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Geography played a huge role in the Pacific War and the Japanese made huge mistakes based on simple geography. Imperial Japan was the first country to begin bombing cities. They began with invasion of Manchuria (1931). Not only did they bomb Chinese cities with unprotected civilian populations in Manchuria, but eventually Shanghai as well. They began doing this convinced that their own cities were invulnerable because no bombers existed that could transit the vast Pacific and reach the Home Islands. They ignored the fact that Japanese cities sere largely constructed by wood and paper. Essentially tinder for fire bombing. And the American created the B-29 Superfortress that could reach Japan. The other mistake concerned merchant shipping. They wanted the resources of the Southern Resource Zone, especially oil. Imperial planners assumed that the Americans given the vast stretches of the Pacific and their powerful navy could never cut off the flow of oil and other strategic material. Again they were badly mistaken. Just as Japan was uniquely vulnerable to strategic bombing, resource poor Japan was also uniquely susceptible to naval blockade. Not only was the country not self-sufficient in food production, but it had few of the natural resources needed to maintain a war economy. The Americans did not have to deploy submarines throughout the vast Pacific, but only in two very small strategic choke points--the Taiwan Straits and the Luzon Straits. Actually the Imperial Navy appears to have been somewhat ware of this. Thus the Japanese did not just attack the Dutch and British to seize the SRZ, but the Americans as well because of the American presence in the Philippines. The Japanese successfully seized oil fields in Borneo and Sumatra. The oil as well as the rubber, tin, and rice from the SRZ had to pass through these two key waterways. All the Americans had to do was to deploy their submarines in these two very small waterways. As this could have been effectively done early in the War--if the Pacific Fleet subs had torpedoes that worked. Once this problem was solved in a little over a year (late-1943-44), the Japanese Maru fleet was destroyed and Japan was cut off from the resources seized in the SRZ.
Geography has had a huge impact on history and World War II is no exception, perhaps especially true of the Pacific War. Geography played a huge role in the Pacific War and the Japanese made huge mistakes based on simple geography that school children could have predicted. And the impact of gepgraphy was no where more evident than in the Pacific. The Pacific was the largest battlefield over which man has fought. The distances involved basiclly defy human understanding. The Pacific is by far the world's largest ocean. The expanse and the distances involved are beyond the experience of most people. Only people who have flown from the States to Australia and New Zealand begin to get some idea of the distances involved. The great expanse is only broken by tiny islands and atolls, around which is where the major battles of the Pacific War were fought. The Pacific is both the largest and deepest of the five oceans. It extends from the Arctic Ocean south to the Antarctic. It is ringed by Asia and Australia in the west and North and South America in the east. The separation of Asia and the Americas is immense. There is a reason that Columbus not only made it home, but crossed the Atlantic several times. But Magellan did not even make it all the way across the Pacific. The Pacific is also the world's deepest ocean but that was not a factor in the Pacific War--the overriding factor was the immense area involved. Ironically, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor suceeded because The U.S. Navy believed that the Pacific distances made an attack impossible. And the Japanese believed that the distances made an attack on their country impossible. Even a child can marvel at the lack of insight to think that Japan could attack the Americans, but the Americans could not attack Japan.
Imperial Japan was the first country to begin bombing cities. They began with invasion of Manchuria (1931). Not only did they bomb Chinese cities with unprotected civilian populations in Manchuria, but eventually Shanghai as well. They began doing this convinced that their own cities were invulnerable because no bombers existed that could transit the vast Pacific and reach the Home Islands. They ignored the fact that Japanese cities sere largely constructed by wood and paper. Essentially tinder for fire bombing. And the American created the B-29 Superfortress that could reach Japan. he Pacific War was fought on the largest battlefield in history. This would make the range of aircraft to be a critically important factor. The air war in the Pacific began, as in the European theater, with mastery of the skies over China by the Japanese. The Chinese air force was vitually non-existant. The Japanese conducted terror bombing raid, first on Shanghai and then on other Chinese cities. The Japanese began the Pacific War with air mastery. This surprised Allied military experts. The dazzling Mitusubishi A6M Zero was so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the United States beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Zero was fast and maneuverable and had an impressive range. This continued throughout much of 1942 and only with the arrival of new American 56L Hellcat in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was another factor. New American aircraft brgan reaching the fleet (January 1943). The Gruman 56L Hellcat would be the mainstay of the U.S Navt during the Pacific War. Gradually American flyers had planes with capababilities well beyond those of the Zero. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers brought the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The initial raids were inclonclusive. General Curtis LeMay devised a strategy of fire bombing which caused massive destruction in Japanese citis crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. When Japan refused to surender after the Yalta Conference, President Truman ordered the use of tha Atomic Bomb in August 1945. The Japanese surendered in September.
