Figure 1.--Here two little French girls with sun bonnets wave their French flags at Free French troops as they march by in the Allied Victory Parade along Avenue Gambetta in Tunis. This may have been a unit organized from French North Africns. Perhaps readers more knowledgeable aboout the Free French will know more. The photograph was taken May 20, 1943.

Tunisia had largely stayed out of the War until the Torch invasion (November 1942). In the south, Rommel retreating from Alemein used the French Tunisian border defenses (the Mareth Line) to make a stand. Montgomery's 8th Army which pursued him along the coastal road all the way from El Alemine. It was Rommel's first real attempt to make a stand. In the north, the Allied Totch forces rushed east for the Tunisian ports (Bizerte and Tunis). Tunisia thus for several months of 1943 became the focus of the War for the Western Allies. It was beyond the reach of the Torch landings because of the German and Italiuan air bases in the central Mediterranean. Tunisia would this have to be taken by overland attacks from Algeriain the north and Libya in the south. Hitler rushed the the newly created Fifth Panzer Army rushed to Tunisia to defend the Tunisian ports. (This occitted just as the Stalingrad battle was shaping up.) A chain of parallel mountains (called Dorsals) separates coastal Tunisia from the arid Saharan interior. A plain exists between the two two Dorsals. he British Torch force advanced east in the north along the coast toward the Tunisian ports. The American Torch force moved east further south hoping to cut off the retreating Afrika Korps. The advancing American army had set up important airfields and supply dumps in Dorsals. Rommel before Monthomery reachedv his Mareth nLine defenses, attacked U.S. forces sending his Panzers through the Kaserine Pass in the Tunisian dorsals (February 14, 1943). The goal was to break through the American positions, seize needed supplies, and envelop the British in the north. Rommel had grandiose plans to drive through the Kasserine Pass, then move northwest seizing an Allied supply base at Tébessa and then drive to the coast and trap the Allied units in Tunisia. It was a baptism under fire for the fledgeling U.S. Army. The U.S. II Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. Poor coordination and outright animosity between Von Arnem in the north and Rommel in the south weakened the Axis position and Rommel's force proved inadequate to exploit his victory at Kasserine. The Americans rapidly recovered, supported by effective artillery fire and air support. Kasserine was a relatively minor engagement. German commanders optimistivally saw Kasserine as an indication that the Americans would be a relatively weak opponent. Of course this was how OKW initially viewed the Red Army. For the Americans it was the beginning of the shaping of an effective combat force that would in less than 2 yeats land in Normandy and with the British and Canadians liberate Western Europe. Eisenhower moved rapidly to remove commanders not up to to the task and replace them with those that were. Kasserine while a German victory exposed the fundamental weakness of the German adventure in North Africa. They did not have sufficient strength to defeat either the British or Americans and the conflict basically provided a vast school for both armies, instructing them on how to fight the modern war that the Germans had developed. Gen. Eisenhower gave George S. Patton, who had commanded the landings in Morocco, command of II Corps which respnded with a victory at El Guettar. The Americans had a great deal to learn about modern war, but after Kasserine the learning curve was steep. Hitler's decession to contest the Tunisia delayed the Allied victory, but it also meant that he deployed substantial forces that he could not supply because of overwealming Allied naval and air supperority. Thus the final surrender was much more costly for the Germans than it might have been. With the German surrender, over 275,000 Axis prisoners of war were taken (May 13 1943). Many were shipped to POW camps in the United States. Unlike the Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad by the Soviets, many of the Gerrmans who surrndered in Tunisia did not have the feeling that the War was lost. Mis of the Italians were more than hppy to have the war over.

