Figure 1.--This British girl has salvaged her doll house from what was left of the family's home. The Luftwaffe began the Battle of Britain trying to destroy the RAF (July 1940). Thry made some progress toward that goal. Eventually Hitler adopted the tactic of bomning London and other cities--the Blitz (September 1940). He assumed that the British people would plead for mercy as the Dutch had done. The British people, however, did not crack. Hitler not only lost a lot of aircraft and crews needed for Barbarossa, but filled the British with a terrible resolve to procecute the War with the same raw force as the Germans. A resolve that would not be quenched until Dresden (February 1945). Unfortunately for the German people, the British joined by he Americans would have far more time, resources, and industrial capacity to scourge Germny from the Baltic to the Alps. It is tue that German resolve also did not crack. It is not true that the Stratgic Bombing Cmpaign was not an important factor in the Allied victory.

At the time of World War II, air tatics were still just theories. There was a range of different theories adopted by the major powers. The Allies hesitated to bomb German cities at the onset of the War, but the British once they survived the Blitz set out to build a massive bomber force. Even before entering the War, the United States adopted the doctrinme of a strategic air war. The United states believed that they could accurately bomb specific targets without causing massive civilian casualties. And the United States had the capacity to build both a strategic and tactical air force. Both the Germans and Japanese put considerable emphasis on air power. The Germans began World War II with the world's most modern air force. They did not, however, have the largest industrial capacity to build aircraft. The German advantage was gained by a crash building program before the British and French began to rearm. Even so, the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce designed to support the Wehrmacht's land offensive as part of Blitzkrieg. Germany did not have the industrial capacity to buld a strategic air force and had no substantial force of plans to wage a stategic bombing campaign. America and Britain did have the industrial capacity to build a strategic air force. We notice the pacifists who played a huge rile vin causing the War after the War charging the British and Amnereicns with war crimes. They insist that the Western Allies were wrong to wage a strategic bombing campign when it was clear after the battle of Britain that bombing does not work. This is a fundmentally flawed analysis. The Germans to win the War needed quick victories. And this was unobtainable in the time and wuth the fiorce availble. The situation was very different for the Allies. Once Britain had survivd the Blitz, the War became war of attrition and as in World War I, a war that Germny was not going to win a war of attrition. And the Allies had both the time and the resources capable of scourging the Reich from the Baltic to the Alps. In the Pacific, The Japanese also introduced air power. The Japanese has a small aviation industry, but China had even less. The Japanese placed less emphasis on close ground support, but from an early point began bombing Chinese cities with little opposition. But bombing a largely agricultural country only involved Japan in a quagmire. The Japanese unlike the Germans created a poweful naval fleet air arm. It heloped win a huge empire, but was incaopble of bringing the war to America. The Japnese like the Germns planned a short war. Incredably, they decided that the way to bring the war in China to a successful conclusion was to attack the United States. The militrists who started the war thought their ciuntry' wood nd por cities eere safe from the bombing they were subjecting China to because the United States had no bomber that could reach Japan. It proved to be monumental misclcuiltion by poorly educated minds with no foresight. Within a few short months of Pearl Harbor, American aircraft designers were working on the B-29 Super Fortress.

Britain

British air doctine in the inter-War era focused largely on bombers. As a result, RAF fighter Command almost entered the War with biplanes. The Hawker Hurricane was the first modern mnoplane fighter, but was not an all metal fighter and not up to the performance of the German Me-109. Supermarine Spitfires only began reaching the Fighter Command in numbers after the War began (1939). And even at the time of the Battle of Britin (1940), the bulk of the fighting was carried out by the Hurricanes. Fighter Command's performnce was brilliant in beating back the Luftwaffe, but unlike the Luftwaffe had developed no tactical icrine of close air support. Despite the RAF rmphasis on bombers, the Allies hesitated to bomb German cities at the onset of the War. The French vetoed sch operations and Primeminister Chamberlain had no desire to pursue the War vigirously. British bombers with only a few exceptions were first used to drop leaflets on German cities. fter the fall of France, the British no longer had the capability to bomb Germny in any significant way. The bombers with which the British began the war were not capable of significant long-range operations. And the operations conducted were largely ineffective. German uir defenses meant that RAF Bomber Commad were resticted to night operations. As a result, few bombs fell on targets. Not uncommonly, British bombers at firstvcould not even find whole cities. The British once they survived the Blitz set out to build a massive bomber force. And they soon hd one of the iocvomic planes of the War to procedute th Strsatergic Bombing Campign--the Avro Lancaster. Given the Luftwffe's failure in the Battle of Britain, one might have thought that the British might have not placed such faith in strategic bombing, but in 1940 bombing was the only means the British had at striking back at the Germans and bomber advocates like future chief of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, offered victoiry without the horrendous World war I ground casulties. The British and American Bomber Barons would not deliver the victory on their own. Strategic bombing, however, wuld be a vital part of the Allied victory. American Air Corps commander Hap Arnold visited England near the end of the Blitz (1942). His assessment was that the Luftwaffe failed not bcause of British fighters, but because of the Luftwaffe's inadequate medium bombers which had small paylods, were slow, and lightly armed. The British for their part did not have a tactical ground support dictrine at the time of the Battle of Britain, and despite the Luftwaffe's vital role in the fall of France, would only slowly develop one over the next 2 years. It wiuld be a vital part if tge kliberation of Frabce nd th assault on the Reich.

