*** East German worker riots 1953








The Cold War: East German Worker Riots (June 1953)

East German worker riots
Figure 1.--Here we see West German boys assisting with relief supplies for refugees that crosed over to East Berlin and East German as a result of the Soviet suppression following the East German Worker riots in 1953. The wire service caption read, "Germans help Germans: Under this slogan they started in Celle [a German city] an ad campaign for all Lower Saxonia for refugees from the Soviet zone. The first step for the campaign which might be taken as an example came from the city council of Celle. The beginning of this aid-campign was a three-hours collection staged by 500 Celle children who collected during this time three truck-loads and a horse-drawn cart full of clothing, shoes, toys and houshold furniture and implements. Most of these things were as good as new."

The working class in Germany before the NAZIs had been heavily politicied by left-wing politicians. Thus many workers in the Soviet occupation zone were willing to give socialism a chance. Many would have acceoted Communist political control if they delivered on material benefits. Many in the Party believed that they would be able to unleased the productive engine of socialism. By the early-1950s, it ws clear tht this ws not happening. And it is notable ghat the first real opposition to the Communists camed from workers in whose named they claimec to govern. The 1953 East German worker uprising was the first in a series of violent uprisings that would periodically rock the Soviet Eastern European empire. Workers in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) began protesting working conditions conditions (June 17, 1953). Factory managers imposed unreasonable production set by DDR authorities quotas on (June 17). he uprising began as a demonstration against those quotas, but quickly spread to over 400 cities, towns, and villages throughout the DDR. The resulting riots threatened the very existence of the Communist East German regime. The spontaneous outburst shocked the leadership of of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as well as their Soviet masters. This was not how workers were expected to behave in a Socialist workers paradise. Stalin died March 5, 1953. The riots occurred only 3 months after his death and the Soviet empire was still in a state of turmoil adjusting to a new political reality without Stalin. It was East German workers which set off the event, but it was soon embraced by a wide cross-section of East German society. And as it developed, the demonstators began expressing concerns far beyond factory quotas. The movement began to express a much wider range of political and social issues--including free elections. This of course was anethma to the SED and the Soviets. And most shocking of all was when chants began to be heard like 'Death to Communism' and 'Long live Eisenhower!' One historians writes in his introduction, for the first time ever 'the proletariat had risen against the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'." [Ostermann] This was a critical turning pont in the Cold war. Living conditions and political oppression in the Soviet Union could be hidden from Western Communists and the freedom and affluence of the West could be hidden from the Soviet people. But Germany was different. East Germans could listen to West German radio and television at a time when the German Economic Miracle was taking hold. Some observers believe that the commercials may have been more influential than the programming. It was thus in divided Germany that the stark disparities between East and West became starkly apparent. The worker protests quickly turned violent. At the time as the workers were quickly supressed, the riots were not seen as particularly important. Some historians now believe that the impact of the riots were more significant than believed at the time. The confidence of the SED leadership including Walter Ulbricht was badly shaken. The East German workers were brutally suppressed. The Soviets while shocked, reacted immediately by sending tanks into the streets and ordering Red Army troops to fire on the demonstrators. At the time, the Soviet leadership was involved in a struggle for power following Stalin's death. The arrest of KGB Director Lavrentii Beria has been explained on his attitude toward Germany, although obviously other more practical matters were involved, namely the fear of other Politburo members for their saftey. Similar reactions occurred at different times in the Soviet satellite states: Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970, 1976, 1980)

The Stalin Note

The Socilist Unitb Party (SED) was the governuing Communist Party in East Germany. They supported German unificatiion, but showed no willingness in free democatic elections which if gleld mean that they would lose power. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko issued released a diplomatic note suggesting a sollution to the 'German problem' March 10, 1952). Stalin called for the three major western powers currently occuopying Gerrmany (Ameruca, Britain, and France) to participate in a four-power conference ith the Soviet Union. It provided for a peace treaty ending World War II and the creation of a unified, independent, neutral Germany. It would be a democratic German state with full civil rights kike freedom of speech. 【Soviet Draft】 West German Chancellor Adenauer was dubious about Soviet 'democratic elections' and for good reasons. The Soviets clasimed to hold democratic elections and priovide basic civil rights which actually maintaining a brutal police state in the Soviet Union and Easterrn European countries they controlled. He also was aware that the only circumstance that prevented Stalin from seizing control of West Germny was the Western military presence. Thus Adensuer's main priority was integraing West Germany into the Western Alliance. Stalin's proposal was thus rejected by the Western Allies. And West Germany instead signed the European Defence Community Treaty.

