Figure 1.--Here two children on a collective farm use a shot-down ME-109 as acommfortable bench. I'm not sure when this photograph was taken, but probably durung Summer 1943.
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Figure 1.--Here two children on a collective farm use a shot-down ME-109 as acommfortable bench. I'm not sure when this photograph was taken, but probably durung Summer 1943. |
Most historical accounts of the air war available in the West seal with the Luftwaffe campaigns in the West and the subsequent Allied strtegic bombing campaign. The air war on the Eastern Front is much less studied. This is somewhat surprising as Germany and the Soviet Union when the War began had the two mist powerful air forces. The Luftwaffe essentially destroyed the Red Air Force during the first few days of Barbarossa. As a result the Red Air Force was not a factor during Barbarossa. The Red Army during the Barbarossa had to fight with virtually no air cover. This graduaally changed and by 1943 the Red Air Force was again an important factor in the War. Several factors were involved here. The Soviets did have a substantial aeronautics industry and the Soviet war plants that had been moved east by 1943 had reached full production. America through Lend Lease was delivering planes to the Soviets. The Allied strategic bombing campaign forced not only forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw assetts from the Eastern Front to defend German cities. In addition the bombing disrupted German production as well as casused substantial lossess in German fighters. Many accounts of the air war do not give sufficent attention to the impact on the Luftwaffe of engaging the Allied bombers even before long-range fighter cover became available.
One has to ask after the resources devoted to the VVS why Soviet aircraft proved so disappointing during Barbarossa. Soviet aircraft designers had made considerable progress and had introduced some innovative aircraft. Later in the War the VVS proved more effective. There were several reasons for inferority of VVS aircraft. Aircraft designers were also sunject to the Stalinist terror. Two of the Soviet Union's most gifted designers, V.M. Petlyakov and A.N. Tupolev, were arrested by the NKVD and not released until 1940-41. One of the weakest aspects of Soviet aviation were the engines. This rflected the weakness of the overall Soviet industrial plant. There are factors that are difficult to assess. We susprect that Stalin's terror inhibited creativity and innovation--key elements in aviation. We also suspect that the free enterprise system so dispariaged by the Soviets were a factor in more technically advanced aircraft being created in Europe and America.
Stalin made a huge committment to military aviation and by the time of the NAZIs came to power had built a huge air force. The Voenno-Vozdushniye Sily (VVS) was the largest and most powerful air force in the world. Only when Hitler seized powe in German (1933) was an air force created which could challenge the Soviet Air Force. Hitler ordered the secret rearamament of Germany, including the construction of an air force, in flagarant violation of the Versailles Treaty. Stalin poured emense resources into his air force. Planes were built in large numbers and incoroprated a ranbge of modern features. The Soviets had both modern figters and bombers.
the Polikarpov I-16 fighter was the world's first monoplane fighter with a retractable undercarriage which improved performance.
The Tupolev TB-3 bomber appeared in 1930. It was the the world's first long-range monoplane heavy bomber and had four-engines. It was the first such bomber to be put into series production. [Harvey] A substantial part of the VVs air fleet was composed of obselete aircraft. The Soviets tended to add new planes, but maintain their older planes in service. The result was a massive force with large numbers of obsolete craft. Less thgan 25 percent of the VVs fighter force was made up of the newer MiG-3s and LaGG-3s. A substantial part of the force was the increasing outclassed I-16s. There were even substantial numbers of biplanes in service. [Harvey]
The ability of the Luftwaffe to surprise the VVS was not just a cleverly engineered attack. It relected the state of a service seriously depleted by Stalinist purges. Not only had the senior leadership of the VVS been either executed or committed to the Gulag, but large numbers of experienced officers at mid levels had suffered the same fate. One assessment suggests over 40 percent pf VVS aviation officers had served less than 6 months. Even more telling. over 90 percent of VVS formation commanders had been in that position for more than 6 months. [Harvey] The inexperience of the leadership and the fear of commanders to innovate mean that VVS tactical doctrine was out molded and ineffective against well conceived Luftwaffe tactical doctrine which had been tested and honed with campains in Poland (1939), France and Britain (1940), anf the Balkans (1941).
