*** Cold War Soviet Jews








Cold War Era: Soviet Jewery


Figure 1.--Here a bemused Soviet Jewish child hold a flower as she sits in Absorption Ministry Hall at Ben-Gurion Airport in 1990. She was part of a flood of Jews that poured out of the Soviet Union when General Secutary Gorbechev removed the restrictions. Like all new immigrants she is wondering about her future. Photographer: Nathan Alpert.

The Pogroms launched by Tsar Alexander III made drove many Jews from Poland abd other areas of the Pale where Jews were allowed to live in Tsarist Russia (1880s). It made the Tsar and the Tsarist regime a subject of fear and hated. Jewish raducals turned to revolutionary politics. These were ethnic Jews often without any religious afiliation with the Jewish community. Many Jew put there faith in socialism and were active in the Russian Revolution. The most famous was Trotsky, but there were many other prominant Jews. The same was true in the socialist movements in other European countries as well. After Stalin seized control of the Soviet Union, supression of all religious groups became more intense, but gradually unwritten restrictions on Jews developed. Historians generally believe that the Doctor's Plot was the beginning of a major anti-Semetic campaign Stalin was planning at the time of his death (1953). This was never launched, but Soviet Jews were desciminated against and denied basic religious and cultural rights. And they like other Soviet citizens with rare exceptions were not allowed to emigrate. The issue of Jewish immigration first received international attention durung the Nixon Administration. Two Jews who had been denied exit visas began plotting to hijack a plane. They were arrested, tried and sentenced to death (December 1970). The press picked up on this and it caused an international outcry. The Soviets backed down and decided not to execute the two men. This brought the issue of Jewish emigration tothe internstional spot light. It was a difficult issue for them, because if Jews were allowed to emigrate it would make it difficult to deny similar rights to other Soviet citizens and to explain why people whould want to leave the 'workers' paradise. The Nixon Administration was primarily interested in bilateral relations with the Soviets and pursued detente. Senator Henry Jackson made human rights an element in that relationship. The passage of the Jackson-Vanik Act (1974) forced both the Soviets and American administrations to address the civil rights issue as part of the bilateral relationship. Authors disagree as to the importance of Jewish emigration. Secretary of State Henry Kissenger seems to have seen it as more of an irritant in United States-Soviet relations. Another author writes, "It armed Soviet citizens with the greatest weapon against their closed society: the opportunity to vote with their feet and leave." [Beckerman]

Background

The Pogroms launched by Tsar Alexander III made drove many Jews from Poland abd other areas of the Pale where Jews were allowed to live in Tsarist Russia (1880s). It made the Tsar and the Tsarist regime a subject of fear and hated. Jewish raducals turned to revolutionary politics. These were ethnic Jews often without any religious afiliation with the Jewish community. Many Jew put there faith in socialism and were active in the Russian Revolution. The most famous was Trotsky, but there were many other prominant Jews. The same was true in the socialist movements in other European countries as well.

Soviet Jews

After Stalin seized control of the Soviet Union, supression of all religious groups became more intense, but gradually unwritten restrictions on Jews developed. Historians generally believe that the Doctor's Plot was the beginning of a major anti-Semetic campaign Stalin was planning at the time of his death (1953). This was never launched, but Soviet Jews were desciminated against and denied basic religious and cultural rights. And they like other Soviet citizens with rare exceptions were not allowed to emigrate.

Jewish Population

Tzarist persecution, Soviet persecution, and finally the NAZI invasion and Holocaust substantially reduced Russia's Jewish population. There were about 3.5 million Soviet Jews on the eve of World War II. About 0.9 million were killed by the NAZIs in the Holocaust. The numbers would have been much larger had not the Red Army held before Moscow (December 1941), preventing the Germans from occupying much of the Russian heartland. The post-War Jewish population numbered about 2.3 million (1959). This is only a rough figure. Soviet statistics are believed to unestimate the Jewish population.

