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World War II: Poland Military and Diplmatic Preparations
World War II: Poland Military and Diplomatic Preparations (1933-39)
Figure 1.---Poland at the time of World War II was being surronded by massive NAZI and Soviet armies and their NKVD and SS auxileries. Primary children at the Copernicus School (now zkoła Podstawowa nr 1) near Minsk saved their pennies to buy a machine gun for the Polish Army. A Polish army officer presents the gun for the children to see (March 23, 1939). The Germans had invaded Czecholovakia a week earlier, extending the extensive German enciurclkement. Here the children present a Polish officer flowers. The Polish people woiuld paid a terrible price for their definance of the two great totalitarian powers, but today poland exist and free and NAZI Germany abd the Soviet Union have been conemned to ash can of history as Marx would say.
Hitler after seizing power (1933), adopted a moderate forign policy after swizing power. He negotated a German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact (January 26, 1934). The Poles given Hitler's speeches and writings were releaved. Hitler's goal was to put the Allies at rest until his rearmament program had created a new, poweful German Army. The Poles watched thec growth of the Wehrmacht with growing concern. Poland in 1939 was a small country wedged between two vicious totalitarin giants that had attempted to destroy Poland as atate and Polish national life. The two totalitarian states were her bitter historical enemies--the Soviet Union and NAZI Germany. The Poles had been able to seize large areas of the old Russian Empire after World War I. The Red Army had been weakened by the Civil War and Marshal Pilsudski succeeded in extending Polish borders to areas largely populated with Ukranians, White Russians, and Lithuanians. The German still held some of the Polish lands seized by Prussia in the 18th century Polish partitions. The NAZIs were equally opposed to Poland because areas of the former German Empire such as the Polish Corridor with ethnic Germans were awarded to Poland after World War I. Poland in the inter-war era maintained a substantial army, but did not have an industrial capacity or scientificic establishnent capable of equiping it with modern armaments. Nor did the Poles plan a reasonable military strategy. Its principal diplomatic approach was the Franco-Polish Alliance and Military Convention of 1921. Under the terms of this treaty, a German attack on Poland would trigger a French offensive against Germany in the West. This treaty was premised on the French maintaining a clear military superiority over Germany. French military policy soon evolved into a defensive outlook of resisting Germany behind the fortified Maginot Line. The French pledge to Poland was confirmed just before the War (May 1939). As a result of Germany of Germany's denounciation of the versailles Treaty, annexation of Austria, and then campaign against Czechoslovakia, Britain became increasingly concerned about German intentions. hamberlain at Munich made it clear that Britain would accept further norder modifications as long as they were done peacfully. He was of course speaking of the Polish border. In soon becme clear that Poland was the next target, but the Poles were no going to give in to German threats. British and Polish diplomats discussed posible cooperation. It was Hitler, however, who made the desion. He ordered the invasion of what was left of Czechoslovakia (Mach 15, 1939). Shortly after, the terms of an accord were worked out, the Anglo-Polish Agreement (March 31, 1939). The British pledged their support of Polish independence. They had, however, a relatively small army and no way of offering immediate assistance if the Germans struck. Poland was not willing to consider Soviet aid, realizing that allowing the Red army into the country would soon allow Stalin to seize control. Poland was hopeing that the antagonism between the NAZIs and the Soviets making it difficult for either to invade Poland.
Background
Poland during the Medieval era had been one of the great powers of Europe. There is a long history of German interest in the East--the Drang nach Osten. As Part of the Polish Partitions Poland disappeared from the map of Euurope (18th century). Tsarist Russia seized the bulk of Poland, but Prussia obtained areas of western Poland and ustrua smaller areas in the south (Galcia). This occured at the same time that nationlist sentiment was rising theoughout Europe. Polish nationals, proved a problem for the three countries especially the Russians. Napoleoon was in the process of reciving a Polish state (the Duchy of Warsaw), but defeat in Russia end this effort (1812). After the Napolenoic Wars, Tsarist offucials found Ooland ti be an increasingky restive possession. The Poles were also a concern for Prussia/Imperial Germany. Channcellor Bismarck in particular was concerned about the increasing Polish ethnic population in eastern Germany.
