Figure 1.-- |
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Certainly there were limits as to what they could do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. None were, however, ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess. The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschvitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in day light to target the gas chambers, relatively small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precession targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several NAZI death camps would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly. I do not know to what extent the miitary possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operaions that would have allowed them to make those assessments. Perhaps it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy decission. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconmstructed forcing repaeted strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and the Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps.
The Brigtish learned through Ultra intercepts in 1941 that the NAZIs were killing large numbers of Jews as part of the invasion of the Soviet Union. This information because of the importance of Ultra could not be released to the public. Credible reports from Poland reached American authorities in 1942. Many writers who are disturbed about the Allies failure to act point to the 1942 reports in particular and often assume that because of these reports that Allied authorfities were fully aware of what was happening. This is a misunderstanding of intelligence in warfare. First we do not fully understand just how this informatiin was dessiminated among policy makers. Second just because an event reported does not mean that policy makers can accept it as fact. The NAZIs for example received creditable reports that the Allied cross-channel invasion would come at the Pas de Calais and not Normandy. In fact these reports were so creditable that the Wehrmact did not commit their Panzer Divisions when the Allies actually invaded at Normandy. We also know about the many creditable reports that Sadam Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. One of the otoblems with the reports coming out of Poland was that they were coming from Jewish or Polish sources all with vested interests in what was happening and with a desire to draw the Western Allies into actions in Poland.
There were severe limitations as to what the Allies had the capacity to do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. This was especially true when long-range P-51 MUstang escorts became available. No bombing campaigns, however, ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess.
The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschvitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Senator George McGovern who flew bombing strikes in the War has argued this. [McGovern] Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in day light to target the rail lines and gas chambers. The rail lines could have been hit, but this would not have been effective. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconmstructed forcing repaeted strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. There was not just one line to the Auschvitz, but many alternate lines. In addition, rail lines hit by bombers could and were repaired in hours. The Germans were very adept at this. Hiting the gas chambers is much more difficult than commonly realized because they were such small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precession targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several NAZI death camps, which were further East would have been even more problemstic. would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly.
I do not know to what extent the miitary possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operaions that would have allowed them to make those assessments. It is much easier for us today to say that it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy operation as is often assumed. And as we have discussed, the Allied knowledge appreciation of the Holocaust was far from perfect. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation.
Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and the Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps.
McGovern, George. Editorial, Washington Post (January 27?, 2004).
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