Figure 1.-- Here boys look over a VW Kübelsitzwagen--the German equivalent of the American Jeep. Kübelsitzwagen meant bucket-seat car. It was designed by Ferdinand Porsche and built by Volkswagen, a company created by the NAZIs to build low-cost cars for German workers. The Kübelsitzwagen was largely based on the pre-War Volkswagen Beetle. VW beginning in 1940 built over 50,000 Kübelsitzwagen. The Kübelsitzwagen compared very favorably to the jeep. It's chief disadvantage was thsat it was diffiult to start in low temperatures. The problem for the Germans was that the Americans maufactured about 650,000 jeeps. Similar disparities in production occurred in most other areas of productioj during the war. The only country with a fully mechanized army was the British when Hitler launched World War II. Hitler's military concept was to overwealm his adversaries before the great material and industrial power of the Allies could be brought to bear.

German Führer Adolf Hitler launched World War II with the most profesional, competent military officer corps in the world. The NAZIs embarkened on a program to train boys to be warriors beginning with the Hitler Youth (HJ). This would take some time. The HJ was not at first compulsory. Thus when Hitler launched the War, many of the young recruits had some HJ experiences, but the officer corps of the German military had been trained in the military schools of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. It was still hevily influenced by the the Prussian military tradition. And since the creation of the Prussian state, here was a warrior tradition that remained remarkably consistent over four centuries. The founder of that martial state was the Great Elector--Friderich-Wilhelm I (1640-88). He inherited a minor, rather poor and discontinguous principality in northern Germany--Brandenburg-Prussia. He turned his realm into a state with one purpose, to fund and support his army. The army he created was not a large one. His realm could not support a massive army on the level of the great powers like Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden. His solution to this problem was to create a small, but well-drilled and equipped standing army which could defeat a larger opponent before they could marshal their forces. [Citino, pp. xiii-xiv.] This was the only way a small power could defeat a larger power. And this was the policy that the Great Elector and his Hohenzollern's descendants followed and used sucessfully to turn Prussia into a major power. This was the tradition with which Hitler's Wehrmacht launched World War II. And Hitler had turned Germany into a state with a single purpose--to support a modern military machine that could expand the Reich. The Wehrmact had many strengths. Great attention was given to speed and mobility. These were capabilities that the Great Elector himself had emphasized. Blitzkrieg was in fact a modern version of the Great Elector's tactics with industrial weaponry. The Wehrmacht also had some major weakenesses. The industrial base of its targets, significantly increased that of Germany. Essentially the same sitation faced by the Great Elector and his descendants. German military strengths brough great victories at the beginning of World War II as they had at the start of World War I. A major strength was the support of the Luftwaffe in the early years. Perhaps the most serious Geman military weakness was the lack of attention to logistics. This was an area of lesser importance to an army designed to win a war in a brief period, but was of vital importance in a protacted war. [Citino, p. xiv.] Another weakness was military intelligence. [Citino, pp. xiv-xv.] This is less easy to understand, but may lie a tendency to underestimate their importance and an over confidence in their military superiority. These weakenes proved disastrous in World War II as they had in World War I. A great weakness was the lack of adequate naval power.

Historical Background

And since the creation of the Prussian state, here was a warrior tradition that remained remarkably consistent over four centuries. The founder of that martial state was the Great Elector--Friderich-Wilhelm I (1640-88). He inherited a minor, rather poor and discontinguous principality in northern Germany--Brandenburg-Prussia. He turned his realm into a state with one purpose, to fund and support his army. The army he created was not a large one. His realm could not support a massive army on the level of the great powers like Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden. His solution to this problem was to create a small, but well-drilled and equipped standing army which could defeat a larger opponent before they could marshal their forces. [Citino, pp. xiii-xiv.] This was the only way a small power could defeat a larger power. And this was the policy that the Great Elector and his Hohenzollern's descendants followed and used sucessfully to turn Prussia into a major power. This was the tradition with which Hitler's Wehrmacht launched World War II.

German Strengths

The Wehrmact had many strengths. German military strengths brought great victories at the beginning of World War II as they had at the start of World War I.

German officer corps

German Führer Adolf Hitler launched World War II with the most profesional, competent military officer corps in the world. The NAZIs embarkened on a program to train boys to be warriors beginning with the Hitler Youth (HJ). This would take some time. The HJ was not at first compulsory. Thus when Hitler launched the War, many of the young recruits had some HJ experiences, but the officer corps of the German military had been trained in the military schools of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. It was still hevily influenced by the the Prussian military tradition. Luckily for the World, Hitler neither trusted the officer corps or respected its professional judgement.

Preparation

None of the World war II beligerant countries were prepared for War. The two countries most prepared, however, were Germany and Japan. Hitler had turned Germany into a state with a single purpose--to support a modern military machine that could expand the Reich. And unlike the period leaduing up to World war I there was no military arms race. NAZI Germany began its rearmament program at a time when the Allies were attempting to limit military expenitures to deal with welfare problems resulting from the Depression. To the Eat, however, the situation was different. Stalin wa persung a massive armament program.

Tactical concept: Blitzkrieg

Great attention was given to speed and mobility. These were capabilities that the Great Elector himself had emphasized. Blitzkrieg was in fact a modern version of the Great Elector's tactics with industrial weaponry.

German Weaknesses

The German military also had some major weakenesses which were not at first apparent. They would in the end would result in catrostrophic defeat. As was the case of the Prussian Arny before it and the Imperial German Army in World War I, Hitler's strategic doctrince was premised on early victories against countries that were unprepared for War. This way Hitler believed he could defeat his enemies even though they had a greater industrial capacity and resource base. This would be possible only if Germany could defeat the countries targeted in quick, short wars. As in World War I, a long, proteacted war would inevitably lead to Germany's defeat. The Wehrmacht achieved spectacular victories largely because of the perfection of modern tactical doctrine--Blitzkrieg. The fall of France stunned the world. The Panzers, however, were stopped by the Channel and rhe RAF stopped the Luftwaffe. When President Roosevelt underwrote the British war effort with Lend Lease, it meant that Germany would not have its quick short victory. As a result, as the War progressed the weakenes inherent in the German war effort gradually became increasingly apparent. These weaknesses proved disastrous in World War II as they had in World War I. And they were magnified by Hitler's mishandling of the War effort.

Sources

Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2005), 428p.

Created: 4:54 AM 5/13/2008
Last updated: 8:42 PM 9/26/2008