he Polish nation once the most powerful in Europe disappeared as a result of three partitions in the 18th century carried out by Austria, Prussia, and Russia with the major share and Warsaw going to Russia. The Poles resisted these empires and in reaction the Russians in particular set out to destroy Polish national identity and Russify the Poles. Polish nationalism was largely preserved by the nobility and the Church. The Polish peasantry was largely a political. Although there was no Polish state, Poles participated in the War as part of the armies of the three empires that had partitioned the country. About 2.0 millions participated in the War. Nearly 0.5 million were killed. Polish nationalists were divided in the conflict. Many right-wing Poles led by Roman Dmowski's National Democrats promoted the Allied cause which on the Eastern Front meant the Russians. Dmowski thought that a grateful Russia might agree to autonomy for Poland, perhaps even independence in the future. Josef Pilsudski led the Polish Socialists. He also commanded the Polish Legion in the Austrian Army. He thought that Russia might be knocked out of the War. Austria which had gained Galicia in the partition had been the most willing to allow a measure of Polish autonomy. The poor performance of the Austrian Army on the Eastern Front resulted the Germans assuming command. Marshal Pilsudski refused to take an an oath of allegiance to the Kaiser. German authorities arrested him and imprisoned him in Magdenburg Castle. Russian collapse changed the political situation in the East. America had joined the war. President Wilson promoted the 14 Points which included national self determination. With Russia no longer in the war Britain and France came out for Polish self-determination. Although the Germans had achieved their goals in the East reverses in the West changed the political landscape. Revolts broke out in German cities. The Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland. German authorities released Pilsudski Magdenburg (November 10, 1918). He immediately headed for Warsaw. He arrived there on the same day the Armistice on the Western Front went into effect (November 11). The Germans had set up a Regency Council in Warsaw. Understanding that a Polish national rising was about to take place, the Regency Council turned to Marshal Pilsudski. The German garrison in Warsaw chose to evacuate by train. The Allies recognized the new Polish state set up by Pilsudski. At Versailles the Poles demanded the boundaries of Poland before the 18th century partitions. The boundaries of the new Polish nation were only established by diplomacy and military engagements (1919-21). Inter-war Poland included a German minority in the west and eastern areas where Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians outnumbered Poles.
German Polish Border Conflicts (1918-20)
The Versailles Peace Treaty ending World War II precisely set Germany's western border (1919). It did not set the new borders in the east with such precision. It did create the Ploish Corridir and established Danzig as a free city. Much of the rest of the border was to be determined by plenecites in areas of mnixed erhnicities, especailly German and Polish ethnic populations. The Gernan Army was not allowed to interfere whuch woulkd have resuklted in Allied intervenyion. The new Polish Army dud intervene, although we are not sure about actual actions. The Germans organized Frei Korps to push the border as far east as possible. There was fighting between German and Polish forces.
The Poles had moved quickly in the east, engaging the Bolshevicks in Lithuanian and Beylorusia. They captured a primary objective--Vilna (April 19, 1919). The League's answer was the Curzon Line (December 8, 1919). This would have left most etnic Poles with in the boundaries of the new Republic. It did not, however, satisfy the Poles. They wanted the pre-partition boundaries even though the population beyond the Curzon Line was mixed with many non-Poles, including many Ukraines, Beyelorusians, and Lithuanians. The Poles demanded that the Bolshevicks negotiate a new border well east of the Curzon Line (March 1920). Negotiatins got nowhere. Poland declared war (April 25). The Poles with French assistance moved east, even taking Kiev in the Ukraine (May 8). The Bolsheviks launched a counter offensive (June) and drove the Poles back almost to Warsaw. At that point the Franco-Polish Army struck backmand defeated the bolshevicks in several sharp engagements. The two sides reached a cease fire (October 12, 1920). A factor here was the Civil War in Russia and the Bolshevicks need to end the war with Poland so thaey could focus in the White armies. The Treaty of Riga confirmed Polish possession of large areas in the east beyond the Curzon Line (March 18, 1921).
