Figure 1.--Dulag was a town in the south of the immediate beachead area when the Americans landed on Leyte (October 20). The Sixth Army from the beginningof the Liberation effort was alkso fced wita humnitarian mission. A major objective of the landings were to seize the Japanese airfields in the Central Valley a few miles west of the coast. The Americans also moved to seie the highground ovelooking the beahead near Dulag--Catmon Hill. The 96th Infantry Division targeted Catmon, a 1,400 ft (430 m) promontory, the highest point in the beachhead area. The Japanese were using it as an observation and firing poition to target the beachead and landing craft. The Filipinos were caught in the crossfire. It was very dangerous for Filipinosto be in combat ares becuse the Japanese considered them loyal to the americans and not uncommonly would retilate for their losses by killing villagers. The press caption read, "Pied Piper of Leyte: A boy from the Bronx, S/Sgt, Howard Preube, acts as the Pied piper of Leyte leading little Filipino evacuees from an operationl area to the town of Dulag after Japs defending village had been cleared out. The photogrph was dated October 31, 1944, although we are not sure if that was when the photograph was taken or when it was released to the press. Source: Signal Corps.

The Battle for Leyte was the decisive ground battle of the Pacific War. Unlike most Pacific island battles after Guadalcanal, it was not just the Japanese digging in and waiting for the American advance. The Japanese fought a three-dimensonal battle. They launched a major counter offenive aimed at reducing the American bridgehead and capturing General MacArthur. The Japanese even committed paratroopers. And unlike Guadalcanal, the Japanese had not only substantial and well-armed forces in play, but the full might of the Imperial Fleet would be committed. It would also be the last air battles before the Japanese turned to full scale Kamakazee tactics. Despite the importance of the battle for Leyte, it is surely the least covered of the important Pacific island battles. One author writes, "The land campaign for Leyte involved more than two hundred thousand American soldiers, far more than the number of sailors and Marines who fought the three-day Battle of Leyte Gulf. These soldiers, many of whom spent the entire four months deep in heavy jungles, fighting in spite of typhoons and the rainy season, basically destroyed the fabric of the planned Japanese defense of the entire Philippines. For the Japanese High Commnd had decided, albeit late, that rather than fight the decisive battle for the Philippines on Luzon, it woud be fought on Leyte." [Prefer] The American Army forces advanced steadily. The Battle of Leyte was fought for more than 2 months. The fighting over rugged terraine was vicious and the Japanese resisted the American advance tenciously . The terraine precented the Army from bringing its firepower fully to bear. American air power could, however, hammer the most remote Japanese position. Navy F6F Hellcats and P-51 fighters from land air fields played a major role in the fighting. The Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and were well dug into hillside positions defended by pill boxes and casemates as well as natural caves. The climax of the battle occurred with the ferrocious fighting at Break Neck Ridge and nearby Kilay Ridges (early November). The battle was initiated by by the U.S. Army 21st Infantry Division. Japanese resistance from carefully prepared defensive positions was determined if not fanatical. The Japanese in the end could not match American fire power. The battle was joined by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32nd Infantry Division. Japanese units in the area was destroyed (December 14). The Americans thus pushed the Japanese 35th Army out of Leyte's central valley and into the islands mountain backbone. Bitter fighting ensued as the Americans forced the Japanese north. Further landings occurred at Ormoc, an important port (December 7). After breaking through at Break Neck Ridge and Kilay Ridges the advancing American units met less organized Japanese resistance as they moved north. The 1st Cavalry Division reached the coast (December 28). The 24th Division reduced thd the last Japanese positions from the northwest corner of Leyte on (December 28). They then met 32nd Division patrols (December 30). Scattered resistance continued another day (December 31).

