ÿþ<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Final//EN"> <HTML> <head> <title> war and social upheaval: World War II Pacific naval campaigns -- Pearl Harbor </title> <META NAME="Description" CONTENT="It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The isolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for the United States. With photos and text. "> <META NAME="KeyWords" CONTENT="United States, America, Japan, Japanese, World War II, Second World War, navy, Oacufic War, Pearl, Pearl Harbor, attack, sneak attack, history, historical, fashion, "> </head> <BODY BGCOLOR="#000066" TEXT="#FFFF00" LINK="#FF0000" ALINK="#FFFF00" VLINK="#99CCFF"> <br> <br> <img src="/HBCgold.gif"> <br> <br> <HR> <br> <br> <br> <br> <center><h1>World War II Pacific Naval Campaign: Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941)</h1></center> <table border=0 cellpadding=20 width=35% align=right > <tr> <td><table border=5 width=95% align=right bgcolor=##7f00ff"> <tr> <td><a href="/country/us/chron/940/ww2/intern/usi-jap.html"> <IMG SRC="/image/essay/war/ww2/sea/pac/pearl01s.jpg"></a> <hr> <i>Figure 1.--Amid the carnage of The Japanese attack, these women of Japanese ancestry at Pearl are fighting the flames on the battered American installation. Fears that Japanese-Americans were unloyal proved unfounded. Unlike the West coast, Japanese-Americans in Hawaii were not interned. The Army never explained why, probably because they were too important to the operation of the local economy.</i> </td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </table> <p> The Japanese militarists having successfully taken on China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05) and participating in World War I believed that in possession of a powerful fleet they could now enter World War II to solidify their position in China andexpand their empire with the Southern Resource Zone. They thought that the rich, comfort loving Americans, dustracted by the Germans in Europe would not have the will or capability of fighting a war in Asia. It was thus the stunning surprise Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that finally brought America into World War II. On a bright Sunday morning, sleek Japanese csrrier aircraft with a destinctive red circle thindered out of the sky abnd chsnged not only Anmerica, but the world for ever. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The isolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for the United States. <br> <h2>Diplomatic Efforts</h2> <p> Japanese Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori dispatched senior Japanese diplomat Kurusu Saburo to the United States to assist Ambassador Nomura KichisaburM. He arrived (November 15). It was a last effort to reach a peaceful resolution of the differences between the two countries. There were important Japanese officials, including Emperor Hirohito and Foreign Minister Togo who were deeply troubeled by the prospect of war with America. Their concern was the danger that Japan might lose the War. There was not a single Japanese leader of any stature, however, that questioned the correctness of Japan's aggressive foreign policy. The central issue that divided the United States and Japan was China. Not one Japanese leader was prepared to offer an end of the "China Incident" and withdraw troops from China. Some were prepared to offer to withdraw in 25 years or some date that meant no withdrawl. The military, however, objected to even this offer. President Roosevelt was primarily concerned about aiding Britain in Europe and the developing naval incidents with U-boats in the North Atlantic. He toyed with the idea of what he called a "modus vivendi" in the Pacific with the Japanese, to delay the outbreak of hostilities. In the end, however, he was not prepared to abandon China. He had earlier set the "oil clock" ticking. The Japanese military was set on war. While they were unsure about the outcome of a protracted war, they determined that never would their chances be greater than at the present time. Delay would mean their oil reserves would be depleted and the American military buildup would reduce the advantages they currently held. They believed that the anticipated German victory in the Soviet Union would enable the Germans to turn west and fully occupy the Americans and British. Secretary CordellHull's ten pont resppnse to the proposals presented by Kurusu was delivered (November 26). The Japanese were outraged when it reached Tokyo (November 27). The orders for war were finalized. The Imperial Conference decided on war and the Emperor put his seal on that decesion (December 1). The Imperial Navy's strike force was already at sea. President Roosevelt appealed to the Emperor Hirohito for peace (December 6). The Emperor did not reply. <br> <h2>Pearl Harbor</h2> <p> Few Americans before December 7 had ever heard of Pearl Harbor. It was in fact a minor American naval base until the Pacific Fleet was moved from San Diego to Pearl in a show of force to the Japanese (early summer of 1940). Creating a great naval base is not something that is done instantaneously. [Emerson] This was especially true in the conditions of 1940-41 when America was just beginning to rearm and there were shortages everywhere. Most serious was the shortage of reconisance aircraft. The Navy at Pearl was still operating on a shoestring. [Wallin] <br> <h2>American Assessment</h2> <p> American