Figure 1.--Here a French boy uses the wreckage of a German tank near his home as a kind of playground. Wouldn't I at this age have loved to have a German tank in my front yard. The tank was a Mk. IV. You can tell by the front bogie wheel and the the track apron on top. The Tiger had a much different apron or guard on top of their tracks. Both Tiger I and II. Same for the Panther Mk V. The Germans with only a few Mk. IVs were able to drive into the heart of France as part of their Blitzkrieg Western offesive, largely beause of French incompetence (June 1940). The Germans after D-Day used their Panzers not for slashing mobile attacks as in 1939-43 but instead as mobile pillboxes to hold the Allies in Normandy (June 1944). After the Allied breakout from Normandy, many Germans managed to escape back to the Reich when the Allies liberated France (August 1944), thy were able to get few of their tanks out with them. The difference was airpower. In 1940 the Luftwaffe dominated the skies. In 1944, the Luftwaffe was hardly to be seen. And while the American M-4 Sherman was not a match one on one for the German Panzers, withering Allied air attacks directed by newly developed ground air support desimated the German Panzers.

The Germans when they began the War did not have a huge superority in tanks, rather it was their tactics that made a difference in the battle for France (May-June 1940). The German concept which camp to be called Blitzkrieg was to focus power at the decisive point of a battle. This meant organizing armored or panzer divisions and brining them to play at a decisive time and point along with air power. The French concept was just the opposite. The French had some excellent tanks, although unlike the Germans they were not equipped with radios so they could easily be directed as a battle developed. The French spread their tanks out among infantry divisions and use them to seal off enemy thrusts through the Maginot Lind. By the same token the French Air Force was spread out, much of it in the South where it would not be vulnerable to a surprise German attack, but where it also would play no part in the battle for France. The Germans were the first to grasp the importance of anti-tank weapons and had the high-velocity 88-mm gun originslly designed as an anti-aircraft gun. They essentially taught tank warfare to the British in the Western Desert. Fortunately for the British, the Germans, focused on the Soviet Union, and were not able to deploy adequate forces in North Africa to defeat them before they learned how to use anti-tank artillery. The Red Army had a massive armored force. Many of their tanks, however, by the time of Barbarossa were obsolete. The T-34 tank began reaching the Red Army soon after Hitler launched Barbarossa. The Red Army, however, did not have a well developed battlefield doctrine for tank warfare. Stalin's purges had weakened the command structure of the Army which probably delayed needed adjustments. The Army thus paid a terrible price for its lack of an effective tactical doctrine as well as Stalin's interference, especially is insistince that the Red Army stand and fight whatever the circumstances. The Red Army suffered enormous losses in the summer of 1941. The Germans destroyed huge numbers of Soviet tanks in the Bloody Triange of the Ukraine (June 1941). There were also major defeats in the Spring and Summer of 1942, but the Red Army was learning. The Germans did not bag huge numbers of prisoners in their 1942 victories as they had in 1941. The climatic tank battle on the Eastern Front was fought at Kursk, again in the Ukraine. It was the greatest tank battle in history with massive casualties on both sides, but the Red Army tankers prevailed largely because of the weight of numbers. The Soviets could take losses, the badly depleted Wehrmacht could not. And by the time of Kursk (July 1943), American Lend Lease trucks were reaching the Red Army in huge quntities, giving the Soviets a mobility that the Germans never had. The U.S. Army also had a poorly developed concept of tank warfare and an unjustified confidence in the M-4 Sherman. The basic idea at first was something akin to a calvalry charge. This chaged in North Africa , especially after Kaserine. Again it was the Germans that taught the Americans. By the time the Allies rentered the Continent (June 1944) with the D-Day landings, tank tactics had to adjust for increasingly effective infantry anti-tank weapons.

