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President Clinto brought PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Isreali Primier Ehud Barak together at Camp David to reach a final resollution of the issues set in motion by the Oslo Peace Process. The negotiations were protracted and contentious. President Clinton did a comendable job of keeping the negotiations going and wringing concessions from both sides. Considerable controversy exists over what the final Isreali offer was to the Palestinians. The offer is, however, a matter of clear historical record. [Ross] One can argue the value of the accord hammered out and wether is was a fair and just resolution, but the details are a matter of public record. The Palestinians can argue that the Isreali offer was not adequate. They can not, however not argue that the Isrealis did not make substantial concessions and meet many of their legitimate demands. Israel offered Arafat 94-96 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza. Israel would ceed 1-3 percent of its territory to the Palestinians. [Clinton, p. 936.] Thus the Palestinians were essentially offered 97 percent of the West Bank. This is a matter of historical record. Individuals who deny that Israel offered the Palestinians 97 percent of the West Bank are either in error or dishonest. The areas retained by the Isrealis contained 80 percent of the Jewish population in the East Bank. The Arab neigborhoods of Jeruselum would be incorprated into the new Palestinian state, this included parts of the Old City. Thus both states could claim Jersuselum as their capital. The Palestinians were given soverignity over the Temple Mount/Haram and the Isrealis soverignity over the Western Wall. There was to be no excavations without mutual consent. There were a variety of arrangements governing Isreali withdrawl from the West Bank and provisions to satisfy Isreali security concerns. The right of return was to be limited to the new Palestinian state, although it was understood that Israel would except small numbers of Palestinians, especially from the refugees in Lebanon. [Clinton, p. 937.] There was to be a major international effort to help resettle the refugees. A international aid package og about $30 billion was discussed. [Ross] Yasser Arafat's rejection of the Israeli peace offer led to a new Interfada, disastrous for both the Israeli and Palestinian people. Arafat has widely been blamed for the failure of the talks and the violence that followed. His moytives are not known. Some believe that he calculated that a brief resumption of violence would improve his baragaining position. He may have also believed that he could had got a better deal with Bush. What ever his reasons, the violence quickly spiraled beyond his control. This may be the case. It also may be the case that he believed that signing the agreement would be like signing his death warrant. Other Arab leaders attempting to makes peace with Israel were assasinated (Jordanian King Abdullah and Egyptian President Sadat). It may also be the case that the Palestinian people are simply not ready for peace.
The Oslo Peace Process seem to offer the possibility of peace. The official name of the Oslo accords was the "Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements". It was the foundation of the Oslo Process--peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians between 1993 and 2000. They were signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by President Bill Clinton (September 13, 1993). Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin famously shook hands, seemingly ending decades as sworn enemies. The foundation of the process was the idea that Israel would trade land for peace. The Oslo Process envisaged that the Israelis would proceed to transfer portions of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to the control of the Palestinian Authority, a quasi-state organization. The Palestinian Authority would in exchange guarantee Israel's security by ending Palestinian Organization (PLO) terrorism and supressing armed Palestinian groups that failed to comply. After progress was made in these areas, Israel and the PA would negotiate a final agreement involving a mutual recognition of each other's territorial claims. The "land for peace" transfers were seen as building mutual trust and confidence. Finally the two sides would negotiations the "final status" issues that were left unresolved at Oslo. These included some of the most difficult issues: Palestinian statehood, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and the right of return. Although the Oslo Accords were signed with great optimism, there was considerable opposition to the agreement, especially among various Palestinian groups.
