** World War II European Theater -- Soviet civilian evacuations World War II European Theater -- Soviet civilian evcuations








World War II: Soviet Civilians--Evacuations

World War II Soviet civilian evacuations
Figure 1.--A Russian reader tells us, "Some 0.2 million orphans were evacuated to Uzbekistan. Our reader tells us, "Local people treated the orphabns very well. A blacksmith from Tashken (Toshkent), Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov, with his wife Bakhree were famous for adopted and educating 16 evacuated orphans. For many of those children Middle East became a second home even after the War. a memorial 'Friendship of peoples' depicting Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov and recognizing humanism and hospitality of the Uzbek people to the evacuated children (1982)."

The German invasion of the Soviet Unioncame as a great shock (June 22). Areas of the the western Soviet Union were quickly overun. Evacuation from these areas were impossible. But the areas overun in the north were the areas of eastern Poland Stalin seized (September 1939). That meant there was some time to organize evacuations from Russia proper. To the south in the Ukraine where Stalin had deployed much of the Red Army armor, a massive tank battle was fouught in the Bloody Triange (June 1941). The Germans destroyed much of the Red Army armor, but the battle bought time to organize evacuations away from the border regions. Priority in these evacuations ere given to factory equipment and the skilled workers (and their families) that operated the equipment. The factories were transported by rail to the Urals and beyond. This meant that they were not within the range of the Luftwaffe which did not have ling-range bombers. It would take some time to reestablish production, but by 1943 Soviet war production had begun to reach pre-War levels. We also believe that Communist Party officials and thrir families had priority. There was not a general evacuation. Civilians were not evacuated from Lenningrad in 1941 before the Germans cut off the city. As a result, thousands of civilians starved in winter 1941-42. Women and children were finally evacuated in the Spring over Lake Lagoda. Nor was Stalingrad evcuated in 1942. A Russian reader tells us that orphanages were also given evacuation priority. And many of the evacuated orphansere Jews. He tell us that 24 percent of the evacusted children were Jews. We are not sure just when this was decided, befire or after reports of Germans shooting Jews that fell into their hands. Some 0.2 million oephans were evacuated to Uzbekistan. Our reader tells us, "Local people treated the orphabns very well. A blacksmith from Tashken (Toshkent), Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov, with his wife Bakhree were famous for adopted and educating 16 evacuated orphans. For many of those children Middle East became a second home even after the War. a memorial "Friendship of peoples" depicting Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov and recognizing humanism and hospitality of Uzbek people to the evacuated children (1982)."

Evacuation Planning (1927)

The Bolshevik Revolutiuion occurred during World War I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were forced by the Germans into a humiliating peace -- Brest-Litosk. At the same time, the Civil War began. Wetern powers intervened and the Volsheviks fomented revolution in the West, esopecially Germny. Wars were fought with the Bkys and Ooles to suoress independence movements. Bolsehevik leaders anticipated more wars. As a result there were preparation for future war at a time when the Western powers were focused on peace. A war scare erupted amomg the Soviet leadership (1927). The Soviets got it in their head that capitalist forces in China abnd Britain were preparing a two front assault on the Soviet Union. (The Sobviets until World War II saw Britain rather than America as the preminent Western power.) The scare, however farfetched caused the Soviets to begin developing defensive measures. This was the first serious formulation of evacuation policies by any World War II beligerant. Unlike the evacuation plans developed by the Western countries, these were not humanitarian efforts to protect endangered populations, chikdren and the elderly. The Soviet evacuation plans were measures to promote defense. They were concened with hindrance of military movement, spread of disease, and demoralizing of units as well as economic stress. [Manley, "To the Tashkent ...", p.13] The idea was to use time and space to aid in defensive operation. Unlike the much smaller Europoean states, as in Napoleions invasion (1812), these could be valuable fctors. The Soviet Council of Labor and Defense was assigned the task drafting actual plans and to coordinte with other agencies. As a result, at the time of World War II, the Soviet Union had the only comprehensive evacuation plan in place in case of invasion. The British had an evacuation plan, but only to get children and the elderly out of the cities, anticipating German bombing attacks. While the Soviets had a plan, nothing could have prepared then for the power the Germans marshalled for Barbarossa.