Landings (October 20)

U.S. Army rangers began the invasion of Leyte (October 17). The US 6th Army under General Walter Krueger after three hours of naval bombardment began landings on beaches of the northern coast of Leyte Gulf--situated along the central coast of Leyte (October 20). The Japanese did not resist at the shoreline. Landing units quickly secured beachheads and began receive heavy vehicles massive supply deliveries. There would be no repeat of The Gudaacanal mistakes. X Corps in the north advanced on a 4-mile wide front between Tacloban airfield and the Palo River (October 20-23). XXIV Corps units further south landed across a 3-mile wide strand between San José and the Daguitan River. Advancing units there were hindered by swampy terrain. The 1st Cavalry Division took Tacloban, the provincial capital (October 21). General MacArthur with President Sergio Osmeña landed and announced thathe had returned and the beginning of their liberation to the Filipino people. Until air fields were secured, the advancing infantry had to depend on planes from esort carrier groups (Taffy 1, 2, and 3. ). At this point Japanese naval forces reached the Philippines and the climatic naval engagement of the Pacific War--the Battle of Leyte Gulf commenced. The Japanese made a substntial effort repel the invasion force, but failed.

Importance

The Battle for Leyte was the decisive ground battle of the Pacific War. Unlike most Pacific island battles after Guadalcanal, it was not just the Japanese digging in and waiting for the American advance. The Japanese fought a three-dimensonal battle. They launched a major counter offenive aimed at reducing the American bridgehead and capturing General MacArthur. The Japanese even committed paratroopers. And unlike Guadalcanal, the Japanese had not only substantial and well-armed forces in play, but the full might of the Imperial Fleet would be committed. It would also be the last air battles before the Japanese turned to full scale Kamakazee tactics.

Dimensions

Despite the importance of the battle for Leyte, it is surely the least covered of the important Pacific island battles. One author writes, "The land campaign for Leyte involved more than two hundred thousand American soldiers, far more than the number of sailors and Marines who fought the three-day Battle of Leyte Gulf. These soldiers, many of whom spent the entire four months deep in heavy jungles, fighting in spite of typhoons and the rainy season, basically destroyed the fabric of the planned Japanese defense of the entire Philippines. For the Japanese High Commnd had decided, albeit late, that rather than fight the decisive battle for the Philippines on Luzon, it woud be fought on Leyte." [Prefer]

Terraine

The American Army forces advanced steadily. The Battle of Leyte was fought for more than 2 months. The fighting ws initially in Leyte's Central Valley, but as it movd in the islnd's rugged backbone, the terrine becme increasingly difficult. The Japanese abndind the south and thus the fighting ocure in the central and northern area. The fighting in the rugged mountaneous area was vicious and the Japanese resisted the American advance tenciously . The terraine precented the Army from bringing its firepower fully to bear. And this was furher complicated by a typhoon which pelted the island with torrential rains and turned primitive roads into rivers of mud. The Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and were well dug into hillside positions defended by pill boxes and casemates as well as natural caves.

Air Power

Japanese airpower in the Central Pacific had been badly danage by the Battle of the Philippines Sea (June 1944). As aesult of the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, the Japanese lost carriers and most of its remaining contungnt of experinces pilots. It meant that the surviving Japanese carriers no longer had substantial air components and expeienced flyers. The Japanese did have land based aircraft on the Philippines as well as Formosa (Taiwan) and the Ryukyu Islands. The later two posed a danger as they could could support the defense of the Philippines. To deal with this congency, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet began a series of carrier raids on Japanese fcilities in the Western Pcigic (October 12). The Japanese command activated Shō-Gō 2, thinkig that the Americans were preparing to invade Formosa. It was a contest between land based and carrier aircraft. Land based aircraft had advantages over carrier aircraft in that air bases can not be sunk. But the quality of the aircraft and pilots were not equal. The 3rd Fleets carriers destroyed some 600 Jpanese aircraft in 3 days, virtually eliminating Japanese air strength in the Western Pacific. The Fifth Air Force comnded by Kenney provided the aerial spearhead for MacArthur's island hopping campaign. As the Ameicans seized airbases in the Phillippines it added to the air cover initially provided by the carriers and than expanded into a major force. It became a key element in the steady American drive and in Ormoc Bay brought Japanese badly damaged Japanee resupply efforts (November 11). . They were able to devastate the Japanese attempts to reenforce Leyte as well as attempts to mass forces to stop the Americans advances. American air power couldcould hammer the most remote Japanese position. Navy F6F Hellcats and P-51 fighters from land air fields played a major role in the fighting. MacArthur chose Leyte in part to secure land airbases from which American airpower could support the Luzon landings. Teraine and weather caused the Leyte air bases to be disappointing. as a result, a whole new campaihn was launched to take Mindoro south of Luzon. Air bases there proved more effective.

