* war and social upheaval: World War II Pacific Theater -- the Philippines liberation Luzon








Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon (1945)

World War II battle for Manila
Figure 1.--An American soldier in Manila is recuing an injured Filipino girl (February 1945). Defying orderes fro General Yamashita, Japanese Marines in Manila went on a barbaric killing spree. MacArthur refused to bomb the city. The Japabese who refused to surrender had to be rooted out byulding by building. Civilians were not just caught in the crossfire. The Japanese actually sought out civilians to kill. An estimated 100,000 civilians perished, most were killed by the Japanese on purpose. Source: MacArthur Memorial.

The Americans finally reach the main island of Luzon with landings at Lingayen Gulf (January 9, 1945). The initial American landings were unopposed. Japanese Imperial Army General Tomoyuki Yamashita had been tasked with the defense of the Philippines. He was one of the Japanese's most effective generals. He devised the plan for defeating the large British garrison in Singapore commanded by General Percivel and became known as the Tiger of Malaya. He has been side tracked because of differences with Tojo, but was assigned to defend the Phippines. He realized that he could not stop the Americam landings at Lingayen Gulf and to oppose them would exposed his force to devestating air attacks when they retired into the hills. He conceived of a defense based using the mountanous teraine in the interior using caves, pillboxes, and artillery to shield his force from American firepower and to cause as high American casualties as possible. The Japanese strategy at this point had become to make the American pursuit of the War so costly that they would not dare invade the Home Islands. MacArthur pushed toward Manila. Yamashita conducted a skillfull defense, but without air support and the armor and artillery support of the Americans could not stop them. The Americans within a month had crossed Luzon's Central Plain and were approaching Manila. Yamashita at this time evacuated Manila for defenses prepared in the mountains. He left troops in Manila to take a toll on and tie down the advancing Americans. Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi commanded the force of 16,000-19,000 mostly Imperial Marines in Manila. I am not sure what orders he was following. He defied Yamashita's orders. What ever the orders, cut off by the Americans, the Japanese turned on the defenseless civilian population of Manila. They seemed to have decided that if they were going to die that they would take as many Filipinos with them as possible. The Japanese targeted and killed an estimated 100,000 Fhilippino civilians in an outporing of mindless violence which has become known as the Rape of Manila. The city had to be taken block by block in vicious hand-to-hand combat. Iwabuchi and almost his entire force were killed. Manila finally fell (March 4). Yamashita with a force of about 50,000-65,000 soldiers resisted in the hills north of Manila. MacArthur decided against pursing him there n forcebecause of the casualties that would have resulted. While Yamashita did not surrender, without supplies and by withdrawing to remote mountaneous areas, he was no longer a factor in the War. The Americans were horrified at the condition of the POWs and civilians held in Japanese concentration camps. MacArthur declared the Philippines secure (June 30, 1945). Yamashita continued to hold out, however, until the the Emperor ended the War (August 15). Yamashita finally surrendered (September 2).

Leyte (October 1944)

The lsargest and most important island in the Philippines is Luzon. Leyte was, however, the most vulnerable to naval forces coming from the east. And with the Imperial Navy able to deploy powerful forces, Leyte was the logical first step. U.S. Army rangers began the invasion of Leyte (October 17). As the U.S. Army invasion proceeded inland the soldiers were supported by the planes from Taffy 1, 2, and 3. A 2- day naval bombardment was followed by landings of the 6th Army under General Walter Krueger (October 22). MacArthur President Sergio Osme�a waded ashore with the main invasion force at Leyte Gulf (October 20??, 1944). The American Army forces advanced steadily. The Japanese resisted, but could not match American fire power. The destriction of the Japaese fleet in the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf opened the way for the land campaign. The Armericans pushed the Japanese 35th Army out of Luzon's central valley and into Leyte's mountain backbone. Bitter fighting ensued as the Americans pushed the Japanese north. Further landings occurred at Ormoc, an important port (December 7, 1944). The kamikazes appeared in substantial numbers at Ormoc. The Japanese had prepared fortified positions supported with heavy artillery. Ormoc fell (December 10). The primary objective of assaulting Leyte from the beginning was was to provide a staging area for the much larger effort needed to liberate Luzon. It was on Luzon Luzon where most of the Japanese combat forces were positioned. The completion of msajor conbat operations on Leyte gave the Americans their first foothold in the Philippines.

General Yamashita

Japanese Imperial Army General Tomoyuki Yamashita had been tasked with the defense of the Philippines. He was one of the Japanese's most effective generals. He devised the plan for defeating the large British garrison in Singapore commanded by General Percivel and became known as the Tiger of Malaya. He has been side tracked because of differences with Tojo, but with Tojon gone he was assigned to oversee the defense of the Philippines.