Sovitization

The West's rejection of the Stalin Note had severe consequences fir the people of East Germany. SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht saw the Western rejection of the Stalin Note as clraing the way for what he and the SED had been wanting to do for some time--creating a true socialist state along the lines of the Soviet Union. He and his Soviet advisrs had already createdc a Stalinist police state and supressed all basic civil liberties. But they had not yet completely socilized the economy. Apparentkly, Stalin was holding them back, believing that unificatiion could be ache=ved if East Germany was not completely socialized. But now this restraint was gone. One can't help wonder if the emerging German Economic Miracle did not begin to cast doubt on belief in socilist economics. Apparently not or id Ulbricht and his colleagues did not want to jepordize their positions as controlling power with no threat of elections. Perhaps his faitb in Socialism was the main reason. Socialism is akin to relihion in many ways. It takes a great deal to skake the belief of truev believers. At any rate Ulbricht proceeded to accelerate the construction of a socilist state abnd economy. The SED announced their plans to Sovietize the economy at the Second Party Conference (July 1952). This entailed: 1) increase investment in heavy industry, 2) huge tax increases on the remaining private industrial concerns, 3) collectivization of agriculture, and 4) an intensified atheist campasign. 【Kopstein, p. 411.】 Not announced was tightening border restrictions.

German Working Class

The working class in Germany before the NAZIs had been heavily politicied by left-wing politicians. This was a problem Hitler faced after seizing power, a working class heavily priented toward the Soialists and Communists. Ovr opposition was relatively easily extinguished by the Gestapo and concentration camps. But Socialist ideas were never fully extinguished. And of course the term Sociakist was even part of the NAZI Party name. After the disaster of World War II, many workers in the Soviet occupation zone were willing to give socialism a chance. Many would have acceoted Communist political control if they delivered on material benefits, but just the opposite occurred as a result of the SED's 1952 descision to Sovietize. The living standards of worker's declined, and declined substantially. The extent of thedeckline shocked Soviet advisers in the country. Living standards had been rising in East Germany, not as rapidly as in the West, but rising. Workers began to feel a real pinch in their sandard of living. State subsidies were slashed in areas like tranportation and healthcare--leading to rising prices. The avaability of consumer goods began to disappear. There wee reports of emoty store shelves. Factories tried to reduce operating costs and a major item they looked at was worker wages. Managers cut overtime. 【Ross, p. 54.】 m any workers depended on the overt=me. And this occurred at a time of rising food prizes. There was poor1952 harvest, butthe major problem was farm collectivization. Large numbrs of farmers fled to the West. The result wasc some 750,000 ha of prime farm land was not cultivated (1952). 【Kopstein, p. 411.】 To make matters wiorse during a cold winer, the Government had trouble maintaining electrical nd heating servives to households. Unable to ibcrease efficencies in state owned factories, Ulbrucht cinvinced the e Politburon to increase work quotas as part of the histotric process of costrcting socilaism. The workers now hadc tom priduce 10 percentbmore on the same sakary. This ineviatablyb would meann longer hours for the same pay. 【Hutchinson, p. 368.】 One estimate suggests that all told, the impasct was a cut in wages by a third. 【Ross, p. 55.】 Additionally, there were increases in prices for food, health care, and public transportation. Taken together, the work quota and price increases amounted to a 33 per cent monthly wage cut.[11] The work quota increase would take effect on 30 June, Ulbricht's 60th birthday.[citatio.

The Party

Most in the Communist parties in the Soviet Ynion, Eastrern Europe, and around the world truly believed that they would be able to unleased the believed productive engine of socialism. They were convinced that socialism was not only a more 'fair' economic system, but was more efficient. in part because it would do away with wasteful competition. And the capitalist West would not be able to compete with them. They were stunned when the German Economic Miracle began to develop and to drive similar develop in other Western countries. That was just the opposite to what they thought was going to happen. And despite the Soviet imposed Iron Curtain, German workers were becoming aware of the growing prosperity in the West in contrast to East Germany's drab poverty. They began asking, where is this 'worker's paradice that the Communists promised.

Economic Problems

By the early-1950s, it ws clear that this was not happening. The German Economic Miracle taking shape in the West was not occurring in the DDR. There were several reasons for this. The Soviets in the aftermath of World War II dismantelled East German factories and shipped them back to Russia as reparations. They wanted to dimantle factories in Wsst Germnt (where most of the factiries were located), but the Western Allies preveted this. This was one of the issues that led to the end of the origial Four Power occupation. In addition, the terms of trade between the DDR and the Soviet Union were highly favorable to the Soviets. The Germans did not get fair payment for the manufactured and finnished product shipped to the Soviet Union. The major problem, however, was the fundamntal inefficies of Socialism and economic planning. Unlike capitalism which created wealth, socialism destroyed wealth. All of this affcted the wages thst the regime was able to pay workers. It is not that Socialist mangers did not want to pay their wirkers like Western workers. It was just that Socilist enterprises were not profitable and thus could not afford to pay their workers like Western workers.