Filipino Guerrillas

The Filipino guerrilla groups played an important role in the Leyte campaign. After the landings they begame atached to the Sixth Army corps and divisions. Yhey were active in scouting, intelligence, and combat operations. The first goal of the landings were to seize Tacloban and Dulag. Colonel Ruperto Kangleon guerrilla units with significant American supplies and support went into action for the first time. They blew up bridges behind Japanese lines to block Japanese reinforcements, harassed Japanese patrols, and sabotaged Japanese supply and ammunition depots. Scouting reports provided invaluable information on enemy troop movements and dispositions.

The Sixth Army

The Skxth Army in the inital phae of the battle had been activated from units of the Eighth Army on New Guinea. It consisted of two corps. The X Corps included the armored 1st Calvalry Diviion and the 24th Infabtry Division. The XXIV Corps included the 7th and 96th Infantry Division. The 6th Ranger Battalion was also part of the 6th Army. ftervlanding, the American force joined up with the Filipino gurrillas. As the Japanese reinforced Leyte, additional Army Divisions were committed to the battle, expanding the 6th Army. Eventually strength reached 200,000 Americans and 3,000 Filipino guerrillas. The Sixth Army was commanded by Prussian-born Gen. Walter Krueger (1881–1967). He rose from the ranks to become a general officer. He was deployed to New Guinea where after victories there was assigned to oversea the libertion of first Leyte and than Luzon.

Central Valley (October 20-early-November)

The heart of the Leyte Campaign was the struggle for the islands' central valley which the Americans entered with the landings in Leyte Gulf. The Cental Valley was located mostly in centrl and northern Leyte. The Japanese had with drawn to the north and central areas of the island which iswhere the campaign was fought. The U.S. Sixth Army launched its advance from the east. The battle was fought out in torrential rains and over difficult terrain. The advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. The Central Va;lley was located primarily to the west and north of the American beach head. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for two months, the Americans were in control.