Soviet Jewish Movement (1960s)

The Soviet leadership created a new issue in the Cold War, an asault on Soviet Jewery. Stalin had been preparing a major pogrom at the time he died (1953). The Doctor's Plot was the first step. This was shelved by Khruschev, but by the 1960s the Soviet began a new campaign. It was not a NAZI style racial genocide, but a cultural campaign to eliminate all Jewish culture and cultural identity. We are not sure while idea this was or the thought process involved. And raw anti-Semitism can not be ignored. Another factor here was Soviet foreign policy which by this time had sided with Arab regimes adopting Arab Socialism (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen). Those countries were intent on destoying Israel and the Soviets provided massive arms shipments to make this possible. This policy which blended it to attacks on Jews. It is likely that the KGB saw Soviet Jews as a potential subversive group in the effort to destoy Israel. The KGB resorted to Stalinist tactics, although not on Stalinist scale. The KGB arrested an executed over one hundred Jews on trumped-up charges of various economic crimes. The Soviets began systematically closed down synagogues and published shockingly anti-Semitic books. Soviet spokesmen charged that Judaism was a Nazi-like religion. This only intensified when the Israelis emerged victorious in the Six Days War (1967). Cartoons appeared in Soviet newspapers of Israeli General Moshe Dayan with a Nazi swastika armband. What the Soviets had not counted own was the reaction, both in the Soviet Union and in the West (especially America). In the Soviet Union, the attention given to the Six Days War seems to have stimulated interest among Soviet Jews in their religion and cultural tradition. This ws just what the Siviets did not want. And why they wanted to destroy Judaism and Jewish identity, they were dead set against large-scale Jewish mmigration. Jews wre among the most educated and skilled groups in the Sovit Union. It would mean the loss of many talented citizens. As a Jewish movement began to build, the KGB began aresting leaders. Now Stalin could have prevented the Soviet Jewisg movement. There would hve been a bullet in the head or years of slave labor in the Gulag. But the lower level of terror meant that there were Jews willing to challenge authorities, And arests onlyhightened the intenational condemnation of the Soviet Union. In fact, these prisoners of conscience of the world-wide Soviet-Jewish protest movement. In the United States, the Jewish community was transformed by the issue as reports of Soviet actions against Jews became known. There had been considerable sympthy within the Americam Jewish community with its liberal leanings for the Soviets, both because of the role they played in defeating the NAZIs and their socialist policies. Some bought the Soviet propaganda line of a worker's paradice. American Jews by the 60s were better informd about the nature of Soviet Communism. And Jewish publications picked up on the reports of Soviet spression of their Jews. Many American Jews had guilty feeling about not being more militant during the NAZI Holocaust. Jewish leadees were determined not to repat that mistake. A protest movement on behalf of Soviet Jewry rapidly spread throughout the United States and other Jewish communities, but itws merica that had the largest Jewish community outside Israel. And not only were Jew politically active, America was a country with real power. American Jews were not only outraged, but detrmined to act. Young New York Jews organized the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) (1964). Jacob Birnbaum Glenn Richter wre key figures. The SSSJ demanded that Jews who so desired be allowed to openly live as Jews in the Soviet Union or leave the country if they so desired. Jews across Ameica formed other support groups. They colessed into the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry. Protestors lost no opportunity to raise the issue. Any Soviet delegation wether ibscure or the world renowned Bolshoi Ballet, found themselves facing Jewish protestors demanding rights for Soviet Jews. And there was more than protest. Jewish groups encouraged thousands of American and European Jews to make tourist trips to the Soviet Union and to meet with Jewish dissidents. Here the Soviets were torn because if tgey rejected visa requests they were turingvdown needed foreign currency earnings. Jewish groups began lobbing in Washington. This was something else the Soviets did not want as Soviet diplomats began promoting Détente. There were also important tradeissues. The failure of Soviet agriculture meant tht they had to import grain.

Lenningrad Trial (1970)

The issue of Jewish immigration first received international attention durung the Nixon Administration. Dymshits and Kuznetsov, two Jews, who had been denied exit visas began plotting to hijack a plane. They were arrested, tried and sentenced to death (December 1970). The press picked up on this and it caused an international outcry. Now the Soviets had previously excuted some 100 Jews that were entirely innocent of any criminal activity. These two Jews had clearly committed a serious crime. The Soviets blinked. Thy backed down and decided not to execute the two men. Even so, the furor over the trial brought the issue of Jewish emigration to the intense internstional spot light as never before.

