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It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The isolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for
the United States.
Japanese diplomats come to America in a last effort to reach a peaceful resolution of the disputes between the two countries. President Franklin Roosevelt on December 6 appeals to the Emperor Hirohito for peace. The Emperor does not reply.
Few Americans before December 7 had ever heard of Pear Harbor. It was in fact a minor american base until the Pacific Fleet was moved from San Diego to Pearl in a show of force to the Japanese during the early summer of 1940. Creating a great naval base is not something that is done instantaneously. [Emerson] This was especially true in the conditions of 1940-41 when America was just beginning to rearm and there were shortages everywhere. Most serious was the shortage of reconisance aircraft. The Navy at Pearl was still operating on a shoestring. [Wallin]
American officials concluded that a Japanese attack was imminent. They believed that the Japanese were most likely to strike somewhere in Southeast Asia. Naval planners did not believe that the Japanese would dare or have the capability of striking the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. They thought the strong air defenses on Ohahu would prevent the Japanese from risking their carriers. Nor did they understand the striking power (number of planes) carried aboy the carriers. And the did not understand just how good the Japanese planes and pilots were. They also believes that the shallow water at Pearl would prevent torpedo attacks. (This despite the fact that the British carried off a carrirer torpedo attack on the Italians at their base in Torrento (1940). This was another instance of the American underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese. The Japanese in fact adopted their torpedos for shallow runs and trained their pilots in low-level reduced speed deliveries. The American tactical dictrine was to separate their carriers. Thus they did not believe tht the Japanse could organize a strike with a sufficient number of aircraft to effectively overwealm Pearl's defenses.
Code breaking played a major role in World War II. And like radar, American code breakers almost alerted Pear Harbor of an impending Japanese attack. American codebreakers broke into the Japanese Foreign Office's top secret system for sending messages (September 1940). The American cryotolgists named it Purple. The information gained from Purple decryptions came to be called Magic within the U.S. government because the Foreign Office used it for only their most important messages. The location of the Magic operation in Washington meant that information from the decrypts were not sent to Pearl Harbor unless the War Department decided to send some of the intelligence obtained. The Purple machine was a successor to earlier machines used to read Japanese diplomsatic mesages.
The Japanese Foreign Office began using the Alphabetical Typewriter 97 (1938). Purple was not an actual code, but an electromechanical coding system. It was a rotor machine like the Germans were using and like the Germans, the Japanese were convinved that the system could not beccracked. The U.S. Army Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) began to work on breaking into the system. Frank Rowlett directed the project. Finally Genevieve Grojan made a critical discovery . The SIS team was thus able to build a duplicate of a maxhine that they had never seen (September 1940). The American code breakers referred to the Japane encryption system as Purple and thus called the duplicate device the Purple Machine. The system was called Purple because of the color binders that were used for the decrypts. The messages were sent through machines and the American cryptologists managed to build their own Purple machine to read the Japanese diplomatic messages. The information gained from Purple decryptions came to be called Magic within the U.S. government because the Foreign Office used it for only their most important messages. [Curtin] The location of the Magic operation in Washington meant that information from the decrypts were not sent to Pearl Harbor unless the War Department decided to send some of the intelligence obtained. The Purple machine was a successor to earlier machines used to read Japanese diplomsatic mesages. The Japanese code system was designed by a Japanese Navy captain. Thus American officials were provide an insight into Japanese plans, albeit not military operations.
Magic gave American officials the ability to read Japanese diplomatic dispatches in near real time. Military plans were not transmitted on Purle. Decessions in Japan were made by the military and the nationlist military officers did not entirely trust the Foireign Office and certainly did not entrust them with military secrets. Distribution of Magic was very carefully restricted. The use of Magic and the information contained in the messages is often misunderstood. Military plans were not transmitted on Purle. Decessions in Japan were made by the military and the nationlist military officers did not entirely trust the Foireign Office and certainly did not entrust them with military secrets.