Barbarossa (June 1941)

The German invasion of the Soviet Unioncame as a great shock (June 22). At first it looked like another quick German Blitzkrieg victory. Large areas of the the western Soviet Union were quickly overun. Much of the population ofvthe Baltic received the Germans as liberators. Perfectly executed pinzer movements surounded and destroyed whole Soviet armies. Millions of Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. The Red Air Force was destroyed, largely on the ground. Evacuation from these areas were impossible. But the areas overun in the north were the non-Russuian areas of eastern Poland and the Baltics which Stalin seized (September 1939). The Germans also seized Belorusia. The huge battlefield of the East and distances involved was an order of magnitude greater than any of the battlefiekds in the West. The Luftwaffe, weakenbed by the Battle of Briyain anhd facing a much larger battlefield could not offer the level of support it had in the West. And logistics became a growing problem as the Wheremacht plunged deeper into the Soviet Union. All of the Western campaigns were fought close to the Reich with short secure supply lines. It was not until the Germans took Smolensk (September) that the Germans reached ethnic Russian areas. And here Red Army resitance stiffened and the weather began to change.

Bloody Triangle (June 24, 1941)

To the south in the Ukraine where Stalin had deployed much of the Red Army armor, a massive tank battle was fouught in the Bloody Triange (June 1941). It was one of te ctwo largest armored battles in history. It was exceeded in size and importance only by the famous defeat of Germany's Panzer forces at nearby Kursk (1943). More nearly 3,000 Soviet and German tanks met in a week-long engagement in a stretch of northwestern Ukraine that came to be known as the 'Bloody Triangle'. This was an area that military experts call 'tank country'. There were only a few narrow, poorly maintained highways, movement was largely restricted to unpaved roads running through terrain dominated by forests, hills, small marshy rivers and swamps. Here during the first week of Barbarossa a tintanic tank battle took place. It was fought in a triangular area bounded by the cities of Lutsk, Rovno, and Brody. The Germans destroyed much of the Red Army armor. [Kamenir] The battle, however, bought time to organize evacuations away from the border regions. It also slowed the advanced of Army Group South. It would eventualy lead to one of the major decisions of Workd War II. When Army Group Center reached Smolensk (July 1941). Hitler had to decide tob proceed on to Moscow with an inprotected flank or to delay the drive on Moscow to assist Army Group South in the fight for Kiev. The fight at the Bloody Triangle meant there was some time to organize the defense and evacuations from the Russian heartland.

Evacuating Industry

Priority in these evacuations were given to factory equipment and the skilled workers (and their families) that operated the equipment. The Soviets managed to pack up and move whole factories east, where they could not be reached by the Panzers or even the Luftwaffe's bombers. Tsarist Empire industry was largely located west of the Urals in centers like St. Ptersburg, Mosvow and the Don Bas. Lenin after the victory of the Bosheveks sought to diverify Soviet industry. The motivation was a more even economic developmentand no much military defense. Lenin used the New Economic Program (NEP) to begin this effort. What ever the goal, it meant that there were substantial industrial capacity beyond the reach of the Germans. The Germans struck with the hammar blow of Barbarossa (June 22). Stalin was shocked. He retired to his dachau and could not be reached by anyone. He suffered what may have been a mental breakdown. Thus for the first 3 days at this moment of crisis, the Soviet Union was without a leader. Stalin had never anticipated a crisis of the magnitude of Barbarossa. One author tells us, "There had been only scant pre-war contingency planning, there were no actual plans for any strategic industrial withdrawl into the eastern hinterlands, where the building of new plants and the construction of new railways had proceeded very slowly. ...the highly centralised state machine was scattered behind the Volga. "[Erickson] Even so, almost immediately upon Barbarossa, the Soviets began moving factories and factory workers east beyond the Urals. Even while Stalin was holed up in shock at his dachau, Soviet authorities put 41 mobilisation production plans into effect (June 23). The Red Army and Air Force was unprepared for a German attack. So was Soviet industry. Authorities established an Evacuation Council (June 24). After 3 days, his colleagues came to him. Stalin because he had so misjudged Hitler's intentions, expected to be arrested. But instead of aresting him, they came to plead with him to come with them to Moscow and take control (June 25). Authorities organized the State Defense Committee with Stalin as chairman (June 30). The Germans were rapidly noving east, but the Soviet union is a huge country and after the first few weeks the pace of the German advanced slowed. Much of the rapid advance was in ares seized by the Soviet Union (1939-40) and was not in the country's Russian heartland. The Soviet rail system was mobilized for the gigantic task. It was done by rail. The Soviet highway sysrem was virtully non-existent. This operation was given priority on the Soviet rail system. Even as the rail system was needed to supply the Red Army, the most massive industrial relocation in history was carried out: 300,000 railway wagons were moving fctories, equipment, and workers (July 1941), 185,000 rail waggons (August 1941), 140,000 rail wagons (September 1940), and 175,000 rail wagons (November 123,000). The operation ended with the Red Army winter offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Soviets managed to move over 1,503 factories and plants east beyond the Urals. Another source puts the number if factories at 1,306 enterprises. [Перемещение] What we do not have a good handle on is what portion of Soviet industry that the Soviets moved and the Germzns seized. There is also the matter of the Soviets disabling olbys so the Germsbs could nbot use them. Moving the workers that opersted the macjinery was an imporant part of the effort. And this include their families. This meant not only could the Panzers not get to them but even the Luftwaffe bombers. It would take some time to reestablish production, but by 1943 Soviet war production had begun to reach pre-War levels.