Difficult Issue for the Soviets

Emigration was a very difficult issue for the Soviets. From the beginning of the Soviet regime, emmigration was discouraged. It was seen as an admission that Communism was not building a worker and peasant paradise. Under Stalin it was virtually impossible and to even request permission to emigrate was essenbtially a one-way ticket to the Gulag. Stalin did not even allow the starving Ukranian peasantry to emigrate resulting in the death of millions. Jewish immigration was a special issue. It was not because the Soviet leadership particularly wanted Jews. But unlke Tsarist Jews, Soviet Jews were some of the most educated and skilled groups in the country. Soviet Jews had taken full advantage of educational opportunities never avilable under the Tsars. While Jews in part because of the NAZI Hollocaust, made up less than 1 percenht of the population, they may have constituted a much larger percentage of the intelligensia. Something like one-third of the emigranting Jews had university degrees of various levels, including advanced degrees. Perhaps even more importantly, highly compentent Jews were concentrated in several important areas, including medicine, mathematics, biology, and music. [Buwalda] International protests resulted and the Soviets revoked the tax, but continued to sporadically impose various limitations. Through all of this more nmd more Jews submitted emmiogration requests. During the 1960s, only about 4,000 people were permitted to leave the Soviet Union. In contrast, during the 1970s motivated by the increasing economic problems and desire to improve access to vibrant Western economies, about 250,000 people were allowed to leave. [Alexeyeva] Soviet authorities could have done what the Tsarist authorities did, allowed them to leave with few limitations. And in Tsarist Russia, most Russians were glad to be rid of Jews. The Soviet calculation was different. If Soviet authorities allowed Jews to emigrate it would make it difficult to deny similar rights to other Soviet citizens. And they faced the equally perplexing issue, how would they explain why people whould want to leave the 'workers' paradise. Soviet propaganda trumneted the claim that conditions in the Soviet Union were ideal for workers. We are not sure how many Soviet citizens bought this claim, but apparently many in the closed Soviet society did. So depite resevations, Soviet officials began to quietlt approve exit visas, largely because of pressure from the West. Israeli sources report that from very low numbers, the Soviets suddenly permitted about 45,000 Jews to leave (1969-72). These were stateling numbers at the time, althoug low in comparison as to the numbers that would come. What we do not yet know is how many Jews actually applied to leave and just how Soviet authorities processed the applications and decided on who would be granted permission. Or what acton to take against the applicants. Soviet media at first simply ignored the subject so the Soviet people were largely unaware of the issue.

Chess (1972)

In the midst of all the issues with Jews in the Soviet Union came a furor over of all things chess. The Soviet Union was a hermetically sealed state, but did like to engage in international competitions to demonstrate their superiority. Here they had an advantage in competitions like the advantage because they could support their athletes in a way that other countries clinging to amateurism could not. (Not to mention drugs and dishonest judges). Of course the Olympics dealt with athleticism. The Soviets also wanted to demonstrate intellectual superiority. This was more difficult. The greatest demonstration of intellectual prowess is Nobel Prize awards. But this mean releasing important scientific advances to the world. And the Soviets did not want to share their scientific advances. A poor second to Nobel awards was international chess competitions. Here the Soviets had another advantages--age Jewish population. And Jews over time have dominated the chess world--before the Soviet Union existed. The so called 'Match of the Century' took place in 1972. And it occurred between Soviet and American grand masters--a perfect cold war slugfest. Less mentioned was that both grand masters were Jewish which was more important than Soviet-American differences. As with the Olympics, the Soviet grand masters (Boris Spassky) had an advantage. He had the full support of the Soviet state. He did not need to have a job and could devote himself full time to chess. A team of Soviet grand masters studied the American Bobby Fischer's chess games and helped to advise Kasparov. Fisher was on his on with no state support. The 1972 World Chess Championship took place in Reykjavik, Iceland and proved to be the most celebrated chess match in history. Spassky was the defending champion. Chess Grand Master Raymond Keene describes it, "Inevitably a clash within representatives of Russian and American might became overladen with symbolic and political overtones, which attracted the glare of the world media." The Soviets were confident of a propaganda win. Chess was part of Soviet political system. And the Soviets had dominated international competitions for over two decades. Fischher was seen as an American upstart. The turning point in the 21 game competition came early--Game 6 which Fischer won spectacularly ending Soviet dominance. Many chess experts see it as one of the most powerful chess games in chess history. And occurring at the height of the Cold war only added to the spectacle.