American code breakers in Washington late-Decmber 6 began intercepting a 14-part Japanese diplomatic message. The first 13 parts were dechipherd and passed on to the Preident and Secretary of State. The final part of the Japanese message informed the Embassy that diplomatic relations with the U.S. were to be broken off were not decoded until early December 7. This was a virtual declaration of war. The 14th part was decoded about 9:00 AM. Code breakers intercepted another Japanese message about 10:00 AM. The second message instructs the Embassy to deliver the main message in the first 13 parts to the State Department at 1:00 PM. American officials noted that this time is the morning at Pearl Harbor is 6 hours behind Washigton time. The War Department sent an alert to Pearl, but inadvertedly used a commercial telegraph because radio contact was temporarily cut. The message did not arrive at Pacific Fleet headquarters on Oahu until 12:00 noon (Hawaii time) fully 4 hours after the Japanese attack had begun.
Much more important was the Japanese Navy's code which American cryptologists called JN-25. It was an enciphered code, producing five numeral groups iwhich was what was actually broadcasted. It proved more difficult to break than Purple. It was not until months after Pearl Harbor that the cryptologists at Pearl (Station Hypo) began breaking into JN-25. While it was only partially cracked. JN-25 decrypts played a major role in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.
The American defense of the Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor was based in large part on air bases scattered around the island. It was widely assumed that a Japanese naval force would be detected by naval patrols and engaged by American aircraft. The first-line American fighter was the P-40 Tomahack. It could match the Zero in speed and was more rugged. It had armor protection for the pilot and self-sealing fuel tanks. It was armed with six machine guns and two cannons. It was not, however, as manuervable as the Zero. Using appropriate tactics, the P-40 could be effective against the Zero. The P-40 with its limited manuverability could not be used for dog fights against Zeros.
Radar had provided the British the decisive edge enabling it to defeat the vaunted NAZI Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain (August-September 1940). Britain and the United States had aklready began to share research on military equipment. The effectiveness of radar was not yet fully appreciate by either the Army Air Corps or the Navy. The Army had installed SCR-270 Radar sets on Ohahu.
The Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was not on high alert. Naval commanders at Pearl believed based on available intelligence that a Japanese attack was not imminent. As a result, som preparations are based on fear of sabatoge from the Japanese living on Oahu rather than a naval attack. Planes at the airbases were left wingtip to wingtip on airfields to make them easier to guard. Anti-aircraft guns were unmanned. Ammunition boxes kept locked following peacetime Army regulations. Navy planners do not believe a torpedo attack is possible in the shallow waters of Pear Harbor--depite a successful 1940 British carrier attack at Tarnto on the Italian fleet. Thus ther are no torpedo nets protecting the battleships. The Navy was still operated on a peace-time schedule. On Sunday morning, many officers and crewmen were not at duty stations, but ashore or a variety of leisure activities.
Historians focus on Pearl Harbor because the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl was the only substantial military force in the Pacific that could oppose the Japanese. It was thus the centerpiece of the Japanese offensive to lunch the Pacific War. The Imperial Fleet issued Combined Fleet Order No. 1 (November 7, 1941). The order sets out a vast military operation to seize control of the western Pacific. The massive Japanese carrier fleet gave them the aboility to initiate operations throughout the western Pacific. At the heart of the operation, the 1st Air Fleet with about half the Japanese carriers was ordered to to attack and destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The 2nd Fleet was ordered to attack and seize the Dutch East Indies, British possessions in China (Shanghai and Hong Kong, British Malaysia, and the American Philippine Islands. The
4th Fleet was ordered to attack and seize Guam. Attacks were alsoplanned on Wake and Midway Islands. A Northern Force was to guard the Japanese home waters. This was an offensive over a greater geographic than ever before attempted. In terms of the mahnitude of the invasion, it was only exceeded by the NAZI Barbarosa invasion of the Soviet Union.
The Japanese strike force of six carriers has a complement of 423 planes. It was the most powerful carrier strike force ever assembled. The Japanese used all six of their first-line aircraft carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded the operation. The Japanese Pearl Harbor Striking Force also included fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with tankers to fuel the ships during their passage across the Pacific. There was also an advanced force of I-class submarines, including midget submarines caried by conventional submarines. They were to scout Hawaian waters. The midget submarines were ordered to penrtrate Pearl's harbor defenses, bith to press the attack and engage ships trying to escape the air attack in the harbor. Each was equipped with two effective type 95 torpedoes.