Vichy Tunisia

Tunisian troops as was the case in World War I were repositioned to defend France against a German invasion. Three infantry regiments were transported theough Marseille (March 1940). With the fall of France, many of these units were not able to return to Tunisia. The Army of Africa was reduced to a level of some 120,000 men. General Maxime Weygand managed to maintain and train an additional 60,000 men as auxiliary police, 'provisional conscripts' and 'unarmed workers'. [Sumner and Vauillier, p. 13.] They became part of the Vichy French Army of Africa (Armée d’Afrique). It was a substantial force, but not well armed. French authorities in Tunisia affirmed their support for the Vichy regime. Arab Tunisians were not displeased with the German defeat of the French. Moncef Bey acceded to the Husaynid throne (July 1942). He adopted a nationalist stance. He asserted Tunisian (Arab) rights against the new Resident General appointed by Vichy. He traveled widely throughout Tunisia, dispensing with the traditional protocol. He became very popular with Tunisia nationalists. Moncef Bey managed to fill the place of the pre-War nationist parties (Destour and Neo-Destour parties) which the French had supressed. They remained effectively suppressed by the Vichy French. [Perkins, pp. 105–106.]

Second Battle of El Alemein (October 1942)

The British and Axis forces prepared for a massive battle at El Alamein, the decisive battle in the Western Desert. Here after the British stopped the Afrika Korps, the iniative of battle gradually shifted from the Germans to the British as massive quantities of American supplies surged toward Egypt and the 8th Army. The same geography that helped the British stop the Germans, helped the Germans prepare for an attack by the building British force. Although the geography of the battlefield assisted the Germans, the location of the battle created enormous problems for Rommel. The British 8th Army in Egypt under its new commander Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery methodically prepared a final offensive against Rommel and the Afrika Korps. El Alamaine was the last defensible point before Alexandria and the Suez Canal. To the north of this desolste railway station was the Mediterranean Sea and to the south was the Qattara Depression through which even tracked vehickes could not pass. El Alamein was thus a physical bottleneck that had ensured that Rommel could not use manuer to defeat the British. Now it restricted the movement of the large armored force Montgomery was assembling. For Rommel there was no more defensible position to the West. It was hold the British at El Alamein or be destroyed. The British had stopped the Afrika Korps here in a desperate battle after a string of defeats. They also stopped a second German attack. The the two sides settled down. The 8th Army's supply lines were long, but the they were sea lanes and secure. Men and supplies thus flowed into Egypt in vast quantity. Most of the supplies came from America, including the new M-4 Sherman tank in large numbers. Oil was available from Iraq. The situation was very different for Rommel. OKW had instructed him not to pursue the British into Egypt, in parr because of the supply situation. Men and supplies were limited to begin with. The primary German focus was on the desperate struggle in the East. But not only were supplies limited, but the suoply lines very vulnerable, more vulnerable than the Germans realized. The Germans had to transport th supplies on Italian cargo ships crossing the Mediterranen, prmarily to Tripoli. Here with help of Ultra, the British destroyed large quantities by suinking the Italian transprts. Here Malta was a major factor. Oil was a particular problem for Rommel. As Bengazi was within range of British ar attack, most of the fuel had to be trucked over 1,200 miles from Tripoli. Thus the Germans used up much of the fuel landed, just trucking it east to Egypt. Water also had to be trucked. And the land route was also nor secure, savaged daily by the British Desert Air Force. We are not sure just how much of the supply trucks wre destroyed, but the portion was substantial.

Torch Landings (November 1942)

Tunisia had largely stayed out of the War until the Torch invasion (November 1942). American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided that the Allies needed to open a Second Front to take pressure off the hard-pressed Red Army reeling under the German summer offensive driving toward Stalingrad and the oil-rich Caucauses (July 1942). Joseph Stalin demanded an invasion of Europe. Wisely Roosevelt and Churchill targetted French North Africa. American General George Marshall, in many ways the architect of the American victory, was opposed to Totch, considering it a diversion. Roosevelt insisted. While Montgomery's victory at El Alemain often receives more attentiin, it was the Torch landings that were the decisive action. The Amercan and British landings in North Africa sealed the fate of the Axis desert campaign. Even if Rommel had broken through to Suez, he would have been forced to turn west to deal with the Allied landings in French North Africa. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied commander to oversee the Torch Landings. The Allies driving east from their Moroccan and Algerian beachheads linked up with the Brish advancing west (November 1942). Although Hitler rushed reinforcements to Tunisia, the end result was the first major defeat of a German Army by the Western Allies.

