Figure 1.--

After the RAF's victory, any NAZI invasion of Britain would not be possible until Spring 1941. At this stage of the War, the initiative lay with the NAZIs. The perponderance of power meant that the future direction of the War would be determined by the German Führer. Britain was the only country still at war with Germany. Some British officials thought that an invasion was coming. Churchill thought that a move through Spain to seize Gibraltar and an offensive against Greece to secure the Balkand would be most likely. [McJimsey, p. 136-138] No one envisioned that Hitler would strike at the Soviet Union and open a Eastern Front while Britain was still fighting. In fact Churchill told Hopkins in that, "This war will never see great forces massed against one another." Churchill was right about another aspect of the War when he briefed Hopkins, a struggle for mastery of the air (January 1941). [Mc Jimsey, p. 138.] Hitler's mind was clearly fixed east. British resisantnce had come as a surprise to him. With the RAF and Royal Navy undefeated, Hitler saw no way of defeating Britain. He convinced himself that the British would hold out, hoping to draw America or the Soviet Union into the War. He had from the beginning seen the East as the true prize in the War. At the onset of the War he was determined to avoid a two-front war. With the Wehrmach stopped bybthe Channel, Hitler convinced himself that the only way of forcing Britain to make peace was to destroy the Soviet Union and removing any hope of military assistance to the British. But before the NAZIs could strike at the Soviet Union the Reich's southern flank would have to be secured.

Battle of Britain

Britain's bvictory in the Battle of Britain and even more so, Churchill's failure to make peace had shicked and frustated Hitler. It greatly complicated what he had planned for from the very beginning, a war in the Eadt to destroy the Soviet state and gain the emense resources needed to make Germany self sufficient. After the RAF's victory, any NAZI invasion of Britain would not be possible until Spring 1941. And this was when he wanted to invade the Soiviet Union.

British Assessment

At this stage of the War, the initiative lay with the NAZIs. The perponderance of power meant that the future direction of the War would be determined by the German Führer. Britain was the only country still at war with Germany. Some British officials thought that an invasion was coming. Churchill thought that a move through Spain to seize Gibraltar and an offensive against Greece to secure the Balkand would be most likely. [McJimsey, p. 136-138] No one envisioned that Hitler would strike at the Soviet Union and open a Eastern Front while Britain was still fighting. In fact Churchill told Hopkins in that, "This war will never see great forces massed against one another." Churchill was right about another aspect of the War when he briefed Hopkins, a struggle for mastery of the air (January 1941). [Mc Jimsey, p. 138.]

War in the West

After the fall of France June 1940), NAZI Germany was only at war with one country--Briain. Most believe that the Germans would cross the Channel and invade Britain. The invasion was designated Operation Sea Lion and Hitler signed the order in mid-July, but soon modified the orders to make the operational conditional on the success of the Luftwaffe. The RAF's victory over the vaunted Luftwaffe upset those plans. German planners suggested attavking the British position in the Mediterranean. The German's devised Opetration Felix to seize Gibraltar in cooperation with Franco's Spain while Italy would drive east from Libya and take Suez. These were objectives that in 1940 were within Hitler's capabilities.

Adolf Hitler and the East

Hitler's mind, however, was clearly fixed east. British resisantnce had come as a surprise to him. With the RAF and Royal Navy undefeated, Hitler saw no way of defeating Britain. He convinced himself that the British would hold out, hoping to draw America or the Soviet Union into the War. He had from the beginning seen the East as the true prize in the War. The Soviet Union offered huge mineral and agricultural resources. With the resources of the Soviet Union to fuel the German war effort, the Royal Navy blockade was meaningless. Germany would have the resources to wage war indefinitely. The East also offered the Lebensraum that Hitler ferventky believed that Germany required.

Hitler's Strategic Assessment

Hitler at the onset of the War was determined to avoid a two-front war as was the High Command of the Wehrmacht. With the Wehrmach stopped by the Channel, however, Hitler convinced himself that the only way of forcing Britain to make peace was to destroy the Soviet Union and removing any hope of military assistance to the British. Mosdt accounts see Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union as the great mistake which cost the NAZIs the War. Hitler's view from Berlin in 1940 was different than that commonly offered by modern historians. Hitler saw himself as facing the Red Army to the east, the largest army in the world. To the west he saw a still dangerous Britain backed by the United States and its enormous industrial potential which would eventually enter the War. NAZI victories in the War so far had come by attacking either small or unprepared countries. Germany was at the peak of its strength. The Soviet Union was engaged in a massive rearmament program, but its officer corps had been desimated by Stalin's purges. He saw war with the Soviets as inevitable and believed that the Soviets would only grow stronger if he delayedThe United States was now beginning to prepare for war. Hitler assessed with considerable validity that Germany's advantage compared to the Soviets to the east and the British and Americans to the west could only decline. As a result, HJitler made the decession to take the risk of a two-front war. He would strike east and informed his generals (July 31, 1940) while the Battle of Britain had just begun. He told them that the Soviet Union would have to be "shattered to its roots with one blow".

Axis Planning

Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite (Axis) Pact (September 27, 1940). The agreement allied Germany and Italy (which were at war with Britain) and Japan (which was at war with China). Germany and Italy has since 1939-40 been at war with Britain. Japan since 1937 had been at war with China. Even before America entered the war, American and Britain had begun to coordinate war planning. Harry Hopkins' meeting with Churchill (January 1941) was the begging of this effort and it first became formalized with the Atlantic Charter (August 1941). This was followed by a series of meetings in which atrategy was coordinated at the higest level. Nothing loke this occurred with the Axis. Each of the three main Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) made their principal war decessionhs indeoendently. Meetings were used more to announce the decessions taken than to develop and coordinate the war effort. This is a different of enormous consequences. The Axis in 1940-41 had a military superiority of such enormous proportions that a coordinated military strategy could well have defeated both the Soviet Union and the United States and Britain. The most obvious potential step would have been a joint German and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union.

NAZI Diplomacy

Before the NAZIs could strike at the Soviet Union the Reich's southern flank would have to be secured. He also wanted to secure the support of allies. This meant Spain, Vichy, France, and Italy in the west and as well as the Balkan countries. One might have thought the NAZI battle field victories and dominant position could have compeled the remaining independent countries to join him in his anti-Bolshevick campaign. NAZI diplomacy had already laid the groundwork in the Balkans. Hitler assumed that Franco who he had helped install in power would join him. Hitler also believed that the defeat of France and Petain's anti-Communist views would enable him to get Vichy's support for the war with the Siviets. He also did not anticipate that his ally Mussolini would complicate his plans. What followed was a diplomatic failure of staggering proportions which would cobntribute to the failure of the NAZI invasion of the Soviet Union.

Sources

McJimsey, George. Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Liberty (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1987), 474p.

Created: 2:33 AM 9/16/2004
Last updated: 12:29 AM 10/12/2004