Figure 1.-- |
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Soviet participation in the land campaign against Germany was critical. Without the Red Army engaging the Wehrmacht in the East, an Allied invasion of France would have never been possible. America extended Lend Lease to the Soviet Union in September 1941. Lend Lease proved critical to the Soviet war-effort. This should not be over emphasized. The Red Army stopped the Wehrmacht at Lenningrad and Moscow (December 1941) before Lend Lease aid had begun to arrive in any quantity. The Soviets had a massive arms industry that out produced the Germans in many areas. [Dunn] Many of their weapons were of a high quality--especially the T-34 tank which was superior to the American Sherman tank. The Soviets had moved their armaments plants back to and beyond the Urals after the NAZI invasion. By 1942 those plants were back in opperation. Still wars are won by marshalling superior resources. After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. Most historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first weeks of the German invasion. The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Lend Lease not only provided weapons including high performance aircraft, but many oyher key materials. American trucks and locomotives played a key role in the logistics neeed to support Red Army offenses. Other materials such as blankets and canned meat were very imporyant tothe Red Ary. The Soviet Union had been essentially a parter with the NAZIs until Hitler ordered an invasion (June 1941). Aid to the Soviets was more contencious than to other countries, but had a stron advocate in Hopkins. [McJimsey, pp. 293-294] Some Americans wanted to restrict aid to the Soviets on ideological grounds. Some ike Ambassador Standley may have also understood the evil nature of the Soviet regime. Here a case can be made that Ameruca erred in so copiously supplying the Sovierts. Certainly the trucks which America supplied the Soviets to fight the Wehrmacht were later used to cart unknown numbers of people off to the Gulag. These arguments can safely made today after the NAZIs ere defeated. That defeat was, however, much less certain in 1941-43. One of the considerations to bear in mind was that Stalin and joined Hitler once, in part because he thought the Allies were intent on weakening the Soviet Union by sitting out the war and having the Soviets and NAZIs destroy each other. After the cross-Channel invasion was postponed in 1942 (Sledgehammer) and especially in 1943 (Roundup). Stalin was enraged. There were Soviet and NAZI peace feelers. [Mastny, p. 1378. and Karpov] Historians debate as to how serious these feelers were, in part becuse Stalin to suppress all evidence after the War. Hopkins argued with considerable force that after the postponment of the cross-Channel invasion in 1943 that full scale Lead Lease aid was necessary to convince Stalin of the Westen Allies sincerity and commitment. [McJimsey, pp. 292-294.]
Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941). It was the largest military operation in history. Hitler warned that the world would tremble. He was correct. Stalin had sought to have the NAZIs and Western Allies fight the War and weaken eawhile he watched from the sidelines building his strength. Instead, he found himself isolated and facing the full force of the German military without any allies. Within ibly a few months, the NAZIs had reached the outskirts of Moscow.
It was not immediately apparent what the Allies would respond. The Soviets were Communists and had engaged in a series of aggressions of its own as a virtual allyof Hitler. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt resonded immediately. Churchill told Parliament that Britain would aid the Soviets. There was not muxh the British could do. America was a diiferent matter and Roosevelt indicated that America would aid the Soviets to fight the NAZIs (June 24). Congress approved legislation extending Lend Lease to the Soviet Union (September 1941). Aid to the Soviets was more contencious than to other countries, but had a strong advocate in Hopkins. [McJimsey, pp. 293-294] Some Americans wanted to restrict aid to the Soviets on ideological grounds. Some like Ambassador Standley may have also understood the evil nature of the Soviet regime. Here a case can be made that Ameruca erred in so copiously supplying the Sovierts. Certainly the trucks which America supplied the Soviets to fight the Wehrmacht were later used to cart unknown numbers of people off to the Gulag. These arguments can safely made today after the NAZIs ere defeated. That defeat was, however, much less certain in 1941-43.