officials through the Magic intrcepts concluded that a Japanese attack was imminent. They believed that the Japanese were most likely to strike somewhere in Southeast Asia. Naval planners did not believe, however, that the Japanese would dare or have the capability of striking the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. They thought the strong air defenses on Ohahu would prevent the Japanese from risking their carriers. Nor did they understand the striking power (number of planes) carried aboy the carriers. And the did not understand just how good the Japanese planes and pilots were. They also believes that the shallow water at Pearl would prevent torpedo attacks. (This despite the fact that the British carried off a carrirer torpedo attack on the Italians at their base in Torrento (1940). This was another instance of the American underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese. The Japanese in fact had developed one of the best torpedoes of the War. And they had adapted them torpedos for shallow runs. In preparation for the attack, their pilots trained in low-level reduced speed deliveries. The American tactical doctrine was to separate their carriers. Thus they did not believe that the Japanse could organize a strike with a sufficient number of aircraft so far east to effectively overwealm Pearl's defenses. <br> <h2><a href="/essay/war/ww2/code/ncb/w2ncb-us.html">Code Breaking: Magic</a> (1939-42)</h2> <p> Code breaking played a major role in World War II. And like radar, American code breakers almost alerted Pearl Harbor of an impending Japanese attack. American codebreakers broke into the Japanese Foreign Office's top secret system for sending messages (September 1940). The American cryotolgists named it Purple. The information gained from Purple decryptions came to be called Magic within the U.S. government because the Foreign Office used it for only their most important messages. The location of the Magic operation in Washington meant that information from the decrypts were not sent to Pearl Harbor unless the War Department decided to send some of the intelligence obtained. The Purple machine was a successor to earlier machines used to read Japanese diplomsatic mesages. Station Hypo code brakers at Pearl were wirking on JN-25, the Imperial Navy code, but had not yet broken into it. Only after theJapanese attack did Statiion Hypo begin to make real progress with JN-25. <br> <h2>American Aircraft</h2> <p> The American defense of the Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor was based in large part on air bases scattered around the island. It was widely assumed that a Japanese naval force would be detected by naval patrols and engaged by American aircraft. The first-line American fighter was the P-40 Tomahack. It could match the Zero in speed and was more rugged. It had armor protection for the pilot and self-sealing fuel tanks. It was armed with six machine guns and two cannons. It was not, however, as manuervable as the Zero. Using appropriate tactics, the P-40 could be effective against the Zero. The P-40 with its limited manuverability could not be used for dog fights against Zeros. <br> <h2>Radar</h2> <p> Radar had provided the British the decisive edge enabling it to defeat the vaunted NAZI Luftwaffe in the <a href="/essay/war/ww2/air/ac-bob.html">Battle of Britain</a> (August-September 1940). Britain and the United States had aklready began to share research on military equipment. The effectiveness of radar was not yet fully appreciate by either the Army Air Corps or the Navy. The Army had installed SCR-270 Radar sets on Ohahu. <br> <h2>American Preparations</h2> <p>The Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was not on high alert. Naval commanders at Pearl believed based on available intelligence that a Japanese attack was not imminent. As a result, som preparations are based on fear of sabatoge from the Japanese living on Oahu rather than a naval attack. Planes at the airbases were left wingtip to wingtip on airfields to make them easier to guard. Anti-aircraft guns were unmanned. Ammunition boxes kept locked following peacetime Army regulations. Navy planners do not believe a torpedo attack is possible in the shallow waters of Pear Harbor--depite a successful 1940 British carrier attack at Tarnto on the Italian fleet. Thus ther are no torpedo nets protecting the battleships. The Navy was still operated on a peace-time schedule. On Sunday morning, many officers and crewmen were not at duty stations, but ashore or a variety of leisure activities. <br> <h2>Japanese Plan</h2> <p> Historians focus on Pearl Harbor because the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl was the only substantial military force in the Pacific that could oppose the Japanese. It was thus the centerpiece of the Japanese offensive to lunch the Pacific War. The Imperial Fleet issued Combined Fleet Order No. 1 (November 7, 1941). The order sets out a vast military operation to seize control of the western Pacific. The massive Japanese carrier fleet gave them the aboility to initiate operations throughout the western Pacific. At the heart of the operation, the 1st Air Fleet with about half the Japanese carriers was ordered to to attack and destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The 2nd Fleet was ordered to attack and seize the Dutch East Indies, British possessions in China (Shanghai and Hong Kong, British Malaysia, and the American Philippine Islands. The 4th Fleet was ordered to attack and seize Guam. Attacks were alsoplanned on Wake and Midway Islands. A Northern Force was to guard the Japanese home waters. This was an offensive over a greater geographic than ever before attempted. In terms of the mahnitude of the invasion, it was only exceeded by the NAZI Barbarosa invasion of the Soviet Union. <br> <h2>Japanese Strike Force</h2> <p> The Japanese strike force of six carriers has a complement of 423 planes. It was the most powerful carrier strike force ever assembled. The Japanese used all six of their first-line aircraft carriers: <i>Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku</i> and <i>Zuikaku</i>. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded the operation. The Japanese Pearl Harbor Striking Force also included fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with tankers to fuel the ships during their passage across the Pacific. There was also an advanced force of I-class submarines, including midget submarines caried by conventional submarines. They were to scout Hawaian waters. The midget submarines were ordered to penrtrate Pearl's harbor defenses, bith to press the attack and engage ships trying to escape the air attack in the harbor. Each was equipped with two effective type 95 torpedoes. <br> <h2>Japanese Planes</h2> <p> The American military generally despairaged Japanese industry and their ability to produce modern weapons, especially war planes. The Jsapanese, however, had a competent aircraft industry which had recieved technical assistance from the Germans. Japan thus entered the War with modern aircraft that in many ways outpreformed American aircraft. The Mitshbishi A6M2 Zero had a top speed of 362 miles per hour and a range of 1,200 miles. It was armed with two light machine guns and two 20 mm cannons. It entered into service in 1940. Japanese weapons were named based on the year they entered into service and thus the last dighit of 1940 became the common name for the plane. The great characteristic of the Zero was is manueribility. This was achieved in part through light weight. The Zero was poorly armoured and did not have self sealing fuel tanks. This cavalier attitude toward protecting highly trained pilots proved to have a devestating long term impacr=t on the competence of the Japanese air arm. At Pearl and during the first year of the War, however, American pilots faced highly-trained pilots in modern high-performance aircraft. The Japanese also used the BFN2 Kate torpedo bomber. Kate was the designation given the plabe by American inteligence classifying Japanese aviation. The Kate had retractable landing gear and an inovative variable pitch propeller. It proved highly effective at Pearl. <br> <h2>Launch</h2> <p> Nagumo launched his the first wave of 183 planes at 6:00 AM 230 miles north of Oahu to strike the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It consisted of 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo planes, 50 high level bombers, and 43 'Zero' fighters. Two Army radar operators at Oahu's northern shore station at 7:02 AM detect the Japanese planes. A junior officer decides they are B-17 bombers arriving from the U.S. west coast. At sea, Nagumo at 7:15 AM launches a second wave of 167 planes. <br> <h2>The Attack</h2> <p>Nagumo's first Japanese assault wave at 7:53 AM begin the attack. Flght commander Mitsuo Fuchida radios "Tora! Tora! Tora!" (Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!). The Japanese surprise was total. The first wave targets airfields, carriers, and battleships--only the carriers to the Japanese surprise were not at Pearl. Seven of the eight battleships of the Pacific fleet were moored on Battleship Row locted along the southeast side of Ford Island. The <i>Pennsylvania</i> was in drydock across the channel from Ford Island. Within minites the seven battleships along Ford Island were hit by bombs and torpedoes. The <i>West Virginia</i> settled into the water. The <i>Oklahoma</i> capsized. An armorpiercing bomb hit the <i>Arizona's forward ammunition magazine at about 8:10. The ship exploded in a ball of fire. Many ofvthe Pear Harbor casuaties camd from <i>Oklahoma</i> and Arizona</i>. On the <i>Arizona</i> alone, 1,177 men were killed. The Japanese also hit the <i>California</i>, <i>Maryland</i>, <i>Tennessee</i>, and <i>Nevada</i>, although the damage was not as devestating as that done to <i>Arizona</i> and <i>Oklahoma</i>. The <i>Nevada</i> tried to get underway and exit Pearl to the open sea. Just at this time the second wave of 170 carrier planes reached Pearl (8:30 am). They immediately focused on the ome moving battleship. To prevent <i>Nevada</i> from being sunk in the channel and blocking the entrance to Oear, the <i>Nevada</i> was beached at Hospital Point. The second wave then targeted other ships and shipyard facilities. The Japanse attacks continued until 9:45 AM. <br> <h2>Results</h2> <p> When the Japanese carrier planes reached Pearl Harbor, there were 90 ships at anchor. The Japanese sank or heavily damaged 21 of those ships. The carriers and the battleships were the principal target. To their surprise, the carriers were not there. Thus the Japanese focused on the Japanese concentrated on the battleships. The Japanse succeed in severely damaging eight battleships (<i>Arizona, California, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,</i> and <i>West Virginia</i>, sinking five. This was a devestating loss. At the time naval strength was measured in battleships and the Pacific Fleet was left without one single operational battleship. The power of carriers had not yet been fully appreciated by many naval planners. The Arizona exploded in a huge blast with a Japanese bomb hit the magazine. The <i>Oklahoma</i> was also destroyed beyond repair. The Japanese also sank three light cruisers (<i>Helena</i>, <i>Honolulu</i>, and <i>Raleigh</i>); , four destroyers (<i>Cassin, Downes, Helm</i>, and <i>Shaw</i>, and various other craft. These included the seaplane tender <i>Curtiss</i>, target ship <i>Utah</i> (an old battleship), repair ship <i>Vestal</i>, the minelayer <i>Oglala</i>, and the tug <i>Sotoyomo</i>. THe Floating Drydock Number 2 was also sunk. The Japanese in addition destroyed 188 aircraft--most on the ground. Another 150 aircraft was damaged. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded. It was the most disatrous defeat in the history of the American Navy. The Japanese losses were minor--27 planes. Also lost were 5 midget submarines which had attempted to enter the inner harbor at Pearl. While the losses were lopsided, it should be noted that almost all of the American vessels wre daaged or sunk rather than destroyed. Except for <i>rizona</i> and <i>Oklahom</i> the Pacific fleet would rise from the ashes of Pearl Harbor. <br> <h2>The American Carriers</h2> <p> The Pacific fleet had three carriers. This meant that the Japanese had a carrier force in the Pacific that was four times larger than the American force. While the Japabese vistory was a great shock at the time, looking at this overwealming force, the Japanese success was in fact a forgone conclusion. The fact that American Army Air Corps forces were poorly handled at Pearl and in the Philippines is whatv turned the attack on Pear into a disaster. Only by great fortune did the American carriers escape destruction. Escaping damage from the attack were the prime targets, the three U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, <i>Lexington</i>, <i>Enterprise</i>, and <i>Saratoga</i>, which were not in port at Pearl. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Kimmel ordered Rear Admiral Willliam Halsey to take <i>Enterprise</i> to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island (November 28). Halsey delivered the planes (December 4) and was oin his way back to Pearl. He would have been back in Pear December 7, but heavy weather made it difficult for the screening destoyers to keep up with <i>Enterprie</i>. He slowed down which made him a day late arriving back in Pearl. Admiral Kimmel ordered Rear Admiral Newton to take a Task Force 12 built around the <i>Lexington</i> to deliver 25 scout bombers to Midway Island (December 5). <i>Saratoga</i> was at San Diego undergoing maintenance and repair. The United States did have four other carriers: <i>Ranger</i>, <i>Yorktown</i>, <i>Wasp</i>, and the brand new <i>Hornet</i>. They were in the Atlantic where the United States was engaged in an undeclsared naval war with German U-boats. <br> <h2>Facilities</h2> <p> While the Pacific Fleet battleships were decestated, the Japanese did not destoy the principl shipyards or base fuel tanks. This meant that Pearl continued as an operational naval base. A third wave was planned to hit these facilities, but Admiral Nagumo was concerned about the securitybof his carriers and deided against it. <br> <h2>Casulaties</h2> <p> The Japanese attack resulted in substantial casualties. This included 2,335 American servicemen and 68 civilians killed in addition to 1,178 wounded. Over half of the dead came from <i>USS Arizona</i>. A 1,760-pound air bomb penetrated into the ship's forward magazine. <br> <h2>Assessment</h2> <p> Appauling as the casualties at Pearl Harbor were, in actuality the results could have been far worse. Still little noted even today is had the Japanese not attacked the fleet an anchor in Pearl, the caualties from a highseas engagement would have been much higher. The Japanese carriers at the time had superior air craft types, a highly effective torpedo (the American naval torpedo at the time essentially did not work), and the pilots were better trained. Except for <i>Arizona</i> most of the crews of the American ships survived as most of the ships were not destroyed. This would not have been the case in a highseas engagement. Given the superior Japanese carrier forces, if the Pacific fleet had engaged the Japanese at sea, the crew and ship lossess could have been catestrophic. Batleship losses when sunk at sea can be catrestrophic. When the <i>Bismarck</i> sunk the <i>Hood</i>, only three sailors survived. Not only did most of the sailors of the Pacific fleet survived, but the battleships with the exception of the <i>Airizona</i> and <i>Oklahhoma</i> were refloated and repaired and joined the struggle gainst the Japanese in the Pacific War. The damage to the Pacific Fleet mean that the wave of Japanese invasion in the eastern Pacific could be carried out without serious naval opposition. Japan's failure to destroy the fleet, however, mean that the core of the fleet existed around which would be built the most powerful naval force in history and within only a few months would conduct fleet actions engaging the Imperial Navy. It would not occur in time to save the