World War II: Korea

World war II Korea
Figure 1.--This young Korean, Yang Kyoungjong, had one of the strangest odyssies of World War II. The Japanese who occupied Korean drafted him at the age of 18 years and deployed him to Manchuko (Japanese occupied Manchuria) (1938). The Japanese generally used Koreans in labor batallions. (The Americans encountered these Korean labor brigades in the Pacific.) He was then captured by the Soviet Red Army during the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol (1939). Like other captured Japanese and Koreans, the Soviers sent hom to a Gulag labor camp in Siberia. The Soviets after the German invasion (1941), began drafting inmates of the Gulag, desperate for men to stop the Germans. Yang was thus drafted into the Red Army (1942). The German Wehrmacht captured him at the Battle of Kharkov in the Ukraine (1943). The Germans then used him in one of the Ost Battalions made up of Soviet POWs to defend the Atlantic Wall in France (1944). It was there at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula not far from Utah Beach that American paratroopers took him prisoner, thinking he was Japanese. After a time as a POW in Britain one report suggests that he was forcibly repatrauted to the Soviet Union like other members of the Ost Battalions. Most of these men were then shot by the NKVD. We are not sure if he was actually sent back to the Soviet Union, but he managed somehow to emigrte to the United States (1947). Here he made his living as a barber in Chicago.

Korea was not an independent country during World War II, but a totally subjegated Japanese colony. It proved of considerable importance in supporting the Japanese wae effort. The Japanese after seizing Korea (1909) actively supressed Korean culture and nationalism. Thus there was no independent Korean participation in World War II. Korea's primary importance was as a source of raw materials for the Japanese war effort. Allied POWs were used as slave labor in Korean mines. The Japanese heavily industrialized the north and thus Korea was also an important source of war production outside the effective range of American bombers. The War in China was a factor in Korea's industrialization. Industrialization also mean that more of the Korean rice harvest was consumed by Korean workers rather than exported back to the Home Islands. Korea before the War had been an important source of rice needed to meet domestic demand in the Japanese Home Islands. Korean rice would have been especially imoortant because it was more difficult for the Americans submarines to interdict shipping in the Inland Sea. The only problem was that the surplus available for export declined sharply during the War. Industrilization in northern Korea was only one reason. The War in China helped raise food prices and the peasants benefitted. This they were able to hold back more of their harvest for heir own consumption. A drought in 1939 affected the havest. Most of the resulting surplus harvest was needed to feed the Japanese military forces occupying Korea. Another drought in 1942 virtually ended Korean rice shipments to the Home Islands. [Collingham, p. 234.] The Japanese conducted some of their research on weapons of mass destruction in Korea, including their nuclear program. There was a uranium mine in northern Korea. Considerable differences exist on just how much progress the Japanese made. The Japanese conscripted Koreans as laborors in the War. Some of these laborors were encountered by Americans on Pacific islands beginning with Guadacanal. We are not sure just how these labor units were treated. We are also not sure to what extent Koreans were drafted into the Japanese military. Apparently the Japanese did not entirely trust the Koreans. The Japanese seem to have consripted Koreans mostly to serve in labor brigades. The ypinf Kprean here is just one such example. One of the best publicized Japanese attriocties of the War is the Japanese Army's use of Koreans as 'comfort women'. Syngman Rhee formed a Korean Government in exile. He attracted little international attention before the War, but this changed after Pearl Harbor. Kim Il Sung claimed to have played an important role in the liberation of Korea, but there is little evidence to substantiate this. The Soviets and Americans agreed to split the occupation of Korea at the 38th parallel. Japanese civilians were quickly repatriated after the War.