Southern Leyte Central Valley

The Southern Leyte Vlley lay astride the invasion beachhead in central Leyte. The Sixth Army after the landings made made steady progress inland. The Japanese had expected the Americas to land on Luzon. Only about 16,000 men were thus on Leyte. Yamashita was drawing forces from the various islands to bolster his defense of Luzon. Resistance on Leyte was thus at first only sporadic and not well uncoordinated. As part of X Corps the American 1st Cavalry Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge in the north entered the provincial capital of Tacloban on the second day of the invasion (October 21). Gen. MacArthur from Tacloban presided over a ceremony to restore Filipino civil government to Leyte (October 23). The Division (1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades) etnlished a holding action to prevent a Japanese counterattack from Leyte's mountainous interior and to get their equipment and logistics organized. Once this was accomplished, the 1st Cavalry began to attack. The X Corps and beachhead left flank was the 24th Infantry Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving drove inland encountering heavy Japanese resistance. Several days of around the clock followed. The 24th Infantry Division (19th and 34th Infantry Regiments) expanded the beachhead and seized the high ground dominating the entrance to the northern Leyte Valley. Both regiments after a 7-day tank-infantry advance supported by artillery, rapidly droveup the the Leyte Valley and were close to the coast and the port of Carigara (November 1). The 2nd Cavalry Brigade captured Carigara (November 2) The drive through the northern Leyte Valley inflicted some 3,000 Japanese casualties. This meant only one major port on Leyte was left in Japanese hands--—Ormoc in the West. From the XXIV Corps beachhead in central Leyte Gen. Hodge had sent his two divisions (the 7th and 96th Divisions) into the southern Leyte Valley, which had four already prepared airfields and a large Japanese supply center. Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley's 96th Infantry Division targeted Catmon Hill, a 1,400 ft (430 m) promontory, the highest point in the beachhead rea and which the Japanese were using as an observation and firing poitiom to target the beachead and landing craft. With the support of artillery and naval gunfire, the 96th Div. slogged through swamps south and west of the high ground at Labiranan Head. After a three-day fire, the 382nd Infantry Regiment took the major Japanese supply base at Tabontabon, 5 mi (8.0 km) inland October 28). This affected subsequent Japanese resistance as supplies began to run out. Four battalions (two each) from the 381st and 383rd Infantry Regiments attacked up opposite sides of Catmon Hill againsr fierce Japanese resistance, finally seizing the hight point (October 31). After Catmon was taken and the mop-up completed, the Ameicans found 53 pillboxes, 17 caves, and several heavy artillery positions. On the left of XXIV Corps and the american beachead, the 7th Infantry Division commnded by under Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold moved inland targeting four Japanese airfields, one of the primary targets of the invasion. They were located between the small towns of Dulag and Burauen. The 184th Infantry Reiment took Dulag airfield (October 21). The 32nd Infantry Regiment cleared both sides of the Calbasag River. The fight for the airfields and village was intense, but the Japanese outnumbrs and laking firepower and air cover. On the relatively flat ground, the Americans orgamized flying wedges of tanks which cleared the way for the advancing infantry. At Burauen, the 17th Infantry Regiment encountered spider holes and suicidal attacks. Japanes soldiers rushed the American tanks and presed explosive charges against the armored hulls. The 32nd Infantry killed more than 400 Japanese at Buri airfield. Two battalions of the 184th Infantry patrolled the corps' left flank as the battles for the airfields raged. The 17th Infantry, with the 184th's 2nd battalion attached, turned north toward Dagami, 6 mi (9.7 km) north of Burauen airfield. The Americans resorted to flamethrowers to root the enemy out of pillboxes and a cemetery. The americns secured Dagami (October 30). Gen. Makino commanding the Japoanese defense had to abandon his command post. The 32nd Infantry's 2nd Battalion, preceded by the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, drove 15 mi (24 km) south along the east coast to Abuyog to probe the Japanese defenses (October 29). They found the Japanese had abandoned the south. They then moved west crosing the mountins and controlled the approaches to Baybay (November 3). This brought the Americans to the southern shore of Ormoc Bay. It also mean tht much of the southern Lryte Vlley was in American hands.

