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The Germans not only began rearming by building weapons, but once the weapons had begun to roll off assembly lines, they reintroduced conscription (1935). This was the critical step in Hitler's preparations for war. It was a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty, but neither Britain nor France reacted beyond ineffectual diplomatic protests. This is when they could have reacted, failing to do so meant that war was inevitable as soon as the Wehrmacht was armed and trained. Germany had many weaknesses that had to be overcome in waging another war, including limited industrial capacity and the lack of natural resources, including iron ore and oil. But an often overlooked weakness was that few German boys, both city and farm boy, had experience with motorized vehicles, either driving or maintaining the engines. As World War II would be a war of movement, operating and maintaining motor vehicles from jeeps to tanks as well as aircraft and naval engines would be a vital part of the war effort. The Germans addressed this problem by creating a special unit of the Hitler Youth (HJ) to train motor vehicle specialists--the Motor HJ. While less well known than the Flieger (air) and Marine HJ specialized units, they none the less played an important role in Germany's preparations for war and what would become the greatest military conflict in human history, the war in the East. Here vast numbers of motorized military vehicles were needed as the Wehrmacht and Red army fought it out on the vast Eurasian Steppe. A combat environment in which huge numbers of drivers and mechanics were needed. This was a special problem for the Germans as so few young men had grown up around cars and other motor vehicles and the Wehrmacht used such a hodgepodge of vehicles and engines in the East. America as late as 1941 had not mobilized for war. As the Panzers neared Moscow and the decisive battle of the War would be fought, the vast armada of American motor vehicles needed to fight the war did not yet exist. What did exist was the largest reservoir of mechanically savvy talent in the world--American youth. More Americans knew about motor vehicles, both how to drive them and even more importantly, how to maintain and repair them, than the mechanics in all the rest of the world combined. This was not part of Hitler's calculation. He knew America was a danger. It had turned victory into defeat in World War I. He believed, however, that the Wehrmacht could complete its conquest of Europe before America reacted, let alone mobilized. He did not, however, plan for the RAF's startling defeat of the Luftwaffe (1940) or the Red Army's Winter offensive before Moscow (1941). Nor did he anticipate how rapidly a largely unarmed America could arm and train a modern, mechanized army. The pool of young Americans familiar with motors and engines was a huge asset as America entered
the War.
The countries that were to create the Axis powers began preparing their people for war even before Hitler seized power in Germany (1933). Once Hitler was in power, that preparation went into over drive. And this while the democracies slept, at the onset of the War, the Axis not only had the best weaponry, but the most motivated and dedicated soldiery to fight the War. The Italians were an exception, but this was certainly the case for the Germans and Japanese. Simply put, Stephen Ambrose was wrong, the children of the democracy do not make the best soldiers. 【Ambrose】 They are to prone to question their superiors which does not make for the needed military discipline. But there was a major wrinkle in the German and Japanese military planning. World War II was to be an industrial war and in particular unlike Wold War I an highly mobile industrial war in which motor vehicles as well as aircraft and naval vessels would play central roles. And it was in the democracies (America, Britain, and France) that the industry that built motor vehicles in large numbers developed. It is interesting to look at streets in Germany and Japan before the War, one can only ask--where are the cars and trucks. Even on the major streets in big cities, you do not see many motor vehicles. Not only did the Allies, even with the loss of France, have the ability to build motor vehicles in vast numbers, but its young people grew up in and around motor vehicles, even on the farm. Tractors were revolutionizing agriculture in the democracies. They were conspicuously absent on German, Italian, and Japanese farms. Few Germans in contrast even knew how to drive a car, let alone maintain it. And this problem was magnified by German craftsmanship. The Germans created tanks that were marvels of engineering, but with no thought as to mass production or ease of maintenance. There were plenty of German who knew how to handle the millions of horses used by Wehrmacht, but relatively few that do how to drive a car, let alone a tank. And even fewer that knew how to maintain vehicles. German secondary schools were highly academic. Few had shop classes as was the case for American high schools. This would be a serious problem when the German easy victories ceased and the Wehrmacht has to fight protracted mobile warfare. The situation was even worse for the Japanese. Few Japanese soldiers had even ridden in a car.