Soviet participation in the land campaign against Germany was critical. Without the Red Army engaging the Wehrmacht in the East, an Allied invasion of France would have never been possible. Most of the Wehrmacht during World War II after the fall of France was employed on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union. It was on the Eastern Front that the Wehrmacht suffered the bulk of its casualties and material losses. It is virtually inconceiveable that the Western Allies could have rentered Europe had the Wehrmacht not been ground down by the tutantic battles waged on the Eastern Front.
One of the considerations to bear in mind was that Stalin and joined Hitler once, in part because he thought the Allies were intent on weakening the Soviet Union by sitting out the war and having the Soviets and NAZIs destroy each other. After the cross-Channel invasion was postponed in 1942 (Sledgehammer) and especially in 1943 (Roundup). Stalin was enraged. Hopkins argued with considerable force that after the postponment of the cross-Channel invasion in 1943 that full scale Lead Lease aid was necessary to convince Stalin of the Westen Allies sincerity and commitment. [McJimsey, pp. 292-294.]
There were Soviet and NAZI peace feelers. Historians debate as to how serious these feelers were, in part becuse Stalin to suppress all evidence after the War. Since the disollution of the Soviet Union more details have become available, although there is considerable debate among historians about the circumstances. Some of the relevations if accurate are startling. One Russian author citing declassified Soviet intelligence files reports that Stalin agter the Wehrmacht had stabalized the Eastern Front personally authorized the offer of a separate peace to Adolf Hitler (February 1942). Stalin reportedly proposed that the Soviets and NAZIs cooperat against the United States and the United Kingdom. A Soviet document dated February 19, 1942 reveals that Stalin offered Hitler a cesefire on the Eastern Front and to joint the NAZIs in joint military operations against the Western Allies "to restructure the world" by the end of 1943 under the pretext of accusing "world
Jewry of war-mongering." Another document dated February 27, 1942, provides a report on high-level discussins between Soviet and NAZI officias. lsVsevolod Merkulov, a Soviet security official reported on his meeting with SS Gen. Karl Wolf, in Mtsensk, Belarusian, at the time occupied by the Germans. Merkulov reported that Wolf discussed German demands that Stalin must "solve the Jewish question" in the Soviet Union before Germany would agree to an alliance against the Allies. Wolf also discussed concessions that the NAZIS were prepared to make, including territorial concessions. There was even a curious offer to change the color of the swastika on the NAZI
flag from black to red. Merkulov described the world-wide view of the NAZIs, including a demand that the Soviets acqiese to German control over Latin America, the Arab world and North Africa as well as Japanese control over China. This was reprtedly unacceptable to the Soviets. [Karpov] U.S. intelligence was aware of some of these contsacts [Mastny, p. 1378.]
The role of Lend Lease should not be over emphasized. The Red Army stopped the Wehrmacht at Lenningrad and Moscow (December 1941) before Lend Lease aid had begun to arrive in any quantity. The Soviets had a massive arms industry that out produced the Germans in many areas. [Dunn] Many of their weapons were of a high quality--especially the T-34 tank which was superior to the American Sherman tank. The Soviets had moved their armaments plants back to and beyond the Urals after the NAZI invasion. By 1942 those plants were back in opperation.
Building the needed war equipment was only part of the task. With the Soviet Union, the more difficult task was getting it to the Soviets. Aiding the British involved a straight shoot accriss the Atlantic. Although the U-boats posed a threat, most of the dhipments reached Britain and the turn around for the ships was realitively quick given the relatively short distance involved. The United States abnd the British opened up three routes to the Soviets. First, was the northern route to Murmansk and Ark Aangel. This route at times proved almost suisidal. Convoys were attacked by U-boats as well as German surface ships and aircraft based in Norway. Second, was the southern route. This involved a long trip around the Cape of Good Hope and then overland through Iran. This route was limited because the length of the voyage tied up shipping and the Iranian port and transportation infrastructure was limited. In addition during much of 1942 the Indian Ocean was threatened by the Japanese Navy. Third was the western or Pacific route. This route extended from american west coast ports to Soviet Pacific ports. This proved to be the most important. About half of Lend Lease shipments took the Soviets were shipped over this route. Some of this was done by air. American aircefaft were flown from Alaska to the Soviets. Large quantities of supplied were also shipped by cargo vessels. It is surprising because these shipments took place through Japanese controlled waters. This began before Pearl Harbor. Even after Pearl Harbor the Japanese did not intercept the shipments. American officials, however, decided it adviseable to tansfer the vessels to Soviet registry. The first 15 ships were transferred (November-December 1942. Eventually 125 ships were transferred. [Herring] American magic intercepts revealed that Ribbentrop could not believe that the Japanese were permitting this when he first received reports of what was happening. [Boyd, p. 221.]