Diploma Tax (1973)

A major impediment to Jewish emigration was the diploma tax. The Soviets required those desiring to emigrate to pay for the cost of their state-privided education. The charges calculated far exceeded the means of almost all Soviet citizens. Ending the diploma tax was a major step in making large-scale emigration possible. Brezhnev told the Politboro, "At this particulsr time, when the Zionists have incited a campaign around the Jackson Anendment and around the bill granting us [most favored-nation] status, we need to let them out." [Beckerman]

Refusniks

The Soviet Union despite the NAZI Holocaust still had a small, but given the size of the country a very substantial Jewish population. It was the third largest Jewish population after the United Stares and Israel. The Refusniks were Soviet citizens, especially but not all Jews, which the Soviet Government refused permission to emigrate. This was a post-Stalinist development. Jews for the most part did not dare request to emigrate during the Stalinist era. This was likely to invite the NKVD to arrest them. And just before he died, Stalin had decided on a major anti-Jewish pogrom. The so-called Doctor's Plot was a beginning step. Actually this may have contributed to his death, with Kremlin doctors either in NKVD prions are too terrified to do their jobs. With the 20th Party Congress and the de-Stalinization process, Soviet Jews began to apply for exit visas to Israel. Most of the applicants came from the new 'western territories' annexed as a result of World War II. This included the western Ukraine, Belorussia (formerly eastern Poland), the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), Transcarpathia (formerly eastern Czechoslovakia), Bessarabia and northern Bucovina (formerly Romania). The Jewish population in these areas was desdescimated y the NAZIs, but there were survivor. And unlike the Russian core and central and eastern Ukrraine, Jews in these areas had a very real memory of life before being annexed into the Soviet mpire. Their requests for emigration were systematically denied by Soviet officials. It did not fit well with the Soviet propaganda narative that people wanted to leave the worker's paradise. This was done on an individual basis. The people involved had had no way of knowing that others were attmpting to emigrate. This began to change in the late-1960s. Nationalist and other political dissident activity became more common and while not tolerated was not as brutally supressed as had been the case previouly. Détente was another major development. The Soviet leadership became more sensitive to Western pressures and opinion. Economics was another factor. It was becoming better understood that Western economies were supporting the Soviet state to a greater degree than formerly known. The Refusniks some of whom had been trying to emograte for over 20 years began to undrstand that they were part of a larger group and not just isolated individuls and they began to influence the wider Soviet Jewish national movement. The Refuseniks dispairing of ever having their emigration requests approved began to engage in dissident activities. Actually several of the more prominent Refusniks were active in the overall dissident movement before engaging in the Jewish one. This of course was only possible once the draconian Stalinist actions against disidents ceased. But it did not mean that the KGB did not have an extensive panoplay of legal and extra-legal powers it could use against the Refusniks. The Refusniks began establishing contact with individuals and organizations beyond KGB control in the West. Refuseniks began to become household names in the West, especialy among Jewish groups. Their plight and details on KGB actions against them were chorinicled in the press, causing a major outcry against the Soviet Union in the United States and Western Europe. Israeli media also covered the Refuniks. This had less impact on Soviet leaders, but it did help get the word out about Soviet repression. The Refuseniks suceeded in publicizing the denial of their right and KGB harassment, including being fired from their jobs or demotion to junior, often menial jobs. Their economic plight, including the loss of apartments as well as the discomfort and harasment of threir families (including their children) was duly reported in the Western media. This coverage and publicity was not what Soviet officals were used to experiencing. Previously the Sovirts were very adroit at covering up discent and even massive attrocities like the Ukranian Famine.