Japan was the only industrialied country in Asia. The country was, however, deprndent on both imported raw materials and food. The country built up a formidable military, but few World War II belgerants were so poorly situated to wage an extended war. It was capable of supporting the war in China, but bot without consequences. Thus rather than achieving benefits from occupying large areas of China, the Japanese people began to feel adverse impacts from the war and massive military spending. The country's industry directed at military production rather than consumer goods. And to make matters worse, the United States, Japan's major trading partner began to take commercial actiins to sanction Japan for its aggression in China. Drafting large numbers of young men also affected the country's agricultural prodyction which in the best of times only provided part of the domestic food demand. While the Japanese economy could support the war in China, it was totally inadequate to support the Japanese military in the Pacific War with the United States, especially as Japan was still mbigged down in Chians. The Japanese milutarissts achieved spectacular vicyories in the first 6 months of the War. Then at Midway (June 1942), Japan's offensive capability was sverely restricted. And gradually the American industrial capacity began to make itself felt in the Pacifiv battlefields. This had severe consequences for the Japanese war economy. Japan went to war to acquire needed resources such as oil, tin, eubber, rice, ect. As a result, of the offensive that followed Pearl Harbor, it acuired those resources, but after Midway, the merican Pacific Fleet gradually cut off the Home Islands fron he resources it acquired in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, This was largely done by American sunmarines which decimated tne Japamese Maru flet but were joined by surfac fleet and carrier operations. Japan's industrial capacity was a fraction of the American industrial production, but was severly impaired when raw materilas deliveries could no longer be delivered. Food supplies wre short even before the Pacific War, but as the American blockade intensified, the Japanese begam to go hungary.
apan unlike China faced major obstacles to developing a productive economy. There were very limited arable agricultural land and few natural resources. Until the modern age, agriculture was the primary source of wealth for millennia. Japan unfortunately has very limited arable land that supports agriculture. The country is mountaneous. Forests abound, but agricultural land is limited. One source estimates it at 12.5 percent. When the population was fairly small, this was sufficient to meet domestic demand. As the population expanded the country's agricultural harvest barely met demand. And as Japan began to industrialize after the Meiji Restoration, it was totally insuffient to meet the food demands of the growing cities and industrial workforce. Japan had to begin importing rice and other foodstuffs. Despite the need for food, Japan at the time of World War II had an inefficent agricultural sector. This changed with the many reforms promulgated during the American occupation. Although arable land is limited, agricultural resources are not insignificant. Japanese crop yields per acre are now among the highest in the world. The country now produces more than 60 percent of its food. Japan has boutiful coastal waters that provide fish and other marine foods. Given the large population, however, the demand far exceds the coastal resource. After World War II Japan began building distant-water fishing vessels. But the finite limots on ocean productibity and coastal countries expanding their limits based on the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention have closed off most produvctive distant-water grounds. One important resource that Japan has is timber. The country is heavily forested. And many homes in Japan are constructed of wood. Even with all the forests, Japan has to import wood, including lumber, pulp, paper, and other wood products. Some forests in Hokkaido and northern Honshu have been severely over harvested affecting not only production, but causing local environmental problems. Even in ancient times, natural resources were of some importance, but nothing like the demands of an industrial economy. With the rise of Japan as an industrial powerhouse, Japan found itself needing to import just about everything. And while some coal was availvle, there was a virtual absence of oil and natural gas. Small domestic oil fields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido supply a negliible share of the country's energy needs. At the time of World War II, Japan was totally dependent on imported oil. And even worse for Japan, its primary source was the United States. The hydrocarbon resources it did have, coal, were not avilable in sufficent quantity. Coal deposits in Hokkaido and Kyushu are more abundant but are mostly low grade and expensive to mine. They are also located at some distance to the major cities and industrialized areas where they are most needed. Japan does have abundant water and hydroelectric potential and has developed hydroelectric industries. Japan is particularly lacking in metal and mineral resources. Japan did have a copper resource. The great mines at Ashio in central Honshu and Besshi on Shikoku have been depleted and have been closed. There are no appreciable domestic sources of bauxite, cobalt, iron, lead, tin, tungsted, zinc, and other major industrial ores. These are not only the key metals needed for an industrial economy, but were the metals along with oil that Japan needed to wage World War II. Some of the few mineral resources Japan has are titanium and sheet mica.
The Japanese leadership saw the ourbreak of war in Europe (Septmber 1939(\) as offering an opportunity for resolving the war in China. The Strike South Faction saw as the Germans achieved sp[ectacular victorie the opportunity to seize Southeast Asian from the European colonial powers. This included British (Malaya, Borneo, and Burma), French (Indo-China), and Dutch (Dutch East Indies) colonies in Southeast Asia. The Japanese called Southeast Asia as the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ). The American-controlled Philippines was not an essential part of the SRZ. Its geograohic posituiin astride the sea lanes betwee the SRZ and the Home Islands meant that it could not be allowed to remain in American hands. Australia was eventually added to the Japanese concept of the SRZ as well as Pacific islands neded to build a hard defensive shell around the SRZ, a shell that would prove too hard for the United States to crack. Seizure of the the SRZ would not only cut off Nationlist China from Western aid, but also provide the Japanese military the resources it needed to complete the conquest of China. Japan would no longer be dependent on American resources. The SRZ offered large petroleum resouces, but the enticement was not just petroleum. The SRZ also offered various critical mineral resources: rubber, tin, nickel, bauxite (aluminum) and minerals. And not only minerals were involved. The SRZ was a major source of food. Rice was the most important, but not the only food resoure. Southeast Asian produced nearly 70 percent pf the rice involved in international trade. [Kratoska, p.9.]
