Figure 1.-- |
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Iran developed after World War II as a constitutional monarchy with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as the young Shah. Nationalist parties dominated the legislature. Mohammad Mosaddegh dominated the nationalist faction in parliament. Mosaddegh oversaw the passed of legislation nationalzing the growing oil industry (1951). The bill passed with a near-unanimous vote. The industry at the time was controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) which had made the needed investments to developed it. (AIOC was the origins of the modern compahy British Petroleum (BP). Popular discontent with Britain hd begun to develop even before the War in both Iraq and Iran. Both countries developed pro-NAZI policies, both because the NAZIs opposed Britain as the colonial power and becuse of shared attitudes toward Jews and race. The Allies seized both countries during the War. After the War the Allies wihdrew and eventually the Soviets as well, lthough reluctantly. The anti-British feelings thus could be openly expressed in Irans's developing political system. One of the most important issues becam AIOC because of the great wealth involved. A substantial part of the Iranian public and many politicians incresingly sae the AIOC was as colonial exploitative and a prime vestige of British imperialism. [Gasiorowski, p. 59.] Britain as a result of World War II had liquidated most of its foreign assetts. Thus AIOC was Britain's single most valuable remaining foreign asset and the British thus organized an international boycott of Iranian oil. Britain considered a mikitary operation to seize control of the Abadan oil refinery, the largest in the world. Prime Minister Clement Attlee opted, however, for the economic boycott. Britain also sureptiously found Iranian agents to weaken Mosaddegh's government. Mosaddegh responded by closing the British Embassy. President Truman was unwilling to support a coup. [Kinzer, p. 3.] American policy was focused more on the Cold War than the oil. Truman and his advisers attempted to working out a compromise oil agreement between Mosaddeq and British. Their assessment was that Mosaddeq as a nationalist was the most effective barrier to a Tudeh (communist) takeover in Iran. The Tudeh Party had been strebgthened by the Wotrld War II Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran. The change of Governments in Britain and America changed the trajectgory of Iranian policy. Conservative governments were elected in both Britain (Windton Churchill) and the United States (Dwight Eisenhower). Both Churchill and Eisenhower decided to overthrow the Mosaddegh Government. Analysts in the Eisenhower administration concluded that Mosaddeq's inability to withstand Tudeh subversion or a coup creted a dangerous opening for Soviet subversion. [U.S. NSC 136/1] Both American and British agenests orchestrated the 28 Mordad coup (August 19, 1953). Not only was Mosaddegh overthrown, but Shah Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi used the coup to begin the trahnsformation of from a constitutional monarch to an authoritarian one who relied heavily on a vicious secret poice to mauntain his hold on power. [Abrahamian] The assessment of the coup and is aftermath is often simplistically repprted in both Iran and the West. There is no doubt that Britian and America overthrew a democratically elected government and replace it with an autocrat who ruled through a secret police (Savak). [Abrahamian] That is a fair criticism of American and British policy and a clear violation of the democraric principles for which both countries stand. Much of the discussion in Iran and the West is, however, simplistic and colored by the author's ideological orientation. Rarely os the Coup put in a Cold War context. And very few authors consider what would have happened to the Iranian people (especially the Islamicists) had they fell victim to Soviet subversion. One can look at the countries that were vicims of Soviet expanionism and local Communists (Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, and Cambodia). Of course, one can reasobably argue that Mosaddegh would have been the best defense against the Tudeh, but tht is speculative. Perhaps, perhaps not. Another line of argument is that Anglo-American coup led to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. That is, however, a streach. Certainly, the Coup and American support for the Shah led to anti-Western sengiment. The fact that America saved Iran from the Soviets after World War II and greatly expanded the country's infrasructure is barely mentioned, suggesting that Americn actions were not going to be fairly assessed. Khomeini is fundamentally a Iranian creation. The Middle East is populated with tyrants for which America and rhe West is not responsible: the Assads, Hussein, Qadafi and other lesser tyrants. The dynamic of Middle Eastern politics has been clearly one of tyranny and the causes for this process need to be assessessed in a more sophisticated way than just blaming America.
Popular discontent with Britain hsd begun to develop even before the War in both Iraq and Iran. Both countries developed pro-NAZI policies, both because the NAZIs opposed Britain as the colonial power and becuse of shared attitudes toward Jews and race. The Allies seized both countries during the War. After the War the Allies wihdrew and eventually the Soviets as well, although reluctantly. The anti-British feelings thus could be openly expressed in Irans's developing political system. One of the most important issues becam AIOC because of the great wealth involved.
Iran developed after World War II as a constitutional monarchy with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as the young Shah. Nationalist parties dominated the legislature.