Japanese Response

The Japanese saw the Philippines as the key battle of the Pacific war. The Philippines in American hands would essentially cut the Home Islands off from the resources in the Southern Resource Zone--the reason they had gone to war. It would also provie the staging area needed for the final American assault on the Home Islands. Thus like the Marianas, the Japanese would make a major effort to hold the Philippines. This included an air, sea, and land effort.
Air assault (October 24): The Japanese had airfields not only in Leyte, but on Luzon and other islands. And as the Sixth Army rapidly pushed deep into Leyte from the beachhead along the eastern coast, the Japanese struck back in the air (October 24). A coordinated air attack with 150 to 200 aircraft converge on the beachheads and shipping, primarily from Luzon. But aas in the Marianas, Japanese aviation proved to have declined substantially, both in the quality of their craft and in the comptemce of their pilots. Detected by radar, some 50 American land-based aircraft rose to intercept. The number was small becuse the Americans were just beginning to set up operations in the newly acquired airfields seized from the Japanese. Because of the superority of American aircraft nd pilot training, the american air men shot down anout 75 Japanese planrs, estimates of the actul number varied. The Japanese continued day and night air raids (October 25-28). They damaged supply dumps ashore and targetting shipping in Leyte Gulf. American counterattacks from 3rd Fleet carriers hitting Japanese airfields destroyed much of Japan's air strength. This ended conventional air raids, but caused the Jpanese to shift to the first orgnized kamikaze attacks. They sank the USS St. Lo, an escort carrier and damaged many other vessels.
Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23-26): The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the greatest great naval battle in history, it would also prove to be the last epic naval battle of history. It was the last major fleet action--engagement where opposing battleships faced each other and slugged it out with their big guns. It was a desperately fought series of actions. The Imprrial Japanse Navy essentially decided to pit its battleships against the American carriers. Japan had begun the war with a stratgy based in carrier warfare, but by 1944 the Imperial Navy was forced to rely on its battleships against an overwealming american carrier force. The Battle for Leyte Gulf occurred October 23-26, 1944. The Japanese drew up a highly complex strategy to throw virtually the entire remaining Imperial fleet in a desperate attempt to oppse the American invasion of the Philippine Islands. The battle evolved in four separate actions thayt both side found difficult to coordinate in the furious battles that ensyed. Once the American landings at Leyte Gulf began the Japanese ordered three separate forces to oppose the Americans. The Japanese Cental Force or main force sailed through the Philippines to reach the American landings at Leyte. It was spotted and intercepted by American carrier from Task Force 38. It was mauled in the Sibuyan Sea. The giant Nustachi was sunk. It turned back, but was not destroyed. The Japanese Southern Force tried tried to reach Leyte through the Surigao Strait. They were intercepted by American battleships, some of which had been raised from Pearl Harbor. This proved to be the greatest surface action since Jutland in World war I and the last important action between battleships in history. American destroyers and battleships using radar in a night action virtually wiped out the Southern Force. Next the Northern Force which was a carrier force meant to decoy Halsey's Third Fleet was spotted. Halsey immediately raced to engage this force. It was descimated in an engagement off Cape Engaño. Meanwhile the Japanese Central Force had turned around and was approaching Leyte Gulf. Unprotected by the Third Fleet, the Japanese would have wreaked havic on the troop ships and supply vessels. The only force between Leyte Gulf was a small group of American escort carriers and destroyers. The esort carriers were supporting the landings and protecting the invasion fleet from submarine attack. They did not have armour piercing bombs needed for attacks on battleships. Somehow this force managed to turn around the Japanese Central Force in an action off Samar, although at great cost. After the battle the Imperial Fleet no longer existed as a creditable naval force.
Army reinforcemets: In most of the island campaigns, a Japanese island garisons fought it out with the Americans without any hope of reinforcement and resupply. This waa not the case on Leyte. The Japanese rushed reinforcements to the Ormoc Bay area from Luzon on the western side of the island. At the tie the Americans landed, there were only some 16,000 Japanese troops on Leyte. Lt. Gen. Suzuki Sosaku, apparently convinced that the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf (24–25 October) had seriously weakened the Americans, slipped 45,000 reinforcements onto Leyte. Communction betwee the Japanese Navy and army were nortoriouly poor. Sosaku apparently was influenced by propagabda broadcasts rather than a realistic assesment of the disasterous losses suffered by the Imperial fleet.

Northern Leyte Central Valley

as the Americans prepred to move into the northern ara of the Central Valley, they faced strongly reinforced Jpanese opposition. Mac Arthur had expected to face only mopping up operations after defeating the relatively small garrison that they believed to exist on Leyte. The Japanese reinforcements significantly altered the American battle plan. Krueger's Sixth Army had to now prepare for extended combat in the mountains to the west. MacArthur decided to commit three reserve divisions to Leyte. This extended MacArthur's operations schedule for the Philippine campaign back as well as the War Department's deployment plans for the Pacific. The 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions linked up at Carigara early in the campign (November 2). This shocked the Japanese and climxed the major opening drive of the Leyte campaign. After only 17 days of combat operations, the Sixth Army had achieved its first and second phase opertionl objectives, in addition a third-phase objective -- the port of Abuyog. And elements of the 7th Division had crossed the island controlled approaches to Baybay on the western coast. This meant that outhern Leyte was controlled by the Americans, some Leyte planners were not sure of achieving. The one key component to the Leyte puzzle was the Ormoc Valley in the west. Gen. Krueger prepared a giant pincer operation, with X Corps forces moving south through the rugged mountains and XXIV Corps units pushing north along the western shore. Krueger mobilized his reserve forces, the 32nd and 77th Infantry Divisions. MacArthur activated the 11th Airborne Division. The 21st RCT pulled out from the Panaon area to rejoin the 24th Division and were replaced by a battalion of the 32nd Infantry. The 34th Infantry Regiment moved out from west of Carigara (November 3) given the mission of clearing the northern coast before turning south toward Ormoc into the mountains. The 1st Battalion soon encountered stiff resistance from a heavily fortified ridge along the highway. The 63rd Field Artillery Battalion cleared the ridge with withering artillery fire the Japanese could not match. This allowed 34th Infantry to proceed unopposed through the town of Pinamopoan. They seized heavy weapons abandoned by the Japanese. They halted halted at the point where Highway 2 turns south into the mountains.