France

France refused to authorize the bombing of German cities at the outbreak of war, concerned that the Germans would respond by bombing French cities. At the time, however, the Luftwaffe was largely deployed in Poland. German industry centered in the Ruhr locatd in western Germany was particularly vulnerable. The French chose to use their substantial airforce as a a tactical force, but dipersed throughout the country. This meant that the Luftwaffe could not knock it out, but it alsomeant that when the Germans launched their Western Offensive (May 1940), they faced only weak French air position as the Germand Panzers crossed the all important Meuse and began their race to the Channel. Luftwaffe planbes commonly caried out multiple sortees daily. The dispersed French aircraft rarely were blr ti coinduct more than one sirtee daiky dyrung this critical period. This essentually ended France's air war as an active participant. France had a substanial air industry and could have been used to increase German aircrft production. The Germans did not, however, make ny ttempt to use it. And a German occuoied France mnean tht there was not development or production of new aircraft until after the War. .

Germay

Both the Germans and Japanese put considerable emphasis on air power. The Germans began World War II with the world's most modern air force. They did not, however, have the largest industrial capacity to build aircraft. The German advantage was gained by a crash building program before the British and French began to rearm. Even so, the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce designed to support the Wehrmacht's land offensive as key componnt of Blitzkrieg. This was what the German generals wanted. The German perfected ground support tactical opertions which gave them a huge advantages in the early phase of the War. This gradually eroded as Germay was ununbl to defeat major target countries which gradully copied Germnn tctucs and ammassed far lager air forces with their larger industrial capacity. Within the Air Ministry, however, there was ftom an early point, a discussion of strategic bombing. Germany did not have the industrial capacity to buld a tactical and a strategic air force. So when Hitler and Stalin launched Workd War II (1939), the Luftwaffe had only short range bombers, unsuited for strategic bombing. This was a mjor fctor in the Luftwaffe's failure in he Bttle of Britain (1940-41). With the huge successes eary in the War, Germnany acquited more resources and industril capacity. The resources were not, however, unlimited. And there was one strteguic bomber developed--the He-177 Greif bomber. Enormous resources wre committed to the project, especially after the a Battle of Britain highlighted the need for a srategic bomber and German eyes begn to turn east. The plane encounteted huge problems. Engine pronlens were enbcountered bcuse th designers deciud to go with two very large engines rathers hn four. More problems resulted from Udet's insane insistence on dive bombing capabilities. There were also design projects to build an America's bomber, but they never went into production.

