*** World War II German military organization Kriegsmarine Navy








World War II: German Kriegsmarine

 German Kriegsmarine
Figure 1.--This proud German boy holds a great model of the German ship "Deutschland". It was a heavy cruiser which the Germans called a pocket battleship. It was the same class as the "Graf Spee". The snap shot is undated, but was probably taken about 1935-38. "Deutschland" was renamed "L�tzow" (1940). It was unthinkable to have a ship named "Deutschland" sunk. The name Lützow was available because the Admiral Hipper class heavy cruiser "L�tzow" was sold to the Soviet Union. It is notable that the model is a surface ship. This is what the Kriegsmrine gave priority to before the War. Somehow there was something sinister about submarines. They were less likely to be toy submarines before the War.

Military forces are designed to project a country's power. Ironically, some powerful military forces can ultimately prove to actually reduce a country's security. The best example here is Kaiser Wilhelm's highseas fleet. By creating a High Seas Fleet, the Kaisser increased British concerns about German intentions. And the German surface fleet played no significant role in the War. The principal achievement of the U-boat fleet was to being America into the War, virtually ensuring defet on the Western Front. After the War, severe restrictions were placed on the German Navy by the Versailles Treaty (1919). The Anglo-German Naval Treaty (1935) relieved Germany from many of the naval restrctions of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler unlike the Kasiser was not enamored with the Kreigsmarine. Germany was a a major industrial power. Even so resources were limited. And both the Heer and Liftwaffe were given priority over the Kriegsmarine in the NAZI Rearmament program. Hitler launched World War II 5 years too early for the Germany Navy. Hitler had told his admirals that there would be no war until the mid-1940s. He subsequently pushed forward his time table. At the time he launched the War, the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmact were the most powerful air forces and armies in the world. The Germany Navy ranked as a potent, but relarively small force. The Kregsmarine again played a minor role in World War II. The German surface fleet was a major disappointment to Hitler. The U-boat proved again to be Germany's primary naval threat. And for time seemed to offer some propects for a major victory. Churchill after the War wrote that the u-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic was the one threat that really worried him. The German naval high command (OKM) wanted an impressive surface fleet, but Germany's limited industrial capacity made that impossible. As a result, only minor resources were allocated to U-bpat construction before the War. This changed after the War began and the U-boat proved to be Germany's most potent naval weapon. The Germans devoted considerable resources to building U-boats. Ironically while the German u-boat campaign is one of the great legends of the World War II, it was the Americans in the Pacific who waged the only successful submarine campaign in history--a stark example of what the German might have achieved.

Background

Military forces are designed to project a country's power. Ironically, some powerful military forces can ultimately prove to actually reduce a country's security. The best example here is Kaiser Wilhelm's highseas fleet. By creating a High Seas Fleet, the Kaisser increased British concerns about German intentions. And the German surface fleet played no significant role in the War. The principal achievement of the U-boat fleet was to being America into the War, virtually ensuring defet on the Western Front. After the War, severe restrictions were placed on the German Navy by the Versailles Treaty (1919).

World War I (1914-18)

Military forces are designed to project a country's power. Ironically, some powerful military forces can ultimately prove to actually reduce a country's security. The best example here is Kaiser Wilhelm's highseas fleet. Germany in the mid-19th century was seen by Briton's as an ally and France as a security threat. The British royal family was of German origins. Prince Albert himself was German. This view was altered by Kaiser Wilhelm II's aggressive foreign policy and boisterous, eratic behavior. This revised view was confirmed by the Kaiser's decession to build a highseas fleet. The major impact of the fleet was to seek alliances with Russia and France, Germany's historic enenies. The Kaiser's surface fleet played a very minor role in the War. The U-boat became Germany's primary naval weapon, yet the primary achievement of the feared U-boat fleet was to draw America into the War, thus ensuring Germany's defeat on the Western ront. Following the War, the Germany Navy was to be interned at Scappa Flow. The Navy instead, sunk most of the capital ships before turning them over.

Versailles Peace Treaty: Naval provisions (1919)

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) placed stringent limits on the German Navy. The German naval threat had been the most serious the British faced during the War. As Admiral Jelocoe famously stated, he ws the only man who could lose the War in a single day. The British had won the War, but had been seriously wekened. They were intent on reducung mikitary spending and wanted to ensure there would not be another costly naval arms race with Germany. Articles 159-213 of the Versailles Treaty contained the Military, Naval and Air limitation clauses. The Naval Clauses severly restricted tghe German Navy (Article 181-197). The Treaty required that 2 months after the Treaty came into fotce that the German Navy was not to exceed 6 battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article l90. Submarines (U-boats) were specifically prohibited. The Navy had to be limited to 15,000 officers and men. All military and naval aviation had to be terminated.