Franco-Polish Alliance and Military Convention (1921)
Germany given its location in Central Europe was the Western European country primarily concerned with the East. France also became involved, primaily because of the historic French-Habsburg conflicts (beginning 16th century). France wanted allies east of Austria and. This meant both Poland and Ottoman Emnpire. Polish King Jan III Sobieski saw the need for a Frech alliance. The Polish King, however, saw a greater threat posed by the Ottoman Empire which was advancing massive armies into Europe. The Poles came to the rescue of the Poles during the Second Ottoman seige of Vienna (1683). Poland was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria (18th century). This was during the Enligtenment. There was considerable sympathy for the Poles, especially among French Enkigtenment thinkers. French Emperor Napoleon recreated the Polish state as the Duchy of Warsaw. It is believed that he would have gine further ha he not been defeated in Russia (1812). With the rise of a united German Empire (1871), France and Poland found a new reason to seek common cause. After World War I, France assisted the Poles during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-21). A French Military Mission was sent to Poland. Polish Chief of State Józef Piłsudski and French President Alexandre Millerand sined agreements on political, military and economic cooperation (February 19, 1921). The French helped end the Polish-Soviet War by the Treaty of Riga (1921). French-Polish coperation involved a coodinated foreign policy, economical contacts, and a denive military pact in case either was a victim of an 'unprovoked' attack. A secret military alliance was signed (February 21, 1921). Th pact was aimed at potential threats from both Germany and the Soviet Union. [Marek, pp. 419-20.] An attack comitted France to keep lines of communication free and Germany in check but there was no obligation to commit troops. These pacts were not in force until the economic pact was ratified (August 2, 1923).
Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact (1932)
The Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact was signed (1932). Polish-Soviet negotiations after several years delay were resumed in Moscow (1931) . The pact was finally signed on July 25, 1932, effective for 3 years Ratifications were exchanged in Warsaw (December 23, 1932). The pact went into effect on the same day. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series. We are not entirely sure of Soviet motives. We believe they were in part to discourage Polish sources from repoorting on the horroirs being unleased by Stalin in the Ukraine -- the Ukranian Famine. The pact was unilaterally broken by the Soviet Union as part of the NAZI-Soviet alliance. The Soviet Union invased Poland (September 17, 1939).
German-Polish Non-Agression Pact (1934)
Hitler after seizing power (1933), adopted a moderate forign policy after swizing power. He negotated a German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact to match the agreement Poland signbed with the Sioviet Union (January 26, 1934). The Poles given Hitler's speeches and writings were releaved. Hitler's goal was to put the Allies at rest until his rearmament program had created a new, poweful German Army.
Polish Strategic Situation
The Poles watched the growth of the Wehrmacht with growing concern. Poland in 1939 was a small country wedged between two vicious totalitarin giants that had attempted to destroy Poland as atate and Polish national life. The two totalitarian states were her bitter historical enemies--the Soviet Union and NAZI Germany. The Soviets were enemies from the very beginning as the Bolsheviks wanted to continue Russian colonial dominantion of the Poles. The Germans were also historic foes. Even before World war I, the Germans were concerned about the increasing Polidh population in the eastern parts of the Empire. The rise of the NAZIs eacerbated the situation with the more rafical ficus on ethnicity and the lost of ethnic Germns to the new Polish Reoublic. The German still held some of the Polish lands seized by Prussia in the 18th century Polish partitions. The NAZIs were equally opposed to Poland because areas of the former German Empire, esoecially the Polish Corridor. Even yhough dome of this wa dine by plevbecite, in angered many Germans. And being essentially surrounded by these two powerful states with, heavily armed. modern milutaries meant that Poland was in an impossible situation.
Polish Army
Poland in the inter-war era maintained a substantial army, but did not have an industrial capacity or scientificic establishnent capable of equiping it with modern armaments. Nor did the Poles plan a reasonable military strategy. Its principal diplomatic approach was the Under the terms of this treaty, a German attack on Poland would trigger a French offensive against Germany in the West. This treaty was premised on the French maintaining a clear military superiority over Germany. French military policy soon evolved into a defensive outlook of resisting Germany behind the fortified Maginot Line.