Japan

The Japanese also introduced air power. The Japanese has a small aviation industry, but China had even less. The Japanese placed less emphasis on close ground support, but from an early point began bombing Chinese cities with little opposition. But bombing a largely agricultural country only involved Japan in a quagmire. The Japanese unlike the Germans created a poweful naval fleet air arm. It heloped win a huge empire, but was incaopble of bringing the war to America. The Japnese like the Germns planned a short war. Incredably, they decided that the way to bring the war in China to a successful conclusion was to attack the United States. The militrists who started the war thought their ciuntry' wood nd por cities eere safe from the bombing they were subjecting China to because the United States had no bomber that could reach Japan. It proved to be monumental misclcuiltion by poorly educated minds with no foresight. Within a few short months of Pearl Harbor, American aircraft designers were working on the B-29 Super Fortress.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Red Air Force at the onset of World War II was the World's largest, albeit with many obsolete models. Given its performance in the Winter War with Finland (1939-40), it had no well defined strategic or tactical doctrine. It basically just bombed cities. Of course the loss of so many important commanders in Stalin's purges must have affected any kind of long-term planning. The Luftwaffe because of the forward deployment ordered by Stalin was able to largely destroy the Red Air Force during the first week of Barbarossa (June 1941). But because the Red Air Force was primarily destroyed on the ground, most of the pilots survivd. The Red ir Force repaeared (1943), it was primarily a ground support force. The Aamerican Bell P-29 Air Cobra and the Ilyushin Il-2 (Илью́шин Ил-2) Sturmovik were especally prized as tank destroyers, very important in the Ostkrieg. One imprtant factor in ground support was griund to air communications. This did not exist before the War, in part because Soviet radios and other communicaztions gear and instruments were so ppor. Here American Lend-Lease equipment was an especially important factor in the air war. Also important were aluminum and aviation fuel.

United States

America more so than any other country did have the industrial capacity to build a strategic air force. Well before entering the War, the United States Army Air Corps adopted the doctrinme of a strategic air war. This was surprising in that the Air Corps was organizationally part of the Army. Even so, a major rift began between Air Corps commanders and the army chiefs. This began after World War I, culminating in the court martial of Billy Mitchell. The relationship between the Army and Air Corps chiefs never recovered and amazngky persisted througout the War, despite their organizational unity. Congress after World war I gutted the U.S. military, especially the Army. This was not just a personnel matter, but also training and weapons development. There was one basic exeption--the Air Corps Act of 1926. As a result 35 percent of the Army budget was devoted to the relatively small Air Corps. And the Air Corps lavished much of those funds on bombers. The technologically advance B-10 and B-12 were at the time the most advanced bombers in the world (1931-32). And along with spending th air tactics taught at the influential Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) emphasized strategic bombardment in the criculum to the virtual exclusion of ground support operations. One of the directors, Major Harold George, was a fervent advocate of strategic bombardment. Future commanders like Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and Ira Eaker were imbued with the idea that stratgic bombardment could win a war without massive ground combat casualties. They came to believe that the best way to support ground troops was to destroy enemy war industries. They were also taught that anti-aircraft arillery (FLAK) was distracting, but not dangerous. and that small fighters could not possibly stop heavily armed bombers. Incredibly in addition to contadicting basc priniples of aeronautics, this doctrine which became virtual holy writ seriously retarded efforts to develop advanced fighter aircraft. The few officers like Clare Chennult who did not accept the strategic alternative found their carrers blocked and felt isolated within the Air Corps. The air commanders who during the war became known as the Bomber Boys believed that they could accurately bomb specific targets without causing massive civilian casualties and in doing so cripple enemy war industries. TheB-17 Flying Fortress was the physicl embodiment of the Army Air Corps strategic vision. And the United States had the capacity to build both a strategic and tactical air force. Ironically it was Hitler and the RAF who introduced more ballance in the Army Air Corps. Hitler's Lufwaffe was a major factor in Allied capitulation at Munich and Czech acceptance(1938). In response, President Roosevelt shifted his earlu emphasis on the Navy. He rammed appropriations through Congress for 20,000 planes and annual production of 24,000 planes (1938). The President then got Congrssionl approval for $2.6 billion in Army avition. This was more than the sum tototal of all expenditures during the inter-War era. This emmense expansion provided room for significant fighter development. Subsequently the President ntervened again. After the fall of France and the beginning of the Battle of Britain (1940), Britain pleaded for U.S. aid and planes were high on the list. Marshal and Arnold wanted to give priority to building up the Army Air Corps over meeting Britan's needs. The President insisted that large numbers of aircraft be provided the British. And what they most wanted was fightrs. [Hughe, pp. 68-72.] As a result, development and production efforts were shifted to fighters, capabilities that the Army Air Corps would have focused primrily in bombers. Even so America entered Workd war II with a focus not obly in bombers, but without any tactical ground sypport dictrine. Increadibly this would not bgin to be be developed until 1943, at least by the Army Air Corps. The U.S. Navy with inter-War experiebces and Marines to support in the Pacific were much more innovative. Unfortunaley as a result od service rivlries, there was little sharing of experiences and experise.

Sources

Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (The Free Press: New York, 1995), 380p.

Created: 12:12 PM 2/25/2022
Last updated: 12:12 PM 2/25/2022