Inter-War Era (1919-39)

Both the public and military circles after the War assessed the role of the Germany Navy in the War. Many as a result wondered if Germany should have a navy at all, even the small force allowed by the Versailles Treaty. The Navy survived in part because of the work of the austere Admiral Eric Raeder (1876-1960), a practicing Christian and apolitcal figure. He set about building a highly professional, non-political officer corps. This made a difference in the early Weimar years when the loyalty of the Reichwehr was highly qwuestioinable. Among the many cashiered figures was a young Reinhard Heydrich (1904-42)--one of the most evil figures in the NAZI heirarchy and World War II. Like pre-World War I naval figures, Grand Admiral Raeder wanted a Highseas Fleet of big-gun battleships. While he did not want to divert scarce resources to U-bosts, it was Raeder who selected a reluctant Karl D�nitz to head the U-boat force. The Navy managed to do some research on submarines through foreign subsidiaries. There was also some cooperation with the Japanese. The British pursuing a policy of apeasement, signed a naval treaty with the NAZIs (1935). This permitted the Germans to build both battleships and u-boats. At the time the Royal Navy had concluded that ASDAC (SONAR) rendred u-boats obsolete. Hitler's primary interest was in the Wehrmacht. He had little interest or concept in naval warfare. His primary naval thought was that the Royal Navy had the ability to blockade Germany and deny it food and raw material imports. Thus he wrote about the need for Lebensraum in continental Europe (meaning the East) that would make Germany self sufficent in food production. His preferences for gigantism (large weapons) helped conform the German Admiralty's preference for large surface ships. Hitler approved Plan-Z, a secret plan to prepare the Kriegsmarine for war with Britain by 1944. It involved the construction of a massive fleet of capital ships. The launching of Bismarck (1939) was the beginning of what the Germans admirals hoped would be a major naval building program. U-boats were given second priority and thus Germany would enter World War II wil a vert small, although well trained U-boat fleet.

Operations (1939-45)

Hitler launched World War II 5 years too early for the Germany Navy. Hitler had told his admirals that there would be no war until the mid-1940s. He subsequently pushed forward his time table. At the time he launched the War, the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmact were the most powerful air forces and armies in the world. The Germany Navy ranked as a potent, but relarively small force. The Kregsmarine again played a minor role in World War II. The German surface fleet was a major disappointment to Hitler. The U-boat proved again to be Germany's primary naval threat. And for time seemed to offer some propects for a major victory. Churchill after the War wrote that the u-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic was the one threat that really worried him. The German naval high command (OKM) wanted an impressive surface fleet, but Germany's limited industrial capacity made that impossible. As a result, only minor resources were allocated to U-bpat construction before the War. This changed after the War began and the U-boat proved to be Germany's most potent naval weapon. The Germans devoted considerable resources to building U-boats. Ironically while the German u-boat campaign is one of the great legends of the World War II, it was the Americans in the Pacific who waged the only successful submarine campaign in history--a stark example of what the German might have achieved. While the Battle of the Atlantic was the central struggle for the Kriegsmarine as well as the Royal Navy, the Atlantic was not the only operational area. The KM also fought battles in the Arctic, North Sea, Baltic, and Mediterranean.

Units

The Germans Admiralty encouraged by Hitler develioed the Z-Plan to build a fleet capable of going toe to toe with the British Royal Navy. As in World War I, the KM in its war plannking saw the RN as its principal adversary. It would have been a fully rounded naval force including aircraft carriers. The Anglo-German Naval Treaty (1935) removed Versailles Treaty limitations, including prohibitions on U-boats. The German Admiralty did not give any major priority to U-boats. As with other World War II navies, the German Admiralty with Hitler's support was dominated by big-gun battleship proponents. Hitler assured the Germans Admirals that war would not come intil well into the 1940s when the planned units could be built. As a result of Prime-Miniter Chamberlain's Appeasement Policy, however, Hitler advanced his war schedule. Priority was given to the Heer and Luftwaffe in the run up to the war. As a result, the KM unlike World wr I entered the War with only a small naval force. There were a few battle cruisers and cruisers, a modern destroyer force, a small U-boat force, and coastal patrol craft. Massive battleships and aircraft carriers were still under construction.