The American military generally despairaged Japanese industry and their ability to produce modern weapons, especially war planes. The Jsapanese, however, had a competent aircraft industry which had recieved technical assistance from the Germans. Japan thus entered the War with modern aircraft that in many ways outpreformed American aircraft. The Mitshbishi A6M2 Zero had a top speed of 362 miles per hour and a range of 1,200 miles. It was armed with two light machine guns and two 20 mm cannons. It entered into service in 1940. Japanese weapons were named based on the year they entered into service and thus the last dighit of 1940 became the common name for the plane. The great characteristic of the Zero was is manueribility. This was achieved in part through light weight. The Zero was poorly armoured and did not have self sealing fuel tanks. This cavalier attitude toward protecting highly trained pilots proved to have a devestating long term impacr=t on the competence of the Japanese air arm. At Pearl and during the first year of the War, however, American pilots faced highly-trained pilots in modern high-performance aircraft. The Japanese also used the BFN2 Kate torpedo bomber. Kate was the designation given the plabe by American inteligence classifying Japanese aviation. The Kate had retractable landing gear and an inovative variable pitch propeller. It proved highly effective at Pearl.
Nagumo launched his the first wave of 183 planes at 6:00 AM 230 miles north of Oahu to strike the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It consisted of 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo planes, 50 high level bombers, and 43 'Zero' fighters. Two Army radar operators at Oahu's northern shore station at 7:02 AM detect the Japanese planes. A junior officer decides they are B-17 bombers arriving from the U.S. west coast. At sea, Nagumo at 7:15 AM launches a second wave of 167 planes.
Nagumo's first Japanese assault wave at 7:53 AM begin the attack. Flght commander Mitsuo Fuchida radios "Tora! Tora! Tora!" (Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!). The Japanese surprise was total. The first wave targets airfields, carriers, and battleships--only the carriers to the Japanese surprise were not at Pearl. Seven of the eight battleships of the Pacific fleet were moored on Battleship Row locted along the southeast side of Ford Island. The Pennsylvania was in drydock across the channel from Ford Island. Within minites the seven battleships along Ford Island were hit by bombs and torpedoes. The West Virginia settled into the water. The Oklahoma capsized. An armorpiercing bomb hit the Arizona's forward ammunition magazine at about 8:10. The ship exploded in a ball of fire. Many ofvthe Pear Harbor casuaties camd from Oklahoma and Arizona. On the Arizona alone, 1,177 men were killed. The Japanese also hit the California, Maryland, Tennessee, and Nevada, although the damage was not as devestating as that done to Arizona and Oklahoma. The Nevada tried to get underway and exit Pearl to the open sea. Just at this time the second wave of 170 carrier planes reached Pearl (8:30 am). They immediately focused on the ome moving battleship. To prevent Nevada from being sunk in the channel and blocking the entrance to Oear, the Nevada was beached at Hospital Point.
The second wave then targeted other ships and shipyard facilities. The Japanse attacks continued until 9:45 AM.
When the Japanese carrier planes reached Pearl Harbor, there were 90 ships at anchor. The Japanese sank or heavily damaged 21 of those ships. The carriers and the battleships were the principal target. To their surprise, the carriers were not there. Thus the Japanese focused on the Japanese concentrated on the battleships. The Japanse succeed in severely damaging eight battleships (Arizona, California, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia, sinking five. This was a devestating loss. At the time naval strength was measured in battleships and the Pacific Fleet was left without one single operational battleship. The power of carriers had not yet been fully appreciated by many naval planners. The Arizona exploded in a huge blast with a Japanese bomb hit the magazine. The Oklahoma was also destroyed beyond repair. The Japanese also sank three light cruisers (Helena, Honolulu, and Raleigh); , four destroyers (Cassin, Downes, Helm, and Shaw, and various other craft. These included the seaplane tender Curtiss, target ship Utah (an old battleship), repair ship Vestal, the minelayer Oglala, and the tug Sotoyomo. THe Floating Drydock Number 2 was also sunk. The Japanese in addition destroyed 188 aircraft--most on the ground. Another 150 aircraft was damaged. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded.
It was the most disatrous defeat in the history of the American Navy. The Japanese losses were minor--27 planes. Also lost were 5 midget submarines which had attempted to enter the inner harbor at Pearl. While the losses were lopsided, it should be noted that almost all of the American vessels wre daaged or sunk rather than destroyed. Except for rizona and Oklahom the Pacific fleet would rise from the ashes of Pearl Harbor.
