Figure 1.--. |
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The Big Three (Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill) met for the first time at Tehran (November 28 through December 1, 1943). The Conference was held after the ballance of power had clearly shifted, turing the tide in the War. The Soviets had destroyed the German 6th Army in Stalingrad (February 1943) and defeated a massive German armoued force at Kursk (July 1943). The Western Allies had destroyed the Axis armies in North Africa (May 1943), seized Sicily (July 1943), and forced the Italians to seek peace and invaded Italy (September 1943). They had also defeated the U-boat fleet and launched the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill had developed a close relationship. This was the first meeting with Stalin. the conference was held in Tehran, Iran because the ever-suspicious Stalin did not want to travel far from the Soviet Union. Stalin pressed hard on the Second Front. The principal decession reached was that the Western Allies committed to a 1944 invasion of northern Europe to open the long-awaited second front in the West. Stalin was suspicious that the Western Allies were allowing him to face the Wehrmacht alone so as to bleed Russia. It is understandable that he would think that. The Western Allies had been deplaying the invasion for 2 years. But perhaps more importantly this was the precise strategy he had adopted in reverse when he signed the Non-Agression Pact with Hitler which launched War. Stalin complained that a Supreme Commander for the invasion had not yet been appointed. Other commiments included support for Yugoslav partisans. The participants also urged Turkey to enter the War. Stalin agreed to enter the Pacific War against Japan once the NAZIs had been defeated. It was alo agreed to persue close military cooperation. A separate protocol pledged the three countries, which had moved into Iran to keep it out of NAZI hands, to Iran's independence. Stalin proposed shooting 50,000 German officers after the War. Churchill was visablt shocked, but Roosevelt apparently was not.
The Big Three (Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill) met for the first time at Tehran (November 28 through December 1, 1943). Roosevelt and Churchill had developed a close relationship. This was the first meeting with Stalin.
The Conference was held after the ballance of power had clearly shifted, turing the tide in the War. The Soviets had destroyed the German 6th Army in Stalingrad (February 1943) and defeated a massive German armoued force at Kursk (July 1943). The Western Allies had destroyed the Axis armies in North Africa (May 1943), seized Sicily (July 1943), and forced the Italians to seek peace and invaded Italy (September 1943). They had also defeated the U-boat fleet and launched the strategic bombing campaign against Germany.
the conference was held in Tehran, Iran because the ever-suspicious Stalin did not want to travel far from the Soviet Union.
Stalin pressed hard on the Second Front. Stalin was suspicious that the Western Allies were allowing him to face the Wehrmacht alone so as to bleed Russia. It is understandable that he would think that. The Western Allies had been deplaying the invasion for 2 years. But perhaps more importantly this was the precise strategy he had adopted in reverse when he signed the Non-Agression Pact with Hitler which launched War. Stalin complained that a Supreme Commander for the invasion had not yet been appointed.
We do not know what was on Stalin's mind when hevsuggested shooting 50,000 German officers. Put passing it off as a joke, which many authors do, seems rather caviler to us. After all for a man who had already murdered millions. 50,000 executions was not a large number. This was just what he did to the Poles which by the time of the Tehran Conference was known. And we know from the Katyn Forest that this was sometyhing the NKVD was more than capable of doing. The Russians finally admitted just that. And the fact that Stalin did not actually do it is not evidence that he was not serious at Tehran. After VE-Day and establishing control in East Germany, Stalin began to see the Germans that he controlled as a useful ally in the developing Cold War. This was not the case in Poland during 1940. His goal in Poland as a NAZI ally was to destroy the Polish nation. And eliminating the officer corps and other highly nationalist groups was part of that process. Attempting to eliminate the German nation after World War II would have been counter productive in the Cold War. We suspect at Tehran he was still in the punish the Germans phase of his thinking.
The principal decession reached was that the Western Allies committed to a 1944 invasion of northern Europe to open the long-awaited second front in the West. Other commiments included support for Yugoslav partisans. The participants also urged Turkey to enter the War. Stalin agreed to enter the Pacific War against Japan once the NAZIs had been defeated. It was alo agreed to persue close military cooperation.
A separate protocol pledged the three countries, which had moved into Iran to keep it out of NAZI hands, to Iran's independence. Stalin proposed shooting 50,000 German officers after the War. Churchill was visablt shocked, but Roosevelt apparently was not.
Many historians criticize President Roosevelt's performance at Yalta where he was totavly ill. Less criticism has been directed at him at Tehran, but there is still considerable such criticism. The President made a decision to attempt to charm Stalin, even joining with him to tease if not taunt Churchill. There were some matters of substance such as the timing of the D-Day landings. This had been an issue in the Anglo-American alliance from the point America ebtered the War. The Americans wanted an early invasion. Thankfully the British managed to delay the landings until the American Army was up to the task. Rooseveklt side wih Stalin in this, but in fact it was weather and tide that would now determine the timing. Hurtful to Churchill were personal anhd poliyical jokes which passed in the personal exchanges. Roosevelt's thinking here was that a friendly personal relationship could prevent Stalin from suppressing democratic factions in Eastern Europe and entering the war against Japan. At the time the great American victories in the Pacific were yet to come. It seems increbidke the President could even consider such an approach. He seems totally unaware of the chaacter of Stalin or the millions of people he had already killed. One wonders how an American president could have gone into a major international conference so ill prepared. Britain's Chief of Staff with Churchill commented, "Stalin has got the President in his pocket." This was not the case. It was a calculared policy on Roosevelt's part, And in fact there were few options available to Roosevelt. The Soviets had done most if the fighging and because of this and geography it woukd be the Soviets which would occupy Easern and Central Europe. Only persuasion was available as a tool to moderate what Stalin did with the area. One historian, however, falts Roosevelt for 'emboldening' Stalin and Tehran was only aart of it. [Gellately] And Churchill should not be thought guitless in this approach. He also tried to deal with Stalin on planhd abd Eastern Europe, although more at Yalta than Tehran.
Gellately, Robeet. Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (2013), 496p.
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