Figure 1.-- Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Halifax traveled to Rome to meet with Mussolini in Rome (January 6, 1939). Here Italian Balilla boys prepare for the Chamberlain visit. The press photo was headed, "Fascist boys greet premier. The caption read, "The scenr outside the station in Rome when the Premier arrived from England. Members of the Balilla the Fascist organization were waiting to welcome him."

Mussolini gradually moved Italy toward Hitler and Germany. There is no indication, however, that the two planned war together. And Mussolini did not commit Italy to war in 1939. There is no doubt that he coveted Mediterranean terrirory held or under the influence of Britain and France. Italian Libya was bordered by Egypt to the east and Tunisia yo the west. Britain still had military forces in Egypt to protect Suez. And many Italians felt that Tunisia should be their colony. Mussolini also coveted neihboring Greece which had links to the British. Any effort to expand significantly in the Mediterranean, however, would require war with either Britain and France or both. So Mussokini kept his options open. Chamberliain had hoped that Mussolini would be a moderating force on Hitler. This proved to be an illusion, both with Austria and at Munich. Chamberlain did not, however, let thsat deter him and still attempted to disuade Mussolini from war. For Mussolini's part, war with the Allies was a huge risk. Not only did Italy not have Germany's industrial base, but its geography as a peninsula exposed Italy to Britain's greatest assett, the Royal Navy, in a way that Germany was not. Mussolini appears to have no realistic assessment of the potential of his military, but still he hesitated and maintained his options open with the British.

Mussolin and Hitler

The relationship between Mussolini and Hitler is an interesting one. Mussolini took power several years before Hitler. And Hitler as fledgling politican idealized Hitler. He attempted to contact Mussolini who rebuffed him. Mussolini was unimpressed with Mein Kampf and never thought Hitler would actually seized power in Germany. When he did, Mussolini was concerned about the South Tyrol (part of Italy's territorial gain in World War I) and the security implications of an Anschluss (German annexation of Austria). Hitler gradually won Mussolini over. Mussolini gradually moved Italy toward Hitler and Germany. There is no indication, however, that the two planned war together. Hitler's decission to invade Poland (1939) and the Soviet Union (1941) were taken without consulting Mussolini. Likewise, Mussolini's decession to invase Albania (1939) and Greece (1940) were taken without consulting Hitler. Mussolini did not commit Italy to war with the Allies in 1939. Like most observers at the time, he had no idea how significantly the Germans had shifted the military balance.

Goals

There is no doubt that Mussolini coveted Mediterranean terrirory held or under the influence of Britain and France. Italian Libya was bordered by Egypt to the east and Tunisia yo the west. Britain still had military forces in Egypt to protect Suez. And many Italians felt that Tunisia should be their colony. Mussolini also coveted neihboring Greece which had links to the British. Any effort to expand significantly in the Mediterranean, however, would require war with either Britain and France or both. So Mussokini kept his options open.

British Diplomacy

Chamberliain hoped that Mussolini would be a moderating force on Hitler. This was a policy that Chamberlain persued with considerable vigor from the very beginning of her premiership. He moved to end the scantions on Italy applied as a result of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. Chamberlain formed his cabinent (May 1937). Appeasing Mussolini was important from the very beginning. War. Chamberlain approved concessions in the Sudan, allowing flights between Italian controlled Libya and Italuan East Affrica, including Ethiopia. Chamberlian open direct communications with Mussolini without informing Foreign Secretary Eden. Eden eventually resigned in protest over Chamberlin's policy of appeaement. Chamberlain replaced him with Lord Halifax. Chamberlain suggested a formal treaty with Italy. The result was the Perth-Ciano Pact (April 16, 1938). Chamberlain met Mussolini during the signing ceremonies. Britain recognizing the Italian conquest of Ethiopia with the condition that Italy withdraw from the Spanish Civil War. There were also provisions about the Nile. [Tvedt, p. 175.] Chamberlain's hopes proved to be an illusion, both with Austria and at Munich. Chamberlain did not, however, let these failures of his policy deter him. In fact he intensified his efforts to disuade Mussolini from his association with Hitler and war. Britain ratified the Perth-Ciano Pact (November 16, 1938). Mussolini blustering over Tunis, Djibouti, and Corsica angered the French (November 1938). The Chamberlain Government backed the French, but sought to defuse the situation. Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Halifax traveled to Rome to meet with Mussolini in Rome (January 6, 1939). Nothing came from the meeting. [Doerr, p. 241.]

Mussolini's Calculations

For Mussolini's part, war with the Allies was a huge risk. Not only did Italy not have Germany's industrial base, but its geography as a peninsula exposed Italy to Britain's greatest assett, the Royal Navy, in a way that Germany was not. Mussolini appears to have no realistic assessment of the potential of his military, but still he hesitated and maintained his options open with the British.

Sources

Doerr, Paul W. British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (Manchester University Press: Studies in Modern History).

Tvedt, Terje. The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic Power (IB Tauris).

Created: 7:37 PM 3/29/2008
Last updated: 7:37 PM 3/29/2008