Philippines. It would be in time to save Australia. <br> <h2>White House</h2> <p> The Japanese attack began at 7:50 am which was 1:20 pm in Washington. Eleanor Roosevelt after the war described what she observed in the White House. The President's aides and cabinent ministers were rusing in and out with paers in a varying state of excitement, panic, and nervous exhaustion. Elenor noticed her husband and was struck by hs "deadly calm" composure. He was seated quitely at his desk absorbing the reports as they came in from Hawaii. He was stained and tired, but Elenor described how, "he was completely clam. His reaction to any event was always to be calm. If it was something that was bad, he just became almost like an iceberg, and there was never the slightest emotion that was allowed to show." [Goodwin, p. 289.] <br> <h2>State Department</h2> <p> Secretary of State Cordel Hull had been even more uncompromising toward the Japanese than the president. His 10 points submitted in resonse to the last Japanese diplomatic proposal was taken as an insult in Tokyo. It clearly indicated among other matters that the United States would not abandon China. There would be no American Munich in Asia. The final scene of the Pearl Harbor tragedy occurred in Secretary Hull's office. Hull thus came in on Sunday to receive Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. Hull had a particularly low opinion of Kurusu who had helped negotiate and signed the Axis Tripartate alliance. (Kurusa ironically had an American wife and was thus well aquainted with the United States.) The Japanese Ambassador had scheduled the appointment with Secretary Hull at 1:00 pm to deliver the Government response to his Ten Point message and the declaration of war they had just received. The Japanese Government had specified that it be delivered specifically at this time, knowing that it would be a half hour before the attack began. The Embassy staff not knowing gthe importance of the time and still working on the translation of the lenngthy cabel, asked that the meeting with Secretary Hull be delayed. While Hull was waiting for the Japanese emisaries, President Roosevelt telephoned him a little after 2:00 pm to inform him of the Japanese attack. The two Japanese envoys, still unaware of the attack, arrived 15 minutes after Hull spoke with the president. Thus they arrived at Hull's office after the attack. When they entered his office, Hull refused the normal pleasntries and hand shakes and left them standing. He looked at the note they delivered and sternly replied, "In all my 50 years of public service, I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them." He did not wait for a reply and nodded toward the door. [Hull, Vol. II, p. 1096.] We do not know what Nomura and Kurusa said to each other on the ride back to the Japanese Embassy. Kurusu is one of the most vilified diplomatic figures in history. The Japanese diplomats were exchanged for Ambassador Drew and his staff through Vichy-controlled Mozambique and returned to Japan (1942). He survived the War and insisted he was unaware of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Here he almost certainly was being truthful. The military plans were very closely held. His deninals. however, are rather disengengious. High ranking officials in the Foreign Minister could not have been unaware that Japan was preparing to go to war. <br> <h2>Sneak Attack</h2> <p> News of the "sneak attack" was broadcast to the American public via radio bulletins, interupting many popular Sunday afternoon radio programs. Many other Americans learned of the attack at movie theaters, a popular Sunday afternoon activity. Many Americans upon hearing of the attack had newsreel impages of the smiling Ambassador Kurusa arriving in America a few weeks earlier on a peace image. <br> <h2><a href="/essay/war/ww2/cou/us/ww2us-iso.html">End of Isolationism</a></h2> <p>The news sends a shockwave across the nation and results in a tremendous influx of young volunteers into the U.S. armed forces. The attack also unites the nation behind the President and effectively ends isolationist sentiment in the country. There has always been a strong isolationist streak in American political life. Americans separated by two great oceans have since the Revolution seen ourselves as different and apart from the rest of the World. From the beginning of the Republic, President Washington warned of entagling foreign alliances. For much of our history, Britain was seen as the great enemy of American democracy and of Manifest Destiny. World War I was America's first involvement in a European War and the United States played a critical role in winning that War. Had the Germany not insisted on unrestricted sunmarine warfare, in effect an attack on American shipping, it is unlikely that America would have entered the War. Many Americans during the 1920s came to feel that America's entry into the War was a mistake. There was considerable talk of war profiteering. Many were detrmined that America should avoid war at any cost. This feeling was intensified with the Depression of the 1930s and the country's focus was on domestic issues. With the growing military might of a rearmed Germany, war talk in Europe began. Isolationist leaders opposed any war. Others such as, Charles Lindburg, thought that America could not win a war against Germany's vaunted Luftwaffe. Many not only opposed American