Japanese Colonization (1910)

The Japenese even before the Koreans tried to close themselves off from the world. Commodore Perry forced the Japanese to open to the West (1853). This led to the Menji Restoration and Japan's enbrace of Westrern technology. The Government fostered industry and developed a modern army and navy. This mean that by the end of the century, Japan was the most powerful country in Asia. Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War (1895). Japan next defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Competition between China, Russia, and Japan was what allowed much smaller Korea to maintain its independence. Japan gradually expanded its commercial influence in Korea. As the dominant military power in northeastern Asia, Japan was able to annexed and colonize Korea (1910). The Japan began a brutal attempt to extinguish Korean culture. Japanese authorities did not permit Koreans to speak their own language in public. Schools were conducted in Japanese. Korean history or literature was not taught. Authorities seized both land and harvests from Koreans. A peaceful protest by Koreans including many students (March 1, 1919) led to a brutal crackdown. Many protestors were shot or inprisoned. Koreans could only preserve their culture and language privately in their homes. Interesyingly, the Japanese in the early colonial period did not expell Christian missionaries. Chistinity gradually became associate with resistance to Japanese domination. Korea was not only important strategically to China, but it had important natural resources. Raw materials in the north served as a basis for industry which Japan promoted. The agricultural south became an important source od rice and other agicultural products, although this declined over time as rice was needed to feed the expanding industrial work firce in the north and the Japanese military occupation force.

Economic Importance

Korea was not an independent country during World War II, but a totally subjegated Japanese colony. It proved of considerable importance in supporting the Japanese wae effort. The Koreans themselves had no say in the matter. The Japanese after seizing Korea (1909) actively supressed Korean culture and nationalism. Thus there was no independent Korean participation in World War II. Korea before the War had been an important source of rice needed to meet domestic demand in the Japanese Home Islands. Japanese was not seld suffient in food production, thus securing foreign sources of rice and other food was a priority for Japan. Korea's primary importance was as a source of raw materials for the Japanese war effort. The War in China was a factor in Korea's industrialization. The Japanese heavily industrialized the north and thus Korea was also an important source of war production outside the effective range of American bombers. Industrialization also mean that more of the Korean rice harvest was consumed by Korean workers rather than exported back to the Home Islands. Korean rice would have been especially imoortant because it was more difficult for the Americans submarines to interdict shipping in the Inland Sea. The only problem was that the surplus available for export declined sharply during the War. Industrilization in northern Korea was only one reason. The War in China helped raise food prices and the peasants benefitted. This they were able to hold back more of their harvest for heir own consumption. A drought in 1939 affected the havest. Most of the resulting surplus harvest was needed to feed the Japanese military forces occupying Korea. Another drought in 1942 virtually ended Korean rice shipments to the Home Islands. [Collingham, p. 234.]

Korean Workers

Korean migration to Japan increased after Japan annexed Korea (1910). Annexation removed emigration restritions. Job opportunities and highr wages attracted Koreans. Migration accelerated after 1930. By the time that Wotld War I broke out in Europe, nearly 1 million Korean imigrants were living in Japan, well over 5 percent of the Korean popultion. Before annexation, Korean immigration was negligible. As aesult of the invasion of China (1937) and then launching the Pacific War by attacking Pearl Harbor (1941), lrgevnumbervoif Jpanese workers were coincripted for militaybservice as Japsn expanded its military forces. This created an increasingly serious labor shortage for the Japanese war economy. Until this time, Kreans had emigrated to Japan mostly on their own initiative. With the Japanese pursuit of war and increasing labor shortages , the Governent began promoting official recruitment of Koreans to work at first by contracting civilian agents. Eventually the Government began to use security forces to coerce Koreans. Japanese Governor-General uniaki Koiso ordered conscription of Koreans for labor to support the Japanese war economy. After launching the Pacific War, the Government expanded efforts. The Government added Koreans to the National Mobilization Law (1942). This meant Koreans were conscripted to work in factories and mines in Korean, Manchukuo (Manchuria), and Japan itself. This often meant involuntary relocation. The Japanese conscripted some 5.4 million Koreans workers, a sizeable segment of the population. About 0.7 million of that total were deported to Japan. Some were relocated to Karafuto Prefecture (southern Sakhalin--now part of Russia). The conscript deportees were often treated brutally, forced to work under dreadful, often dangerous conditions. [Rummel, Death, p. 150.] Koreans seem to have been somewhat better treated than other nationlities the Japanese used for forced labor. Even so, a combination of long hours, inadequate food, housing, and medical care resulted in substanbtial mortalities. Some 60,000 Korean consript workers died in Japan, about 10 percent of the deportees (1939-45). The overall death toll including those conscripted for work in Korea and Manchuko is unknown, estimates include 0.3-0.8 million. [Rummel, Statistics] The immigrants before the War and the forced worker conscription during the War meant that over 2 million Koreans were living in Japan at the end of the war. American occupation authorities gave them the opportunity to return home (1946). Some 1.3 million chose to retun to Korea while almost 0.7 million deciding to remain in Japan. [Ryang] Often this was a matter of the degree of aculturation and length of time that they had been in Japan. Their descebdents are now the Zainichi Korean community. A 1982 survey by the Korean Youth Association showed that conscripted laborers accounts for 13 percent of first-generation Zainichi Koreans. The 43,000 ethnic Koreans deported to work in Karafuto (southern Sakalin) were trapped there after the War. The Soviet Union after declaring war occupied Karafuro (Auhust 1945). Unlike the Americans, the Soviets refused to repatriate the Korean workers either to Japan or Korean, including North Korea which they alo occupied. They were in essence trapped in Sakhalin, stateless. They became the ancestors of the Sakhalin Koreans. [Lankov]