Munich Crisis (September 1938)
As a result of the Munich Crisis, the Czech-Polish border duspute flared up. To desguise his ambitiions, Hitler allowed the Poles to seize a small part of Czerchoslovakia while he seized the Sudetenland. After World War I, there were border disputes between Czecchoslonakia and Poland, in particular an important railway junction city of Bohumín. There had been some fighting, but it did not escalate unto an all-out war. The Poles continued to see the city as of crucial importance. Beneš as the Germnan deadline on the Sudetenland approached considered reopen the border issue with Poland (September 28). He aparraently was willing to tuen over Těšínsko as war with Germany loomed. Abandoned by Britain and France, President Beneš turned to the Soviets who had begun a partial mobilisation in eastern Belarus and the Ukraine. They threatened Poland with the dissolution of the Soviet-Polish Non-aggression Pact. [Lukes and Goldstein, p. 61.] In the end, abandoined by Britain, he acceeded to German demands and withdrew from the Sudentenland. Poland immediately issued an ultimatum to the Czechs, demanding the immediate evacuation of Czechoslovak troops and police They gave the Czechs until noon the following day. The Czech Foreign Minister called the Polish ambassador in Prague and told him that they would acceed to the Polish demands (October 1). The Polish Army, commanded by General Władysław Bortnowski, annexed the area. Hitler of course was delighted. The temportary loss of a provincial rail center was of little importance as he planned to invade both Czechioslovakia and Poland. And it orovided some cover for his aggressuve policies, essentially making Poland an accomplice. [Watt, p. 511.] The Poles also seized a small area of Slovakia.
Hitler remiliatized the Rhineland (1935) and conducted the Anschluss bringing Austria into the Reich (April 1938). Hitler's next target was the Sudetenland. The Czechs were prepared to fight. The British and French were not. British Primeminister Nevil Chamberlin delivered the Sudetenland to Hitler at the Munich Conferece (October 1938). The Sudetenland was incorporated into the Reich. Slovakia suceeded and a pro-NAZI regime seized power. Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to seize the rest of the country. It was Hitler, however, who made the desion. He ordered the invasion of what was left of Czechoslovakia (March 15, 1939). Here Hitler step over another milestone, for the first time he seized control of non-Germans, which he hd pledged to Prim-Minister Chamberlasin he would not do. It was now clear that Poland would be the next target, but the Poles were no going to give in to German threats. British and Polish diplomats discussed possible cooperation. Chamberlain at Munich made it clear that Britain would accept further norder modifications as long as they were done peacfully. He was of course speaking of the Polish border. And Hitler's deizure of Czechoslovakia made it clear that his pledges to Chamberlain at Munich were valuless. This was essentially the the end of diplomac, at least with Britain. While Chamberlain still had some feint hopes, no other British politicans or the British people had ny trust in Herr Hitler's assurances. Appeasement had run its tragic course. Hitler had, however, one last thriw of the diplomatic dice. There was one final Eutopean leader that was willing to deal with him--Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin..
Anglo-British Agreement (March 1939)
Durung the Munich crisis, the British had made some initiatives to the Polish Government, but they were not pursued because Prime-Minister Chamnberlsin decided to give into Hitler's demandds on the Czechs at thE munich Conferencve. Hitle had agreed to make no more territorial demands other thn diplomstic. He even signed a paper commiting to this. When Chanberlain returned to London, he waved this paper at the assembled journalists. When Hitler sent his Army into what was left of Czechoslovakia, Chanberlain finally knew that he had been had and began looking for allies. With the Czechs gone this meant Poland. The Poles had a long border with Germany, much longer than before because the Germans were in Czechoslovakia. And the Poles had a substantial army. The weakness of the Polish Army and the strength of the Wehrmacht was not yet understood. Chambrlain now saw Poland as the key to the situation. [Cabinent Conclusions, p. 59.] This is astonishing as Chamberlain had called the the Munich crisis 'a quarrel far away country, between people of whom we know nothing". Now he was going to pin British diplomacy on Poland, a country with which Britain had had little involvement. Even so and with minimal discussion, Britain and Poland signed a binding defensive military alliance -- the Anglo-Polish Agreement (March 31, 1939). The British and Poles saw the agreement very differently. The British were trying to prevent fighting a war by deterriung the Germans. The Poles wanted an ally for a war they noe saw as inevitable. Within only a few months of the Munich agreement, Britain was now committed to defending a border which British public opinion had genrally seen as the most open to criticism and revision of all the arrangements concluded at Versailles. Chamberlain told the House of Commons that ‘in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.’ The die was cast. Britain had, however, a relatively small army and no way of offering immediate assistance to Poland if the Germans struck. Poland was not willing to consider Soviet aid, realizing that allowing the Red Army into the country would soon allow Stalin to seize control. Polish officials hoped that the antagonism between the NAZIs and the Soviets would make it difficult for either to invade Poland.
French Pledge (May 1939)
The French pledge to Poland was confirmed just before the War (May 1939).
