Figure 1.--These Hitler Youth boys are learning Morse Code. The Germans learned after World War I that the British had cracked their codes. As a result, the Reichwehr (predecessor of the Wehrmacvht) adopted a cyphear machine to speedily send and receive coded messages. The Germans believed that the Enigma messages were unbreakale. Enigma operators did not need to know Morse, but they were given strict security instructions that if they had been carefully followed would have mase it much more difficult for the British code breakers.

Intelligence was a matter of substantial importance in World War II. It was of greater importance than in virtually any other major war in history. The primary reason for this was that huge advances were made in radio (wireless) communications. This occurred primarily because of commercial development of radio during the inter-War era. The vast expanse of World War II battelfields as well as the nature of modern mobile warfare required that radio be used. Bltzkrieg required radio communications that could be easily and quickly understood. During World War I, commanders lost control of lead units once they set an offensive in motion. This was no longer the case in World War II. Thus huge amounts of electronic communications were broadcast. Even surrounded units could maintain communications with headquarters. And nothing could be any more insecure than broadcast messages. It meant that vast amounts of vital military communications was up for grabs. It was readily available to any country which was willing to string up radio antenna and invest in training staff to receive and analize the messages. Many mesages were sent in the clear. The most important were encoded. World War II was the first war in which electronic (radio/wireless) messages were a major factor. The telegram became important in the 19th century, but telegram messages sent over wire lines or undersea cables were much more difficult to intercept. They were not impossible (as the British showed with the Zimmerman telegram), but they were difficult to intercept. The major concern in World War II was radio messages, but there was also telegraphic messages sent by cable that were used, mostly by diplomats. And mobile warfare as initiated first by the Germans and subsequently the Allies required vast numbers of easily intercepted (but less easilly decoded) messages. These messages needed to be encoded through a system that could be quickly decoded by the country involved, but would defy code breaking by the enemy. A complicated decodeong system was impossible given the number of messages. Naval warfare also required large numbers of radio messages. Both the Germans and Japanese learned after World War I that their codes had been cracked by the Allies. And the Soviets learned that their codes after the War had also been cracked. As a result, these countries adopted much more elborate code systems. The Germans and Japanese developed cypher machines. The Soviets developed a single pad system. The Germans and Japanese proved particularly vulnerable because they had such confidence in their vaunted cypher machines. And they sent a huge volume of messages which significantly increased the vulnerability of the machines. The Germans also attemptd to read Allied signals. And they had some successes, mostly with British communications. They generally failed at breaking Allied codes. Neither did the Japanese manage to break Allied codes. Very little is known about Soviet code breaking efforts.

World War I

Intelligence was a matter of substantial importance in World War II. It was of greater importance than in virtually any other major war in history. The primary reason for this was that huge advances were made in radio (wireless) communications. This occurred primarily because of commercial development of radio during the inter-War era. Immediately after World War I, radio burst on the commercial scene. It was a huge success. Suddenly people could hve all kinds of entertaiment in their homes, at no cost after the radio was puchased. It soon became common for the family to clusrter around the radio after dinner. Everyone wanted them. Boys built crystal sets because early radios werte expensive. Mass production in America soon brought costs down and by the 1930s, virtually every American family had a radio. A vast new industry came into being. The situation was different in Europe. As in America, virtually everyone wanted one, but only a fraction of the population could afford one. The British had the highest living standards, but even in Britain not all workers had rdios. And the situation was even wose in Germany. As a result, mass production did mot take place. Not only could many Germans not affor radios, but also radios were more expensive than in America. This affected the size of the radion indusyries in the vrious countries. When Hitler camne to power he wanted to improve the livig stndards of German orkers. He could not do thios by significantly increasing wages because that would increase the cost of rearmament which was stressing the German economy. But he attempted to bring down the cost of items. This is how the Volkswagen came into existence. There wre other Volks products. The most suvccessful was the Volks radios. This was a special priority for the NAZIs because they wanted the average German family to hart Hitler's speches and other NAZI propaganda. This all affected the rAdio industries that developed in the World War II combatant countries and that the respective governments could utilize in the war effort.

