Figure 1.--Pearl Harbor changed everything. It was a brillianly executed military operation, but failed in its main purpose--to destroy the Pacific Fleet's carriers. Rather battleship row was devestated--here we see West Virginia, Tennessee, and Arizona. The Japanese sank eight old battleships of only marginal military valueand most were resuracedand eventually joined the fkleet. Pearl Harbor was perhaps the greatest strategic blunder in history. Rather than combining Axis forces to defeat the Soviet Union, the Japanese brought America with its emense resources into the War. And Hitler with the Soviets still undefeated compounded the error in an act of insane bravado by also declaring war on the United States.

A Japanese carrier task force executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). The Axis Alliance was a defensive alliance. It required the three countries to come to the other's aid in case of attack, but did not require any action if one of the three attacked another country. Thus Hitler was not required to come to Japan's assistance, Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop stressed this in meetings with Hitler. Up to this time Hitler had avoided attacking the United States, even when President Roosevelt launched what was in effect an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. Thus Hitler's decision to declare war on America (December 11) is largely unexplained. Speaking before an audience of NAZI luminaries, Hitler announced his decision, explaining that America with its mixture of races would not be an important factor in the War. America was in fact the only country on which Hitler declared war. It was like the other important war decisions, a decision he made personally without any kind of staff discussion. He never explained his decision to his inner circle and historians today can only speculate concerning the decision. Even more unfathomable, he made the decision just as the Soviets launched their offensive before Moscow, clearly demonstrating that Operation Barbarossa had failed to knock the Soviets out of the War in a quick summer campaign. America was unprepared for war against either Germany or Japan. Hitler's declaration solved a problem for President Roosevelt of how after a Japanese attack to enter the European war against NAZI Germany. The Japanese and NAZIs were unaware of the dangers of war with an industrial potential of the United States. They were convinced that America's war production could not be accelerated or a national will to wage war coalesce in time to make an effective contribution.

Hitler and America

Hitler's concept of America is not precisely known. Some have argued that Hitler and the NAZIs serious underestimated the potential power of the United States. Göring is known to have said that all the Americans know is how to make razor blades. Some historians argue that Hitler himself had a similar simplistic understanding of America. [Remnak] Hitler did not discuss America to any great extent in Mein Kampf. What he did have to say was relatively complimentary. He was impressed with the industrial and technological advances. He also approved of the way which America had solved the Native American problem and the Jim Crow system to isolate and restrict black Americans. He enviously discussed America's continental power base, the kind of continental dominance he desired for Germany. Hitler had much more to say about America in his second book which he decided not to publish. Here he concluded that race mixing and Jewish influences had eroded the strength of the United States. He saw the failure of America to overcome the Depression as a sign of weakness. He also postulated the theory that the growth of American power would threaten Britain, perhaps compelling her to seek an alliance with Germany. He probably believed much of this, but Hitler was also a practical thinker and understood that America posed a mortal danger to the NAZIs. As a result, he dealt with America cautiously despite the antagonistic policies of the Roosevelt Administration which steadily expanded assistance to the Allies despite a powerful Isolationist movement. Up to this time Hitler had avoided attacking the United States, even when President Roosevelt launched what was in effect an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. Hitler appears to have understood much better than the Japanese the potential danger that America posed.

Axis Alliance (September 27, 1940)

Both Germany and Japan had some reservations about an alliance, but the course of events by mid-1940 had convinced both that a formal alliance was in their best interest. Both countries had, however, very different goals and objectives. The Japanese tried to convince Hitler to focus on Brtain, but to no avail. His eyes were firmly fixed East on the emense resources of the Soviet Union. He explained to his generls that with the resurces of the East Germany would become a superpower on the scale of the United STatesad and unassailable. The Axis Alliance was a defensive alliance. It required the three countries to come to the other's aid in case of attack, but did not require any action if one of the three attacked another country. Thus Hitler was not required to come to Japan's assistance, Foreign Minister Van Ribbentrop stressed this in meetings with Hitler.