Japan did not have a maru fleet until the early-20th century. For several centuries before Commodore Perry's Black Ships arrived in Tokyo Bay (1853), the primary Japanese interest was isolation, not marine commerce. The Shogunate was intent on maintaining a closed society and in keeping all foreign shipping away, including merchant shipping. An American naval analysts writes just before the War, "The rise in power and prestige of the Japanese merchant fleet since the advent of the iron ship is a maritime exploit of unparalleled proportions. A single generation ago Japan's merchant marine consisted of 20 sailing vessels for every steamship and the operations of the fleet were confined principally to the China service and the coastal trade. Today her shipping companies operate vessels on regular runs over the principal sea lanes of the world. Her tramps dot every ocean and compete for cargo in every port of the globe. No other merchant marine has enjoyed such a magnificent expansion in so short a period." [McCormick, p. 1007.] The development began only after the Meiji Restoration (1868). As a result of the Shogunate's policy of isolation, the country had no experience in international trade nor in the building and management of marine shipping industries, nor did they have the expertise needed to build a modern ocean-going merchant fleet. International shipping was dominated by American and European lines. To begin the development, Meiji authorities granted the Mitsubishi Companies monopolistic privileges and subsidies to begin the construction of a Japanese merchant marine. Mitsubishi began by purchasing used European ships with Government financing to begin operations between Shanghai and Yokohama. Small ship owners also entered the trade. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) stimulated the expansion of the merchant fleet with the Government buying more ships. The shagaisen owners (involved in the Shanghai trade) grew rapidly, acquiring larger ships and began operating liner service beyond Shanghai. Two important regular shipping lines (shasen) developed. The Russo-Japanese War (1905-06) had an even greater impact with the Government purchasing 177 foreign ships. And Japan with its industrial expansion began to build the shipyards capable of producing both naval vessels and merchant ships. World War I was a great boon to the Japanese merchant fleet. The War created a world-wide shortage of merchant shipping and a sharp increase in freight rates. Ideal conditions for the shipping companies to prosper. And unlike the Atlantic, there were no U-boats to contend with. The situation after the War was different. The merchant fleet had reached nearly 3,300 vessels (3.6 million tons). [Kuroda, p. 278.] International trade, however, never recovered from World War I. The Great Depression greatly exacerbated the situation (1930s). It was a disaster for Japanese shipping companies, many of which had o ???? up vessels. The Government to save shipyard jobs introduced a 'scrap and build' system. Many older ships were scrapped and replaced with modern ships, larger (over 4,000 GRT) and faster (over 14 knots). As Japan moved toward war, the Government over saw the consolidation of the Big Five shipping shagaisen companies (Daido, Kawasaki, Kokusai, Mitsui, Yamashita) and the shasen (NYK and OSK) leading to war time control. At the time Japan launched the Pacific War, Japan had the world' third largest merchant marines after Britain and the United States. It totaled some 6.3 million GRT and was about 8 percent of the world merchant tonnage. [Shindo] What the Japanese did not calculate as they prepared for war was the tremendous increase in merchant tonnage that the Pacific War would require, maintenance issues, or their ability to protect merchant shipping from the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The other geographic mistake yhe Japanee made concerned merchant shipping. The Japanese needed the resources of the Southern Resource Zone, especially oil. Imperial planners assumed that the Americans given the vast stretches of the Pacific and their powerful navy could never cut off the flow of oil and other strategic material. Again they were badly mistaken. Just as Japan was uniquely vulnerable to strategic bombing, resource poor Japan was also uniquely susceptible to naval blockade. Not only was the country not self-sufficient in food production, but it had few of the natural resources needed to maintain a war economy. The Americans did not have to deploy submarines throughout the vast Pacific, but only in two very small strategic choke points--the Taiwan Straits and the Luzon Straits. Actually the Imperial Navy appears to have been somewhat ware of this. Thus the Japanese did not just attack the Dutch and British to seize the SRZ, but the Americans as well because of the American presence in the Philippines. The Japanese successfully seized oil fields in Borneo and Sumatra. The oil as well as the rubber, tin, and rice from the SRZ had to pass through these two key waterways. All the Americans had to do was to deploy their submarines in these two very small waterways. As this could have been effectively done early in the War--if the Pacific Fleet subs had torpedoes that worked. Once this problem was solved in a little over a year (late-1943-44), the Japanese Maru fleet was destroyed and Japan was cut off from the resources seized in the SRZ.
Kratoska, Paul H. "The impact of the Second World War II," in Kratoska, ed. Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (Macmillan: London, 1998).
Kuroda, H. Sehai Kaiun Shi (Tokyo: Seizando, 1972).
McCormick, Harold A. "Japanese merchant marine," Proceedings Magazine Vol. 62 No.7/401 (July 1936).
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