Figure 1.--These Italian Alpini soldiers look quite young. Thet are marching in Rome, I think in June-July 1941. The photograph was taken by the Hoffmann German News. I believe the youths here were among those deployed east as part of the Italian 8th Army.

Although Hitler and Mussolini were theoretically partners in the War, Hitler never planned any of his campaigns with Mussolini. Mussolinmi was very much a junior partner in the War. Mussolini returned the favor with his invasion of Greece (1940). After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign. Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) to participate in Barbarossa (July 1941). This was a unit consisting of 62,000 troops. They were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine. The Russian winter proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a mild Mediterranean climate. The Italian Army substantially expanded its commitment to a full army group--the Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR--Italian Army in Russia). It was commonly referred to as the Italian 8th Army. It totaled pver 200,000 men (July 1942). The 8th Army was committed to the German Stalingrad offensive as part of German Army Group B (Heeresgruppen B) commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs. It was deployed south of Stalingrad to help protect the German flank as the German 6th Army drove into Stalingrad itself (August 1942). The Soviet counter offensive Operation Uranus drove through the realitive weak German allies (Hungarian and Romanian forces) deployed north and south of the city (November 19). The Italians deployed along the lower Don were not immediately affected. A new Soviet offensive Operation Saturn smashed into the Italian positions. The Italians suffered terrible losses. The debacle was in part because they were not equipped with modern armor, mostly the light tanks they used in North Africa. About 20,000 Italians were killefd and 64,000 captured. About 45,000 men the Soviets had surrounded managed to fight their way out. The despirited Italians who were also suffering losses in North Africa withdrew the remanents of the shattered 8th Army back to Italy. They arrived home with little fanfare. Mussolini was ot anxious to publicize another debacle. Most of the Italian POWs captured by the Soviets perished in camps because of the apauling conditions.

Hitler and Mussolini

Although Axis leaders Hitler and Mussolini were theoretically partners in the War, Hitler never planned any of his campaigns with Mussolini. Mussolini returned the favor with his invasion of Greece, breaking it to Hitler as a suprise (October 1940). Rather than aiding the Axcis caused, it complicated Hitler's planning for Barbarossa. Compare this to how the Anglo-American alliance operated. Barbarossa would prove to be the last and greatest of the German suprises sprung on the Italians. Mussolini despite his grandiose plans, after the Italian Army faltered in both Greece and Egypt, in sharp contrast to the German Wehrmach, proved to be very much a junior partner in the Axis War effort.

Axis Consultations

Barbarossa was a massive undertaking. It was the largest coordinated invasion in history. It was conducted over a huge front and with two allies (Finland and Romania). Italy was not one of them. Not only was Italy not involved in the planning or initial attack, but Hitler kept the most important decesion of the War secret from Mussolini. It essentially as if President Roosevelt would have kept Operaion orch secret from Churchill. We know the extent to which Hitler kept Mussolini out of the planning and strategic plsanning because of Itlian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano's dairies. On the vary even of the invasion, Hitler asked for a meeting with Mussolimi at the Brenner Pass (June 2). Amazingly at this great moment in history, Hitler seems to have primarily discussed the Hess affair. Mussolini reported to Ciano that Hitler broke into tears. Hitler said nothing of Russia. Amnazongly, Ciano writes in hia dairy, "Hitler has no precise plan of action." [Ciano, June 2, p. 361.] The Italians have no inkling that the incasion of the Soviet Union is eminanyt until Foreign Minister Ribontrop visits Rome. He cut short his visit and gives the impression that the reason is Russia. [Ciano, Junec 15, p. 367.} A message from Hitler arrived at 3:00 am 2 with an explanation of the attack on Russia. [Ciano, June 22, p. 369.] As with other German offensives, there had been no consultation with their Axis ally before the attack. The Germans did not trust Mussolini and the Italians to keep the plans secret.