Undeclared Naval War

Almost from the beginning of war in Europe, President Roosevelt began what was to become an undeclared war with Germany in the North Atlantic. The first tentative step was naval patrols to to prevent belligerent ships from U.S. waters. Also he began to think about bases in Bermuda and the Caribbean only days after the war had begun. [Freidel, p. 323.] While America would not enter the War until December 1941, Britain had an ally in the Atlantic almost from the beginning of the War. At first the American role was limited, but as the situation worsened and the German's expanded the U-boat fleet, the American role expanded. The Royal Navy was ill prepared for the war. Losses to the u-boats were severe, despite the fact the Kriegsmarine began the War with only a small force. Months before American entered the War, the U.S. Navy was involved in a full-scale shooting war to protect the convoys needed to keep Britain in the War. The American public was not fully aware of the extent to which the Navy was involved. The American effort, however, played a major role in allowing Britain to to survive the NAZI onslaught.

Soviet Offensive Before Moscow (December 1941)

Even more unfathomable, Hitler made the decision just as the Soviets launched their offensive before Moscow, clearly demonstrating that Operation Barbarossa had failed to knock the Soviets out of the War in a quick summer campaign. Hitler changed plans and diverted Army Group Central from Moscow. Great victories were achieved, but it was not until the end of Summer that the Panzers began the final push on Moscow. Autumn rains turned the unpaved Soviet roads into rivers of mud, trapping the Wehrmacht and the Panzers. The beginning of the cold weather was a shock to the Wehrmacht which had made no preparations for winter fighting. Men in great numbers suffered from exposure. Equipment, artillery, vehicles, and tanks would not function. German commanders asked for permission to pause. Hitler ordered them to press on. It was at this time that Zhukov reinforced by units transferred from Siberia struck. The result was not only were the Wehrmacht struck, but the losses were so devastating that the German war effort was never able to fully recover.

Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941)

A Japanese carrier task force composed of six front-line carriers executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). American planners had thought the Japanese might strike, but had not expected the attack to come at Pearl Harbor. Most officials had expected the war to come with Hitler and the NAZIs first. The Japanese strike was a shattering success. All eight battle ships of the American Pacific Fleet were sunk, but only two were destroyed (Arizona and Oklahoma). Fortunately the American carriers were not at Pearl. It is often said that the Japanese strike immobilized the Pacific fleet. This is only in part true. It was the Japanese superiority in carriers that gave them the ability to dominate the Pacific taking island after island and launch an offensive into Southeast Asia.

Declaration of War (December 11, 1941)

Speaking before a rapt Reichstag in Berlin, Reich Führer Adolf Hitler delivered an impassioned 88 minute speech. He provided a NAZI view of how the War came about. He rejected responsibility and predictably blamed the war on the Jews. He personally wrote the speech himself. He reviewed how the War came about (September 1939) and why he decided to invade the Soviet Union (June 1941). Much of this was either outright lies or delusionary. With Hitler it is often difficult to separate the two. He spoke at length on President Roosevelt's hostile policies. He described the increasingly belligerent actions of the United States. (The United States was supplying Britain arms through Lend Lease and openly waging war against the U-bots in the North Atlantic.) Here Hitler was accurately describing American actions. Following this, he theatrically announced that Germany was declaring war on the United States and joining its Axis ally. The address was broadcast throughout Germany. At the time only a few military men fully understood the disaster unfolding in Russia where the Red Army had launched a winter offensive before Moscow (December 10). Hitler explained that America with its mixture of races would not be an important factor in the War. It is difficult to know what people throughout Germany thought as they heard this address. Their Führer had brought them stunning victories. It is likely that most Germans, especially younger Germans, had great confidence in him. Many older Germans may have still strong memories of World war I and the impact of America entering the War. One historian reports that an inaccurate and misleading translation of portions of the address appeared in The New York Times (December 12). [Weber]