Japanese Strategy

Yamashita concluded that Luzon would be the next American objective and they woukd land at Lingayen Gulf, just as the Japanese had done in 1941. He realized that he could not stop the Americam landings at Lingayen Gulf and to oppose them would exposed his force to devestating Naval artillery and then air attacks when they retired into the hills. He conceived of a defense based using the mountanous teraine in the interior using caves, pillboxes, and artillery to shield his force from American firepower and to cause as high American casualties as possible. The Japanese strategy at this point had become to make the American pursuit of the War so costly that they would not dare invade the Home Islands.

Japanese Preparations

General Yamashita after the naval losses in the Nattle of Leyte Gulf and the heavy attrition of air power, realized that he would have to fight the battle for Luzon with the forces on the island. Little support or reinforcements could be expected. He had a sizeable force Luzon, about 260,000 men. They were, however, poorly supplied with vehicles and heavy arms (artillery and armor). And they would not have air support. Yamashita fully understood tht they could not sucessfully engaged the well-supplied and heavily armed American Army with air support in conventional battles. MacArthur in his 1941-42 defense of the Philippines, had sought to hold Manila, the central Luzon plains, and the Bataan Peninsula because of the naval facilities and airfields there. He failed becase he neglected to appreciate the stregth bof the Japanese and did not preposition supplies on the Batan Peninsula. Yamashita had a better understanding of the attacking force than did MacArthur. With the Japanese fleet destroyed and air power devestated, naval facilities and airfields had no importance for Yamashita, Thus his strategy was to stage delaying attacks and to withdraw his forces into three widely separated strongholds where because of rugged terraine, American heavy equipment would have less affect. Here he believed he could hold out in an extended battle of attrition, causing a maximum of American casualties and delaying the American push toward the Home Islands. Yamashita divided his Luzon forces into three groups, each based around a remote geographical region (Shobu, Kembu, and Shimbu). Shobu Group was directly commanded by Yamashita. It was locrted in northern Luzon. Shobu force totaled about 152,000 men. Kembu Group was a much smaller force with about 30,000 troops men. They occupied he rugged mountains west of Clark Air Field which Yamashita reliazed was a primary Japanese targe as well as the Bataan Peninsula and Corridor. Shimbu Group was located in the southeast and had about 80,000 men spread out along Luzon's island's long Bicol Peninsula extending toward Leyte and the mountains east of Manila. Most Shimbu units were positioned close to Manila and controlled reservoirs which provided Manila's water supply. Prepositioning these forces was important because the Japanese were not fully mechanized with a limited number of vehices to move men and equipment and would be vulnerable to air attack if they tried to shift positions once the Americans landed and had Clarke Field. .

General MacArthur

Douglas MacArthur was one of Americ's important five-star military commanders in World War II. He had destunuished himself as a courageous divisionjal commander in World War I. He was a modernizing force after the War, serving as commandant of West Point and Chief of Staff of the Army. His right-wing outlook caused him to brutally supress the Bonus Marchers which along with personal scandal tarnished his military career. With rising Japanese military threats, President Roosevelt sent him to the Philippines to organize the Commonwealth's defense. He did some good work, but performned poorly when the Japanese attacked. President Roosevelt ordered him to Australia to organize an Allied counter offensive. Here he performed much more effectively. Ironically, despite his miltary achirvements perhaps his greatest achievement was overseeing the occupation of Japan and helping to create a modern democratic society. MacArthur also comanded United Nations forces in Korea. He engineered the brilliant Inchon landings which broke the back of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Ignoring warnings of Chinese interbention, he drove north leading to the tragedy of the Chosun Reservoir and the near collapse of the United Nations position. President Truman finally fired him for insubordination.

American Plans

Luzon's mounaneous Bicol Peninsula is extemnely rugged and had few roads. It is is separate from Leyte by a very narrow strait. This mean the American forces on Leyte were only a few miles from Luzon. But fighting up the rugged Peninsula would have been a nightmare and would have thrown away the great advantage he Americans had in heavy equipment and mechanization. Thus General MacArthur planned an amphibious operation toi liberate Luzon. He chose Lingayen Gulf in the north, an area of sheltered beaches. It was located ariund half way down Luzon's wesern coast. And it led directly into central plains which provided a realtvively unobstructed route south to Manila. It allowed the Americans to bypass northern Luzon. The central plain was the heart of the island and where the best roads existed for mechanized American equipment as well as the rail network. On the Central Plain, the substantial American force would have room to maneuver. And it included the two greatest prices--Clark Field and Manila. Possession of the Centrl Plain and Manila would not only give the Americans control of the island's core, but also divided the Japanese forces. MacArthur commended a massive force of 10 U.S. divisions and five independent regiments as well as Filipino irregulars. This was a larger force than the United States deployed in North Africa or in Italy. It would prove to be the largest American campaign of the Pacific War.