Barbarossa (1941)

Italian troops were not involved in the initial assault. Mussolini despite being kept in the dark immediately decided to send Itlaian forces to aid Hiter in the invassion of the Soviet Union. Mussolini without consulting with his commsanders ordered Italian units to join the attack. Few ever returned, but thecDuce was very enthusiastic about the undertaking Ciano writes, "The thing that is closest to the Duce';s heart is the participation of one of our contingents, but from what Hitler writes it is clear that vhe woud gladly do without it." [Ciamo, June 22, p. 369.] The next day Count Ciano reports that the Germans are talking about 5 million POWs who will become slaves. He also indicates that We are sending an expeditionary force under te command of General Zingales, whih will operate on the borders between Rumania and sub-Carpathian Russia." [Ciano, June 23, p. 369.] This was at a time when the Italian Army in Libya had been badly mauled by the British Army in the Western Desert. After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign. Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) to participate in Barbarossa. The inintial units were reinforced with additional units including the Alpini Army Corps made up of three Alpini Divisions. Mussolini's primary concern was to deploy Italian forces in time to make a contribution before the Soviet Union collapsed. This would allow him to claim a share of the spoils. Hitler had denied Mussolini a share of the spoils in France because Mussolini only declared war after France had already been defeated. Hitler had even refused to reward the Italians with Tunusia. Mussolini at Verona reviewed the first motorized division moving for deployment (June 26, 1941). This was a unit consisting of 62,000 troops. They were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine. In a colorful ceremony on the morning of June 26 at Verona, Il Duce reviewed the The official communiqué proclaimed that the Italians "presented themselves in a superb manner, complete with men, arms and motor vehicles." Ciano was skeptical," At Verona, Mussolini reviewed the first division on its way to Russia. By telephone he defined it as perfect. Be that as it may, I am concerned about a direct comparison between our forces and the Germans. Not on account of the men, who are, or who may be, excellent, but on account of their equipment. I should not like to see us play once more the role of a poor relation." [Ciano, June 26, p. 370.] The spearhead of the hastily assembled troops passed through Vienna (July 13). A member of Italy's Embassy in Berlin noted that they were dirty, ill-equipped, and likely to make a bad impression. And they did. After the war, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel bitterly remembered yet another group as they were reviewed by Mussolini and Hitler in Galicia near the end of August 1941. He called them "a boundless disappointment" and asked, "How were half-soldiers like these supposed to stand up to the Russians, if they had collapsed even in face of the wretched peasant folk of Greece?" The Italian force became the 8th Army eventually totaled 250,000 men. Little serious preparartion was made to fight in Russia or adequately equip the men being deploted there. Italian soldiers fought as second-class allies in support of Hitler's legions in the most savage campaign of all on the Eastern Front. The Russian winter proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a mild Mediterranean climate.

Second Summer Campaign (1942)

The Italian Army substantially expanded its commitment to a full army group--the Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR--Italian Army in Russia). It was commonly referred to as the Italian 8th Army. It totaled pver 200,000 men (July 1942). The 8th Army was committed to the German Stalingrad offensive as part of German Army Group B (Heeresgruppen B) commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs. It was deployed south of Stalingrad to help protect the German flank as the German 6th Army drove into Stalingrad itself (August 1942). The Soviet counter offensive Operation Uranus drove through the realitive weak German allies (Hungarian and Romanian forces) deployed north and south of the city (November 19). The Italians deployed along the lower Don were not immediately affected. A new Soviet offensive Operation Saturn smashed into the Italian positions. The Italians suffered terrible losses. The debacle was in part because they were not equipped with modern armor, they mostly had the same the light tanks they used in North Africa. About 20,000 Italians were killefd and 64,000 captured. About 45,000 men the Soviets had surrounded managed to fight their way out.

Survivors

The despirited Italians who were also suffering losses in North Africa withdrew the remanents of the shattered 8th Army back to Italy. They arrived home with little fanfare. This was in sharp contrast with their enthusiastic send off. Mussolini was not anxious to publicize another debacle. Most of the Italian POWs captured by the Soviets perished in camps because of the apauling conditions. The Italian people turned on Mussolini as the illconceived War turned against the Italians and their German allies.

Sources

Ciano, Galeazzo. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City Publishing Company: Garden City, 1945), 582p.

Created: 5:42 AM 11/10/2005
Last updated: 3:44 AM 4/14/2010