Détente (1970s)

Jewish emigration was an unwelcomed issue for the Nixon Adminitration. The Admnistration was primarily interested in bilateral relations with the Soviets and pursued Déetente. This and the related Opening to China was seen as what would be the seminal achievements of the Administration. The Cold War which began in the aftermath of World War II, at least Western realization of Soviet policy, included various periods of rising and falling tensions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had by 1970s built up massive and very expensive nuclear aresenals. Arenals that were capable of destroying the other country. President Nixon advised by Secretary of State Kissengr, while winding down the Vietnam War, decided to pursue Détente with the Soviet Union. The two can be seen as the architects of Détente. This was at the time surprising because Nixon was known as a Cold War warrior. At the same time China emerged from the Cultural Revolution as an increasingly independent actor. This was a key development as it allowed the United States to play each off against the other. We now know more now about Kissenger's opinion because of tapes released by the Nixon Presidentisl Library (2010). Kissinger has apologized for the 'undoubtedly offensive" remarks, but insists that he was actually using quiet diplomacy to get Jews out of the Soviet Union.

Congressional Action (1974-75)

The Nixon Administration had favored quiet diplomacy with the Soviets. Congressional Democrats were of a different mind. Wahington Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson wanted to make human rights an integral element in the American-Soviet relationship. He and Ohio Congressman Charles Vanik sponsored a bill to require that as American foreign policy. The Act was passed by Congress as part of an Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 (November 1974 and signed into law by President Ford (January 1975). It forced the Administration to include civil rights as part of the bilateral relationship. The Act required the Soviet Union to end restrictions on emigration, both quotas and diploma taxes) if they wanted most faborable trade status. While some saw this as tilting at windmills, we now know more about the Soviet economic decline and that access to the U.S. markey was indeed important to the Soviets. The Soviets at first rejected this as unwaranted interference and refused the trade deals. It would, however, be key to forcing the Soviets to eliminating long-standing barriers to the emigration of Jews whio were now pressing to leave the country. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee also supported the bill. The Act required that 'non-market' economy countrie (a way of specifing the Soviet Union without specifically naming them, comply with specific free emigration criteria as a prerequisite for receiving economic benefits in trade relations with the United States. What the Soviets wanted was Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and access to U.S. government financial facilities. And the Act meant that they would have to open up emigration to get these trade benefuts. The Nixoin Adminidtration opposed the Act, seeing it as a threat to its policy of because the Soviets so ardently opposed it. The American Jewish community strongly backed it. The Nixon Administration as part of its détente policy had negotited a comprehensive trade agreement with the Soviets (October 1972). Liberal sentors led by New York Senator Jacob Javits broached the idea of linking trade benefits to Soviet Jewish emigration. Senators Jackson, Abraham Ribicoff, and Hubert Humphrey picked up the issue and begam building a liberal-conservative coalition. The Soviets began to make concessions. At first they offered to make exemptions to the diploma tax and offered to rescind it as the Soviet-American Trade Bill as Congress was about to pass it (1974). It iscat that point that Senator Adlai Stevenson III intervened. He was disturbed by Soviet actions durung the Yom Kippur War (1973). The Soviets had not only armed the Arabs to the hilt, but threatened intervention. He introduced an amendment limiting U.S. credits to only $300 million over 4 years. He also prohibiting U.S. credits for developing Soviet oil and natural gas deposits, in resoonse to Soviet support for the Arab oil embargo. The Soviets who had been thinking of some $40 billion in U.S. credits, repudiated the trade agreement. Even so, they did allow increases in Jewish emigration.

Helsinki Accords (1975)