"... everything which America has not drawn from Europe may well appear worthy of admiration to a juda-ised, mixed race; Europe, on the other hand, sees in it a sign of cultural decay." After a long historical discussion, Hitler proclaimed, "I think you have all found it a relief that now, at last, one State has been the first to take the step of protest against his historically unique and shameless ill treatment of truth, and of right – which protest this man has desired and about which he cannot complain. The fact that the Japanese Government, which has been negotiating for years with this man, has at last become tired of being mocked by him, in such an unworthy way, fills us all, the German people, and I think, all other decent people in the world, with deep satisfaction. We have seen what the Jews have done to Soviet Russia. We have made the acquaintance of the Jewish Paradise on earth. Millions of German soldiers have been able to see this country where the international Jews have destroyed people and property. The President of the U.S.A. ought finally to understand – I say this only because of his limited intellect – that we know that the aim of this struggle is to destroy one State after another. But the present German Reich has nothing more in common with the old Germany. And we, for our part, will now do what this provocateur has been trying to do so much for years. Not only because we are the ally of Japan, but also because Germany and Italy have enough insight and strength to comprehend that, in these historic times, the existence or non-existence of the nations, is being decided perhaps for ever. We clearly see the intention of the rest of the world towards us. They reduced Democratic Germany to hunger. They would exterminate our social things of today. When Churchill and Roosevelt state that they want to build up a new social order, later one, it is like a hairdresser with a bald head recommending an unfortunate hair-restorer. These men, who live in the most socially backward states, have misery and distress enough in their own countries to occupy themselves with the distribution of foodstuffs. As for the German nation, it needs charity neither from Mr. Churchill nor from Mr. Roosevelt, let alone from Mr. Eden. It wants only its rights! It will secure for itself this right to life even if thousands of Churchills and Roosevelts conspire against it. In the whole history of the German nation, of nearly 2,000 years, it has never been so united as today and, thanks to National Socialism it will remain united in the future. Probably it has never seen so clearly, and rarely been so conscious of its honor. I have therefore arranged for his passports to be handed to the American Charge d'Affairs today, and the following . . . (drowned in applause). As a consequence of the further extension of President Roosevelt's policy, which is aimed at unrestricted world domination and dictatorship the U.S.A. together with England have not hesitated from using any means to dispute the rights of the German, Italian, and Japanese nations to the basis of their natural existence. The Governments of the U.S.A. and of England have therefore resisted, not only now but also for all time, every just understanding meant to bring about a better New Order in the world. Since the beginning of the war the American president, Roosevelt, has been guilty of a series of the worst crimes against international law; illegal seizure of ships and other property of German and Italian nationals were coupled with the threat to, and looting of, those who were deprived of their liberty by being interned. Roosevelt's ever increasing attacks finally went so far that he ordered the American navy to attack everywhere ships under the German and Italian flags, and to sink them – this in gross violation of international law. American ministers boasted of having destroyed German submarines in this criminal way. German and Italian merchant ships were attacked by American cruisers, captured and their crews imprisoned. With no attempt at an official denial there has now been revealed in America President Roosevelt's plan by which, at the latest in 1943, Germany and Italy were to be attacked in Europe by military means. In this way the sincere efforts of Germany and Italy to prevent an extension of the war and to maintain relations with the U.S.A. in spite of the unbearable provocations which have been carried on for years by President Roosevelt, have been frustrated.

Germany and Italy have been finally compelled, in view of this, and in loyalty to the Tri-Partite act, to carry on the struggle against the U.S.A. and England jointly and side by side with Japan for the defense and thus for the maintenance of the liberty and independence of their nations and empires. The Three Powers have therefore concluded the following Agreement, which was signed in Berlin today: "In their unshakable determination not to lay down arms until the joint war against the U.S.A. and England reaches a successful conclusion, the German, Italian, and Japanese governments have agreed on the following points:
Article 1. Germany, Italy and Japan will wage the common war forced upon them by the U.S.A. and England with all the means of power at their disposal, to a victorious conclusion.
Article II. Germany, Italy and Japan undertake not to conclude an armistice or peace with the U.S.A., or with England without complete mutual understanding.
Article III. Germany, Italy and Japan will continue the closest cooperation even after the victorious conclusion of the war in order to bring about a just new order in the sense of the Tri-Partite Pact concluded by them on the 27th September 1940.
Article IV. This Agreement comes into force immediately after signature and remains in force as long as the Tri-Partite Pact of 27th September 1940. The Signatory Powers will confer in time before this period ends about the future form of the cooperation provided for in Article III of this agreement."

Deputies, Members of the German Reichstag: Ever since my last peace proposal of July 1940 was rejected, we have realized that this struggle has to be fought out to its last implications. That the Anglo-Saxon-Jewish- Capitalist World finds itself now in one and the same Front with Bolshevism does not surprise us National Socialists: we have always found them in company. " [BBC]