German Reaction (November 1942)

Hitler disgusted by the weak Vichy resonse to the Torch landings, ordered the seizure of the Vichy unoccupied zone of southern France, including Corsica (November 9). Operation Anton had long been prepared to do just this. He also ordered the Wehrmacht strategic reserved to be sent to Tunisia at just the time the Battle for Stalingrad was unfolding. Like the Vichy forces in Morocco and Algeria, the forces in Tunisia were incapable of confronting German forces head on. The Germans unlike the Allies, however, were not capable of an assault on hostile beaches. The Vichy forces were capable of holding the ports and air bases. Admiral Darlan, playing a duplisitous role, ordered the Vichy commander in Tunisia not to resist an Axis invasion. As a result, the Germans were able to seize the main ports (Tunis and Bizerte) and air bases with which troops and heavy equipment could be rushed to Tunisia. Hitler proceeded to flood Tunisia with German troops while the British focused on consolidating their Algerian beachheads. The Fifth Panzer Army rushed to Tunisia by Hitler defended the Tunisian ports. The first Axis troops begun to arriving in Tunisia only days after the Totch landings (November 9). Within days they were reinforced with some 20,000 combat troops. And they were quickly reiforced by air. Thus when the British advanced from the Torch Algerian beach heads began they encountered a strong German defense after entering Tunisia. The Germans proved capable of faster action than the British. It would proved to be a phyric victory. It was relatively easy to get forces into Tunisia during Novemver and December. As Allied air and naval forces expanded their reach from Algeria to the west and Egypt to the east, the Germans proved unable to adequately supply these forces and ultimately extricate them when the Allied ground forces moved against them in force.

British Push from Algeria (November-December 1942)

In the north, the Allies rushed east for the Tunisian ports (Bizerte and Tunis). The French colony thus for several months became the focus of the War for the Western Allies. It was beyond the reach of the Torch landings because of the German and Italiian air bases in the central Mediterranean. Tunisia would this have to be taken by overland attacks from Algeriain the north and Libya in the south. The British 1st Army advanced east in the north along the coast toward the Tunisuan ports under the command of General Kenneth Anderson (November 25). The Germam defense was stronger than expected. The 1st Army’s advance was stopped 12 miles short of Tunis and Bizerte. Further German reinforcements enabled Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim who assumed command of the Axis forces in Tunisia to expand his bridgeheads arond the ports into one unified defensive position (December 9). The Germans and Italians had won the race for Tunis.

Logistics

Logistics had never beem a strongpoint of the Wehrmacht. After the British victory at El Alamein, the supply problem for the Afrika Korps which had never been good in the best of times, became a night mare. And at the top of the list was fuel (petrol). There was somefuel in Bengazi and Tripoli anns samll amounts at some other ports. Tankers sent from Italy for Bengazi and Tripoli were sunk. Small amounts were delivered by the Luftwaffe which was primarily focused on deliveries to the Fifth Panzer Army being built up in Tunisia. Rommel repots that the that he did receive 5,000 tons of petrol (November 1942), but the British succeeded in sinking 8,100 tons. [Rommel, p. 370.] Based on this and earlier supply problem, Rommel concluded that maintaining an army in Africa was impossible unless the Battle of the Atlantic could be won. There was just no way of contending with the massive industrial might of the United States outside of the confines of Europe. [Rommel, pp. 361-62] Rommel believing that OKW did not appreciate the situation on the ground. He flew to Rastenberg to meet with Hitler personally to personaally explain the situation (Novemnber 28). He explains how it was like a spark in a powder magazine. Hitler flew into a rage, accusing the Afrika Korps of cowardiuce and thowing away their weapons. [Rommel, p.365.] Rommel was absolutely correct. The Germans had the capability of bulding up he Fifth Panzer Army in Tunisia. A Rommel got most of his men safely to Tunisia. The Germans and Italians had no way of supplying them. And the alreasy sever pronlems only got worse. A British cruiser squadron destroyed an Italian convoy in the Battle of Skerki Bank and that was in the narrow Sicilian Straits (December 2). And as the Allies began buoilding air bases as they moved in on Tunisia, the supply situation steadilt weakened. Allied attacks caused the already poor Axis supply system to collapse. Supply ships and tankers were sunk. The Grmans responded by increasing air transport efforts, flying 12,000 men and 8,000 tons of supplies into Tunisia ((March 1943), but that make up for the shipping losses. Over 40 percent of the Axis tonnage leaving Italy was sunk. [Levine] The Axis pocket was completely cut off (April 1943). Lverall during the Tunisian campaign, the Allies sunk 506 mostly Italian ships, 170 of which were substanial (over 500 tons). And this is in addition to the ships sunk deliverinf supplies to Libya fot the Afrika Korps (1941-42). Italy as a result was left virtually with out a merhant marine. As part of Operation Flax, British, American, South African and Polish-manned Consolidated B-24 bombers, Bristol Beaufighters, Curtiss P-40 fighters and Supermarine Spitfire fighters shot down destroyed some 160 German transport planes in addition to many bombers and fighters. The German air transport fleet which had been seriously weakened during thr Stak\lingrad camnpaign crippled for the rest of the war. The British naval phase of the Allied blockade was one of only two successful submarine campaigns ever fought. (The other being the American submarine campaign in the Pacific.) And the air phase was the first major victory of the American air force over the Luftwaffe.