Slave Labor

Allied POWs were used as slave labor in Korean mines. The Japanese conscripted Koreans as laborors in the War. Some of these laborors were encountered by Americans on Pacific islands beginning with Guadacanal. We are not sure just how these labor units were treated. One of the best publicized Japanese attriocties of the War is the Japanese Army's use of 'comfort women'. The number of comfort women is unknown. They were recruited from countries the Japanese occupied during the war. An unknown number of Korean women were forced into sexual slsvery. The Japanese were able to destroy vast quantities of records before the Americans arived. They were often reported as nurses in oficial recoirds. Estimates range are 20,000-200,000 women. They were genealy recruited from rural areas with promises of fasctory employment. Unlike other countries from which comfort women were obtained, Korean males availed themselves of the services of the comfort stations.

Militay Conscription

It should not be thought that all Koreans resisted or objected to Japanese occupation. Some Koreans coming up through the Japanese controlled schools and reading Japanese controlled newspapers bought into the Japanese enterprise to destroy Korean national identity. This is not easy to assess, especially as these Koreans that did, attempted to hide it after the War. The Japanese did not draft Koreans into the military until very late in the war. The Japanese did not even permit Koreanenlisted men in the military until well after annexation (1910). Some Koreans had enrolled in the Imperial Japanese Army Academy even before annexation. They probably were intending to enter the Korean military. The most notable were members of the deposed Korean royal family, including Crown Prince Lieutenant General Yi Un and Princes Captain Yi Geon and Captain Yi Wu. The Japanese apparently did not trust the Koreans. And even when permitted very few Koreans volunteered at first. Only about 3,000 Koreans applied to enter the Imperial Japanese Army (1938). And the Japanese accepted a mere 400. We have no information on the vetting process, but it clearly was highly competitive. . Nor do we know what motivated the Koreans to volunteer. One would think patriotism was not a factor, although some Koreans may have after three decades come to identify with the Japanese imperial structure. More likely were the career opportunities afforded in comparison to the alternstives in the Japanese-controlled economy. The number of volunteers steadily increased, reaching 0.3 million (1943). we are not entirly sure why the number of volunteers increased so substantially, but military service may have been seen as preferable to labor conscription. The Japanese military, however, continued to be very dubious about the loyalty of the Korans, accepting only 2 percent if the volunteers despite the worsening military situation. Japan only began drafting Koreans for military service when the military reverses began to threaten the very existence of the Empire (1944). Some Koreans reached high ranks. Koreans include seven generals officers and substantial nimbers of field grade officers (Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors). And this was achived in the face institutionalized discrimination by the race-condciuous Japanese. . The Japanese did not conscript Koreans for militry service until late in the War, but we note Korean labor brigades. We are not sure just hw they were recruited. Perhaps it was done through labor recruitment/conscription and not the military conscription process. The young Korean here wjo wound up in the Whermacht is just one such example (figure 1) American Marines were the first to encounter Korean labor units and personnel. Some of them received military training, we think in the field, but this needs to be confirmed. The Marines landing on Guadacanal report incountering Korean lsbores who fleed into the jungle. They pprently had received little combat training and not incorporated inti the combvat structure. The situation was different on Tarawa, the first bloody bttle of the Centtal Pacific Campaign. A substantial portion of the Japanese garrison on the island (20 percent) was Korean laborers who had received combat training, probanly on Tarawa. And they like their Japanese comrads fought it out to the death iagainst an amfibious asault tht almost failed. The Japanese Army finaly began conscripting Korreans (April 1944). Koreans were already being drafted for civilian labor service. Before 1944, only about 18,000 Koreans were inducted by the army. Once military conscription began, the Any inducted 0.2 million Koreans. Japanese commanders were not always as trusting of the Koreans as Rear Admiral Keiji Shibazaki on Tarawa. The Japanese commander on Tinian, doubtful of the loyalties of 5,000 Korean laborers ordered themkilled in preparation for the American invasion. [Daws, p. 278.]