The Pacific fleet had three carriers. This meant that the Japanese had a carrier force in the Pacific that was four times larger than the American force. While the Japabese vistory was a great shock at the time, looking at this overwealming force, the Japanese success was in fact a forgone conclusion. The fact that American Army Air Corps forces were poorly handled at Pearl and in the Philippines is whatv turned the attack on Pear into a disaster. Only by great fortune did the American carriers escape destruction. Escaping damage from the attack were the prime targets, the three U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga, which were not in port at Pearl. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Kimmel ordered Rear Admiral Willliam Halsey to take Enterprise to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island (November 28). Halsey delivered the planes (December 4) and was oin his way back to Pearl. He would have been back in Pear December 7, but heavy weather made it difficult for the screening destoyers to keep up with Enterprie. He slowed down which made him a day late arriving back in Pearl. Admiral Kimmel ordered Rear Admiral Newton to take a Task Force 12 built around the Lexington to deliver 25 scout bombers to Midway Island (December 5). Saratoga was at San Diego undergoing maintenance and repair. The United States did have four other carriers: Ranger, Yorktown, Wasp, and the brand new Hornet. They were in the Atlantic where the United States was engaged in an undeclsared naval war with German U-boats.
While the Pacific Fleet battleships were decestated, the Japanese did not destoy the principl shipyards or base fuel tanks. This meant that Pearl continued as an operational naval base. A third wave was planned to hit these facilities, but Admiral Nagumo was concerned about the securitybof his carriers and deided against it.
Casualties includes 2,335 American servicemen and 68 civilians killed in addition to 1,178 wounded. Over half of the dead came from USS Arizona. A 1,760-pound air bomb penetrated into the ship's forward magazine.
Appauling as the casualties at Pearl Harbor were, in actuality the results could have been far worse. Given the superior Japanese carrier forces, if the Pacific fleet had engaged the Japanese at sea, the lossess could have been far worse. Batleship losses when sunknat sea can be catrestrophic. When the Bismarck sunk the Hood, only three sailors survived. Mot only did most of the sailors of the Pacific fleet survive, but the battleships with the exception of the Airizona and Oklahhoma were refloated and repaired and joined the struggle gainst the Japanese in the Pacific War. The damage to the Pacific Fleet mean that the wave of Japanese invasion in the eastern Pacific could be carried out without serious naval opposition. Japan's failure to destroy the fleet, however, mean that the core of the fleet existed around which would be built the most powerful naval force in history and within only a few months would conduct fleet actions engaging the Imperial Navy. It would not occur in time to save the Philippines. It would be in time to save Australia.
Japanese diplomats did not deliver the war message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, until 2:30 PM, well after the attacks on Pearl Harbor. Secretary Hull had received reports of the attack before the Japanese diplomats arrived. The Japanese had planned to deliver the message before the attack. News of the "sneak attack" is broadcast to the American public via radio bulletins, interupting many popular Sunday afternoon radio programs. Many other Americans learned of the attack at movie theaters, a popular Sunday afternoon activity.
Eleanor Roosevelt after the war described what she observed in the White House. The President's aides and cabinent ministers were rusing in and out with paers in a varying state of excitement, panic, and nervous exhaustion. Elenor noticed her husband and was struck by hs "deadly calm" composure. He was seated quitely at his desk absorbing the reports as they came in from Hawaii. He was stained and tired, but Elenor described how, "he was completely clam. His reaction to any event was always toi be calm. If it was something that was bad, he just became almost like an kveberg, and there was never the slightest emotion that was allowed to show." [Goodwin, p. 289.]