The Luftwaffe scored a major victory in essentially destroying the Red Air Force during the first 2 days of the Operation Barbarossa. This was a enormous accomplishment by the Luftwaffe. It was one of the most important tactical strike of the War. It is what the Luftwaffe had hoped to achieve over Britain. The Soviet Air Force had been the largest in the world. Much of it was destroyed on the ground. The came about because of both surprise, Luftwaffe technical competance, and the superiority of the German aircraft. Given the fact that the Soviets had ample warning of the attack, the Luftwaffe never should have been able to achieve such a success. The reason that they did was due to the fact that Stalin refused to believe the intelligence reports and prepare for the NAZI attack. The Soviet Commander of Russian Aviation, General Rychagov, was shot for "treasonable activity". The result of the Luftwaffe victory was that for most of Barbarossa, the Germans had air superority over the battle field. Thus even lumbering Stuka dive bombers could be freely deployed to support Wehrmacht operations.
The air war in the East was different than the air war in the West for several reasons. First, neither the Luftwaffe or the Red Air Force had a significant strategic bombing apability. Thus the conflict was almost enirely a tactical struggle. Second, the campaign was fought on such a huge front that it was not possible to focus air assetts in a decisive manner nor gain air superority over the battlefield as was the case in western campaigns. The destruction of the Red Air force during the opening days of Barbarossa was a dissaster fir the Red Army. The vast scope of the battlefiekd, however, meant that this was not the decisive stroke that it might havevbeen in a western campaign. The Luftwaffe was just not large enough to deliver a knock out blow on such a huge battlefueld. Third, the weather limited air operations for long periods. The Luftwaffe was largely out of action for substantial periods during the decissive Winters of 1941-42 and 1942-43.
This graduaally changed and by 1943 the Red Air Force was again an important factor in the War. Several factors were involved here. The Soviets did have a substantial aeronautics industry and the Soviet war plants that had been moved east by 1943 had reached full production. The aircraft produced weee high-performance modern aircraft that could compete with the Luftwaffe. America through Lend Lease was delivering planes to the Soviets. The Allied strategic bombing campaign forced not only forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw assetts from the Eastern Front to defend German cities. In addition the bombing disrupted German production as well as casused substantial lossess in German fighters. Many accounts of the air war do not give sufficent attention to the impact on the Luftwaffe of engaging the Allied bombers even before long-range fighter cover became available.
The most famed Soviet aircraft of World war II was the Ilyushin IL-2m-3 Shturmovik. It was two-seater multi-purpose plane. It could serve as a fighter, but its was nore effectively deployed as dive-bomber in ground-support operations. It had a 1,770-horse- power engine and was heavily armored. It became known as both a flying tank and a tank buster. The Soviets built 36,000 Shturmovik.
Its was armed with two cannons and two machine guns, as well as a bomb-load of 1,320 pounds. This was a much more effective ground-support plane than the outdated Stuka the Luftwaffe relied on for ground support for much of the War.
While the Shturmovik was the best-known Soviet plane, the Soviets by 1943 were deploying several planes that were competitive with the Luftwaffe. The Soviets deployed four fighters. Each had its own strenths and weaknesses, but were competitive with the Luftwaffe in a way that had not been the casev in 1941. The United States supplied 5,000 Bell P-39 Airacobra. The Soviets rearmed it with a heavier cannin. While not popular with american fliers, with the upgraded cannon it became an effective tan killer. The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 was not sufficently manoeuvrabile to tangle openly with German fighters, it could cruiise at high altitudes (40,000 ft) and dive on German fighr=ters. The Yakovlev YAK-3 became available in 1943 and was competitive with Luftwaffe fighters. The most effective Soviet fighter was Lavochkin LA-7 which became available in 1944. This impressive fighter had superior characteristics to both the ME-109 abd FW-190. The Soviets produced 15,000 which shifted the nature of the air war in the East during the final year of the war. The Soviets deployed a heavy momber, the Petlyakov PE-8, which could reach Germany, but it was not made in large numbers needed for a stratehic bombing campaign.
Harvey, A.D. "The Soviet Air Force versus the Luftwaffe" History Today (January 2002).
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