Mindoro (December 13-18, 1944)

Mindoro is a large island south of Manila. It was closer to Manila tham Leyte and thus could be used to provide valuable air support for the retaking of Luzon. Also unlike Leyte, Mindoro was on thec wesrern side of Luzon where the landings were planned. With the Imperial Fleet largely destoyed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the lightly defended islamd could be attacked. Mindoro is moutaneous island, but because of its size, there were plenty of locations for airfields. The mountains trap clouds moving up from the south, resulting in daily rains and high humidity and make the island a breeding ground for malaria carrying mosquitos. Amercan planners decided to land in thes south and build airfields in the southwest near San Jose. Landing in the north would have exposed the force to Japanese air attack fromm the fields around Manila. Japanese air power in the Philippines had been severely weakned in battle for Leyte, but was still capable of deadly blows on American naval shipping. The major purpose of the invasion was to secure airfields there that put American ground support fighters within range of Lingayen Gulf and the drive south toward Luzon where the battle for Luzon would be fought. This significntly added to the air support to be provided by Navy carriers. Mindoro also offered an advanced base for U.S. troops participsting on the fight for Luzon. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's Sixth Army was given the task of seizing the island. Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff who commanded the 24th Infantry Division used his 19th Infantry Regiment and the separate 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team. The initial plan was for the 503d to jump, but there was insufficent facilities at Leyte airfieldd to mount a lage jump. As a result both units assulted Mindoro in an amphibious landing. Naval support included six escort carriers, three battleships, six cruisers as sell as many smaller ships--unprecedented for such a small landing force. The landing force was supported by Filipino resistance groups. Krueger chose Mangarin Bay, Mindoro's best anchorage, in the south where beaches provided an ideal lsndung site. The major opposition to the landings came from Japanese land-based kamikaze suicide attacks. The Japanese had begun kamikaze attacks during the Leyte campaign and were increasingly tuning to this tactic for their dwindling air force. Japane air attacks began as the the attacking force moved toward Mindoro. A kamikaze hit the light cruiser Nashville (December 13). Over 130 men on the ship were killed and 190 injured. Among the caualties was Brig. Gen. William C. Dunkel, commander of the landing force. Further kamikaze attacks damaged two landing ships, tank (LSTs) and severely danaged several other ships. American naval air forces and flyers from Leyte airfields attempted to cover the landing force, reporting more than 500 Japanse aircraft destroyed in the air or on the ground. The landings began in clear weather (December 15). This permitted the full deployment od American air power to support the landing force. The ladings were virtually unopposed. Yamshita had concentrted his available forces on Luzon. There were only about 1,000 Japanese troops on the island and about 200 survivors from Imperial Navy ships moving toward Leyte Gulf and sunk by American carrier aircraft during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Almost immediately, Army engineers had begun preparing airfields. One strip was ready (December 20) and a second (December 28). Thus Japanse defenders on Luzon were in the impossible poition of hving to contend with air attacks from the south and east (Leyte) as well as carrier attacks from the north.

Battle for Luzon (January-February 1945)

Leyte was just the preview and designed to support the liberation of Luzon. Luzon was the heart of the Philippines and the liberation of Luzon meant the liberation of the Philippines. It was on Luzon that the Japanese defeated the Americans in 1942. It was Luzon that MacArtthur was talking about when he said, "I shall return." Luzon is the fourth most populated island in the world and had over hlf the total Filipino ppopultiomn. The U.S. Sixth Army commaned by General Krueger finally reached the main island of Luzon with massive landings at Lingayen Gulf along the northwestern coast of Luzon (January 9, 1945--S Day). This was where the Japanese had invaded 4 years earlier. Manila in the south was the real prize, but Lingayen Gulf offered the best beaches for a large amphibious operation. It is why both the Japanese and Americans chose Lingayen Gulf. The weather was perfect for the Americans, good visibility and light seas. The pre-assault bombardment began (0700) followed by the initial landings (0800). Yamashita concentrated his forces on Luzon and conducted a skillfull defense, but without air support and the armor and artillery support of the Americans or the prepared defenses the Marines encountered on small islands could not stop them. He faced the same problem that MacArthur had faced against the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. He had a substantial force on the island, but his men were out-gunned by the Americans who also had extensive air support. The major landings were conducted at Lingayen Gulf. It took over a week to establish the beachhead, then the drive south to Manila began. Kruger made full use of the mobility his tanks and trucks as well as amphibious forces provided. Yamashita began withdrawing his forces east into the rugged interior of Manila. Japanese diehsrds in Msnila, however, refused his orf=ders to withdraw from the capital. Macarthur wanted a rapid push south to Manila. Kruger was worried about an attck on his flank as he moved south. The drive south was supported by subsequent Mike 6 landings north of Batan and southwest of Manila. Within a month they had retaken Clark Field and reached the outskirts of Manila. Here the rpd pace of the drive south ended. The Japanese in the city, however, were prepred to fiught to the death and tke as mny Filipinos with them as possible.

