World War II: The Abwehr (1939-45)


Figure 1.--

The primary German organization responsible for obtaining secret military intelligence and covert operations during World War II was the Amt Auslands und Abwehr--usually referred to as the Abwehr. The Abwehr had developed as a part of the German Army. The German military was more diverse in World war II. Whole the main service coninued to be Aemy (Wehrmacht), the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were independent services and of considerable importance. Thus the Abwehr was independent of the three branches and organizationally attached to the High Command (OKW). Admiral Canaris set about reorganizing the Abwehr into three separate branches (Abteilung): Admiral Canaris set about reorganizing the Abwehr into three separate branches (Abteilung): Abt. I) espionage, Abt. II) covert actions--with sabotage and subversion, and Abt. III) counter-espionage and security. He appointed three respected Abwehr agents to head the three different branches. Each of the principal German services (Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine) has their own intelligence staff to collect, evaluate, and distribute inteligence information to the appropriate commands. Only the Abwehr operated covert overseas operations. The services informed the Abwehr on what they needed and the Abwehr used this information in planning their covert operations. The Abwehr on its own used began to collect a wide range of data that they believed would be useful to both OKW and the different services.

Admiral Canaris

Of course the German intelligence operation was the fact that the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, was actively working against the NAZIS. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was a World War I U-boat commander and war hero. He was appointed to head the Abwehr, German military inteligence (1935). He is one of the most mysterious figures of World War II. While a committed German patriot, he was horrified at SS attrocities in Poland that he personally witnessed. Other attrocities campe to his attention such as plans to kill importantPolishish officials and nobels as well as highly educated and cutures Poles to destroy the Polish inteligencia--the repository of national culture (Aktion AB). From that point he began to work to prevent a NAZI victory in the war. A great deal is known about his activities, but the full extent of his activities may never be known. He was extrodinarily effective, The NAZIs had no idea of his activities until the last months of the War. He was close to many top NAZIs like Goebbels who trusted him without reservation. Only after the Wehrmacht Bomb Plot (July 1944). Hitler had him hanged at Flossenburg Concentration Camp (April 9, 1945). Hitler had movies takrn so he could watch. The Americans liberated the Camp (April 23). German military intelligence during World War II was highly ineffective. It is unclear just what Role Admiral Canaris played in this.

OKW Unit

The primary German organization responsible for obtaining secret military intelligence and covert operations during World War II was the Amt Auslands und Abwehr--usually referred to as the Abwehr. The Abwehr had developed as a part of the German Army. The German military was more diverse in World war II. Whole the main service coninued to be Aemy (Wehrmacht), the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were independent services and of considerable importance. Thus the Abwehr was independent of the three branches and organizationally attached to the High Command (OKW).

Organization

Admiral Canaris set about reorganizing the Abwehr into three separate branches (Abteilung): Abt. I) espionage, Abt. II) covert actions--with sabotage and subversion, and Abt. III) counter-espionage and security. Canaris appointed three respected Abwehr agents to head the three different branches.

Abt. I

Abt. I's responsibility was for offensive intelligence, including espionage. This did not mean that is was entirely devoted to secret operations. A great deal of information can be obrtained from open sources. This was especially the case in democratic countries like America and Britain, less so for countries like the Soviet Union. main Abt I. office in Berlin was divided into various sections. There were separate sections for each of the three services (Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegmarine ). There was a separate section for economic matterrs. There were also several technical sections. The organization of the sections varied somewhat, but were commonly divided to focus on particular countries or regions.

Abt. II

Abt. II was responsible for covert actions--with sabotage and subversion.

Abt. III

and Abt. III focused on counterintelligence and security.

Field Offices

There were Abwehr field offices both in Germany and other countries, including occupied countries--Abwehrstellen (Asts). Branches of the field offices were known as Nebenstellen (Nests). The Abwehr operated in several neutral countries during the War, including the United States which was official neutral, although increasingly unfriendly until Hitler declared War (December 11, 1941). The Abwehr offices in neutral countries were called a Kriegsorganisation (KO) and usually workong covertly within an embassies or consulate, providing diplomatic cover. Organizationally the field stations on a smaller scale reeproduced the functional division at Berlin headquarters.

Staffing

Personnel of the Abwehr included officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, both active and retired or reserve, and civilians recruited and commissioned directly. NAZI Party members were excluded. Both Abwehr headquarters and the field offices recruited, trained, and deployed agents for foreign missions.

Geographic Resonsibilities

There was a basic geographical division of responsibility between the various Asts. This did not, however, function well. For example the Ast Hamburg and Bremen (a subsidiary Nest) were primarily responsible for espionage in the United States. This was because these were Germany's two principal ports and agents could be easily inserted and recovered through the merchant shipping moving back and forth. In practice, other Ast or KO field offices could deply agents to the United States or any other countries if they decided to do so. Often the governing factor was coming across potential agents that had the language and other skills and experiences needed. This resulted in the inefficent use of resources as well as considerable beauracratic confusion.