The Decision

Thus Hitler's decision to declare war on America (December 11) is largely unexplained. America was in fact the only country on which Hitler declared war. It was like the other important German war decisions, a decision he made personally without any kind of staff discussion. He never explained his decision to his inner circle and historians today can only speculate about it. It seems virtual madness. Why would Hitler who had first failed to defeat Britain and then clearly failed to defeat the Soviet Union, declare war on the other remaining great power, the United States. One of the advantages of the Axis Alliance was to pressure Britain and to detract America. But now Hitler acted to bring America into the European war. Unfortunately there is no clear record of what he was thinking. Here we can only speculate. There are several factors which may explain his rash action. 1) We believe the primary action was psychological. Hitler proved himself to be a gifted and calculating politican. He made deals and attacked weakness, temporizing when he found strength. While successful he hated having to make arrangements with people he loathed. If you review his career up through the fall of France, Hitler's calculations and political steps were invariably accurate. After the fall of France, he was invariably wrong. This is because he shifted from political calculation to military command. It was what he always wanted, to be a great military commander. With the declaration of war he tired of political steps to keep American isolationist as long as possible and did what he really wanted, make war. In his declaration war, Hitler called Roosevelt a man of low intellect. In effect it was Roosevelt who had outmaneuvered Hitler. 2) Hitler saw himself a leader of bold action. He saw that Roosevelt would eventfully gain a declaration of war from Congress and decided he wanted to take the bold action. 3) He had promised the Japanese just such an action and did not want to appear to be a reluctant ally. [Rich] 4) Having failed to destroy the Red Army with Operation Barbarossa, he must have begun to see a Japanese attack in the east as needed assistance.

President Roosevelt

America was unprepared for war against either Germany or Japan, but preparations were already being escalated before the Japanese struck. President Roosevelt recognized the danger from an early point, but the emphasis was on dealing with the Depression. At first his emphasis was on the Navy (1934). The Army Air Corps airmail debacle did not endear the new president to the Air Corps. After the Munich disaster, however, he shifted his attenbtion to the Army Air Corps (1938). By the time Hitler and Stalin launched the War, the Army was in a pitiful state, both a tiny force and without modern weapons (1939). The fall of France finall began a period of rapid Army expansion (1940). Hitler's declaration of war conveniently solved a problem for President Roosevelt (1941). It would have been difficult for even a president noted for his persuasive abilities to explain how after a Japanese attack in the Pacific that America should focus its energies on entering the European war against NAZI Germany. Both Roosevelt and Churchill assessed NAZI Germany as the greatest danger and saw a need to concentrate resources on defeating the NAZIs as the highest priority. There were differences between Roosevelt anbd Churchil, but not over the Germany First policy. We think that the President Roosevelt could have managed a declration of war against Germany, but it would have been awkward and possibly taken some time.

Calculation

Both the NAZIs and the Japanese and NAZIs were aware that war with the United States, the preminent ibdustrial power, was a huge risk. But neither were ware of the full dimension of the danger posed by war with the United States and its huge industrial capacity. For that matter even America and its allies were not fully aware of what American industry would actually achieve. Here it is difficult to assess the statements of Axis officials. we often are left wondering if their statements are propaganda or what they really believed. The two countries entered the War with America in very different circumstances. The Japanese studied the matter throughly, looking at America;s industrial power and asseessing how rapidly the United States could covert its industry for war. They were wrong in theor assesment, but at least they did an assessment. The final decision was a group assessment of the Japanese military leaderscontroling the country. The situation was very different in Germany. There was mo detailed study. And there was not push from the German military, except perhaps the Kriegsmarine (at least the U0boat fleet) for war with Ameruca. The Heer committed to a life and death struggle in the East nd remembering America's importance in World war I had no interest in war with America, at least not in 1941. And this included the ardently NAZI generals. Hitler's deesion for war with America was an emotional decision made by Hitler without study or psh from the German military.