Blitzkrieg

The Germans when they began the War did not have a huge superority in tanks, rather it was their tactics that made a difference in the battle for France (May-June 1940). The German concept which camp to be called Blitzkrieg was to focus power at the decisive point of a battle. This meant organizing armored or panzer divisions and brining them to play at a decisive time and point along with air power. The basic concept was not new. What was new was the tanks and planes which provided a greater degree of mobility than military commanders had ever before possessed. The lifeblood of the system was communications. There had to be communications noth with head quaters and between ground commnders as well as pilots and tank commanders. Esentially the Germans invented modern warfare. The French concept was just the opposite. The French had some excellent tanks, although unlike the Germans they were not equipped with radios so they could easily be directed as a battle developed. The French spread their tanks out among infantry divisions and use them to seal off enemy thrusts through the Maginot Line. By the same token the French Air Force was spread out. Without radar they were vulnerable to a surrise German attack. Much of the French Air Force was deployed in the South where it would not be vulnerable to a surprise German attack, but where it also would play no part in the battle for France.

Anti-Tank Weapons

The Germans were also the first to grasp the importance of anti-tank weapons and had the high-velocity 88-mm gun originslly designed as an anti-aircraft gun. The Allies did not at first understand the importance of nti-tank artillery, biut gradually deployed effectuve anti-tank artillery. At first the only effective ant-tank weapns were artillery. Gradually mines and infabtry weapons were developed. The Germans developed the most effective infantry anti-tank weapon--the Panzerfaust. It was light nc was hand held. The soldier, however, had to get close to use it. The american bazookaas not as effective as the Panzerfaust and was a two-man weapon. It could not penetrate heavy armor, but could danage the treads of a German tank.

German Miscalulation

The Germans after their success in France began to believe NAZI superman nonsence. Hitler might wll have suceeded if he could have conquered all of targets at once. But given Germany's limited resources, that was not possible. Hitler had to adopt tactics to take target one enemy at atime while keeping other enenies out of the fight. This mean that his enemies had the opportunity to prepare for his onslaught. And very early in the War, the Germans found that their enemies were capable of developing high quality weaponry, in some cases weapons superior to the German weapons. The British Supermarine Spitfire was as capable as the Me-109 (1940). The Soviet T-34 tank was superior to any German tank when first introduced. And the Allies also managed to digure out an implement the German tactics. For some reason, however, the allies developed advanced weaponry faster than they managed to learn German Blitzkrieg tactics. The French did not have suffucent time. The British and soviets did, although the learning process seems remarkedly slow. The Germans essentially taught tank war fare to the British in the Western Desert. Fortunately for the British, the Germans, focused on the Soviet Union, and were not able to deploy adequate forces in North Africa to defeat them before they learned how to use anti-tank artillery.

Basic Shift

The tank was a major World War II system. All of the great tank battles of history were fought during World War II. The tank was first introduced in World War I by the Allies. It played an important role in the final year of the war, but the War ended before tank tactics had been fully developed and anti-tank tactics had been developed. The tank was a key weapn early in the War. Poland was the first German and Soviet victim (1939). They did not have the industrial base to build a large tank force. The British and French did, but pursued disaterous tactics (1940). The Soviets did which the Germans encounteredwhen they invaded (1941). The largest tank bttles in history were fought in the East. Time and space alloed the Soviets to learn modern tank warfare from he Germans. The same occured in North Africa where the Germans taught the British and Americans modern tank warfare (1941-43). In both the East and North Africa, German superiority was not great enough to defeat either the Soviets or British so they wound up teaching their enenies how to defeat them. The greatest tank battle of all time was fought at Kursk (July 1943). The German defeat meant a fundamental shift in German tactics. The Germans did not have the industry to match Soviet and Allied production. Tank technology advanced rapidly during this period, but so did anti-tank technology as well as Soviet/Allied air power. The Germans first grasped the importance of anti-tank artillery. Both the Germans and Allies developed infantry weapons thst could stop tanks. This meant that tankers needed infantry (grenadiers) to protect their tanks from infantry. This meant a basic shift on the part of the Germans. Their battle doctrine shifted from massed, high speed tank formtions to slow, massive behemoths that were essentially moveable pill boxes. The Sovits and Allies continued to lunch armored attcks, but no longer to attack German armor, noe to break through znd ebcurcle increasingly imobile German units--the sane tactics with which the Germzns began the War. Here air power was part of the shift. Tanks cannot operate in mass uner enemy air attack. And the Soviets and Allies by 1944 controllthe skies.