Einsatzgruppen

The situation for Tunisian Jews worsened after Operation Torch to the west and the arrival of the Germans (November 1942). Tunisia was the only French colony actually occupied by the Germans. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Walther Rauff was given command of the Security Police in Tunisia. He was an associate of Heydrich and deeply involved in the killing of Jews in previous postings. We know that forced labor camps were set up during the Vichy period. The Germans expanded the Vichy anti-Semetic measures. Forced-labor camps already existed, German authorities may have expanded them, although the one estimate of 5,000 is not much larger than estimates of forced labor during the Vichy era. One report indicates that camps were set up near the front lines. The NAZIs immediately abolished all Jewish communal organisations. The Germans immediately abolished all the communal organisations and NAZI measures included property confiscations (bank accounts and valuables), hostage-taking, community extortion, deportations, and random executions. Some of these policies such as forced labor camps were initiated by Vichy authorities before the German occupation. Jews were required to wear the Star of David, although I do not have details on this regulation. Authorities set up Judenrat-like committees to implement NAZI policies. They were committees of Jewish leaders who were held responsible if Jewish communities did not comply with NAZI policies. [Satloff] The Jewish community was fined 20 million frances. Tunisian Jews were subject to a range of violence and terror. NAZI authorities took hhostages. There were indiscriminate seizures on the street and private homes. German or their surogates broke into synagogues, destroying religious artifacts and beating worshipers. About 100 Jews are believed to have died at the time of their arrest or in the internment camp. This is of course a small number in Holocaust terms, but in Tunisia the Germans had only a few months. Some Jews were deported to the European death camps, presumably during the German occupation.

The Americans in the Dorsals (February-March 1943)

A chain of parallel mountains (called Dorsals) separates coastal Tunisia from the arid Saharan interior. A plain exists between the two mountain chains. The American Torch force moved east further south hoping to cut off the Afrika Korps. The advancing American army had set up important airfields and supply dumps in the Dorsdals fir a push to tyhe coast. Rommel before Montgomery reached his Mreth position attacked U.S. forces sending his Panzers through the Kaserine Pass in the Tunisian dorsals (February 14, 1943). His grandiosde goal was to break through the American positions, seize needed supplies, and envelop the British in the north. Rommel planned to drive through the Kasserine Pass, then move northwest seizing an Allied supply base at Tébessa and then drive to the coast and trap the Allied units in Tunisia. It was a baptism under fire for the fledgeling U.S. Army. The U.S. II Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. Poor coordination and outright animosity between Von Arnem in the north and Rommel in the south weakened the Axis position and Rommel's force proved inadequate to exploit his victory at Kasserine. The Americans rapidly recovered, supported by effective artillery fire and air support. Kasserine was a relatively minor engagement. German commanders optimistivally saw Kasserine as an indication that the Americans would be a relatively weak opponent. Of course this was how OKW initially viewed the Red Army. Rommel had a different view, impressed with how the Americabs reesponded, especilly the artillery. For the Americans it was the beginning of the shaping of an effective combat force that would in less than 2 yeats land in Normandy and with the British and Canadians liberate Western Europe. Eisenhower moved rapidly to remove commanders not up to to the task and replace them with those that were. Kasserine while a German victory exposed the fundamental weakness of the German adventure in North Africa. They did not have sufficient strength to defeat either the British or Americans and the conflict basically provided a vast school for both armies, instructing them on how to fight the modern war that the Germans had developed. [Atkinson] Gen. Eisenhower gave George S. Patton, who had commanded the landings in Morocco, command of II Corps which respnded with a victory at El Guettar. The Americans had a great deal to learn about modern war, but after Kasserine the learning curve was steep.