Worker Opposition

It is notable that the first real opposition to the Communists camed from workers or the proleterit in Markist terms. The workers were susposed to be the strongest suporters of the Communist Party -- Vanguard of the Revolution. The Revolution was was susposed to be the workrrs rising up against capitalism--not a Communist Party dictarorship. They were susposed to be the strongest support for the Party in whose named they claimed to govern.

Uprising (June 1953)

The 1953 East German worker uprising was the first in a series of violent uprisings that would periodically rock the Soviet Eastern European empire. Workers in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) began protesting working conditions conditions (June 17, 1953). Factory managers unable to achieve the effencies inherrent in free market capitalism decided to force workers to work harder. They already were paid less in than workers in the West. Factory managers sought to increase production by imposed what proved to be unreasonable production quotas set by DDR authorities (June 17). The reader will note that this sounds suspicously like the way workers were treated by early Capitalists. The uprising began as a small peaceful demonstration against those quotas, but quickly spread to over 400 cities, towns, and villages throughout the DDR. The resulting riots threatened the very existence of the Communist East German regime. Without Soviet intervention the regime probably would have fallen.

Shock to the Ledership

The spontaneous outburst shocked the leadership of of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as well as their Soviet masters. This was not how workers were expected to behave in a Socialist workers paradise. Only 3 months earlier, the Soviet-imposed Communist leaders as well as the Soviet leadership were shocked by news of Stalin's death (March 5, 1953). This set in montion a struggle in Moscow for control. The riots occurred only 3 months after Stalin's death and the Soviet empire was still in a state of turmoil adjusting to a new political reality without Stalin.

Wider Movement

It was East German workers which set off the event, but it was soon embraced by a wide cross-section of East German society. And as it developed, the demonstators began expressing concerns far beyond factory quotas. The movement began to express a much wider range of political and social issues--including free elections. This of course was anethma to the SED and the Soviets. And most shocking of all was when chants began to appeat like 'Death to Communism' and 'Long live Eisenhower!' One historians writes in his introduction, "for the first time ever "the proletariat had risen against the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'." 【Ostermann】 Grouops of workers began to gathering at Strausberger Platz and various other locations and began moving toward the Goverment buildings in the down town area. They encountred sime DDR securuity forces who did not at first attemot to block them, presumably not having instructions. A number of SED and FDJ functionaries, police officials tried to disuade the workers from continuing and for the most part failed. When security forces made an effort to disperse the marchers, they were for the most part ovewhealmed by numbers. The temper of the crowds tended to change as their numbers increased. One sirce describes 'a feeling of solidarity swept over them' as the disperate groups came into contact converged on the down townarea with the Government buildings. Their demands began to vhange from canceling the increased work quotas and price increases and the release demonstrtirs arrested to much more incenderary demands like free elections. Slogans and improvised banners proclaimed 'down with the government!' and 'butter, not arms'. They tore down the multiple Party posters and statues. By about 9:00 AM, some 25,000 demonsrators, mostly male fasctory workers rhad reached the House of Ministries. Many thousands more marching down Leipziger Strasse or in Potsdamer Platz. A relatively small group stormed the government seat, overpowering the 500 Volkspolizei and Stasi members 10-11 O'clock). 【Ostermann, p. 164】 By noon the riots had escalated and the workers from East Germany were marching through the Brandenburg Gate into West Germany. The hoped to join with the West German workers who were sympathetic. This was a critical turning pont in the Cold War. Then everything changed.