Manila (February 4-March 4, 1945)

MacArthur pushed toward Manila. The Americans within a month had crossed Luzon's Central Plain, taken Clarke Field and were approaching Manila. They also landed forced in the south and were poushing north. The highrst priority was the POWs and internees at Santo Tomas. Yamashita at this time evacuated Manila for defenses prepared in the mountains where most of his men were already dug in. He left troops in Manila to take a toll on and tie down the advancing Americans. Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi commanded a force of 16,000-19,000 mostly Imperial Marines in Manila. I am not sure what orders he was following. He defied Yamashita's orders. What ever the orders, cut off by the Americans, the Japanese turned on the defenseless civilian population of Manila. They seemed to have decided that if they were going to die that they would take as many Filipinos with them as possible. The Japanese targeted and killed an estimated 100,000 Fhilippino civilians in an outporing of mindless violence which has become known as the Rape of Manila. The city had to be taken block by block in vicious hand-to-hand combat. Iwabuchi and almost his entire force were killed. Manila finally fell (March 4). It is said to the most heavily devestated Allied city next to Warsaw. (We suspect tht this excludes Stalingrad.)

Batan and Corregidor

Liberating Manila was important for both military and psychological reasons. One important objective was to open the port at Manila. Logistics at Lingayen Bay were a major bottlneck. There were no real port facilities there. Supplies and equipment had to be labded on the beach which signioficatly slowed fown operations. Manila on the other hand was a major port with facilities thsat could hsandle ocean-going shipping. Operating the port, however, would be difficult with Baatan and Corregidor still in Japanese hands. The fight for Corregidor wa a bitter one. American planners thought there were about 1,000 Japanese on the island. There were in fact 5,000. American paratroopers landed on the island. They found a huge Japanese force, but entirely underground.

Resistance in the North

Yamashita had ordered the Japanese Marines in Manila to evacuate Manila and join forces with him. They chose to die and take as many Fiilipinos and American with them as possible. Yamashita was left woth astill sizeable force of about 50,000-65,000 soldiers and limited supplies set out establishing a redoubt in the montains of north-central Luzon. There he established three mountainous strongholds. MacArthur decided against pursing him there in force because of the casualties that would have resulted. And in the mountains with limited supplies the Japanese were not a significant threart. Rather like Rabaul it became a essential a POW camp the Japanese themselves controlled. Except for Yamashita's mountanous retreat in north-central Luzon, Japanese resistance in Luzon was overcome (end of May 1945). While Yamashita did not surrender, without supplies and by withdrawing to remote mountaneous areas, he was no longer a factor in the War. MacArthur declared the Philippines secure (June 30, 1945). Yamashita's lightly populated mountain stronghold was the homeland for the Igorot/Cordillerans. They were an Austronesian ethnic group inhabiting the mountains of Luzon. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines the Igorots fought the Japanese. Donald Blackburn's World War II guerrilla force had a strong Igorot core. [Harkins, pp. 148-65.] Yamashita continued to hold out, however, until after the the Emperor ended the War (August 15). He finlly surrendered his army (September 2).

Furthur U.S. Operations

The U.S. Eighth Army after liberating Manila completed the operation on Leyte, subdued the Japanese in the southern Philippines in a series of amphibious attacks, and conducted the mop-up phase of operations on Luzon.

Japanese Internment Camps

The Americans were horrified at the condition of the POWs and civilians held in Japanese concentration camps. There was fear that the Japsanese might killn the internees before the Americans reached them. Los Ba�os Internment Camp was located 40 miles south of Manila. It held 2,150 civilian internees. Company A (1st Battalion, 5111th Parachute Infantry conducteed a jump to liberate the camp (February 23). Th rest of the battalion had previously landed by amphibious tractors from Laguna de Bay. [Rottman, p. 305.] Filipino irregulsars aided the opersation. The 25o guards were killed in sharp action. The erranged Japanese took out their recenge in a nearby Filipino village.

Sources

Harkins, P. Blackburn's Headhunters (London: Cassell & Co., 1956).

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Liberation of the Philippines (1963).

Rottman, Gordon L. World War 2 Pacic Island Guide.

Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur: Far Eastern General (1989),

Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines (1963).

Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of World War II(1980).

Toland, John. The Rising Sun (1970),

U.S. Army. "Luzon 1944-1945" The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II CMH Pub 72-28.






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Created: 6:55 AM 10/6/2008
Last updated: 12:30 AM 8/30/2020