Japanese Weapons Research

The Japanese conducted some of their research on weapons of mass destruction in Korea, including their nuclear program. There was a uranium mine in northern Korea. Considerable differences exist on just how much progress the Japanese made.

Cairo Conference (November 1943)

The Allies held the Cairo Conference (November 1943). Chiang Kai-shek attended for China. As the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan, Stalin did not attend, but Roosevelt and Stalin continued on to Tehran to meet with Syalin. The Allies decided at Cairo to dissolve the Japanese Empire and to severe Japanese control of its former colonies. Formosa (Taiwan) would be returned to China. Korea would be given its independence under a trusteeship arrangement.

Government in Exile

Syngman Rhee formed a Korean Government in exile. He attracted little international attention before the War, but this changed after Pearl Harbor.

Communists

Kim Il Sung claimed to have played an important role in the liberation of Korea, but there is little evidence to substantiate this.

Yalta Conference (February 1945)

President Roosevelt was anxious at the Yalta Conference for the Soviets to enter the war againt Japan. His primary interest was to end the killing and conclude the War as rapidly as possible. Stalin needed less cajoling than the Americans relized. Joining the War gainst Japan offered the prospect of suzeable territorial gains as well as eliminating the only anti-Communist bastion in the Far East. He was not about, however, to divert resorces away from the finl destruction of NAZI Germany. Stalin pledged to enter the war 3 months after the end if histilitirs in Europe. President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin at the Yalta Conference agreed to establish an international trusteeship for Korea (February 1945). There had, however, been no detailed discusion on how to govern Korea after the War.

Japanese Desire to End the War

After the American seizure of Okinawa, the Japanese desperately wanted out of the War and to avoid at all cost an occupation by the Americans. They were still hopeful that an end to the war could be negotited and an occupation avoided. Thee were still sizeable undefeated forces in the field. Unfortunately for the Japanese, these forces were in Southeast Asia nd the Chinee mainland. With Oknawa in merican hands, nothing stood between the Home Ilands and the 5th Fleet nd the seembling Army and Mrine disions preparing to invade. The ststematic destruction ofJapnese citie by air and the worsening food shortage did not bring the Japanese to the peace table. They did attmpt to use the Soviet Union as an intermediary. Stalin was not helpful as he had already begun to preparing to attack the Japanese position in Manchuria. The Soviets did not reject the Japanee overturs, but simply ignored them. Thus the Japanese continued to cling on to the hope that Stalin might be of asistance. Other than approching the Soviets, the Japanese made no effort to end the War. The Japanese were so out of touch with reality that until the day of the Soviet invasion they continued to hope that Stalin might assist them. The Japanese made no effort to contact the Americans. Nor did they even respond to Amrican initiatives. They ignored the Potsdam Declaration, thinking that Allied action was not eminent and not knowing the Americans had perfected the atmomic bomb. As their cities were being reduced to ashes by conventional bombing, their war industries largly destroyed, and civilian rations being reduced to starvation levels, the primary Japanese response was to pour men and resources into the southern-most island of Kyushu in an effort to defeat an American invasion.