German

Hitler appears to have been more aware of the dangers posed by the United States than the Japanese Army clique that dominated the Imperial Government. He also seems more aware yjan his own inner circle, but of course they often parroited what they thoughtbhe he wanted to hear rather than express their real opinions. Professional military men and industrialists had much more relaistic opinions, but Hitler did not go to them for advise. The exact nature of his assessment is not precisely known. While he speaks highly of America in Mein Kampf, he appears to have convinced himself in his second book that the 'mongeilization' of America had sapped its once formidable energies. Even so, he also speaks about America's industrial might. "The size of the internal merican marketand its wealth of buying power and akso raw materials guarantee the American automobile industry internal sales figures that alone premit production methods tht would simply be impossible in Europe. The result of that is the enormous export capacity of the American automobile market. At issue is the general motorization of the world--a matter of immense significance. [Hitler. p. 107.] Hitler's attitudes toward America may have been influenced by book provided him by War Minister Blomberg in the late-1930s. He reportedly told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotove in Berlin (November 12, 1940), "The United States will not be a threat to us in dcades -- not in 1945 but at the earliest in 1970 or 1980." An incredible miscalculation, but it may have been more takling points to affect Molotov's thinking than his real assessment. His policies, however, until the declaration of war suggest a healthy regard for the potential strength of the United states. His attempted to avoid conflict with the United States, even when President Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to engage U-boats in the North Atlantic. The eternally optimistic Goebbels wrote in his diary, " An American newspaper [sic], The Reader's Digest, with a circulation of 5,800,000, has published a sensational article which asserts that the United States in the last analysis is unable to undertake anything against the armed forces of the Axis. America's war was a hopeless undertaking and could only result in bleeding the nation white. At least one voice in the wilderness! It remains to be seen, however, whether this viewpoint will make headway." [Goebbels, p. 35.] It is unclear where Goebbels got this information as there is no known article in the Reader's Digest that made this assertion. Goebbels' confidence seem to be based on the difficulty America would have in transporting an army to a location where it could attack Axis forces. Within months he would be proved wrong. American offenses would begin in the Pacific at Guadalcanal (August 1942) and North Africa (November 1942). This was the first in a series of misjudgements Goebbels would make about America. Göring seems to have been unaware of America's potential. He assured the German people that the Americans "only know how to make razor blades". This of course came from the head of the Luftwaffe tasked with defending German cities. Germany's production of airplanes was dwarfed by that of the United States. And result would be that German cities were to be reduced to rubble. Such nonsense did not come from from the competent military commanders that would be tasked with fighting the United States.

Japanese

The Japanese as they joined the Axis tried to convince Hitler to focus on Brtain, but to no avail. His eyes were firmly fixed East on the emense resources of the Soviet Union. Thus the Japanese concluded they would have to act on their own. The Japanese appear to have convinced themselves that their Bushido spirit was the critical factor in the War. They also believed that America's war production could not be accelerated or a national will to wage war coalesce in time to prevent Japan from seizing its Asian empire. And America would not have the will to challenge that empire once seized and fortified and protected by the formidable Imperial Navy. As a result of Pearl Harbor, however, American isolationism instantly evaporated. The nation was aroused with an almost crusading zeal. A massive army, navy, and air force had to be trained and equipped. The economy had to be reorganized for war. But President Roosevelt against a determined resistance from the Isolationists had already set in motion the construction of a Two Ocean Navy, a 50,000 plane air force, a 6 million man army as well as a secret program to build an atomic bomb. All of this faced Hitler who had failed to subdue Britain and the Red Army which had just launched a massive offensive before Moscow. And now the Japanese as well. The Japanese miscalculation about firstthe the NAZI victory in Europe and second America appears to have been the fundamental errors of the War. Of course had the Wehrmacht desroyed the Red Army, the Japanese srrategic vission would have looked very different than it did with an undefeated Soviet Union.

Japan Joining Barbarossa

Of all the unanswered questions about Hitler's declaration of war on America, perhaps none is so puzzling as to why he did not insist on reciprocity and demand that Japan declare war on the Soviet Union. At the onset of Batbarossa, Hitler was not that interested in Japanese participation. That would have meant sharing the spoils. By the time of Pearl Harbor, however, it was clear that the Wehrmacht needed assistance. The Japanese-Soviet relationship would get even worse for the NAZIs. The Japanese were not only not going to join the War against the Soviets, but they were going to allow American Lend Lease shipments to transit Japanese-controlled waters and reach Soviet Pacific ports. Hitler did not demand a Japanese declaration of war or the interdiction of American war material. There had been no consultations between the two countries before Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and the Japanese did not confer with Hitler before attacking Pearl Harbor. Hitler's failure to insist on reciprocity seems a major diplomatic gaffe. Surely one reason Hitler declared war on America was to induce Japan to attack the Soviet Union. Notice the wording above of Hitler's declaration of war and the phrase 'loyalty to the Tri-Partite act'. The Axis Pact did not require Japan to declare war on the Soviet Union, but clearly Hitler hoped that 'loyalty' to the pact would draw them in. The Japanese with most of their army mired in China had just declared war in America and Britain. They decided that the undefeated Soviet Union was beyond their capabilities, at least in 1941-42. Japanese diplomats led Hitler to believe that a declaration of war would be coming. Unfortunately for Hitler and the NAZIs. with the American victory at Midway (June 1942), the war began to go against Japan and with it the likelihood that the Japanese would declare war on the Soviet Union.