Privileged Elite Class

Soviet authorities in the pre-War planning developed an evacuation plan for civilans that gave priority to Communist Party officials and Government officials along with their families. We do not yet have much detail on this. Stalin would of course have to have approved something like this. It appears to have been part of an overall policy to protect individuals that were deemed of special value to the Soviet state and Communist Party. Individuals qualifying for this category included scientists, specialized workers, artists, writers, and politicians, meaning members of the Government and Communist Party. These elite individuals and their families were evacuated east to safe areas of the country.

Self Evacuations

The Soviet Government issued no general evacuation order. Millions of people decided on their own to head east away from the Germans. There was nm=o support such as food, housung, and meducal care foir these peole. Nor was transport provided. Some moved on foot or waited at train stations hoping to get on a train headed east. No one knows the precise number, a good estimate is something like 16.5 million. [Manley, "The perils ...', pp. 495.] Some put the number at about 16.5 millionn. [Manley, "The perils ...', p. 495.] These self-evacuees were looked on with some suspicion. The evacuation process despite the pre-War plans were notvwell organized abd this was jusr considering the authoriuzed evacuees. The mass of self-evacuees turned thevmovement of people into chaos. Soviet officials look on many of the sel0evacuees with suspicion. They were not assigned a location where they could be placed. Officials also feared that the disorder might create conditions where Red Army deserters could flee. And there was also the fear of contamination, both epidemic and ideological. [Manley, "The perils ...', pp. 499-500.]

Major Cities

The defense of the Soviet Union was largely determined by battles fought around three of the most importnt Soviet Cities; Leningrad (1941-44), Moscow (1941-42), ad Salingrad (1942-43). Stalin did not like the idea of evacuations, even children. His basic belief was that Red Army soldiers fought harder when they were defendung women and children. Civilians were not evacuated from Lenningrad in 1941 before the Germans cut off the city (September 1941). As a result, thousands of civilians starved in winter 1941-42. Women and children were finally evacuated in the Spring over Lake Lagoda. Stalin did begin an evacuation of Moscow as the Germans closed in (November 1941). There were evacuations, but we do not yet have details. The Moscow Oblast Committee of the Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Moscow Oblast Council decided to evacuate women and children from the Moscow suburbs. They request authorization from the Evacuation Council of the Soviet Council of Peoples Commissariats for 300,000. They were requested to assign destinations. The People's Commissariat of Transportation was to transport the evacuees from Moscow suburbs. [Gorinov, et. al., p. 254.] Officials were unprepared for the operatiom. Children were transported to Moscow in hatily obtained barges whichout side railing. Some poorly suopervised children fell overboard. Little provision was made for food and water. They had to sleep on floors without bedding. The diplomatic corps was evacuated. Stalin's personal train was at the ready in Moiscow's central train station, but fimally Stalin decided to fight it out in the city. Nor was Stalingrad evcuated as the Germans approached (September 1942)..