Mounaneous Backbone: Breakneck and Kilay Ridge (early-November)

The Americans pushed the Japanese 35th Army out of Leyte's central valley and into the islands mountain backbone. The climax of the battle for Leyte occurred with the ferrocious fighting at Break Neck Ridge and nearby Kilay Ridges (early-November). The battle was initiated by by the U.S. Army 21st Infantry Division (November 7). This was the first sustained combat on Leyte. It began as the 21st Division moved into the mountains along Highway 2 (the Pinamopoan-Ormoc highway), near Carigara Bay. The fresh regiment, with the 19th Infantry's 3rd Battalion attached, immediately ran into a strong position set up by the newly arrived Japanese 1st Division. They hastily erected an east-west blocking position across the road, anchored on a network of strong points built of heavy logs available locally. There were interconnecting trench lines and large numbers of spider holes. The Americans called it 'Breakneck Ridge' and the Yamashita Line. Japanese resistance was determined if not fanatical. The Japanese in the end could not match American fire power. The battle was joined by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32nd Infantry Division. If the Japanese resistance was not enough, a typhoon struck Leyte (November 8). Heavy rain hit Leyte for several days. The resulting mud greatly impeded American progress, especially the movement of vehicles and heavy equipment. The tphhon and winds added falling trees and mud slides to the deadly enemy defenses. Supply deliveries were held up. The 21st Infantry continued its slow attavk on theVjpanese poitions. They were often halted. Units constantly had to withdraw and recapture hills that had been previously taken at great cost. The Americans finally managed to seize the approaches to Hill 1525 2 mi (3.2 km) to the east. This forced the Japanese to stretch out their defensive lines to a 4 mi (6.4 km) front along Highway 2. And indoing so they had to weaken them. It took this massive American attacking force a month to break through and destroy the Japanese units. Five days of intense combat against the solid Japanese hill positions and two nights of repulsing enemy counterattacks proved costly and with no real gain. The 21st Division's commander Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, devised a double envelopment plan. The 19th Infantry's 2nd Battalion was ordered to swing east around Hill 1525 behind the enemy right flank and to cut back to Highway 2, 3 mi (4.8 km) south of Breakneck Ridge'. The 34th Infantry's 1st Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford was ordered to attack the Japanese left flank to the west. They had to ross water near the Carigara area to a point 2 mi (3.2 km) west of the southward turn of Highway 2 and thn moved it inland. They used 18 LVTs of the 727th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They crossed a ridge line and the Leyte River, they approached the enemy left flank at 900 ft (270 m) on Kilay Ridge, the highest point behind the Japanese line. Both attacking American battalions slowed by Japanese resistance and heavy rains reached their positions, only about 1,000 yd (910 m) apart on opposite sides of Highway 2 (November 13). The two battalions attacked, but filed to take the hills. It took Clifford's battalion 2 weeks in the mud and rain to clear the Japanese defenses on the slope of Kilay Ridge. The battaliom finally took the Ridge wich overlooked the Highway (December 2). At this point the 32 Division took over. The Battalion suffered heavily, but the Japanese losses were far higher, presumably by artillery fire than constantly pounded the Japanese positions. It took 2more weeks for the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32nd Division to break through the Breakneck–Kilay Ridge area (December 14). Logistical problems became a major problem duting the fight for Breakneck Ridge. Mountainous terrain and heavy rain, and impassable roads made it impossible to deliver needed supplies over impassaible roads. The Sixth Army transportation units improvised resupply methods (Navy landing craft, tracked landing vehicles, airdrops, artillery tractors, trucks, even carabaos and hundreds of barefoot Filipino bearers). The 727th Amphibian Tractor Battalion made daily, often multiple, trips with ammunition and rations between Capoocan and Calubian. From Calubian, the 727th tractors would navigate the Naga River to Consuegra and then traverse overland to Agahang. On their return trip, they would evacuate the casualties. This slowed the pace of assaults on the heavily defended ridgelines (December 14)