German Reaction

Most knowledgeable German military commanders were astonished that Hitler would declare war on America at a time that not only the British were still undefeated, but that the the still undefeated Soviets had launched a major offensive. Many senior commanders remember the impact of the American infantry on the Western front. Even many non-professional military figures were aware of the potential strength of the United States. Many committed NAZIs, however, scoffed at the strength of America. The U.S. Army was still small, untrained, inexperienced and poorly armed. Of course the same was said about the U.S. Army in World war I by German military figures. The Hundred Days Campaign (August-November 1918) was a sobering expweience for them. This time there was little enthusiam for Hitlers's declaration of war within the military. Only with the NAZI acolytes was the step met with enthusiasm--and not all of them. Propaganda Minister Goebbels seemed impressed that a month had past and the United States had not yet launched any attacks. He wrote in his diary, "Roosevelt has nothing positive to report in the way of victories. His loud-mouth speeches before the war are still remembered by everybody. The discrepancy between what he prophesied and what has actually happened is so obvious that he can get out of this dangerous scrape only by lies and rumors." [January 26, 1942--Goebbels, p. 49.] Note how he virtually repeated Hitler'words.

Consequences

The consequences of Japan's decision to strike south rather than north are difficult to assess with any certaintty. But gicen thatafter they failed to defeat the Brirish and that America was bankrolling the British war effort, Germany's only real chance of winning the War was to defeat the soviet Union and securing the vast esources of the East. Failing to do so would mean a repeat of World War I with the superior resources of the Allies grdually wearing down Germany with its inadequate industrial, agricultural, and resource base. The question becomes would Japanese intervention in Barbarossa been enough to turn the tide. We know that the Red army's survival wa alose cut thing, but that Germany's only real chance of winning was with Barbarossa in 1941 before he Red Army severly weakened the ehrmacht in its Winter Counter-Offensive (1941-42). A Japanese offemsive from Manchuko probably would not have penetrated very deeply into the Soviet Far East, but it would have meant that the Red Army could not have counted on Siberian divisions contributing to the offensive before Moscow. This probably would not have precented the Countrr-Offensive, but would have affected the strength of the Red army Offensive. On a more long term perspective, it woukd have meant that Lend Lease deliveries would have been impossible, at least in 1942. And the North Pacific route was the principal route for Lend Lease shipments to the Soviets.

Arsenal of Democracy

Converting the American industrial economy for war was a massive undertaking. A range of problems were encountered. Not the least was the fact that many American corporations experiencing real profits after the lean depression years were not anxious to convert. But convert they did. American war production was was underway in an amazingly short period, astounding not only the Germans and Japanese but the British and Russians and Americans themselves. The industrial capacity of the United States soon created an outpouring of ships, planes, tanks, and war material of virtually every description that was unprecedented in history. It culminated in the building of the atomic bomb. In a steadily rising wave, the force of the American war production was visited on the Axis countries. The nature of the Japanese attack and the Bataan death march galvanized the American people to wage a total war in both Europe and Asia. Allied War propaganda, however, did not begin to fully depict the horrors taking place in the occupied countries--especially Eastern Europe. American military production steadily expanded making possible the launching of a second front in Europe with the D-Day invasion of June 1944 and the destruction of industrial Germany and the Luftwaffe through a massive air campaign.

Sources

BBC. Monitoring Service. Readers may be interested in the full text. We are not sure how it came avout, but it is long and rambling enough to suspect that Hitler personally dictated it. We do not know if he allowed Goebbels or Ribbentrop to review it, but we suspect not. If anyone knows about this, we would be very interested in hearin about it. We think that the text of Hitler's speech is valuable in that it is essentiallt aindow into his thinking and state of mind at this critical point of the War. FULL TEXT

Fridel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.

Goebbels, Jeseph. ed, Louis B. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: New York, 1948), 566p.

Hitler, Adolf. ed. Weinberg. Second Book (1928). This was Hitler's second unpublished book.

Remak, Joachim. "Hitlera Amerikapolitik, " Aussenpolitik VI (1955), pp. 706-14.

Rich, Norman. Hitler's War Aims: Idelogu, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (The Norton Library: New York, 1973), 352p.

Weber, Mark. "Germany’s Declaration of War Against the United States: Hitler’s Reichstag Speech of December 11, 1941," Journal of Historical Review (Winter 1988-89) (Vol. 8, No. 4), pages 389-416. (Revised: October 2007).

Created: June 8, 2004
Spell checked: 5:21 AM 12/4/2011
Last updated: 6:26 PM 6/6/2016