Figure 1.--. |
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The first important Allied effort to stop the Japanese sweep through the Pacific occurred in the Coral Sea. The Japanese planned to seize Port Moreseby, completing their conquest of New Guinea and a smaller operation in the Solomons at Tulagi. Port Moresby would have provided a launching pad for an invasion of Australia itself. (At the time, most of the Australian Army was in North Afric fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps.) The Japanese landing force was escorted by the front-line carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. The Japanese naval task force en route to seize Port Moresby was intercepted by an American carrier force, alerted by American code breakers. It was the first carrirer to carrier engagement in history. The Japanese launched an attack on the Americans, but found only a destroyer and oiler. In the meantime the Americans sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho (May 7). The next day the two carrier forces fought a major engagement. The Japanese succeeded in sinking Lexington and heavily damaging Yorktown (May 8). The Americans heavily damaged Shokaku and devestated the air crew of Zuikaku. The substantial Japanese pilot casualties was very signigicant. Despite the American losses, the Japanese invasion force turned back, the first major Japanese reversal of the War. The Japanese assessment of the battle was that not only was Lexington sunk, but that Yorktown was either sunk or so badly damaged that it could no longer be deployed. This affected planning for the Miday operation. The engagement appears to have convinced Japanese naval planners that the American carriers were no mach for the Japanese carriers. The Japanese failed to preceive that the American carriers effectively fought the battle or that the surprise appearance of the American carrier in the Coral Sea to oppose the invasion of Port Moresby resulted from American code breaking. It also meant that they had lost a carrier, and large numbers of planes and pilots. This effectively removed two front line carriers from the Japanese order of battle. This reduced the available carriers for the Midway operation. Combined with the British damage to the First Air Fleet in the Indian Ocean, Admiral Yamamoto had allowed their carrier forces to be significantly weakened in operations of marginal importance. This was critical because if Japan was to win the War it had to be done in 1942 when they had overwealming superiority in the Pacific. If the War developed into a war of attrition, the far greater industrial resources of the United States would prevail.
The Japanese Greater East Asia Coproperity Sphere was a propaganda concept to gain the support of subject peoples in European Asian colonies. The slogan coined by the Japanese was "asia for the Asians". The propaganda impage promoted by the Japanese was a grouping of independent Asian nations liberated by Western influences. The Japanese concept was very different, including two basic concepts. One was the racial and ciltural superiority of the Japanese people and two obtaining access to the resources of the region, especially the petroleum of the Dutch East Indies. As it
And as it function in the areas conquered, the Japanese established puppet governments with the primary purpose of exploiting local resources for the Japanese war effort. The concept originated with General Hachiro Arita, while serving as foreign minister. The Japabese plans were first enunciated by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke (August 1, 1940). It was a concept long discussed by strategic thinkers in Japan. Influential Japanese educator Fukuzawa Yukichi described his concept of "Japan's Mission in Asia" (1882) jystifying Japanese imperialism and the "manifest destiny" of Japan to be the leading Asia nation. Secret socities such as the Black Dragon Society and Kita Ikki proved influential, especially among military leaders. The idea of a righteous war to expel Europeans from Asia achieved increasing currency. The concept was essentially Japan displacing the Europeans and not freeing the Asians. As Japanese Word War II conquests unfolded, they were not infrequently met as liberators in the European colonies they conquered. Local populations, however, soon experienced the brutality of Japanese occupiers and enthusism for the Japanese quickly declined.
The Asian colonies occupied by the Japanese soon found out the difference between Japanese propaganda and actual plans. Japanese oaccupation and military leaders proved more haughty and and more brutal than the former European colonial officials. Just how Australia and New Zealand fit into Japanese plans is unclear. Some Japanese theorists argued that the Europeans should be ousted from Australia and New Zealand. The Pacific War launched at Pearl Harbor, however, was a war launched with limited goals. Just what those goals were, however, are not entirely clear and I am not sure the Japanese militarists who launched the War clearly defined them.