Major German surface ships

Germany had some fine surface ships, but was even more badly outnumber than in World War I. This they never attempted a major fleet engagement like Jutland. The Kriegmarine began the War with some excellent destroyers. They were almost totally destroyed in the battle for Norway when they were used as troop trannsports. Thus as the Germans were planning Operation Sealion, almpst no destroyers were available. This left the Kriegsmarine with a small number of cruisers and battleships. The Germans at first deployed their surface fleet for commerce raiding in the North Atlantic. The Graf Spee was lost early in the War (December 1939). Bismarck was lost (1941). The British staged a number of raids off Normay, harrasing coastal shipping. Swedish iron ore was shipped trough Norwegian ports. The British also staged a successful Commando raid on Vaagso (194?). This convinced Hitler that the British were planning to attempt an invasion. The result was a substantial German deployment. This included both the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kreigesmarine (U-boats and surface ships). Gradually the German Admiralty concluded that surface raiding was untenable in the Atlantic. The additional need to stop the Allied northern convoys caused Hitler to order the deployment of the Kriegsmarine's primary surface ships to Norway. The Tirpitz was deployed there. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst like Bismarck were used for commerce raiding in 1942. With the entrance of the U.S. Navy into the war, commerce raiding ecame less tenable. This was especially the case as the Allies began closing the mid-Atlantic air gap and deploying jeep (small escort) casrriers. The Allies also developed technical advances such as Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) nd improved, airborne centimetric radar. As a result, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst which had been operating from French Atlantic ports made a dash through the Channel for redeployment to Norway (1942). The Kriegsmarine with these powerful ships, achieved very little. They failed to inderdict PQ12 (March 1942) and raided Spitzbergen (September 1943). The poweful Tirpitz sent most of the wr in Norwegian fjords. She was finally sunk by the RAF in Troms� fjord (November 11, 1944). Gneisenau was damaged in the Channel dash and was never deployed to Norway. The Royal Navy sank Scharnhorst in the engagement over JW-51B. Hitler was frustated by the poor performance of the Kriegsmarine. Mosdt of the Arctic convoy vessels sunk were sunk by u-boats.

Surface raiders and Q boats

The Kreigsmarine as in World War I deployed merchant raiders disguised themselves as non-combatant merchant vessels. They were, heavily armed. While not armored or capable of engaging combat ships, they were easily capable of sinking merchant shipping. Germany deployed several merchant raiders early in World War II. Germany sent out two waves of six surface raiders each during the War. They chose refrigerator ships which were deigned to transport fresh food from the tropics. They were mosdtly in the 8-10,000 ton range. As they transported perishable food, they tended to be faster than standard merchant vessels. Speed was of course vital fior merchant raiding. They were armed with six 15 cm (5.9 inch) guns and a variety of smaller calibre guns. They also carried mines to lay in the sea lanes as well as torpedoes. The German captains did their best to disguise their ships to make them look like Allied or neutral shipping. Italy deployed four "Ramb" class ships as auxiliary cruisers in World War II. The British Royal Navy began the War woefully short of escort vessels to protect convoys. One effort to engage the German U-boats was Q-ships. The Royal Navy Q-ships were warships desguised as merchant ships, the opposite of a merchant raider. They were generally 8-10,000 ton ships. British Armed Merchant Cruisers were converted passenger liners and thus fast ships.

U-boats

World War II naval histories focus very intensely on the GermannU-boat force and the Allied efforts to defeat it. Ironically German admirals before the War wanted a big-gun surface fleet. Hitler with his penchant for military giganitism actually promised them just such as fleet, but then advanced the time table for war. Thus the Kreigsmarine unlike World war I began the War with only a small surface fleet. As a result of World War I, most German and British admirals did not believe the U-boat was a formidable weapon and this were still big-gun battleship enthusiasts. Admiral D�enitz thus had only a small U-boat force when Hitler launched the War, but they were very well trained. The U-boat proved again to be Germany's primary naval threat. Once this became apparent, Hitler ordered a massive U-boat construction program. Churchill after the War wrote that the u-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic was the one threat that really worried him. The fall of France provided the Germans Atlantic ports that they were denied in World War I and which greatly greatly incrased the effectiveness and striking power of the growing U-boat fleet. The effectiveness of the U-boats can be seen when President Roosevelt ordered took the extrodinary action of ordering the U.S. Navy into an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic months before the United State actually entered the war. Even so, Hitler did every thing he could to avoid incidents with the Americans in the Atlantic. He was intent on keeping America out of the war until he completed the conquest of the Soviet Union. His anger at having to do this was so intense that it is probanly the primary reason that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that he so readily declared war on the United States. This freed the U-boats to launch a highly successful attack on shipping along the Amerucan Eastern Coast. The Battle of the Atlantic would be the decisive campaign waged by the Western Allies. Ironically while the German U-boat campaign is one of the great legends of World War II, endlssly chronicled in film and literature, it was the Americans in the Pacific who waged the only successful submarine campaign--a stark example of what the Germans might have achieved. All of the other Allied campaigns in Europe were contingent on defeating the U-boats in the North Atlantic.