Orphanages

A Russian reader tells us that orphanages were also given evacuation priority. And many of the evacuated orphans were Jews. He tell us that 24 percent of the evacuated children were Jews. We are not sure just when this was decided, before or after reports of German Einsazgruppen shooting Jews that fell into their hands. Some 0.2 million oephans were evacuated to Uzbekistan. Our reader tells us, "Local people treated the orphabns very well. A blacksmith from Tashken (Tashkent), Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov, with his wife Bakhree were famous for adopted and educating 16 evacuated orphans. For many of those children Middle East became a second home even after the War. a memorial "Friendship of peoples" depicting Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov and recognizing humanism and hospitality of Uzbek people to the evacuated children (1982)." Here we see a memorial to the orphans to the orphans and Shaakhmed Shamakhamudov and his wife who cared for them (figure 1).

Soviet Jews

The Soviet agressions as a NAZI ally, especially the seizure of Poland along with Lithuania and Northwestern Romania added some 2 million Jews to the Soviet population (1939-41). [Asher] Most Soviet Jews lived in the western Siviet Union (Lithunia, eastern Poland, and the Ukraine. Most of these Jews were murdred by Einstzgruppen as the Wehrmacht drive east unto the Soviet Union. Polish Jews were lagely murdered in the Aktion Reinhard killing campaigns in the death camps established mostly in Poland. This at the time was the largest Jewish populstion in Europe. While the largest numbers were in estern Poland, there were substabtial numbers in northeastern Romania (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina). One estimte suggests there were 0.25 million Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Another 0.12 million Jew fled from Romania to the Soviet controlled aeas as the Germans moved into Romania. This brought the total number of Jews in the Soviet region to over 0.4 million. Small numbers were deported into away fromn the bordr areas into the Soviet interior. Many were drafted into the Red Army. [Kaganovitch] Soviet officials attempted to incorporate the displaced Romanian Jews into Soviet society. A Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was organized. [Asher] Many Jews living in NAZI Poland and pro-NAZI Romania did not fully assess the nature of the NAZIs nor did the Soviers encourage Jews to flee. Red Army border gards fired oin Jrews trying to cross the border. With the advent of Barbarossa, German Einsatzgruppen killed more than a million Jews in the western Soviet Union . The Romanian Army went on a horific killing spree of its own in Bessarabia and Bukovina. They apparently viewed all Jews as Communist agents. Some Jewish families managed to fled east into the Soviet interior. There are no availabke Soviet data on this. It is know that Soviets authorities evacuated 300,000 Soviet citizens Moldavia to the interior, including Kazakhstan. It is unknown how many of the Molavian evacuees were Jewish. The Soviets report as many as 45,000 displaced Jewish citizens from the Moldavian region living in Uzbekistan (Februry 1942). [Asher] And there were some 80,000 Jews from the Moldavian region displaced to other Soviet repiblics (early 1942).[Kaganovitch] This suggess that many Jews from other reas such as eastern Poland may have also found refuge in the Soviet interior. And of course, There were Jews among the "pivilidged Elite Class of Soviet citizes that were evacuated east. A far as we know, there is no data as to the mumber of Jews among this group.

Sources

Asher, Harvey. "The Soviet Union, the Holocaust, and Auschwitz". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (November 14, 2003), pp. 886-912.

Gorinov, M.M, V.N. Parkhachev, and A.N. Ponomarev, eds. Moskva prifrontovaia, 1941 1942: Arkhivnye dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Izdatel stvo ob edineniia Mosgorarkhiv, 2001).

Kaganovitch, A. "Estimating the number of Jewish refugees, deportees, and draftees from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the non-occupied Soviet territories," Holocaust and Genocide Studies. pp. 464-482.

Kamenir, Victor J. Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941 (2009).

Manley, Rebecca. To the Tashkent Station Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War (Cornell University Press: 2009).

Manley, Rebecca. "The Perils of Displacement: The Soviet Evacuee between Refugee and Deportee." Contemporary European History, Vol. 16, No. 4 (November 2007).

"Перемещение производительных сил СССР на восток" from victory.mil.ru.





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Created: 7:55 AM 11/16/2011
Last updated: 4:01 PM 7/19/2021