President Clinto brought PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Isreali Primier Ehud Barak together at Camp David to reach a final resollution of the issues set in motion by the Oslo Peace Process. The negotiations were protracted and contentious. President Clinton did a comendable job of keeping the negotiations going and wringing concessions from both sides. Considerable controversy exists over what the final Isreali offer was to the Palestinians. The offer is, however, a matter of clear historical record. [Ross] One can argue the value of the accord hammered out and wether is was a fair and just resolution, but the details are a matter of public record. The Palestinians can argue that the Isreali offer was not adequate. They can not, however not argue that the Isrealis did not make substantial concessions and meet many of their legitimate demands. Israel offered Arafat 94-96 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza. Israel would ceed 1-3 percent of its territory to the Palestinians. [Clinton, p. 936.] Thus the Palestinians were essentially offered 97 percent of the West Bank. This is a matter of historical record. Individuals who deny that Israel offered the Palestinians 97 percent of the West Bank are either in error or dishonest. The areas retained by the Isrealis contained 80 percent of the Jewish population in the East Bank. The Arab neigborhoods of Jeruselum would be incorprated into the new Palestinian state, this included parts of the Old City. Thus both states could claim Jersuselum as their capital. The Palestinians were given soverignity over the Temple Mount/Haram and the Isrealis soverignity over the Western Wall. There was to be no excavations without mutual consent. There were a variety of arrangements governing Isreali withdrawl from the West Bank and provisions to satisfy Isreali security concerns. The right of return was to be limited to the new Palestinian state, although it was understood that Israel would except small numbers of Palestinians, especially from the refugees in Lebanon. [Clinton, p. 937.] There was to be a major international effort to help resettle the refugees. A international aid package of about $30 billion was discussed. [Ross]
While the actual offers made at Camp David are a matter of fact, the reasons for the failure of the talks are much more complicated. Here various authors have offered their interpretation of why the talks failed. Often authors attack the motivations or tactics of Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. They may be right or wrong on these assessments, this is difficult to assess. It seems likely, however, that the talks failed because of a basic disagreement still persisting between Israel and Palestinians on two key issues: 1) Jerusalem and 2) the Palestinian "Right of Return". The Isrealis made concessions on Kerusalem at Camp David. They were, however, not adequate for Chairman Arafat. The Isrealis refused to make substantial concessions on the right of return and for Arafat many Palestinians this must be an element in any negotiated peace.
Many accounts of the Camp David talks describe Primeminister Ehud Barak's offers to Chairman Yasser Arafat as unprecedented and a generous attempt to achieve peace. He can be criticised for not going far enough or for going to far, depending on one's perspective. He did, however, make significant concessions, albeit after considerable cajoling by President Clinton and his team. Other observers. Some have criticized Barak for not offering compromises the Palestinians could accept and for not creating a more congenial atmosphere as well as for his negotiating strategy.
[Agha and Malley] Barak in particular was opposed to approaching the problem throufg gradual steps. He wanted a final definitive peace agreement. Barak can be criticised for these and other reasons, but it seems a fair assessment that he truly wanted peace and made a sincere effort to achieve it.
Yassir Arafat is an almost mythic figure in the Palestinian resistabce to Israel. How one views the man will depend largely on one's views on the overall Isreali-Palestinian struggle. He was anephew of the Grand Mufti and helped launch the Palestinian resistance effort after the failure of the ealy efforts by the Front Line states to destroy Israel. One has to question how sincerly he was committed to compromise and the peace effort or rather his presence at Camp David was simply a cover aimed at achieving international legitimacy. Again one's view will depend on the overall view of the Isreali-Palestinin issue. It seems clear that Arafat was not at all favorably disposed to the talks he thought he was forced to attend by world public opinion. He seems to have thought thathe was being railroaded by Barak and Clinton. [Agha and Malley] Opinions are of course elusive, it is always best to seek actual facts. And here I do not know of any major concessions Arafat offered the Isrealis. Some will see him as a brave patriot, standing up to Barak and the Isrealis. Others will see him as a rejectionist, not willing to make a commitment to peace, one more missed opportunity for the Palestinins.