Ormoc (December 7)

Ormoc was an important port along the western coast. The Japanese used it to resupply the Japnese units continuing to oppose he American advance on Leyte. And the Ormoc Valley became the center of Japanese reistance on the island. The battle for Ormoc began with a naval battle after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Japan was running reinformcemnts and supplies from Manila into Leyte through Ormac using fast fast destoyer transports capable of 40 knots. These resupply convoys helped build up the ground forces on the ilnd. The Japaneseorganized two convoys on two days. The destroyer transports of the first convoy were to offload their cargo, then double back to the second convoy and also escort it. this doubld the the anti-aircraft fire power. The Japanes had about 40 planes providing air over. This time the Ameicans caught the doubled up convoy at sea and threw 350 aircraft at it. They sunk seven destoyers, five transports, a minesweeper, and a subchaser. Three destroyers survived, but were sunk t Manila two days later. The American 77th Division landed near Ormoc about a month later (December 7). The landings surprised the Japanese The 77th Divisio landed at Deposito and launched the campaign for Ormoc and the Ormoc Valley. , drove north and seized Ormoc (December 11). There was a tough fight at Cogon. A two prong attack cut the main road, cptured the important Valencia airfield andthen headed for the Libungo road junction, clode to where they liked up with thr 1st Calvalry Division (December 21). The 77th Division then turned west toward Palompon. [77th Division Association, p. 139.] Before reaching it, an LVT Task Force (1st Battalion, 305th Infantry) seized the town (Decembr 21). Elements of the 96th Division attacked and destroyed Japanese paratroops who dropped on and captured Buri airfield near Burauen (Decmber 6-10). After a major land and air battle, Ormoc was secured. The Japanese on Leyte were finlly cut off. They were no longer able to reinforce and resupply Leyte. And the suviving troops were dispered into small units.

Far North (December 28-31)

The fall of Palompon was essentially the end of the Leyte campaign and attention shiftd to Luzon. Fighting on Leyte, however, continued for some time, tieing down American units on Leyte. After breaking through at Break Neck Ridge and Kilay Ridges the advancing American units met less organized Japanese resistance. The 1st Cavalry Division reached the coast (December 28). The 24th Division reduced the last Japanese positions from the northwest corner of Leyte on (December 28). They then met 32nd Division patrols (December 30). Scattered resistance continued another day (December 31). The campaign lasted longer than MacArthur had expected, largely because the rugged terraine and Japanese decission to reinforced the garison and fight it out on Leyte. Small groups of Japanese soldiers continue to reist and raid American positions for some time.

Losses

The Japanese in the defense of Leyte suffered the near destruction of the Imperial Fleet -- 26 major warships, 46 large transports, and hundreds of merchantmen. The Jpanese losses on Leyte itself were also substntial. The Imperial Army lost four divisions as well as several independent combat units. Some 3,504 Americans died on Leyte and and 12,000 wounded. Some 50,000 Japanese are believed to have died on Leyte. The number wounded us unknown, inpart because badly wounded men commonly committed suiside. Very few Japanese soldiers surrendered.

Impact

The loss of four divisions were substantial, but not catclysmic. But at this stage of the war, the Japanese were hard pressed to move and supply divisions in forward areas. The fighting on Leyte also resulted in the loss of about half of Japan' land-based air capability in the Philippines. Yamashita still had 250,000 troops on Luzon. But the army, air, and naval losses on and aroun Leyte narrowed, significantly changed Gen. Yamashita's capabilities. Thus the loss essentilly made it impossible for Gen. Yamashita to make any serious attempt to defend Luzon. He did not even oppose the American landings tbLinguayan Bay. Yamashita was only able to fight a passive defense of Luzon. His goal becme only a delaying campaign to drag out the fighting and cause as many American casualties as possibe. But the Japanese had esentilly lost the Philippines on Leyte.

Sources

77th Division Association. Ours to Hold it High: The History of the 77th Division (Infantry JournalmPress: Washingon, D.C., 1947).

Prefer, Nathan N. Leyte 1944: The Soldier's Battle (2012), 336p.

Created: 3:52 AM 1/15/2016
Last updated: 3:52 AM 1/15/2016