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war and social upheaval: World War II -- Soviet ciphers
Soviet World War II Ciphers
Figure 1.--This 1962 Soviet film shows Ivan writing a report about his spying activities behind German lines. The information is coded in the nature specimins he brings back from his spying mission. These are put into order and then Ivan writes up his report. This of course was his own code. Soviet discussion of their own cipherss was a taboo subject. Details on World War II ciphers and codebreaking remained classified for years after the War, even in the West. These activities have since been declassified--except in Russia. Soviet codebreaking has been a subject not addressed by Russian historians or film makers even today.
We do not yet have a good understanding of Soviet ciphers during World War II. There seem to have been quite a number of codes with several different agencies having their own codes. In addition to the military services and Foreign Ministry, several other agencies had code systems. One was Soviet trade offices which had an especially important unit with a considerable amount of traffic working with the American on Lend-Lease. This group included the Soviet Trade Organization (AMTORG) and the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. Other codes were adopted by Soviet intelligence (NKVD/KGB), Red Army military intelligence (GRU). Red Navy military intelligence (GRU-Naval). [Goebel] Presumabky the Red Air Force also had an intelligence unit, although we do not have details. We do not know if there was any central cryptology school or instituition providing technical information to these various institutions or if the different agencies were on their own in developing codes. Not do we know if there were similarities withe codes adopted by these agencies. We have very little information as to the nature of the Soviet codes. Many of these codes were cracked during the War by the Finns, Germans and Japanese. A major step was the Finns seizing a partially burned Soviet code nook at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki when the Germans launched Batbarossa (June 22, 1941). The Finns shared their find with the Germans and Japanese. We are not sure what inteligence coups resulted from this work. The Red Army launched several major offensives during the war in the East and German intelligence failed to provide alerts to any of these offensives. The United States also cracked some of these codes, by began working on them later (1943) and many were not read until after the War. Many of the messages the United States had to work with were messages associated with the Sioviet Trade Office involved with Lend Lease. The American decrypts are known as the Venona papers and provided insights into Soviet espionage operations in the United States. [Goebel] The only aspect of World War II crypthology that is not now available to historians are Soviet efforts at code breaking. The Soviets and now the Russians have been reluctant to open their archives to historians.
Soviet Ciphers
We do not yet have a good understanding of Soviet codes during World War II. There seem to have been quite a number of codes with several different agencies having their own codes. In addition to the military services and Foreign Ministry, several other agencies had code systems. One was Soviet trade offices which had an especially important unit with a considerable amount of traffic working with the American on Lend-Lease. This group included the Soviet Trade Organization (AMTORG) and the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. Other codes were adopted by Soviet intelligence (NKVD/KGB), Red Army military intelligence (GRU). Red Navy military intelligence (GRU-Naval). [Goebel] Presumabky the Red Air Force also had an intelligence unit, although we do not have details. We do not know if there was any central cryptology school or instituition providing technical information to these various institutions or if the different agencies were on their own in developing codes. Not do we know if there were similarities with codes adopted by these agencies. We have very little information as to the nature of the Soviet codes.
Cipher Machine
The Germans during World War II had the most famous cioher machine--the Enigma machine, cut it was not the only such machine. The Soviets also had a a cipher machine. It was not as complex as Enigma, but the Soviets used throughout the War. K-37 Crystal machine was a mechanical cipher machine, designed and built by the Soviets. It was introduced shortly before the outbreak of World War II. The machine was basically a copy of the Hagelin B-211. Hagelin was Swedish company that most notably built cipher machines for the French in the inter-War era. We do not know the extent, if any that Crystal was cracked during the War. The Soviets were still using Crtystal at theend of the War and during the early Cold War era. They were, however, working on improved systems probably in part because of the German Enigmas they must have obtained as they drive west. Also they lerned from sies in MI-5 that the British has cracked Enigma. Their first Cold War response was Albatross folowed by Fialka which as far as we know was never cracked during the Cold War.