Coastal patrol boats

We do not have much information on German coastal patrol boats yet. Unlike the larger craft, they were not subject the Versailles Treaty restrictions. While there were no restrictions om construction, they were not hat the German admirals wanted and later Hitler. They wanted bug-gun battleships. We notice references to three patrol craft used by the Kreigsmarine in World War II: R�umboote--R boats (1929-45), E-boats (1927-45), and Patroullienboot Ausland--PA (1943-45). Unlike the capital ships and later U-boats, they did not attract Hitler's interest. The 41 meter (m) R�umboote (R boat) was the surface ship built in the greatest numbers by the Germans before and during World War II. The were designed as minesweepers, but used for a variety of assignments. The Germans built 424 of these boats and used then in every theater including the Atlantic (coast of France), the North Sea, Baltic, Mediterranean and the Black Sea. With the Kreigsmarine's destroyers sunk or damaged after Norway, these small boats could have played an important role in Operation Sealion. The Kreigsmarine used them for convoy escort, coastal patrol, mine sweeping, mine laying, and air-sea rescue. Perhaps the best known German patrol boat was the 33-m Schnellboot (E-boats). These fast motor torpedo boats were called Schnellboote German (S-boats) for 'fast boats' by the Germans, E-boat was the British designation, probably meaning enemy boats. The E-boats were incredibly fast, cruising at 40 or 50 knots. The wooden construction meant it could pass through the extensive magnetic minefields laid in the Channel and North Sea. It outclassed the better known American PT boats as well as the British motor torpedo boats (MTB). It could operate in the open sea and had a range of about 700 nautical miles. In response the British developed an upgraded MTBs using the Fairmile 'D' hull design. The Americans withdrew the PT-boats from European service, but they were used with considerable success in the Pacific. The most notable E-boat action was off Devon when a group of E-boats caught American landing craft practicing for the D-Day invasion--Operation Tiger (April 1944). Some 638 Army and Navy personnel were killed. The action was hushed up at the time. On D-Day, however, the E-boats were not a factor. The Allied invasion armada crossed the Channel before the Kreigsmarine detected it and could deploy their E-boats from Cherbourg. The 62-m Patroullienboot Ausland were the largest of the German coastal patrol craft. They actually ships being built by the French at the time of the German invasion (1940). They were seized by the Germans who attempted tom complete construction for the Kriefsmarine. Work progressed slowly, apparently as a result of reluctance or even actual sabotage by French workers. Only four were eventually completed. The Germans commissioned them and deployed them as as escort vessels (1943�44). Three were sunk by the RAF (1944). The Germans sunk the fourth as a block ship at Le Havre after the D-Day landings.

Naval Air

The KM like other World War II navies was concious of the adavances in air power and the realization that it would play a role in any coming naval war. But like all World Watr II navies, in the pre-War era, the imprtance of baval aviation was not fully recognized. As a result yhe KM did not insist on its own air service. KM air units, both onboard, and land based, were Luftwaffe units. This included the air components of aircraft carriers. Along with the Luftwaffe naval units were KM observers riegsmarine seconded to the Luftwaffe. Thus through the War, the KM had no maritime air units or air crews of its own. Before the ar, airborne maritime units were the responsibility if the OKL-F�hrer der SeeLuftstreitekrafte. While working with the KM was a fully Luftwaffe unit. The OKL-F�hrer der SeeLuftstreitekrafte was disbanded and replaced by the General der Luftwaffe beim Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Ob.d.M) (1939). Opertionally, for most of the War, as the German military successes led to the occupation of costal areas (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, the Baltic Republics, and Italy), coastal and maritime units were subordinated to the Fliegerkorps/Fliegerf�hrer in those areas. At the end of the war responsibility for what was left of the coastal and maritime units was placed under the control of the General der Aufkl�rungsflieger. [Pipes and Wadman] The KM Z Plan called for the construction of two aircradt carriers. The Graf Zeplin was completed, but never became opertional. The larger fleet units (battleships and cruisers) had small plnes, mostly float planes. These primarily served recomissance functions. Bith the large and small fleet units had to depend on anti-aircraft guns or Luftwaffe aircraft for for protection from enemy air attacks. Ludtwaff protection varied during the War and became less dependable as the War began to go against Germany and the Luftwaffe begame to be withdrawn back to the Reich to defend German cities from the Allied strategic bombing campaign. This meant that fleet units had to rely primarily on shipboard and port anti-aircraft guns. This mean that German patrol craft and minelayers operating in the English Channel in the run up to D-Day had little or no air cover. The Luftwaffe also controlled the aircraft involved in marine patrol and anti-shipping attacks. This was of some imprtance in the early phase of Battle of the Atlantic from French bases and attacks on the Arctic convoys from Norwegian vases. The FW-200 Condor proved effective in long range sea patrols and mine laying and eventually actual attacks on shipping. Once the Royal Navy began deploying shipboard fighters and finally escort carriers, the Germans ended the Condor patrols.

Sources

Pipes, Jason and Dave Wadman. "Kriegsmarine naval air power, " Feldgrau.com - research on the German armed forces 1918-1945.







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Created: 5:35 AM 11/9/2011
Last updated: 2:30 AM 8/13/2015