envolvement, but even military expenditures. Aginst this backdrop, President Roosevelt who did see the dangers from the NAZIs and Japanese militaists, with political courage managed to not only support Britain in its hour of maximum peril, but with considerable political skill managed to push through Congress measures that would lay the ground work for turning American into the Arsenal of Democracy, producing a tidal wave of equipment and supplies, not only for the American military, but for our Allies as well, in quantities that no one especially the Axis believed possible. <br> <h2><a href="/essay/war/ww2/cou/us/ww2us-war.html">America Enters the War</a></h2> <p> The United States and Britain, which also was attacked, declared war on Japan the following day (December 8). President Roosevelt in his address to Congres called December 7, "a date which will live in infamy..." Germany and Italy joined Japan and declared war on the United States. This releaved President Roosevelt of the awkward problem of dcaring war on NAZI Germany--something the Ameeican people had steadfastly resisted. It would have been difficult to explain why a Japanese attack justified declaring war on Germany. <a href="/essay/war/ww2/cou/ger/w2g-usdw.html">Hitler's decesion</a> to declare war is one of the unanswered questions of the War.The Axis treaty did not require them to do so. It was a defensive treaty and Germany and Italy did not have to declare war. And Japan did not reciprocate with a declaration of war on the soviet Union. <br> <h2>Presidential Leadership</h2> <p> President Roosevelt delivered one of the most famous presidential speeches ewhen he asked Congress to declare swar on Japan/ He told the Congress and American people that December 7, 1941 was "a date that would live in infamy". He carfully chose the word. It was also a major turning point in American history. In one stunning stroke the Japanese changed everything, Thdy ended the Depression in America, instantenously erased the isolationist movemrnt, doomed the Axis war effort, ans swept America into the War. It also altered the course of the Roosevelt presidency. The President bhad failed to end the Depression, but we would oversee the victorious American war effort. If the Roosevelt presidency had ended in 1941, hw would have been classed as aresudent with a mixed record. With us war record he emerged as one of the greatest presidents in american history. The President was shaken by the enormity of the cdefeat, but we will never know just hiw shzken. He was outwardly calm. Typically Roosevelt, he was cunning and ddcdptive. He hid the enormity of the Pear Harbor disaster from the public abnd even the Congress. But his leadership away from public view wasc as described by ond historian, steady, sure-minded and decisive. And decesions needed to be made and made fast in the hours after the attack. [Gillon] <br> <h2>Admiral Nimitz</h2> <p> President Roosevelt appointed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet December 17). Nimitz was one of the outstanding American commanders of the war. Of all the American commanders, Nimitz was the only one that was able to craft amajor victories before the American military buildup provided overwealming material advantages. The military relieved Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, of their duties for failing to adopt adequate defense measures. Both commanders had, been alerted of Japanese intentions reveled by American code breakers. They did not, however, receive, the final cabel warning Pacific commanders that war was imminent. <br> <h2>Consequences</h2> <p> It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The issolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for the United States. As for Japan, the NBC documentary summarizes the consequences succintly, "With the dead lies the vision of a new fleet hidden by the pall and smoke of a shattered fleet--and the vengence of the United States." <br> <br> <h2>Military Impact</h2> <p> Conventional wisdom suggests that the destruction of the American battleships at Pearl allowed the Japanese to sweep over the Pacific in the 6-months followingb the attack. This is a misconception. It was not the destruction of the Pacific Fleet's battleships, but rather the massive Japanese superiority in carriers that allowed the Japanese to sweep through the Pacific. In fact had the United States met the Japanese at sea in a fleet engagement, it is likely that the casualties would have been much greater than those excpeienced in Pearl. Only 3 men survived the sinking of <i>Hood</i>, for example, in the North Atlantic. Most of the casualties at Pearl camme from <i>Aizona</i>. In a general fleet engagement at sea, given the Japanese carrier superiority, the American losses could have been disastrous. In additiion there would have been no way of raising battleships sunk at sea and all but two battleships sunk at Pearl (<i>Arizona</i> and <i>Oklahoma</i> were raised and rejoined the fleet. At the time of the Japanese attack, the U.S. Navy was still wedded to the battleship. The attack in fact forced the American Navy to radically change it tactics and strategic concept. When the critical engagemebts came at the Coral Sea (April 1942) and <a href="ncp-mid.html">Midway</a> (June 1942), the only ships playing an important role was the carriers. The American Pacific fleet had developed the competence and tactics to take