The Isreali-Palestinian issue is very complicated. And discussions of the failure of the Camp David talks often descend into mind-numbing minutia. There was progress made on several issues, but in the final analysis the failure ot the talks rests on two main issues: 1) Jerusalem and 2) the Palestinian "Right of Return". The Isreals were willing to compromise on Jerusalem, but not on the "Right of Return" beyond cosmetic steps. The Palestinians were not prepared to compromise on either. These two issues were the basic reason for the Palestinian refusal to accept the accord offered. [Abbas]
Jerusalem: Jerusalem was envisioned by the United Nations in 1947 as an internatinal city. It was not to be part of the partitioned Arab or Jewish states in 1947. The city was divided in the ensuing war. The small Jewish community in East Jerusalem was besieged by Arab irregulars. They held out, but after the Aran Invasion, the Jordanian Legion quickly overcame the small Haganah detachment in East Jerusalem (May 1948). The Hagenah men were taken prisioners and the civilians expelled to Jewish lines. This in essence was the ethnic cleansing of East Jerusalem. The city and the West Bank was annexed by Jordon. Major sites of importance are located in East Jerusalem, especially the Old City. The Hebrew University on Mount Scopus held out. The Arab Legion, however, seized the Jewish quarter, the Wailing Wall, the cemetery on Mt Olives, where Jews have been buried for centuries. The Jordanians not only ethnically clensed East Jerusalem, but prohibited Isrealis from visiting the religious sites. The Isrealis in aprolonged campaign manage to hang on to West Jerusalem. The Isreals seized East Jerusalem in the 6 Days War (1967). They attempted to convinced King Hussein not to joint with the Egyptians and Syrians, but he felt his obligation to Arab unity compeled him to do so and Nasser assured him that the Egyptian Army was achieving great vicories. After the Jordanians attacked, Isreali paratroopers seized East Jerusalem and the Army the West Bank. Since the 6 Days War, Jerusalem has remained under Isreali occupation. The internaional community, however, has not recognized Isreali jurisdiction. The Isrealis unlike the Jordanians have allowed Muslims access to the religious site, mainly the Dome of the Rock mosque on the Temple Mount.
The Right of Return: Arafat remained committed to the "Right of Return". And even relative moderates within the Palestinian community remain committed to Right of Return. Abu-Mazen has made it plain that hebelieves in a afull and literal implementation of the "right" of return, "It is noteworthy in this matter, and this is also what we clarified to the Israelis, that the Right of Return means a return to Israel and not to the Palestinian State... When we talk about the Right of Return, we talk about the return of refugees to Israel, because Israel was the one who deported them and it is in Israel that their property is found ... ". At a memorial service for Arafat, he stated, "We promise you [Arafat] that our heart will not rest until we achieve the right of return for our people and end the tragic refugee issue." This is more complicaed than it may seem. First not all of the refugees were created by the Isrealis. Palestinian and Aran officials encouraged Palestinians to fleet so that the Jewish forces could be more easily attacked. Second, many of the original refugeee have since passed away. Most of the refugees are their descendents and the numbers are much larger than the actual number of refugees. And this means to accept such aarge number of Palestinian Arabs would destroy Israel. A two-state sollution with the "right of return" would in effect be a one state sollution.
What ever one's opinion of the Yasser Arafat's rejection of the Israeli peace offer. there is no doubt that there were coinsequences. It led directly to a new Interfada, disastrous for both the Israeli and Palestinian people. Arafat has widely been blamed for the failure of the talks and the violence that followed. His moytives are not known. Some believe that he calculated that a brief resumption of violence would improve his baragaining position. He may have also believed that he could had got a better deal with Bush. What ever his reasons, the violence quickly spiraled beyond his control. This may be the case. It also may be the case that he believed that signing the agreement would be like signing his death warrant. Other Arab leaders attempting to makes peace with Israel were assasinated (Jordanian King Abdullah and Egyptian President Sadat). It may also be the case that the Palestinian people are simply not prepared to make peace with Israel.
Abbas, Abbas. (Abu Mazin) Al Hayat (Beirut, November 23-24, 2000).
Agha, Hussein and Robert Malley. Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors.
Clinton, Bill. My Life (Knopf: New York, 2004), 957p.
Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace. Ambassador Ross was deeply involved in the Camp David discussions. Ross includes in his book a verbatim copy of the final offer Barak made and that Arafat refused to accept.
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