Another major achievement of Détente was the Helsinki Accords (1975). The Soviets probably underestimated the impact of the human rights provisions. After more than 2 years of difficult discussion, the representatives of Canada, the United States, and 33 European countries met in Helsinki, Finland. The expressed purpse was formalize the post-World war II borders. The formal name of the occssion was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki ccords consisted of three 'baskets'. The first basket consisted of practical measures regarding security. The existing borders were confirmed and the parties pledged peaceful settlements of any future disputes. The second basket dealt with cooperation in trade, culture, science, and industry. The third bsket addressed humanitarian concerns and called for free movement of peoples and circulation of ideas. The first two baskets were largely acceptable to all sides and resulted in substantial benefits to all sides. The third basket was very different. The United States and the Soviets viewed the three baskets differently, especially the thirdd basket. The United states, especially after the election of President Carter, was very serious about the third basket. The Soviets were fairly pleased with the first two baskets, deeing benefits for the struggling economy. And they considerefd the third backet a public relations exercise. It could be useful in criticizing the West in its propaganda and simply ignored behind its own inukated borders. After all Stalin had pledged democratic elections during the Yalta Conference at the end of World war II. Soviet negotiators saw no reason why they could not do the same. The agreement was signed (August 1, 1975). American negotiators about essentially recognize Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and annexation of the Baltic Republics, but believed on balancethat the Treaty would have a positive impact. Many in the human rights community, however, greeted it with skepticism if not open cynicism. They argued that the Soviets had obtained their political objectives of non-interference and would simply ignore the provisions of the Agreement which addressed human rights. This certainly was what the Soviets thought that they had achieved. Something entirely unexpected occurred. The human-rights provisions resulted in the creation of Helsinki Watch committees throughout the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellites. This inspired dissent which developed into important movements that gradually represent major challenges to Communism. Natan Sharansky argues that dissent was not possible under Stalin. The cost of dissent was death. That is why there was no notable dissenters during the Stalinist era. Once the cost of dissent became less draconian, a human rights movement could develop. [Sharansky and Dermer] The movement took various forms in different countries. In Czechoslovakia Charter 77 was created which launched a human rights campaign beginning with a declaration signed by 243 intellectuals, journalists, and reform communists who had been purged during the 1968 Soviet intervention.

Destinations

The Soviets locked in the Cold War with the United States seemed more willing to grant emigration visas to Israel. It did not have the same ideological taint as emmigration to the United States. At first almost all of those who managed to get exit visas to Israel actually made aliyah. We are not sure if that is what the Jews involved actually wanted. Notably most Soviet Jews by the 1970s had been deprived of their religiuous anbd cultyural heritage by the Sioviet atheism campaign which in the Staklinmist era was extrodinarily brutal. After the mid-1970s, most of those allowed to leave for Israel actually began chosing other destinations, most notably the United States.

Human Rights

The Nixon Administration was primarily interested in Détente and accomodation with the Soviet Union. They wanted a softer approach on hunman rights so that advances could be made on security issues like arms control. Subsequent administrations were increasingly interested in raising human rights as an important element of U.S. policy. Human rifgts was especually important to President Carter (1977-81). And emigration was one of the issues focused on, because it was the one most subject to actual results. Jewish emigration reached 51,000 in 1979. And it was no accident that this was the year that a bad harvest which caused the Soviets to pursue a grain deal with the United States. There was also an arms limitation treaty to ratify. And President Reagan (1981-89) pursued human rights vigorously in his dealings with the Soviets. Secretary of State George Schultz when he was in Moscow to meet with Genrral Secretary Mikhail Gorbechov attended a Passover seder with Jewish activists (1987).

Gorbechev (1985)

Mikhail Gorbechev was appointed Genrral Secretary of the Communist Party (1985). He fully understood the economic decline of the Soviet Union and the need to reach an understanding with the United States to limit burdensime arms spending as well as access to the U.S, market. He also realised that this meant reaching an understanding on Jewish emigration. His closest foreign affairs adviser wrote in his dairy, "We have to resolve the Jewish question, the most burning among human rights problemns." (1986) [Chernyaev] The exodus from the Soviet captivity finally began in large numbers. Jewish immigrantion reached unprecedented levels: 71, 196 (1989), 181,802 (1990), and 178,566 (1991).

Importance

Authors disagree as to the importance of Jewish emigration. Secretary of State Henry Kissenger seems to have seen it as more of an irritant in United States-Soviet relations. Another author writes, "It armed Soviet citizens with the greatest weapon against their closed society: the opportunity to vote with their feet and leave." [Beckerman]

Sources

Alexeyeva, Lyudmila. History of Dissident Movement in the USSR (Vilnius: 1992). In Russian.

Beckerman, Gal. "Kissinger's distortion: The true story of Soviet Jewish emigration," The Washington Post (December 28, 2010), p. A13. Beckerman addresses the subject of Jewish emigration in much more detail in his book, When They Come for Us, We'll be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewery (2010).

Buwalda, Petrus. They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union 1967–1990 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

Chernyaev, Anatoly.

Sharansky, Natan and Ron Dermer. The Case for Democracy: The Power of Democracy to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (2004).







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Created: 6:33 AM 12/28/2010
Last updated: 4:58 AM 7/11/2018