the Japanese on and te code breakers allowed the American carriers to fight engagements on realtively equal terms despite the overwealming Japanaese carrier superiority. <br> <h2>Raising the Fleet</h2> <p> In the aftermath of the Japanese attack it is often not understood that the eight Pacific Fleet battleships were not destroyed. Two were destroyed: <i>Arizona</i> and <i>Oklahoma</i>. But the other six were not. Had they been sunk at sea they would have been, but they were sunk at their moorings or bedached. This meant that they while battered, they werwe were salvalage. And while the ships were still warm from the fires started by the Japanese attack, expers from the mauiland were flown in to begin the most remarkable salvage opertation in the history of naval warfare. The damage varied from ship to ship. There were two groups of ships. The first were those that had been moderartely damaged, but could quickly be refloated. The Japanese had not significantly damaged the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, thus this operation could commednce immeditely. Tenders and ships' crewmen immediately began repairs. These preliminary actions suceeded in putting battleships <i>Pennsylvania, Maryland</i> and <i>Tennessee</i> to a point that they could sail to shipyards on the mainland for repairs beyond the capability of the Pearl facilities (February 1942). Several smaller vessels were also repaired. This included the cruisers <i>Honolulu, Helena</i>, and <i>Raleigh</i> and the destroyers <i>Helm</i> and <i>Shaw</i>. <! seaplane tender Curtiss, repair ship Vestal and the floating drydock YFD-2 back into service, or at least got them ready to steam to the mainland for final repairs. The most seriously damaged of these ships,> <i>Raleigh</i> and <i>Shaw</i> the two most severly danaged of this group rejoined the fleet (mid-1942). The second group of ships had been much more heavily damaged. Five more battleships, two destroyers, a target ship and a minelayer were sunk, or so severely damaged as to represent nearly total losses. <i>Arizona</i> and <i>Ol;ahoma</i> were in these groups. Both were too heavily damnaged to rejoin the fleet. Other ships could be refloated, but required very extensive work just to refloat them so repairs could commence. The Navy Yard stripped the destroyers <i>Cassin</i> and <i>Downes</i> of servicible weapons, machinery and equipment (December 1941 - February 1942). The salvaged materiel was shipped to California ship yards where it was installed on new hulls. These two ships thus returned to the fleet in a symbolic sence (late-1943 and early-1944). For the other ships a salvage organization was formally set up only a week after the Japanese attack (December 1941). Captain Homer N. Wallin, from the Battle Force Staff was given the job of overseeing the Salvage Division (January 1942). They reloated some of the ships and salvaged equipment from the ships thst could not be refloated. The battleships Nevada was refloated (February 1942). It would eventually become the flag ship for the D-Day invasion. They refloated <i>California</i> (March 1942) and <i>West Virginia</i> (June 1942). The minelayer Oglala was refloated (April-July 1942). All reqquired extensive shipyard repairs, but eventually rejoined the fleet. <! The Salvage Division also righted and refloated the capsized battleship Oklahoma, partially righted the capsized target ship Utah and recovered materiel from the wreck of the battleship Arizona. However, these three ships were not returned to service, and the hulls of the last two remain in Pearl Harbor to this day.> Many of the salvaged battle ships played important roles in the Pacific War. They were not fast enough to be used in carrier task forces. They were extensively used for pre-invasion shelling. Their most famous action was to smash the Japanese southern force at Surigao Straits during the Battle of Leyte Gulf (OCtober 25, 1941). As the Japanese Southern Force tried to pass through the narrow Surigao Straits six American battleships having executed the classic crossing the "T" maneuver were waiting for them. They included <i>California, Maryland, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee</i>, and <i>West Virginia</i>--all but <i>Mississippi</i> were Pearl Harbor veterans. <br> <h2>Enduring Impact</h2> <p> Pearl Harbor was seared into the national consciouness. Since the foundation of the Republic, American had considered itself protected by two great oceans. Pear Harbor changed this. The Japanese attack demostrated that America was vulnerable to the attack from abroad. The isolationist outlook that had so dominated American thought evaporated over night. Pearl Harbor still resonates in the American psyche today. [Rosenberg] <br> <h2>Conspiracy Theories</h2> <p> The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has like the Kennedy assasination spawned a veritable cottage industry in consiracy assessments. These assessments are notably for their poor understanding of the military and code braking as well as the unprofessional cherry picking of facts and events to make their case and sell books. A good example is the Stinnett book. This and similar books should not be considered real history. Certainly President Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy keading up to Pearl Harbor is an important topics, but readers should avoid authors like Stinnett who form an opinion based on