Relations with Services

Each of the principal German services (Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine) has their own intelligence staff to collect, evaluate, and distribute inteligence information to the appropriate commands. Only the Abwehr operated covert overseas operations. The services informed the Abwehr on what they needed and the Abwehr used this information in planning their covert operations. The Abwehr on its own used began to collect a wide range of data that they believed would be useful to both OKW and the different services.

Relations with SD

The Sicherheitsdienst (SD) was a rival inteligemnce agency to the Abwehr during the War. Organizationally, the SD was a branch of the Himmler's SS. The SD was founded as the security and intelligence service of the NAZI Party. The SD gradually grew in importance, especially in the hands of Reinhard Heydrich. Unlike the Abwehr, the operations of the SD were not limited to military intelligence. The SD came to be the ultimat intelligence organ of NAZI state and eventually at the end of the War, gained control over the Abwehr. With the outbreak of World War II, the Abwehr took on its final shape. The various German police agencies of the State (including the Gestapo) were combined to form the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Central Security Service of the Reich--RSHA.). Much of the RHSA had non-military functions. One section (Amt VI) was the SD. This unit began working in foreign intelligence, completely independent of the Abwwhr. The SD began recruiting and placing agents abroad. The initial goal was political intelligence, but as the War continued and the SS grew in importance, the SD began to acquire economic and military intelligence. The SD by the end of the War had espionage networks in several countries. Two of the largest were Argentina and Spain.

Incorporation within the SS/RSHA (Spring 1944)

The SS before World War II was a para-militry organization, but did not have military formations. This gradually changed as the War progressed, especially after Barbarossa faltered bedore Moscow. The SS began organizing military units--the Waffen SS. A rivalry developed between Himmler's SS and the Wehrmacht. As Himmler had Hitler's ear and the Wehrmacht had failed in Barbarossa, Hitler allowed Himmler to organize an increasing number of Waffen SS units. These units were given priorities in quipment and supplies. With the Wehrmacht's battlefield failures and the Abwehr's failure to produce accurate assessments, both in the East and West, Himmler and Ernst Kaltenbrunner pressed to have the Abwehr removedcfrom OKW and placed within the RSHA. They finally succeeded in convincing Hitler (Spring 1944). Some of the Abwehr's functions were turned over to the RSHA's Amt IV (Gestapo) and Amt. VI (SD). Most of the Abwehr and its staff were left in a new unit named the Militaerisches Amt (MilAmt). MilAmt was theoretically a major section of RSHA. In practice it was largely dominated by Amt VI. MilAmt came under severe suspicion as a result of the July Bomb Plot targetting Hitler and the NAZI leadership (July 1944) because it was an attempted Wehrmacht coup and MilAmt chief Col. Hansen was involved. Walter Schellenberg, head of Amt VI (SD), in the aftermath formally took over took over MilAmt. As a result, during the final months of the War, RSHA controlled military intelligence. Of course by this time the War was lost and the organization changes had no real impact.

Spy Rings in America

America like many other countries attempted to remain neutral as Europe headed toward war and for over 2 years after the War began. Hitler made a variety of different statements about the United states, but from the beginning sensed the United States with its massive industrial power was a danger. He thus persued a range of policies aimed at keeping American neutral such as distanting the NAZI Government from Fritz Kune and the German American Bund and later ordering U-boat commanders to avoid incidents with American ships. German military planners were more than aware of the role the United States played in World war I and thus assumed that eventually America would comed into the War to support the British. Thus even before the War, the Abwehr organized a network in America. In World War I the focus as on sabatoge, because the United States did not have importanrt war industry with secrets to steal or before 1917 a substantial army. This was different in World War II when the focus became military intelligence. The NAZI effort proved much less sxuccessful than the Soviet espionage effort. Hollywood tends to depict these German spies as rabid NAZIs, as the Abwehr conducted the operations they tended to be German nationalists rather than NAZI activists. Korvetten-Kapitaen Pheiffer, a veteran of World War I, returned to active duty as an Abwehr officer in 1935. He began collecting information on the United States. Pheiffer was in charge of the naval section of Nest Bremen and as such in a position to establish close contacts with the extensive German shipping interests centered in that port. At first he worked through the "Aussenhandelstelle," or foreign trade office, where German businessmen going overseas were registered. He began interviewing retunrning businessmen. After a while he began recruiting agents. The German espionage and sabatoge r\effort in the United states proved largely inefectual and in mny cases amateurish. We know of now importasnt success achieved by the effort, although the resulting news reports and movies helped confirm the negarive opinion most Americans had of the NAZIs.

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Created: 1:28 AM 5/1/2009
Last updated: 9:48 AM 6/2/2014