Mohammad Mosaddegh dominated the nationalist faction in parliament. He antagonized the Americans by 'flirting' with Communism and the British by nationalizing the British-owned oil industry. Churchill believed M was detrined to humiliate Britain. Eisenhower beieved that he would turn Iran over to the Soviets. he Amricans and British sideed with Shah Muhammed-Reza Pahlavi who went on impose a despotic rule. Views of Mosaddegh vary. According to one author, Mosaddegh was one of the first liberals in the Middle East. He wanted friendship with the West, but was committed to Iranian independence. [de Bellaigue] Mossadegh is an important figure. De Bellaigue may be correct, but we are a little uncomfortable with any author who moves away from history to suggesting with an air of authority what might have been. Journalists with liberal mindsets tend to project their ideology on their observations. Here it is important to catgorize fact from assessment. What we know for sure is that the Shah kept Iran out of the hands of the Soviets and spressed he Mullahs until 1979. Now Mossdegh may have fashioned a liberal democracy in the middle East, but we are doubtful, It is just as likely that he underestimatd the Soviet threat. Bellaigue and other authors seem to suggest that the Mullas were moderate clerics only radicalized by American intervention. It is more likly that Mossaegh would have had the same difficulty dealing with them that moderates have had after the fall of the Shah. In fact no one really knows and the idea that American policy is at the centr of the problem greatly overestimates America's ability to influence devlopments in other countries. br>
Mosaddegh oversaw the passed of legislation nationalzing the growing oil industry (1951). The bill passed with a near-unanimous vote. The industry atthe time was controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) which had made the needed investments to developed it. (AIOC was the origins of the modern compahy British Petroleum (BP). A substantial part of the Iranian public and many politicians incresingly saw the AIOC was as colonial exploitative and a prime vestige of British imperialism. [Gasiorowski, p. 59.] Britain as a result of World War II had liquidated most of its foreign assetts. Thus AIOC was Britain's single most valuable remaining foreign asset and the British thus organized an international boycott of Iranian oil. Britain considered a mikitary operation to seize control of the Abadan oil refinery, the largest in the world. Prime Minister Clement Attlee opted, however, for the economic boycott. Britain also sureptiously found Iranian agents to weaken Mosaddegh's government. Mosaddegh responded by closing the British Embassy. President Truman was unwilling to support a coup. [Kinzer, p. 3.]
American policy was focused more on the Cold War than the oil. Truman and his advisers attempted to working out a compromise oil agreement between Mosaddeq and British. Their assessment was that Mosaddeq as a nationalist was the most effective barrier to a Tudeh (communist) takeover in Iran.
The Tudeh Party had been strebgthened by the World War II Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran.
The change of Governments in Britain and America changed the trajectgory of Iranian policy. Conservative governments were elected in both Britain (Windton Churchill) and the United States (Dwight Eisenhower). Both Churchill and Eisenhower decided to overthrow the Mosaddegh Government. Analysts in the Eisenhower administration concluded that Mosaddeq's inability to withstand Tudeh subversion or a coup creted a dangerous opening for Soviet subversion. [U.S. NSC 136/1]
Both American and British agenests orchestrated the 28 Mordad coup against 72-year old Iranian Primeminister Muhammed Mossadegh (August 19, 1953).
Not only was Mosaddegh overthrown, but Shah Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi used the coup to begin the trahnsformation of from a constitutional monarch to an authoritarian one who relied heavily on a vicious secret poice to mauntain his hold on power. [Abrahamian]
The assessment of the coup and is aftermath is often simplistically repprted in both Iran and the West. There is no doubt that Britian and America overthrew a democratically elected government and replace it with an autocrat who ruled through a secret police (Savak). [Abrahamian] That is a fair criticism of American and British policy and a clear violation of the democraric principles for which both countries stand. Much of the discussion in Iran and the West is, however, simplistic and colored by the author's ideological orientation. Rarely os the Coup put in a Cold War context. And very few authors consider what would have happened to the Iranian people (especially the Islamicists) had they fell victim to Soviet subversion. One can look at the countries that were vicims of Soviet expanionism and local Communists (Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, and Cambodia). Of course, one can reasobably argue that Mosaddegh would have been the best defense against the Tudeh, but tht is speculative. Perhaps, perhaps not. Another line of argument is that Anglo-American coup led to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. That is, however, a streach. Certainly, the Coup and American support for the Shah led to anti-Western sengiment. The fact that America saved Iran from the Soviets after World War II and greatly expanded the country's infrasructure is barely mentioned, suggesting that Americn actions were not going to be fairly assessed. Khomeini is fundamentally a Iranian creation. The Middle East is populated with tyrants for which America and rhe West is not responsible: the Assads, Hussein, Qadafi and other lesser tyrants. The dynamic of Middle Eastern politics has been clearly one of tyranny and the causes for this process need to be assessessed in a more sophisticated way than just blaming America.
Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, the CIA and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (1953), 304p. Abrahamian is the author of many works on ranian history and a professor at the City University of New York. He displays a encyclopedic knowledge of the coup and the people involved, especially the Iranians. We take issue, however, on his assessment, especially the degree to which America is resoonsible for Khomeini, Nor do we think he puts the Coup in a Cold War context. He describes the Shah's regime as auppet regime. This is not accurate. Abrahamian needs to look at the true puppet regimes such as the Soviet Eastern Eutopean Empire. The United States certainly influenced the Shah, but did not dictate to him. And the United States did not act to stop oil price rises which helped create an affluent properous Iran, in stark comparison to the policies of the Ayatollah and his successors.
de Bellaigue, Christopher. Patriot of Persia: Muhammed Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo American Coup (2012), 320p.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State (Cornell University Press: 1991).
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008).
U.S. National Security Council (NSC). "United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran," (NSC 136/1). Top Secret Report, November 20, 1952 in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, ed. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran.
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