After imobilizing the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), the Japanese swept over southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific, in fact creating the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that stratehic Japanese thinkers had long advocated. The Imperial Navy won a series of seal victories against weak Allied naval forces. After seizing Wake and Guam and Hong Kong the Japanese went after better defended targets. Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Philippines and achieved stunning success. The Durch East Indies provided the oil resources that Japan so desperately needed. Malaya and surounding areas provoded the bulk od the world's rubber resources. Next the Jpanese focused on New Guinea and seized the western part of the island and northeastern coast. The southern coast was more diffivult because of the rugged Owen-Stanley Mountains which prevented the Japanese from easily moving south from their newly won bases along the northern coast.
Japanese militarists after the stunning successes during the first months of the War debated their next steps. Admiral Yamamoto argued for an invasion of Australia. Other opportunities were Ceylon, a push into India, or possibly joining the NAZIs and striking north into Soviet Siberia. The fascinating aspect of Japanese stratehic thinking is that the obvious target did not receive priority and that was using their enormous naval advantage to focus on what was left of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pear Harbor. That the Navy dispatched a fleet into the Indian Ocean and was promoting an invasion of Australia befpre completely destroying the U.S. Navy is difficult to understand. General Tojo was against the invasion of Australia, primarily because of limited available forces. The Imperial Army at the time was heavily commited in China and pushing toward India in Burma. Perhaps more importantly, the NAZIs were preparing for the 1942 summer offensive that might destroy or fatally weaken the Soviet Union. Thus powerful forces had to be maintained in Manchiko prepared to seize Siberia. The Japanese estimated that at least 10 divisions would be needed to take and occupy Australia. Thus Tojo decided that the Japanese should try to knock Australia out of the War during 1942 by
Operation FS. [Frei, p. 172.] The objective was to isolate Australia from its only possible source of support--the United States. This lead the Japanese into New Guinea and the Solomons. The Japanese believed that they could then force the Australians to surrender so that the country could be added as another compliant pupet state in their Great East Asia Coprosperiy Sphere. Operation FS involved one a bombing campaign launched by New Guinea based planes. For this Port Moresby was needed. Secondly a naval and air campaign to cut Australia off from the United States. Here bases would be built in the Solomons. The major naval base would be Rabaul, which could sustain a naval campaign to cut the sea lanes with America. Air bases could be built in the southern-most Solomons to support this effort. This would eventually result in the battles over Guadacanal and the Slot.
Japan launched Operation FS (early May 1942). Amphibious forces embarked to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea and Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. The dates for further operations targetting New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa were set (July 8, 18, and 21). The Japanese had earlier demanded that Australia surrender January and February 1942). Primeminister Curtin rejected them. General MacArthur had escaped from Corredidor and was overseeing the Allied build-up in Australia. Men and supplies were streaming out from America, but the situation was precarious. The Australian Army was still largely in North Africa fighting the Aftika Korps with the British. General Tojo speaking in the Japanese Diet issued a final warning to Australia (May 28, 1942). One historian explains, "Japan was now tightening the noose on Australia." [Frei, p. 172.]
The first important Allied effort to stop the Japanese sweep through the Pacific occurred in the Coral Sea. The Japanese planned to seize Port Moreseby, completing their conquest of New Guinea and a smaller operation in the Solomons at Tulagi. Port Moresby would have provided a launching pad for an invasion of Australia itself. (At the time, most of the Australian Army was in North Afric fighting Rommel's Afrika Korps.) The Japanese landing force was escorted by the front-line carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.
Nimitz finally decided to deploy his carriers to engage the Japanese carriers. This was a risky commitment because the Japanese carriers outnumbered the American carriers. He reasoned that the intercepted Japanese messages gave him to deploy his carriers soas to take on an equivalent Japanese force and with the element of sirprise--vital in carrier engagements.
American carrier aircraft attack a base on Tulagi on islands in the Solomons that the Japanese had just seized (May 4). Important for the future, Tulagi was close to Guadacanal.
