.
The Russian Offensive and gradual reduction of the Stalingrad pocket took place during the Christmas celebration in Germany. It was a bitter Chriustmas for Germany. Most Germans haf fathers or sons serving on the Eastern Front. NAZI big wigs gave optimistic speeches, but combined with the Allied bombing, many Germans now realized that the War was not going well.
Varous sources claim that a German soldier wrote this letter home from the battle to his clergyman father. It is believed to be one of the last German letters out of the Stalingrad pocket.
"... In Stalingrad to question God means to deny Him. I must tell you that, dear Father, and I am doubly sorry for it. You brought me up, because, I had no mother,
and you always kept God before my eyes and my soul. And I doubly regret my words, for they will be my last. After this I will be able to speak no others which
could compensate or reconcile.
"You are a clergyman, Father. In one's last letter one says only what is true or what he believes to be true. I have looked for God in every shell crater, in every
destroyed house, in every corner, among all my comrades when I lay in my hole, and in the sky. God did not show Himself, when my heart cried out for Him.
Houses were destroyed. My comrades were as brave or as cowardly as I. Hunger and murder were on the earth. Bombs and fire came from the heavens. But
God was not there. No, Father, there is no God. I write it again, and know that it is terrible and that I cannot make amends for it. And if in spite of all there should
be a God, then it will be only with you, in the hymnbooks and prayers, the pious sayings of priests and pastors, the ringing of chimes, and the smell of incense. But
not in Stalingrad." [Vetter]
Only 90,000-110,000 German soldiers (accounts vary) in the 6th Army 4th Panzer Army survived the Battle of Stalingrad to surender to the Soviets in January 1943. Only 5,000 of those German POWs survived the Gulag and finally managed to return to Germany years after the War. Only a fraction of the Soviets captured by the Germans survided the NAZI camps. The Germans treated Soviet POWs differently than POWs from the Western Allies.
A German reader writres, "It is very good that we humans always remind each other of the great war tragedies. Especially Stalingrad was one of the heaviest and sadest ones. Although these short reports can hardly cover the whole tragedy they are important to be mentioned again and again - in order to remind everybody about what can happen once a war is waged. We should point the finger on those things and show them to our political leaders who
almost all have been born after World War II. Much more is needed in order to save us from the egoists who see no other goal of their life than becoming the biggest - which never will happen - and most cruel . They should study the cruel details of history - or do you thing the Sadam Hussain´s and Ladens and many other do not bother about their fellow people´s fate and pains? I think they do not." HBC agrees. There are men like Sadam who want to use War to impose their will, regardless of how his or other people are affected. There are also people like Hitler and Bin Laiden who see war as a possitive good and revell in it.
Davidson, The Unmaking of Adolf Hitler (The University of Missouri Press: Columbia, 1996), 519p.
Domarus, Max. Hitler: Reden: und Proklamationen 1932-1945 kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgwenossen, 2 vols, (Würzburg, 1962-63).
Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1973), 844p.
Schneider, franz, Charles Gullans, and S. L. Marshall. Last Letters from Stalingrad (Greenwood Publishing Group June, 1974).
Speer, Albert. Spandau: The Secret Diaries (New York: 1977).
Vetter, John F., translater, "Letter 17", Last Letters from Stalingrad. (Coronet Press, 1955).
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