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A major problem in World War I was that once an offence was set in motion, the high command lost contact and the ability to direct forward elements. Advances in radio meant that World war II commanders could keep in contact contact with forward units no matter how rapidly they were moving. But this raised a serious problem in that radio broadcasts could be intercepted by the ememy. The German sollution to this problem was the Enigma Machine. This was an advanced electro-mechanical cipher machine. It was used by all branches of the German military including the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffee and Kriegsmarine. The different services developed different machines and varied in their operational procedures. The Enigma machines were the principal German device for secure wireless military communications throughout the War. The German military was concerned about security and thus developed increasingly complex types which made it more difficult for code breakers to crack. The most complex Enigma machine type was developed by the Krigsmarine for U-boat operations, in part because of rising U-boat losses. The Kreigsmarine also added a fourth rotor. The Germans also developed increasingly complex operating procedures. Enforcement of these procedures varied. The Luftwaffee was especially lax. Some commanders became concerned that the Allies might be breaking the Enigma codes. As a result, the Germans conducted investigations about this possibility. The German experts concluded, however, that Enigma was still secure. Their assessments proved to be inaccurate. A Polish mathematician played a key in cracking the German military's suposedly unbreakable cipher machine--enigma. The Poles in cooperation with the French were able to construct an enigma machine which they turned over to the Britih just before the German invasion launching the War. Additional work done at Bletchly Park allowed the British by late 1940 to read large numbers of Luftwaffe messages. The Kriegsmarina code was also broken, but was more difficult because their operators were more careful to follow procedures and the fourth rotar. Many messages were read because operators did not follow procedures. The Royal Navy managed to obtain an intact Enigma machine and associated material needed to set the machines. Decoded Enigma traffic played a vital role in the Allied victory against the U-boats and in the cutting off of Rommel's supplies in North Africa.
A major problem in World War I was that once an offence was set in motion, the high command lost contact and the ability to direct forward elements. Commanders were constantly frustrated by the fact that no matter how carefully planned by the fact that once they set an offensive in motion that they lrgely lost control. No battle plan in the end survived contact with the ememy.
The German military in the inter-War period developed the theory of Blitzkrieg and Hitler financed the countruction of a military to conduct Blitzkrieg. An integral part of Blitzkrieg was command and cointrol of rapidly moving mobile formations and this was only possible through radio communications. Advances in radio meant that World war II commanders could keep in contact contact with forward units no matter how rapidly they were moving. But this raised a serious problem in that radio broadcasts could be intercepted by the ememy. The German sollution to this was the Enigma Machine.
The German sollution to the insecurity of radio messages this problem was the Enigma Machine. This was an advanced electro-mechanical cipher machine originally developed by the German Railway Service. It was used by all branches of the German military including the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffee and Kriegsmarine. The different services developed different machines and varied in their operational procedures. The Enigma machines were the principal German device for secure wireless military communications throughout the War.
The German military was concerned about security and thus developed increasingly complex types which made it more difficult for code breakers to crack. The most complex Enigma machine type was developed by the Krigsmarine for U-boat operations, in part because of rising U-boat losses. The Kreigsmarine also added a fourth rotor. The Germans also developed increasingly complex operating procedures. Enforcement of these procedures varied. The Luftwaffee was especially lax. Some commanders became concerned that the Allies might be breaking the Enigma codes. As a result, the Germans conducted investigations about this possibility. The German experts concluded, however, that Enigma was still secure. Their assessments proved to be inaccurate.
Poland in the period before World War II attempted to break the German Enigma cipher system. Btilliant Polish codebreakers with limited resources managed to dechipher some German Enigma mssages before World War II began. They were at first reluctant to share their work with the British and French. This chznged after Munich when Hitler began to move against the Poles. The Germanys made cryptographic improvements that rendered much of the Polish work moot. The Polish work was an important beginning and the British and French had greater resources to attack the Enigmna problem. The Poles built new mechanical cryptanalytic aids which they called bombes as well as Enigma replicas and presented them to their new Allies (July 1939). After the German invasion, the Poles managed to close down their code breaking operation anf the German occupation forces never learned of what they had accomplished. The work by the Poles, however, played an important part in the future success success of Ultra--the British code breaking effortb at Blechly Park.
The code name for the British effort to crack the German military Enigma cipher machines was called Ultra. It was one of the most closely guarded secrets of the War. It was conducted at a country estate called Blechley Park. With the help of the Poles the British began working on the Enigma code machines that the German military used for radio communications. Effctive German communications were part of the reason for the victories in Poland and France. The French General Staff for example was using messengers to communications. While effective, the use of messages sent by radio meant that German military communications were vulnerable. The German relying on their preceived notions of supperiority were convinced that their Enigma cipher machine could not be ceacked. The Germans did not know of the Allied success until well after the War. British code breakers at Bletchley Park faced different problems with the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarina code. The Luftwaffe code proved the easiest to crack, primarily because flushed with sucess, the Luftwaffe was careless about following established security procedures. Many messages were read because operators did not follow procedures. The British suceeded in dechipering some Luftwaffe messages (May 1940), although regular and timely decoding was not possible until the end of the year. (We have noted different assessments as to how useful Ultra was during the Battle of Britain.) Working with uncoded German radio messages also provided valuable information. This provided valuable intercepts with infornmation on force strength and targetting was available to the RAF. Dechipering Naval messages proved more challenging. The Kriegsmarina Enigma msachines were also cracked, but was more difficult because their operators were more careful to follow procedures and a fourth rotar was eventually added.
The Royal Navy managed to obtain an intact Enigma machine and associated material needed to set the machines.
Cracking the Kriegsmarina Enigma msachines played a major role in the defeat of the U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic.
Decoded Enigma traffic played a vital role in the Allied victory against the U-boats and in the cutting off of Rommel's supplies in North Africa.
One often ignored aspect of the radio technology and the German Enigma Macine was the impact on German military doctrine. The Prussian military was renowned throughout Europe. (Americans in the Revolutionwary War got ataste of this when they faced off with the Hessians who were not nearly as renowned as the Prussians.) Prussia itself was apoor state, often described as an army attached to a country. The relative poverty of Prussia was one reason such great attention was given to a professional standing army. A key aspect of Prussiam military dictrine was that commanders in the field should be given great latitude and authority. This was almost required by an aggressive force like the Prussian Army because of the slowness and unrelability of communications. One renowned Prussian commander who ignored Frederick the Great's ordered famously replied toi him that after the battle his head would be at the King's diposal. Prussian military dictrine was ingherited by the German Empire and was still largely intact at the onset of World war II. Radio communications chamged this. Suddenly OKW and Hitler had the capability to communicate instantaneously with field commanders. The Wehrmacht was allowed to operate without much interference in the first two years of the war, but this changed with Barbarossa, especially when progress began to slow. Historians argue as to what extent this affected the outcome of the War, but Hitler had the ability and frquently used it to interfere in the operatins of field commanders.
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