The Japanese naval task force en route to seize Port Moresby was intercepted by an American carrier force, alerted to the Port Moresby operation by American code breakers. It was the first effective American operation against the Imperial Fleet as well as the first carrirer to carrier engagement in history. The Japanese launched an attack on the Americans, but found only a destroyer and oiler. In the meantime the Americans sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho (May 7). The next day the two carrier forces fought a major engagement. The Japanese succeeded in sinking Lexington, but the crew was saved. The Japanese also heavily damaging Yorktown (May 8). The Japanese air crews report that they left both carriers buring and sinking. The Japanese concluded that they had sunk both. The Americans heavily damaged Shokaku and devestated the air crew of . The substantial Japanese pilot casualties, especially from Zuikaku, were very signigicant. It put the carrier out of operation even though it was not damaged.
Despite the American losses, the Japanese invasion force turned back, the first major Japanese reversal of the War. The Japanese unablr to seize Port Moresby by sea, proceeded to launch a land attack, but wre forced to oenetrate some of the most rugged and isolanted erraine in the world--including the formidable Owen-Stanley Mountains.
The Japanese assessment of the battle was that not only was Lexington sunk, but that Yorktown was either sunk or so badly damaged that it could no longer be deployed. This affected planning for the Miday operation. The engagement appears to have convinced Japanese naval planners that the American carriers were no match for the Japanese carriers. The Japanese failed to preceive that the American carriers effectively fought the battle or that the surprise appearance of the American carrier in the Coral Sea to oppose the invasion of Port Moresby resulted from American code breaking.
The Battle of the Coral Sea It also meant that they had lost a small carrier, had a front-line carrier damaged, and lost numbers of planes and pilots. This effectively removed two front line carriers and one small carrier from the Japanese order of battle. This reduced the available carriers for the Midway operation. Combined with the British damage to the First Air Fleet in the Indian Ocean, Admiral Yamamoto had allowed their carrier forces to be significantly weakened in operations of marginal importance. This was critical because if Japan was to win the War it had to be done in 1942 when they had overwealming superiority in the Pacific. If the War developed into a war of attrition, the far greater industrial resources of the United States would prevail.
From the point of view of the Japanese Navy, Coral Sea had been a success, even though the army amphibious opeation at Port Moresby had to be postponed. But the Japanese thought they had sunk two of the American carriers, most of the Pacific's fleet offensive capability after Pearl Harbor. The loss of a light-carrier, air crews, and damage to Shokaku seem a reasonable cost for such a stunning achievement. What the Japanese do not seem to have focused on is why the American carriers all of a sudden appeared in the Coral Sea to block the Port Moresby operation. The Pacific is a very big place. The chances that the American carriers had encountered the Japanese task force by accident were remote. This can npt be emphasized enough. Readers who have studied navy engagements over time know that the most difficult part of operations in remote areas is finding the enemy fleet. The best example is Nelson chasing around the Mediterreranean looking for Napoleon after he set out for Egypt. It would be one thing for a destoyer or even a cruiser to happen upon the Japanese. But this was two American carriers, the most valuable assets in the Pacific Fleet. For this to occur by chance so far from Pearl would strained the credulity of even the most minimally trained annalyst. Of course a great deal had changed by Wotld War II, but technology had not yet solved the detection problem. Why Yamaoto and Nagumo did not focus on this question is unclear. The reported success in sinking two American carriers may have destracted them. The Japanese later referred to this mindset as "Victory Disease". Some in the Imperial Navy suspected that the Americans had broken their codes. A change in codes was overdue, but had been delayed because of of the wide-spread operations that the Navy had had to conduct. Despite the suspicions, senior commanders did not inist on the code change. It proved to be a mistake that would decide the Pacific War.
With the naval landing forced turned back, the Japanese decided to strike Port Moresby overland over the formidable Owns-Stanley Mountains. This made it impossible for the Japanese to strike quickly or deploy the considerable strength along the northern coat. They were opposed by Australian Militia battalions. The young Australians involved in the defense of Port Moresby had little training.
Neverless they resisted supperiot Japanese forces attempting to advance along the Kokoda Track. The Australians managed to hold back te Japanese just short of Port Moresby. They were finally relieved by Second Australian Imperial Force, brought back from North Africa (August 1942).
Frei, Henry. Japan's Southward Advance and Australia.
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