The French in the Dorsals

Free French Forces (FFF) as they begn to orgnize destinguised themselves in the British campaigns in the Wester Desert even though poorly armed (1940-42). Their defense of Bir Hakeim was particularly notable (May-June 1942). [Hastings, p.136.] FFF participated in the Alemein battle. And they played an imprtant role in Torch. The French Resistance prevented the Frenvh (Vichy) Army of Africa 19th Corps from rffectively resisting the Allied landings at Algiers (November 8). The weak Vichy resistance in North Africa enfuriated Hitler. He activated Case Anton meaning the occupation of the unoccupied Vichy area of France. This led to the Vichy Army of frica joinining the Allies. Ghey fought with the Americans in the fight for the Tunisian Dorsals. Gen. Clark and Vichy commander in North Africa Adm. Darlan reached a agreement (November 13). Unknown to Clark, Darlan has earlier ordered the Vichy authoriies in Tunisia to allow the Germans to use Tunisian ports and air bases allowing Hitler to rush in forces. The Allies finally got what they wanted, French forces in North Africa would immediately assist American and British forces in liberating Tunisia and later metropolitan France. The political fragmentation in the French armed forces was theoretically patched over to the common purpose of defeating Axis armies. General Eisenhower quickly endorsed the Clark-Darlan agreement. Allied field commanders added French units to their command structure. This was not the same as going over to the Free French, but it was a step in the right direction. French Tunisian units were active soon after the Torch landings, eventually going over to the Free French and joining the Americans in the fight for the Dorsals (November 1942). The French preferred fighting with the Americans because of the anger over British actiins like the attack non the French fleet at Oran (July 1940). We are not sure about the composition of these units. We think that they were mostly French Tunisians, but they may have included some Francophile Tunisian Arabs. This is something we need to look into--the Arab reaction. The men here seem to be a French Tunisian unit (figure 1). The unified French Forces received major deliveries of modern Americn arms as part of Lend Lease (November 1943). By this time the last Vichy holdouts in the French Empore wnt ovr to the Free French. (The only continuing holdout was Jaoanese-occupied French Inno-China.) The French would later join the Allied invasion of Italy and enterig Rome (June 1944). They then fought in the liberation of France landing along te Mediterranean ciast (August 1944), ending the War at Stuttgart.

Mareth Line (March 1943)

In the south, Rommel used the strong French border defenses south of Gabès (the Mareth Line). They had been built by the French before the War to protect the border with Italina Libya. (The British hadmade no effort to fortigy the Egyptian border with Libya.) Here Rommel made a stand against Montgomery's Eighth Army which had pursued him along the coastal road all the way from El Alamine, albeit slowly. This had enabled him to race north to strike the Americans ay Kasarine . It was his first real attempt to make a stand after Alamein. Rommel and the Afrika Korps set up strong defensive positions at the Mareth Line and he raced his Panzers south from Kasarine to reinforce the Mareth Line position. It was a well designed defensive line. Rommel decided to launch a surprise Panzer strike at the Eighth Army's left flank, calculated that Montgomery would not expect it. He was probably correct, however, thanks to Ultra, the British were pepared and moved up new anti-tank guns. And destroiyed some 40 of Rommel's precious tanks. He then withdrew behind the Mareth Line defenses. Nontgomery launched Operation Pugilist at Wadi Zarat at the center of the Mareth Likne--a perceiced weak point (March 19). They established a foothild, but could breakthrough because of a German counter attack. Montgomery decided on another move. The British found a pass into the Jebel Dahar which was desigmnated Wilder's Gap. He sent New Zealanders on a flanking movement---Operation Supercharge II, an outflanking manoeuvre was planned. Montgomery reinforced the flanking attack through Tebaga Gap. Fighting continued (March 26-31). Rommel was forced to retreat to Wadi Akarit, some 40 miles north. But compared tp the Mareth Line it was a weak position and the Germans had to head north to join Armem's Fifth Panzer Army/Army Group Africa holding northwest Tunisia (Bizerte and Tunis).