The Japanese were well aware of the American Lend Lease shipmebts. Although a NAZI ally adhered to their neutrality pact with the Soviets. Thus the Japanese allowed the American Lend Lease shipments to pass unmolested. Japanese diplomats traveling on the Trans-Siberian Railway reported trains loaded with American trucks and manufactured goods. [Boyd, p. 88.] They also noted American aircraft. The overall Japanese assessment, however, underestimated the full dimmensions of the shipments to the Soviets. [Boyd, p.93.]
The United States through Lend Lease delivered a wide range of weapns and material to the Soviet Union. Some of the most important items wre trucks, planes, and food. The United States also dlivered naval vessels to the Soviet Union, most going to support the Arctic convoys and to escort the Pacific convoys. A Russian reader has supplied us some information about deliveries of naval vessels. These deliveries played an important role in the development of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet Union had been essentially a parter with the NAZIs until Hitler ordered an invasion (June 1941). Thus the decession to assist the Soviets was a major policy shift. It also took time to increase war production and ship material to the Soviets. There were huge demands for war material, both from the American military and other allies, especially Britain. Thus deliveries were failrly limited in 1941 and 42 when American industry had not been fully converted to war production. Lend Lease proved critical to the Soviet war-effort. Wars from time memorial are won by marshalling superior resources. And this was the case in EWorld War II. Lend Lease did not play a role in stopping the NAZIs in front of Moscow (DEcember 1941). (Although President Roosevelt's pressure on the Japanese did play a role, allowing Stalin to transfer substantial forces from the Siberia to the defense of Moscow.) And deliveries were still limited in 1942. But by 1943 American industry had been fully coverted to war production and deliveries to the Soviet Union increased expodentially. After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. Most historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first weeks of the German invasion. The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Not only the building of these planes, but delivering them to the Soviet Union was a massive logisical undertaking. The delivies were far below the comitmnent, but reached significant levels by 1943: 114 aircraft in 1942, 2,465 in 1943, 3,033 in 1944 and 2,482 in 1945 (through August). [Alberti] Lend Lease not only provided weapons including high performance aircraft, but many oyher key materials. American trucks and locomotives played a key role in the logistics neeed to support the massive Red Army offenses. Other materials such as blankets and canned meat were very imporant to the Red Ary.
A retired Red Army officer has provided us a view of Lend Lease from a Russian perspective. He provides some very useful statistics. We agree with his point that Lend Lease did not sugnificantly aid the Soviets in 1941 and 42. Here it was the Red Army that stopped the NAZIs largely with Soviet manufactured arms. We disagree with our reader, however, on some of his other points concernng Lend Lease. We are very interested in his comments, in part because the war in the East is often not sufficently covered in World War II histories. Thus his comments provide a very useful addtion to our coverage of World war II which relies almost completely on Western sources.
Alberti, Fedor (Deputy Head of Moscow State Civil Aviation Engineering University). "Lend-Lese Air Ferries", AeroSpace Journal (1997).
Boyd, Carl. Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi nd Magic Intelligence, 1941-1945 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 1993), 271p.
Dunn Jr., Walter S. The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).
Herring, George C. Aid to Russua, 1941-1945: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold war (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
Karpov, Vladimir. Generalissimo.
Kimball, W.F. The Most Unsordid Act (1969).
McJimsey, George. Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Liberty (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1987), 474p.
Mastny, V. "Soviet war aims at the Moscow and Teheran conferences," Journal of Modern History (1975).
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