The news sends a shockwave across the nation and results in a tremendous influx of young volunteers into the U.S. armed forces. The attack also unites the nation behind the President and effectively ends isolationist sentiment in the country. There has always been a strong isolationist streak in American political life. Americans separated by two great oceans have since the Revolution seen ourselves as different and apart from the rest of the World. From the beginning of the Republic, President Washington warned of entagling foreign alliances. For much of our history, Britain was seen as the great enemy of American democracy and of Manifest Destiny. World War I was America's first involvement in a European War and the United States played a critical role in winning that War. Had the Germany not insisted on unrestricted sunmarine warfare, in effect an attack on American shipping, it is unlikely that America would have entered the War. Many Americans during the 1920s came to feel that America's entry into the War was a mistake. There was considerable talk of war profiteering. Many were detrmined that America should avoid war at any cost. This feeling was intensified with the Depression of the 1930s and the country's focus was on domestic issues. With the growing military might of a rearmed Germany, war talk in Europe began. Isolationist leaders opposed any war. Others such as, Charles Lindburg, thought that America could not win a war against Germany's vaunted Luftwaffe. Many not only opposed American
envolvement, but even military expenditures. Aginst this backdrop, President Roosevelt who did see the dangers from the NAZIs and Japanese militaists, with political courage managed to not only support Britain in its hour of maximum peril, but with considerable political skill managed to push through Congress measures that would lay the ground work for turning American into the Arsenal of Democracy, producing a tidal wave of equipment and supplies, not only for the American military, but for our Allies as well, in quantities that no one especially the Axis believed possible.
The United States and Britain, which also was attacked, declared war on Japan the following day . President Roosevelt in his address to Congres call December 7, "a date which will live in infamy..." Germany and Italy joined Japan and declared war on the United States. This releaved President Roosevelt of the awkward problem of dcaring war on Germany becaue of the Japanese attack. The Axis treaty did not require them to do so. It was a defensive treaty and Germany and Italy did not have to declare war.
President Roosevelt on December 17, appoint Admiral Chester W. Nimitz commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The military relieved Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, of their duties for failing to adopt adequate defense measures. Neither commandr had, however, been fully apraised of Japanese intentions reveled by American code breakers,.
It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The issolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for the United States.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the destruction of the American battleships at Pearl allowed the Japanese to sweep over the Pacific in the 6-months followingb the attack. This is a misconception. It was not the destruction of the Pacific Fleet's battleships, but rather the massive Japanese superiority in carriers that allowed the Japanese to sweep through the Pacific. In fact had the United States met the Japanese at sea in a fleet engagement, it is likely that the casualties would have been much greater than those excpeienced in Pearl. Only 3 men survived the sinking of Hood, for example, in the North Atlantic. Most of the casualties at Pearl camme from Aizona. In a general fleet engagement at sea, given the Japanese carrier superiority, the American losses could have been disastrous. In additiion there would have been no way of raising battleships sunk at sea and all but two battleships sunk at Pearl (Arizona and Oklahoma were raised and rejoined the fleet. At the time of the Japanese attack, the U.S. Navy was still wedded to the battleship. The attack in fact forced the American Navy to radically change it tactics and strategic concept. When the critical engagemebts came at the Coral Sea (April 1942) and Midway (June 1942), the only ships playing an important role was the carriers. The American Pacific fleet had developed the competence and tactics to take the Japanese on and te code breakers allowed the American carriers to fight engagements on realtively equal terms despite the overwealming Japanaese carrier superiority.
Pear Harbor was seared into the national consciouness. Since the foundation of the Republic, American had considered itself protected by two great oceans. Pear Harbor changed this. The Japanese attack demostrated that America was vulnerable to the attack from abroad. The isolationist outlook that had so dominated American thought evaporated over night. Pearl Harbor still resonates in the American psyche today. [Rosenberg]
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has like the Kennedy assasination spawned a veritable cottage industry in consiracy assessments. These assessments are notably for their poor understanding of the military and code braking as well as the unprofessional cherry picking of facts and events to make their case and sell books. A good example is the Stinnett book. This and similar books should not be considered real history. Certainly President Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy keading up to Pearl Harbor is an important topics, but readers should avoid authors like Stinnett who form an opinion based on ideological grounds and then cherry pick facts and events to prove his case. This is not real history.
Emerson, William. Interview by Dorris Kearns Goodwin in No Ordinary Time.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary Time. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), 759p.
Rosenberg, Emily S. A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Duke University, 2003).
Stinnett, Robert. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor.
Wallin,Vice Admiral Homer N. Pearl Harbor--Why, How: Fleet Salvage and Final Apprisal (Naval History Division: Washington, D.C., 1968).
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