Northern Bastion (March-May 1943)

The German forces rushed into Tunisia were deployed into northrrn and central Tunisia and made no effort to link up with Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps in Libya. The germans managed to stop the British coastal attack from Algeria (November-Secember 1942). The bothern fiorce was organized as the Fifth Panzer Army, nominally under Rommel's command. It was led by Hans-Jürgen von Arnim who had fought in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. Von Arnim did not, however, get along with Rommel. And attacks into the eastern Dorsels led to nothing in part because the two could not cooperate (February 1942). Von Arnim had a poor understanding of the Allied forces araigned against him. He percived that the Kasserine and other attcks into the Eastern Dorsals had significantly weaked the Allies, causing the British to weaken their northern front to back up the Americans in the central front. As a result, he lauched Operation Unternehmen Ochsenkopf (Operation Ox Head) against the British V Corps in the north (February 26). This woukd prove to be the last significant German offensive in North Africa. They made some progress, but the British position had not been weakened. And the Germans suffered signficant losses in men and equipment, including most of their Tiger tanks. Rommel was medevaced out of Tunisia and Von Arnim took command of Army Group Africa (March 10). What then transpired is Von Arnim set up a strong norther bastion to defend the ports of Bizerte and Tunis in the hope that Axis reinforcements and supplies could reach him. What was left of the Afrika Korps after the fight for the Mareth Line raced north to join him so as to not be cut off by the Americam II Corps. Then Field Marshal Alexander oversaw the reduiction of Von Armim's bastion by the American II Corps, and the British 1st and Eighth Armies. Of course a norther bastion could only dsurvive of it could be supplied. Von Armim had no undrstanding of the impact of Hitler declaring war on America and the massive expansion of Allied air and nval power. Allied naval and air forces which comletely shut off Axis supply efforts. After heavy fighting, wuth no xis reebgocements and supplis, the Americans took Bizerte and the British took Tunis (May 7). Hitler's decession to hold Tunisia delayed the Allied victory a few months, but it also meant that he had deployed substantial forces that he could not supply because of overwealming Allied naval and air supperority. At a time that the Germans has suffer caerrophic dfet at Stlingrad and preparing for the Jurskl offensive, thosses in Tunisia significantly reduced the dwindling German strategic reserve. Throwing resrves into nTunisu thus the final surrender was much more costly than it might have been.

POWs

With the German surrender, over 275,000 Axis prisoners of war were taken (May 13, 1943). (Different sources provide a range of estimates.) This was the largest surrender of fighting forces in all of World War II. More than half were Germans. This was more than Germans prisoners than the Soviets took at Stalingrad, but of course more Germans were killed in the Stalingrad fighting. Many of the Axis POWs were shipped to POW camps in the United States. Unlike the Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad by the Soviets, many of those who surrndered in Tunisia did not have the feeling that the War was lost. Also almopst all of the PWS takrn in Tunisia survived the War.

Allied Occupation

General Eisenhower subsequently wrote of the occupation of Tunisia (following an anti-colonial policy) "far from governing a conquered country, we were attempting only to force a gradual widening of the base of government, with the final objective of turning all internal affairs over to popular control." [Eisenhower, P. 137.] Yet Tunisia was a French colony.

Sources

Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday 1948).

Hastings, Max. All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939–45 (London: Harper Press, 2011).

Levine, Alan J. The War Against Rommel’s Supply Lines, 1942-1943 ( Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1999).

Perkins, Kenneth. A History of Modern Tunisia (2004).

Rommel, Erwin. B.H. Liddell-Hart, ed. The Rommel Papers (New York: DeCappo Press, 1953), 545p.

Satloff, Robert. "The Holocaust's Arab heroes," Washington Post (October 14, 2006).

Sumner, Ian and Francois Vauillier, The French Army, 1939-45

Created: 8:00 AM 4/16/2014
Last updated: 12:43 PM 1/10/2022