Telegraphy

The telegram became important in the 19th century, but telegram messages sent over wire lines or undersea cables were much more difficult to intercept. They were not impossible (as the British showed with the Zimmerman telegram), but they were difficult to intercept. Diplomatic messages could be intercepted, in part because the British cut the German cables and they had to use their embassies in places like Sweden and thse went through British posts, including London and the Bahamas. A reader writes, "... all telegraphs leaving America and South and Central Americas went through the British operated and controlled relay station in the Bahamas where any non coded messages but of interest were copied and sent to various British Ministries and/or the PM's Office. Anything that was in code was copied and sent to the British code breakers in Britain. The British had 2,000 people working there, mostly in secret."

World War II Battlefield

The vast expanse of World War II battelfields as well as the nature of modern mobile warfare required that radio be used. Bltzkrieg required radio communications that could be easily and quickly understood. During World War I, commanders lost control of lead units once they set an offensive in motion.

Radio Messages during the War

Commanders in World War II no longer lost control of lead elements as in World War I. World War II was the first war in which electronic (radio/wireless) messages were a major factor. The major concern in World War II was radio messages, but there was also telegraphic messages sent by cable that were used, mostly by diplomats. And mobile warfare as initiated first by the Germans and subsequently the Allies required vast numbers of easily intercepted (but difficult to decode) messages. These messages needed to be encoded through a system that could be quickly decoded by the country involved, but would defy code breaking by the enemy. A complicated decodeong system was impossible given the number of messages. The German answer was the Enigma machine which they begn to intoduce at a very early point (late-1920s). The French Army, belived to be the strongest in the world even after the onset of World War II was still relying on telegraphic land lines (in the Maginot Line) and World War I style courriers for mobile units. When the Germans struc, corriers soon found that the Germans had already taken positions where they were ordered to deliver messages. Naval warfare also required large numbers of radio messages. Here the distances could be even larger, but it was an easy matter to install sophisticated euipment on ships than mobile land units, this was done even in World War I.

Advanced Systems

Both the Germans and Japanese learned after World War I that their codes had been cracked by the Allies. And the Soviets learned that their codes after the War had also been cracked. As a result, these countries adopted much more elborate code systems. The Germans and Japanese developed cypher machines. The Soviets developed a single pad system. The Germans and Japanese proved particularly vulnerable because they had such confidence in their vaunted cypher machines. And they sent a huge volume of messages which significantly increased the vulnerability of the machines.

Code Breking Efforts

The Allied war effort was enormously assisted by code breakers. Both German and Japanese codes were broken, providing vital information to Allied military planners. A Polish mathematician played a key in cracking the German military's suposedly unbreakable cipher machine--enigma. The Poles in cooperation with the French were able to construct an enigma machine whicg they turned over to the British just before the German invasion. Additional work done at Bletchly Park allowed the British by late 1940 to read large numbers of Luftwaffe messages. The Kriegsmarina code was also broken, but was more difficult because their operators were more careful to follow pricedures. Many messagesre read because operators did not follow procedures. The Kreigsmarine also added a fourth rotor. Enigma traffic played a vital role in the Allied victory against the U-boats and in the cutting off of Rommel's supplies in North Africa. American breaking of the Japanease naval code was a key element in the naval victory at Midway. It also allowed American pilots to shoot down Adnmiral Yamamoto--the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Germans also attemptd to read Allied signals. And they had some successes, mostly with British communications. The Germans were able to read British naval messages in early 1940 which allowed them to counter planned Anglo-French operations in Norway with their successful invasion of Denmark and Norway. They generally failed at breaking Allied codes. Neither did the Japanese manage to break Allied codes. Very little is known about Soviet code breaking efforts. They must have acquired large numbers of Enigma machines. What they did with them is unknown.

Message Volume

As a result of the military needs, huge amounts of electronic communications were broadcast. And nothing could be any more insecure than broadcast messages. It meant that vast amounts of vital military communications was up for grabs. This was important because if properly staffed, volume is an imprtant advantage for code breakers. Secret messages was readily available to any country which was willing to string up radio antenna and invest in training staff to receive and analize the messages. Many mesages were sent in the clear. The most important were encoded.

Surronded Units

Even surrounded units could maintain communications with headquarters.

Created: 6:32 AM 12/19/2012
Last updated: 6:32 AM 12/19/2012