The Germans not only began rearming by building weapons, but once the weapons had begun to roll off assembly lines, they reintroduced conscription (1935). This was the critical step in Hitler's preparations for war. It was a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty, but neither Britain nor France reacted beyond ineffectual diplomatic protests. This is when they could have reacted, failing to do so meant that war was inevitable as soon as the Wehrmacht was armed and trained. And NAZI propaganda along with the Hitler Youth had primed young Germans for war in a way that young men in the democracies were not. Germany had many weaknesses that had to be overcome in waging another war, including limited industrial capacity and the lack of natural resources, including iron ore and oil. But an often overlooked weakness was that few German boys, both city and farm boy, had experience with motorized vehicles, either driving or maintaining the engines. As World War II would be a war of movement, operating and maintaining motor vehicles from jeeps to tanks as well as aircraft and naval engines would be a vital part of the war effort. The Germans addressed this problem by creating a special unit of the Hitler Youth (HJ) to train motor vehicle specialists--the Motor HJ. While less well known than the Flieger (air) and Marine HJ specialized units, they none the less played an important role in Germany's preparations for war and what would become the greatest military conflict in human history, the war in the East. Here vast numbers of motorized military vehicles were needed as the Wehrmacht and Red army fought it out on the vast Eurasian Steppe. A combat environment in which huge numbers of drivers and mechanics were needed. This was a special problem for the Germans as so few young men had grown up around cars and other motor vehicles and the Wehrmacht used such a hodgepodge of vehicles and engines in the East. In addition, German military equipment was not made for operation and service in the field. German Panzers in particular were over-engineered and required more servicing than American and Soviet tanks, placing a greater strain on maintenance operations. Hitler knew America was a danger. It had turned victory into defeat in World War I. He believed, however, that the Wehrmacht could complete its conquest of Europe before America reacted, let alone mobilized. He did not, however, plan for the RAF's startling defeat of the Luftwaffe (1940) or the Red Army's Winter offensive before Moscow (1941). Nor did he anticipate how rapidly a largely unarmed America could arm and train a modern, mechanized army. The pool of young Americans familiar with motors and engines was a huge asset as America entered
Of all the major World War II combatants, Italy fielded an army that was least prepared to fight. This was apparent from the beginning of the War. The Italian Army performed poorly when it invaded Greece from Albania(October 1940), even they outnumbered he Greeks and were better equipped. The Greeks drive the Italians back into Albania. The Italians also failed in the Western Desert when they invaded Egypt , Operazione E) (September 1940). They badly outnumbered the poorly equipped British, but were routed and driven back into Libya. Eventually the Germans would have to rescue the Italians in both the Balkans and Western Desert. World War II historians debate just why the Italians performed so poorly. Ineffective leadership was a factor. And Italy was not a major industrial power, they were poorly equipped. Much of the population did not have the skills useful fir modern warfare such as experience working with machinery. But a major factor was the fact that unlike the Germans and Japanese, the average Italian soldier did not have his heart in the War. This was especially true of the large number of soldiers from southern Italy who grew up in virtually feudal circumstances. The soldiers were not well cared for by their officers which just confirmed the opinion that the Government was not operating in their best interests. Unlike the NAZIs in Germany, the Fascists did not capture the allegiance of many Italians or begin to breaking down the hierarchical class structure. The working class in the north seems more effectively politicized despite the left-wing attitudes of industrial workers. The middle-class had been more effectively politicized by the Fascists. The ordinary Italian soldier, however, had no idea why they were fighting the British and even less why they wound up fighting Americans. Many Italian soldiers would like nothing better than to emigrate to America.
There were no soldiers during World War II that were more committed to the War than the Japanese soldier. Both the officer corps and the average soldier were fervent Japanese patriots to the point of xenophobia. The Japanese officer core was committed to the expansion of the Japanese Empire. The average soldier may not have been fully committed to the geo-political issues, but they were every bit as patriotic and devoted to the Emperor as their leaders. The War took on a sacred mission. And the great bulk of the military including the youngest recruit was prepared to fight to the death. It was not just devotion to the Emperor, although that was a factor. The Japanese soldier did not want to dishonor his family by surrendering. He did not think he could ever return to his town or village with the shame of surrender. We do not know of a mass army in all of history that was so fervently devoted to a war effort. Japan did not have an industrial base to adequately equip their young men, but they sent them into war with a fighting spirit unmatched in history. Unfortunately for these men, their commanders did not prove to be the masters of war that they saw themselves to be. And their leaders in Tokyo committed to a Pacific War without any ability to adequately supply or feed them. Thousands would die in futile banzai charges. More would starve to death as part of isolated island garrisons.