Country Trends

Only a few World War II belligerants had the sizeable tank force needed to develop tank tactics. Only the countries with heavy industry could build large tank forces. This limited effective tank forces to five countries (Britain, France, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States). In the inter-War era only the Germans developed effective tank tactics. The Soviets were working on it, but mot of the best tank tacticians were caught up in Stalin's Purge of the Red Army. They were disproprtionally targeted becazuse they had contacts with Germans as a result of the Rapollo Treaty. The Germans developed the most effective tactics--Blitzkrieg. The French tactics proved seriously flawed, leading to the stunning collapse of France. From that point on the thrust of the development of tank tactics was toward the German Blitzkrieg model. Given the effectiveness of the German tactics, this process was remarkedly slow. Ionically givn the German mastery of Blitzkrieg s the War progressed, the Germans grdually shifted to huge not vry maneuverable tanks.

British

It was the British who had invented the tank during World War I. None other than Winston Churchill was involved.

France

The French concept was just the opposite. The French had some excellent tanks, although unlike the Germans they were not equipped with radios so they could easily be directed as a battle developed. The French spread their tanks out among infantry divisions and use them to seal off enemy thrusts through the Maginot Lind. By the same token the French Air Force was spread out, much of it in the South where it would not be vulnerable to a surprise German attack, but where it also would play no part in the battle for France.

Germany

It was the Germans who invented Blitzkrieg and the modern use of tank, mobile artilery in cinjuction woh airpower that could rapidly break through enemy lines and invelop enemy formations. This continued to be the case until after the Battle of Kursk when German tactics took on a remarkable transformation. From radical mobility, the Germans shifted to stanionary warfare. The German tanls became essentially mobile pillboxes. this was not a matter of choice, but the result of several developments in the war: 1) Allied outproduction of tanks, 2) Allied air superority, 3) German fuel shortages, 4) Hitler's insistance on giganticism.

Soviet Union

The Red Army had a massive armored force. Many of their tanks, however, by the time of Barbarossa were obsolete. The T-34 tank began reaching the Red Army soon after Hitler launched Barbarossa. The Red Army, however, did not have a well developed battlefield doctrine for tank warfare. Stalin's purges had weakened the command structure of the Army which probably delayed needed adjustments. The Army thus paid a terrible price for its lack of an effective tactical doctrine as well as Stalin's interference, especially is insistince that the Red Army stand and fight whatever the circumstances. The Red Army suffered enormous losses in the summer of 1941. The Germans destroyed huge numbers of Soviet tanks in the Bloody Triange of the Ukraine (June 1941). There were also major defeats in the Spring and Summer of 1942, but the Red Army was learning. The Germans did not bag huge numbers of prisoners in their 1942 victories as they had in 1941. The climatic tank battle on the Eastern Front was fought at Kursk, again in the Ukraine (July 1943). It was the greatest tank battle in history with massive casualties on both sides, but the Red Army tankers prevailed largely because of the weight of numbers. The Soviets could take losses, the badly depleted Wehrmacht could not. And by the time of Kursk, American Lend cLease trucks were reaching the Red Army in huge quntities, giving the Soviets a mobility that the Germans never had.

United States

The U.S. Army also had a poorly developed concept of tank warfare and an unjustified confidence in the M-4 Sherman. The basic idea at first was something akin to a calvalry charge. This chaged in North Africa , especially after Kaserine. Again it was the Germans that taught the Americans. By the time the Allies rentered the Continent (June 1944) with the D-Day landings, tank tactics had to adjust for increasingly effective infantry anti-tank weapons.

Sources

Zaloga, Steven. Armored Thunderboldt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II, 360p.

Created: 11:29 PM 9/7/2016
Last updated: 8:23 AM 6/28/2017