Supression

The East German workers were brutally suppressed. Soviet High Commissioner for Germany Vladimir Semyonov as disturbnces developed ordered Soviet troops and tanks in East Germany be moved toward East Berlin. Soviet troops entered East Berlin in force (early morning June 17). Red Arm military vehicles reached the area, followed by tanks to prevent what looked like thev crods seizing cointrol of the Government. Red Army troops quickly took control from the unarmed workers. They cleared out and cordoned off thev area around the Government buildings in the city center. The Soviets the shut down tram and metro traffic to prevent more demonsratirs swelling the crowds. They closed the check points to West Berlin. Next the Soviets declared martial law (about 1:00 pm). 【Ostermann, p. 164】 Then the unthinkable happened. The Red Army soon joined by the Stasi and Volkspolizeipened fire on the workers. This was what evil Tsarist and capitalist regimes did, not rightous Socilaist authorities. The Soviets while shocked, reacted immediately by sending tanks into the streets and ordering Red Army troops to fire on the demonstrators. At the time, the Soviet leadership was involved in a struggle for power following Stalin's death. The arrest of KGB Director Lavrentii Beria has been explained on his attitude toward Germany, although obviously other more practical matters were involved, namely the fear of other Politburo members for their safety. The question of Germany was a very sensitive one in Moscow. The War was still very fresh in the minds of Soviet leadership. The NAZIs had come very close to destroying the Soviet Union. And the Soviet victory required a national effort of massive prportions. A substanhtial part of the country lay in ruins. The Soviet Union suffered over 25 million casulties in the War. The Soviets were not about to relinquish control of Germany. Soviet troops backed by tanks and the East German Stasi/Volkspolize opened fire on the rioters, killing many, and injuring many more. They even fired into West Berlin. This first occured outside East Berlin police headquarters. And not just armed police, but Red Army tanks fired on the unarmed workers. What occured can not be called fightingb as the worketrs were unarmed. Clashed coninued into the night. The tanks and troops firedg directly into crowds with automatic weapons. Executions and mass arrests followed. The most prominent execution was West Berlin worker Willi Gottling. That first night Red Army soldiers, the Volkspolizei, and the Stasi began arresting hundreds. Some 10,000 people are believed to have been detained or arrested. Some 40 people were executed. This may not include the Red Army soldiers who refused orders to fire on unarmed demonstrators. 【Of Flowers】

Fundametal Shift

Many in East Germany had pu aside the brutalities of the SED and Easst German Goverment, believing that they werebuilding what would bev a workers' paradise. Thisn included many SDP members (Socialists)mwhho had joined with the Communists in th SED. But fuiring on the workers was a bridge to far. This destroyed the creditavility of Ulbricht andv thev SED. Anf East Germans began fleein West. Even after rhr=e border was closed. This was in part desenchantment with the East German regime, but eventually hev economic success ofv the capitalistv West becamev the primary alure. Between 1945 and 1988, around 4 million East Germans fled to the West. Finall the East Germans had to build a deadly fortified wall tio keep theor proplev in. Some 3.5 million of them left between 1945 and the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961). Most simply walked across the border until the border was closed by the Communistd (1952). But then escape was possible through West Berlin until Uklbriht oversaw the construction o the Berlin Wall. In a country of 19 million people that was over 20 percent

Western Reaction

Western leaders were surrised by the worker riots and unsure as to just how to respond. Conservative anti-Communidts wanted committed to the idea of 'rolling back' Communism in Eastern Europe. They saw the riots as presenting the opportunity to act. Some wanted aggresive action. Documents now available show that some officials wanted to 'encourage elimination of key puppet officials'. President Eisenhower was just elected and was in process of winding down the Koren War. The last thing he wanted was to generate a conflict in Europe. As a military man he was keenly aware of the huge conventional Soviet military advantage in Europe. He this reacted cautiosly. The primary American reaction was to begin a relief effort to East Germns who cried over to West Berlin and West Germany. This not only provided needed aid to the refugees, but made a strong statement in the propagand war with the Soviets. More than 5.5 million parcels were distributed during the 3 months that the program operated. The United States had already increased its resettlement admissions quotas under the United States Escapee Program (USEP) (1952).