The Western Allies after World War I rapidly disbanded their massive militaries and war production reverted to civilian products. America and Britain ended military conscription which had been a temporary war-time measure. The public concern was how to avoid another War and the primary attitude was that the best way was ton cut military spending, including research and development, to the bone. The French continued conscription, but like America and Britain, the conscripts primary mind set was how to avoid another war. Movements like pacifism, isolationism, and appeasement sapped the military spirit of these nations. Their lack of ardor was in sharp contrast to spirit of the German and Japanese soldiers who were being convinced that the international system created by the Americans and British in particular, were a fundamental threat to their national existence. Even before rearmament began, the Western Allies had one fundamental advantage. Democracies responded to public demands. This meant that their economies responded primarily to consumer demand. Germany had the second largest industrial economy in the world, but it was less consumer based. (It had been molded by the Imperial German Government and perceived strategic needs.) This is part of the reason that the Western democracies had the largest motor vehicle industries--and the ability to produce the vehicles needed to fight a mobile war. But it was not just the ability to produce motor vehicles, it was the men needed tom operate and maintain these vehicles. At a time that virtually all American teenagers (including many girls) could drive and many boys could maintain motor vehicles, a German youth felt lucky to have a bicycle. Japan and Italy were in even worse shape. And to make matters worse for the Axis, German designers felt no compunction to design vehicles that could be mass produced. German industrialists sneered at mass production and the rickety Ford Model-T that at first came off the assembly line. Nor were they concern with ease of maintenance. In sharp contrast to the German Panzers, GI mechanics could loosen a few bolts on the M-4 Sherman and you could get into the tank's innards for maintenance or repairs. Both mass production and maintenance would have a major impact on World War II battlefields.
The French Army was the primary bulwark on the Western Front during much of World War I and suffered grievously. It very nearly broke in 1917, but unlike the Russian Army did not. The bulk of offensive operations, however, had to be carried by the Americans and British in 1918. As a result anti-War thought was rife throughout France after the War. The French continued conscription after the War, but growing pacifist and socialist thought undermined the spirit of the French Army. Even as the threat of the German Luftwaffe increased in the 1930s, French labor unions refused to work overtime in aircraft factories. The unions right up to World War II continued their anti-War stance even though after Munich, it was obvious that the only way to stop Hitler was military action. This of course affected the fighting spirit of the French soldiers that faced Hitler. It was, however, not the only problem. The French General Staff was hugely incompetent. When the Germans attacked in the Ardennes (1940) still had a World War I era communications system. There were no radio connections to front line units. They were using telephones and runners. And unlike the British no program to add radar to their defensive system. Nut unlike the Germans they did have a modern motor vehicle industry. No country in Europe or for that matter the world after Henry Ford created the Model-T Tin Lizzy (1908) ever approached the ability of the United States to produce motor vehicles. France for two decades after World War I was, however the European leader. Only at the onset of World War II did Britain surpass France, and largely because of American joint ventures in Britain. (Germany was a distant third.) France was not only the largest European producer, but it excelled at mass production. The fall of France to the Germans (1940) fundamentally changed the world strategic and military balance. So much so that Hitler felt he had won the War. It also changed the economic balance. The French economy, especially its advanced motor vehicle industry could have been a prized asset to the German War Economy and Grossraum. The Germans for some reason did not even try to use much of the French armaments industry. They did try to use the motor vehicle industry to produce military trucks. But passive resistance from French workers and Allied bombing meant that few trucks were produced. This is part of the reason that the Germans turned to conscripting French workers and transporting them to the Reich to work in German factories (1942). The Germans made no use of French mass production technology.