American Invasion Planning

American military planners after Okinawa began prepartions for the invasion of the Home Islands beginning with Kyushu. Little attention was given to Korea, but as plans were developed, Korea inevitably came up. And Army Chief of Staff decided tht the issue should be brought to President Truman's attention at Potsdam. Marshall who was with the President at Potsdam drafted a note asking for guidance on handling Korea (July 25). [Marshall] He obviously thought that Truman might want to raise the Korea issue at the Conference. Gen. MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, had already received instructions to prepare for occupying Japan. Shortly before Potsdam these orders were broadened to include Korea. Gen. MacArthur subsequently suggested that Tokyo and Seoul have first priority for occupation, Pusan second priority, and the Kunsan area on Korea's west coast, third priority. Gen. Marshall then informed the President that MacArthur should be able to land a division at Pusan on Korea's southern coast shortly after the end of the War. The other strategic areas in Korea, Marshall added, were Seoul, near the west coast, and Ch'ongjin, in the north on the Sea of Japan. Marshall expected Soviets if and when they participated in the War would occupy Ch'ongjin and would attack into Manchuria and perhaps into northern China. He thus considered it important for the United States to establish control over any areas to be occupied as soon as possible. [McGrath. Korean Conflit, pp. 26-27.]

Potsdam Conference (July 1945)

Korea was only briefly addressed at the Potsdam Conference. The principal topics were the Soviet timetable for entering the war against Japan and the American proclamation demanding Japan's unconditional surrender. Assuming Soviet entry in the War, the surrender of Japanese forces in Chima was considered. The Allied military representatives drew a tentative line across the map of Manchuria. The assumption were that the Japanese would soon surrender. The Soviets were to accept surrender of Japanese forces in the north. The initial draft ignored Korea, but since there were substantial Japanese forces in Korea, discussions eventually touched upon Korea [McGrath interviews] The major exchangs on Korea took place away from the conference table. The chief of the Soviet General Staff told General Marshall that Soviet military plans were to attack the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea after declaring war on Japan. He asked whether the Americans could operate in Korea shores to support the Soviet offensive. General Marshall replied that the United States planned no amphibious operation in Korea until Japan had been brought under control. The Chiefs of Staff developed ideas concerning the partition of Korea, Manchuria, and the Sea of Japan into U.S. and Soviet, these had no connection, however, with the subsequent partition of Korea. [McGrath. Korean Conflit, pp. 24-25.] The major outcome of the Potsdam Conference ws the Potsdam Declaration. The Americans and British, informed of the sucessful detonation of an atomic bomb at Trinity sir, issued a declaration demanding that Japan immediately surrender or face "prompt and utter destruction" (July 26). The Japanese did not respond. Some Japanese officials actually thought the Potsdam Declaration showed the success of their policy of bleeding the Americans. Although the Potsdam Declaration called for unconditional surrender, there was language providing for Japan eventually rehoining the community of nations. THis language caused some Japanese officials to see a weakening of the American will. Also and perhaps more impotantly to the Japanese, the Soviet Union did not sign the Declaration. Foreign Minister Suzuki decided to ignore it. He decided to wait for a response from the Soviets.

Atomic Bombs (August 1945)

The American Manhattan Program was initiated by President Roosevelt when work done by German physicists led to concern that the NAZIs might build an atomic bomb. Jewish and oher refugees fleeing the NAZIs made a major contribution to the success of the Manhattan Program. The first bomb was successflly tested at Alamagordo, New Mexico--Trinity Site (July 16, 1945. The Allies met in a Berlin suburb after the NAZI surrender to make dcisions about the occupation of Germany and defeating Japan. The Allied powers 2 weeks after the bomb was tested demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally, or warned of "prompt or utter destruction" (July 27). This became known as the Potsdam Declaration. The Japanese military was prepared to fight on rather than surender. The Japanese Government responded to the Potsdam Declaration with "utter contemp". The Japanese military continued feverish pland to repel the Ameican invasion of the Home Islands. Many Whermacht generals at the end of the War were anxious to surrnder to the Amreicans. One German General commanding forces westof Berlin after the War said, "We wondered why they didn't come." This was not the attitude of the Japanese military. I know of know memoir written by an important Japanese military officer expresing similar sntiments. Truman was not anxious to use the atomic bomb. He was anxious to end the War and limit Ameican casulties. For Truman the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration made up his mind. There have been many books and aticles published in both Japan and America about the atomic bomb. Japanese scholars have reserched the decission making process that led to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Almost always the focus is on Truman and Ameican military leasers. Rarely do Japanese authors address the role of Japanese political and military leaders. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9) and the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan (August 8).