Refugees

Following World War II and the imposition of the Allied and Soviet occuption zone in Germay and the Soviet creation of Communist police states throughout Eastern Europe. Eastern European Comminists adopted Soviet policirs of preventing the free movement of people across what Churchill described as the Iron Curtain. Stalin found this an effective way of preventing the Soviet population of knowing how bad conditions were in the Soviet Union and creating the fiction in the West that Communism was building a worker's paradie. Eastern European Communists at first did not see this as a problem, really believing that Communism would cretr a stronger economy than in the capitalit West. Berlin was also different. It still functioned as a fairly free city and the movemnt pf pople between occupation zones. The overhead rail system had tops in both Western and Soviet zones. People with suitcases might be stopped by Soviet authoriries, but for the most part people could move freedly, It was the one open chink in the Iron Curtain. And this was not just for Berliners. Berlin like Germny inself was at first subjected to a four-power occupation. Andit was almost entirely a one-way movement, East Germans traveling west. It was the only area of the Iron Curtain where Eastern Europeans could freely leave. And even after the Brlin Crisis (1948-49), the Berlin exit route remained open. Taking advantage of this route, the number of Eastern Europeans applying for political asylum in West Germany was 197,000 (1950), 165,000 (1951), and 182,000 (1952). It should not be thought that political freedom was the primary issue. After the German Economic Miracle began to take hold, substantil differences in living standards began to develop btween East and West Germany. And Germany was unique, not only could the Germans lisren to Radio Free Europe, but they could also listen to commercial broadcasts and the adbertisements for products that the East German economy could not provide. German Communists finally relized that they could not compete with the West, bit tgere nswr was mo ecomnomic reform but finally closed the border with West Germany (summer 1952). The border in Berlin, however, remained open. East Germans who found t difficult to cross the increasinly hardened border with West Germany could come to Berlin and reach the Western Zone there. As a result of the East German Worker Riots and the prospects for increaed Sovietization eslewhere in Eastern Europe, the number of refugees increased to 331,000 in 1953. 【Loescher, p.60.】 Workers who participated in the riots if they could be identified wee arrested. Some sought to ecape to West Berlin. Many who did not participate used the Berlin escape route to reach the west. This began a massive brain drain whivh would not stop until the Berlin Wall was erected (1961).

Importance

At the time as the East German workers were quickly supressed, the riots were not seen as particularly important. Some historians now believe that the impact of the riots were more significant than believed at the time. The confidence of the SED leadership including Walter Ulbricht.was badly shaken. It clearly demonstrated that even afterv8 years of singlr party and pilice state rule, the East Germans were not committed to the Communist regime. Worst still, oppoeition was pronounced with the very workers that were susposed to be the bulwark ofvthe regime. In fact they appeared to be the group most critical of the Communists. And the SED leadership had good reason to worry. It would be the Polish workers through the free union Solidarity Movement tht woukd begin the process by which Cimmunist and the soviet empire would unravel. This dynamic was not lost on the Communist party leadership in neighboring countries. In Moscow any idea of liberalization made possible by the death of Stalin to the extent they existed were helved. Ulbricht was able to regain Kremlin support by convincing the Soviets that what was needed was a good Stalinist to supress any disension. The Kremlin also saw the need to support the DDR bith diplomatically and economically. One of the DDR's problems besides the inefficensies of socialism was that the Soviet Union had ben exploiting its German colony. This begn an era of less exploitive policies, but hardly one of eually beneficial relations. American Cold War policy changed as well. It was increasinly clear that the United states would not cjallenge the Soviet Eastern European empire militarily. Republican rehetoric about 'liberating' the captive nations which had been an important feature of the 1952 presidential campaign declined in the nationalmpolitical discourse. Here is was a practical political shift. A Reoublican was now in the White House and ton pursue this line was to citicize their own president and not the Democrats. .

Other Eastern European Uprisings

The East German Wirker riots wee a dress rehersal for other Soviet interbventions. Similar reactions occurred at different times in the Soviet satellite states: Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970, 1976, 1980). The Soviets for the next three decades used military intervention or the threat of such intervention to keep Communist regimes in power and Communist officials in line. Only when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev csme ton power did thi change. He actually believed Communism could be reformed. He refused to use force or allow the East Germans to use force did the the communist system begun to unravel, not only in Eastern Europe, but to his surprise in the Soviet Union itself. The East German workers first showed that the Communism established by the Red Army could only be maintained by brute military force.

German Difference

Living conditions and political oppression in the Soviet Union could be hidden from Western Communists and the freedom and affluence of the West could be hidden from the Soviet people. But Germany was different. East Germans could listen to West German radio and television at a time when the German Economic Miracle was taking hold. Some observers believe that the commercials may have been more influential than the programming. It was this in divided Germany that the stark dispsaities between East and West became starkly apparent.

Sources

Hutchinson, Peter. "History and Political Literature: The Interpretation of the 'Day of German Unity' in the Literature of East and West". The Modern Language Review Vol. 76, No. 2 (1981), pp. 367–82. doi:10.230

Kopstein, Jeffrey. "Chipping Away at the State: Workers' Resistance and the Demise of East Germany, World Politics Vol. 48, No. 3 (April 1996), pp. 391–442. .

Loescher, Gil. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford University Press, 2001).

Ostermann, Christian. "Introduction" Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain (Central European University Press: Budapest, 2001). This volume is part of of the National Security Archive Cold War Document Reader series.

Ross, Corey. Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots: The Transformation of East Germany, 1945–65 (London: Macmillan, 2000).

Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty – First "Stalin Note" (March 10, 1952).

"Of Flowers and Murder," Discover (Feb 1, 1999).








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Created: 3:05 AM 8/23/2012
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