The British like the French were obsessed at preventing another War--at virtually any cost. The World War I losses were traumatic. Most Brits had been convinced during the inter-War era by the increasing popular Pacifist and Socialist thinkers that the real threat to Britain was not the Germans, but war itself. The opposition Labour Party in the mid-30a after Hitler had seized power very nearly adopted the policy of unilateral disarmament. The Oxford Union resolved that they would not fight for King and Country. MPs who favored real opposition to Hitler and the NAZIs could rarely win elections. Churchill and his small group of supporters for several years was a lonely voice in the Commons. Military expenditures had been cut to the bone and even with Hitler's massive rearmament failed to keep pace with the Germans. Prime-Minister Chamberlain and the Appeasers even tried to dampen down criticism of Hitler and the NAZIs thinking that this would help appease them. Fortunately, Labour after Munich turned against Appeasement. While Appeasement left Britain unprepared for the War, it have one salutatory impact. The British soldier and sailor and the public at large entered the War united with the belief that the Government had done everything humanly possible to avoid another war. They were unprepared, but united. Churchill mused upon becoming prime-minister, "I hope it is not too late." One major advantage that the British had was a sizeable motor-vehicle industry. It was Britain that for most of the inter-war era was the second most important motor vehicle producer, close to France and far above Germany, finally eking out a small lead over France at the end of the 1930s decade. Of course cars are not used to fight wars, but motor vehicle factories are uniquely equipped to be turned into war factories.
America was not prepared for World War II. Few Americans wanted to enter the War. Americans largely because of the news reels had negative attitudes Toward Hitler and the Japanese, but until Pearl Harbor a majority of Americans opposed entering the War. Only a small number of Americans had any kind of military training. The United States had introduced a draft (September 1940), but the number of Americans who had been drafted and trained was still very small. What we know about the NAZIs today was not known to the American public and servicemen. When the Allies began overrunning concentration camps (April 1945), what they found behind the barbed wire when the Allies entered the camps was a huge shock. America as late as 1941 had not mobilized for war. Nor had the U.S. military developed the modern tactical doctrines needed to fight World War II. As the Panzers neared Moscow and the decisive battle of the War would be fought, the vast armada of American planes, ships, and motor vehicles needed to fight the war and the trained units needed to fight did not yet exist. There was a substantial reservoir of man power, but men with virtually no military training. The Axis had, however, not only men with military training, but experience warriors that had achieved considerable success. What did exist in America was a population with great faith in their country and because of Pearl Harbor and understanding of the needed to defend it. One American historian talks about the soldiers of democracy which defeated the German soldiers who did not have the same capacity to react to changing battlefield conditions. 【Ambrose】 Unfortunately while the author has published many valuable books, this simply was not the case. Both American and British commanders were aware that their men man for man and unit for unit was not he equal of the Wehrmacht men and formations. The German units were able to achieve substantial combat power with a fraction of the supplies of American units. That was why Gen Eisenhower pursued a broad-front approach after D-Day. What the American soldier had going for him was a democracy which provided competent political leadership and capitalism that provided the implements of war in a quantity far beyond the ability of he Germans to produce. America had one important personnel advantage besides the number of men available and that was the largest reservoir of mechanically savvy talent in the world--American youth. More Americans knew about motor vehicles, both how to drive them and even more importantly, how to maintain and repair them, than the mechanics in all the rest of the world combined. This was not part of Hitler's calculation when he set out to wage a mechanized war.
The Soviet Union was an anomaly, it fought World war II, first as a NAZI ally and helped supply the NAZI war machine (1939-41) and then as a part of the Allied coalition (1941-45). A strong propaganda theme of the Communist state was that war was a capitalist phenomenon and that workers should oppose war and military spending--but only in the West. Soviet workers should support a vast military establishment. Socialist leaders are very poor at creating prosperous economies. They are, however, rather good as creating powerful militaries, one reason NAZI Germany and the Soviet Union were such powerful countries during World War II. Not all Red Army recruits were sold on Communism. but the NAZI invasion changed that, turning the population and Red Army into fervent soldiers motivated to defend the Russian motherland. The barbarity of the NAZI invaders further fueled their resolve. The Red Army officer corps did not have the competence of the German Generals, in part because Stalin murdered so many in the Military Purges of the 1930s. Actually the Red army developed Blitzkrieg-like tactics because they worked with the Germans as part of the Rapallo Treaty. The Red Army was limited at first because of its small industrial base, especially motor vehicles. Stain's Five Year Plans would continue the industrial expansion of Russia began during the Tsarist Era. Of course Stalin did not want cars, but he did want trucks, tractors, and tanks. And to accomplish this, joint ventures were arranged with American automobile companies. The result was that at the time of World War II was that, while Germany had a larger industrial base, the Soviet Union has a larger and more efficient motor vehicle industry. This is part of the reason that the Soviets produced so many more trucks and tanks than the Germans.
Ambrose. Stephen. Citizen Soldiers (1997).
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