ideological grounds and then cherry pick facts and events to prove his case. This is not real history. <br> <h2>Pacific War Naval Base</h2> <p> The Philippine Islands was America's advanced outpost in the Pacific. The Pearl Harbot attack was followed by air strikes from Taiwan that quickly crippled American air power on the Phillipines. And with the Pacific Fleet crippled, when the Japanese invaded, General Mac Arthur was forced to retreat to the Batan Peninsula where the poorly supplied American and Filipino forces conducted a valiant defense for several months. The Japanese took Guam without resistance. The Marines on Wake Island put up a spirited resistance. Guam was taken wiThis left Midway and the Hawaian Islands as America's lone outposts in the Central Pacific. The United States rushed planes and supplies to defend the Hawaian Islands, but the Japanese comitted a huge error by not pressing the attack with its powerful carrier force. The Japanese did not resume the attack until 6 months later when the Pacific Fleet was better prepoared and the result was the enormous naval vicyory at Midway (June 1942). This ended the threat of Japanese attack. The United States turned Pearl and the air bases surrounding it into the most powerful advanced naval base in the world. Huge quanities of men, material, planes, and new ships flowed into Pearl. The Pacific Fleet with the seizure of the Gilbert abd Msrshal Islands began the long march east toward Tokyo abnd gradually Pearl became a rear area base, but the headquarters of the Pacifuc Fleet througout the War. <br> <h2><a href="cent/pearl/pearl-ja.html">Japanese Americans</a></h2> <p> Large numbers of ethnic Japnese lived on the Hawaian Islands. The first Japanese immigrants were brought to the Islands before the Islands were American territory as contract laborers for the American-owned sugar cane and pineapple plantations (1885). Bybthe tgime of World War II, rthere were about 160,000 Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry, about 40 percent of the Islands' population. Most prived to be fiercly loyal to the United States. Unlike the ethnic Japanese on the Pacific Coast, the Japanese on the Islands were not interned in a wholesale operation. We are not sure who made this determination. A small number were arrested by the FBI and interned. They were indivisuals who belonged to Japanese patriotic organizations or for some reason were considered security risks. (Their families were often interned with them.) The numbers were very small. About 2,000 Japanese Americans in addition to 100 German Americans and Italian Americans (both aliens and U.S. citizens) were interned at eight locations on the Hawaiian. It is not entirely clear why they were not interned because the Japanese threat to Pearl Harbor was much greater than it ever was to California. It is probably because the etnic Japanese presense on the Islands was so important to the economy that it would have disrupted the Island economy, including the operations of the military bases. Facilities like Pearl Harbor, for example, had many Japanese workers in the shipyards. <br> <h2>Sources</h2> <p> Emerson, William. Interview by Dorris Kearns Goodwin in <i>No Ordinary Time</i>. <p> Freidel, Frank. <i>Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny</i> (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p. <p> Gillon, Steben M. <i>Pearl mHarbor: FDR Leds the Nation into War</i> (2011), 248p. <p> Goodwin, Doris Kearns. <i>No Ordinary Time. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II</i> (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), 759p. <p> Hull, Cordell. <i>The Memoirs of Cordell Hull</i> Two volumes (New York, 1948). <p> Rosenberg, Emily S. <i>A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory</i> (Duke University, 2003). <p> Stinnett, Robert B. <i>Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor</i> (New York: Free Press, 2000). Stinnett is a highly decorated American sailor. We do not question his bravery or patriotism. He is an acclaimed photographer. He is not, however, a trained historian and this book shows that. He carefully cherry picks facts and events to come with the conclusion that President Roosevelt personally adopted a plan to get Japan to strike the United States and kept the truth from Navy commanders in Hawaii is both perposterous and unproven by hidtorical fact. The books fails to understand either the Japanese military and Fireign office, cide breaking, and the American military. The book is dimissed by most competent historians. <p> Wallin, Vice Admiral Homer N. <i>Pearl Harbor--Why, How: Fleet Salvage and Final Apprisal</i> (Naval History Division: Washington, D.C., 1968). <br> <br> <br> <! Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese naval code, the leaders in Washington knew as well that Japan s  measures would include an attack on Pearl Harbor.[4] Yet they withheld this critical information from the commanders in Hawaii, who might have headed off the attack or prepared themselves to defend against it. That Roosevelt and his chieftains did not ring the tocsin makes perfect sense: after all, the impending attack constituted precisely what they had been seeking for a long time. As Stimson confided to his diary after a meeting of the war cabinet on November 25,  The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. 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