Cracking Soviet Codes
Many of the Soviet codes were cracked during the War by the Finns, Germans and Japanese. A major step was the Finns seizing a partially burned Soviet code nook at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki when the Germans launched Batbarossa (June 22, 1941). The Finns shared their find with the Germans and Japanese. We are not sure what inteligence coups resulted from this work. The Red Army launched several major offensives during the war in the East and German intelligence failed to provide alerts to any of these offensiveds. The United States also cracked some of these codes, by began working on them later (1943) and many were not read until after the War. Many of the messages the United States had to work with were messages associated with the Soviet Trade Office involved with American Lend Lease. The American decrypts are known as the Venona papers and provided insights into Soviet espionage operations in the United States. [Goebel]
Britain
Finland
The Soviet Union invaded Finland (November 1939) in what became known as the Winter War. The Finns fought back and a peace was eventually signed with the Soviets annexing a sizeable portion of southeastern Finland. As a result the Finns, hopeingvto regain their lost territory, became a cobeligerant (but not an Axis partner) when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. A major step in cracking Soviet codes was the Finns seizing a partially burned Soviet code nook at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki when the Germans launched Batbarossa (June 22, 1941). The Finns shared their find with the Germans and Japanese.
Germany
We are not sure what inteligence coups resulted from this work. The Red Army launched several major offensives during the war in the East and German intelligence failed to provide alerts to any of these offensives. While the Sovirts were very sucessful in concealing preparations for their offensives, German offensive preparations were often detected by the Soviets, although this seems more the result of espionage thn signals intelligence..s
The United States also cracked some of the Soviet codes. The U.S. Army's top-secret Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), the forerunner of the National Security Agency (NSA), began working on Soviet secret messages (February 1943) hoping to crack the dioplomatic code. SIS code named the effort JADE, BRIDE and DRUG, but it eventually became known as VENONA. Venona is just a code name and has no geographic connotation. The project was ininiated by Ms. Gene Grabeel, but military personnel soon took over the program. The Venona work was conducted at Arlington Hall. As the effort progressed the SIS obtained a range of Soviet messages. Many were fromm the Soviet Trade Office working with Lend Lease, but there were messages from any other agencies as well, including the military and intelligemce services. From an early stage, the SIS staff determined that the messages came from five different agencies with separate encryption systems.
Although the effort began during the War, the SIS dis not suceed in reading many of the messages until after the War. . Many of the messages the United States had to work with were messages associated with the Soviet Trade Office involved with Lend Lease. The first success came fairly quickly. Richard Hallock, an Army Signal Corps lieutenant and trained an archaeologist (who worked with ancient writing systems) suceeded in developing insights into the system being used by Soviet trade officials who were relatively lax in their security measures (October 1943). This provided clues to other cryptologists working on messages from other Soviet agencies. Cecil Phillips managed to develop a beginning understanding of NKVD messages (1944). This was a more difficult undertaking because the NKVD more carefully protected their messages, using double encryption. As a result, it would take 2 years of work to actually read any of the NKVD messages. The Venona was assisted after the Germans surrendered (May 1945). Army security officers were able to obtain access to the German work on Soviet codes. Meredith Garner decrypted the first portions of the NKVD messages (Summer 1946). The results were starteling. It was clear by 1947 that Soviet agents had penetrated a variety of U.S. Government agencies. The British joined the effort and sent two of their cryptologists to Arlington Hall (1948). As information on Soviet espionage emerged, the Venona group contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). FBI Agent Robert J. Lamphere who was given access to the Venona decrypts. [Goebel] The American decrypts are today known as the Venona papers and provided insights into Soviet espionage operations in the United States.
Soviet Code Cracking
The only aspect of World War II crypthology that is not now available to historians are Soviet efforts at code breaking. The Soviets and now the Russians have been reluctant to open their archives to historians.
Sources
Goebel, Greg. "Venona" 7.5. This is a chapter in a larger work, but it is unclear how to site the overall work.