Soviet Declaration of War (August 8, 1945)

Stalin as he promised Roosevelt and Churchill as well as Truman, declared war on Japan 3 months after VE-Day and launched a major offensive in Manchuria (August 8, 1945). This was 2 days after the United States fropped an atmoic bomb on Hiroshima. The Japanese has positioned substantial forces in Manchuria. They had hoped to capitalize on the German defeat of the Soviet Union. When this did not occur and the Pacific War bdgan to go against Japan, they began to draw down their forces in Mnchuria. This was especially the case when the United States began to pierce the inner defensive line and the possibility of an American invasion of the Home Islands became a real possibility. Thus by the time the Soviets attacked, the Japanese military position in Manchuria was a hallow shell. The Soviets had ammased a massive well-armed force. The American dropping of atomic bombs had shaken the Japanese, but the Soviet invasion may have been even more frightening, especially the prospect of a Soviet occupation which would have meant the end of the monarchy and the imposution of Communism. apan surrendered unconditionally (August 15, 1945). By this time the Japanese military situation in Manchuria had collapsed and the Red Army had reached Korea.

Soviet Invasion (August 8, 1945)

The Soviet Union after declaring war on Japan, launchd a massive offensive, attacking Japanese forces in Manchuria (August 8, 1945). The Japanese forces in Manchuria were at the beginning of the war some of the most battle hardened and well equipped in the Imperial Army. As the Pcific War evolved, the Japanese drew down forces from China, including Manchuria to defend thir iln conquests. And as the war went from bad to worst for Japan, they shifted troops and equipment, including air force units to the defense of the Home Islands, preparing for an American invasion. The Japanese had not only weakened their forces in Manchuria, but there was no effective defense strategy as the commanders in Tokyo focused on the growong American threat. The Red Army rapidly drove South and the Japanese, unlike in the Pacific, surrendered in large numbers. Ironically, the Japanese who could have urrendered to the Americans in the Pavific, would have been well treated and survived the War. The Japanese that surrendered to the Soviets in sharp contrast slaved in the dreadful conditions of Siberian Gulag labor camps for years and died in ;arg numbers.

Japanese Shock

The Japanese had been trying to use the Soviets to mediate an end to the War with the Americans. Suddenly the shock of the atomic bomb was conpounded with the Soviet invasion, both of which were completely unexpected. The surpise of the atomic bomb is understandable. The surprise of the Soviet invasion is much less understanable. The Japanese desired to create a world in which war and military might would determine intenational issues and boundaries. They in effect got just whnt they wanted. Why they thought that the Soviets would respect diplomtic niceties that they themselves rejected is dificult to understand. The Soviet invasion was both a surprise and stunningly effective.

Liberation: Two Power Occupation (August-September 1945)

Liberation for Korea came in the form of two power occpation and would take very different forms dpending on wheter Koreans lived in the north or south. The Soviet declaation of War and invasion of Manchuria (August 8-9) as well as the first signs of imminent Japanese collapse (August 10) dramatically changed U.S. Army planning from a massive opposed amphibious invasion to accepting the surrender of a defeated foe. Planners in the War Department Operations Division began to develop surrender procedures in General Order No. 1 for Gen. MacArthur to transmit to the Japanese Governmentr. The first paragraph of the order specified the nations and commands that were to accept the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East. [McGrath. Korean Conflit, p. 42.] This would also mean who would take posession of the huge stockpiles of Japanese armaments. Within days the first Red Army reached the Koren Peninula which was closer to Soviet Territory than large area of Manchuria. The rapidity with which Japanese forces collapsed in Manchria meant that the Soviets reached Korea first. U.S. troops landed in the south almost precisely 1 month after Soviet troops had entered northern Korea. Although the U.S. and Soviet occupations were supposed to be temporary, the division of Korea quickly became permanent as was the case in Germany. One unintended consequence of tis is that Korea and German would bcome test cases for the effectiveness of capitalism and communism during the Cold War. As the results were not very succesful for Communism, th two norders became hardend as the Communists atemoted to harden th birders to wall off their failure.

Japanese Repatriation

Japanese civilians were quickly repatriated after the War.One not extensively discussed topic is the repriation of overseas Japanese following the surrender. Many of the people involved were soldiers. Unlike the Germans at the end of the War, the Jaspanese still held territory throughout the Pacific, Southeast Asia, China (including Manchuria), and Korea. In adition to the military, there were also large numbers of civilians. German civilians repatriated after the War encountered the hatred of people in neigboring countries and suffered terribly. I am less certain about the experience of Japanese civilians. Japan began building an empire with the seizure of Formosa (Taiwan) in 1895 and Korea (1910). Part of Japan's colonial policy involved installing Japanese administrators, but there were also efforts to establish a Japanese population as well as to establish Japanese culture. The local population was, for example, required to learn and speak Japanese. The Japanese Government after seizing Manchuria (1931), promoted Japanese settlement, but with only limited success. I'm not sure about the number of civilians involved or about their interactions with the local population. Wehave noted references to over 4 million people, but this may include the Japanese military as well. Much of the transport was provided by the U.S. Navy. Most of the civilians repatriated came from Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria, but smaller numbers came from other places as well, such as Saipan. The Soviets entered the War after the Americans droped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Thus it was the Soviets who seized Mabchuria and Nortn Korea. Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Red Army suffered for years in the Soviet Gulag. I am not sure how civilians fared.

Post War Developments (1945-50)

The Japanese surrender to the Americans and Soviet invasion opened a new chapter in Korean history. The Soviets and Americans had agreed to split the occupation of Korea at the 38th parallel. The Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow to decide on just how to adminiter Korea (December 7, 1945). The foreign ministers decideed to establish a trusteeship for a 5-year period. This would provide time to set up a Korean provisional government and pre prepare for full independence. The foreign ministers also agreed to form a joint United States-Soviet commission to assist in organizing a single "provisional Korean democratic government" for a unified Korea. The Koreans themselves opposed the idea of a trusteeship. They wanted immediate control. Syngman Rhee who the Americans deffered to in the south used opposition to the trusteeship issue to consolidate a political base after he returned. The Korean Communists also objected, but deferred to Soviet intructions ordering them to support a trusteeship. The Korean Joint Commission met in Seoul (March 1946), bt made little headway. After several fruitless sessions, they adjourned indefinitely (October 1947). The Soviest insistence that only those 'democratic' parties and social organizations committed to the trusteeship plan would be be allowed to participate in the formation of a united Korean government. This was unacceptable to the United States. The United States saw that the Soviet proposal would hand over control of Korea to the Communists. Korea after more than a millenium of unity began two vey different developmnt tracts. There would be no further efforts to unify Korea until Stlin game Kim Il-sung a green light to invade South Korea and uify Korea by force leading to the Korean War (June 1950). It is no accodent that this occurred shortly after the Soviet nion developed its atomic bomb.

Sources

Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Press: New York, 2012), 634p.

Daws, Gaven. Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World war II in the Pcific (New York: William Morroiw & Co., 1994).

Lankov, Andrei. "Stateless in Sakhalin," The Korea Times (January 5, 2006).

McGrath, Lt. Paul C. U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict n.d.. OCMH draft MS.

McGrath, Lt. Paul C. Interviews: 1) Vice Adm. M. B. Gardner (January 28, 1953, the Pentagon. 2) Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Dir. of the Joint Staff, JCS, OSD, (January 27, 1953. Both in OCMH.

Marshall. Memo for President, delivered at Potsdam. (July 25, 1945). File OPD 370.9, Case 17/8.

Rummel, R.J. Death by Government.

Rummel, R.J. Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1990 (Lit Verlag: 1999).

Ryang, Sonia. Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2000).






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Created: 7:05 AM 10/15/2013
Last updated: 12:45 AM 8/17/2016