*** Allied Around the Clock bombing campaign 1943 Schweinfurt Black Thursday








Allied 1943 Strategic Bombing Campaign: Schweinfurt--Black Thursday (October 1943)

Schweinfurt--Black Thursday
Figure 1.-- If there was any lingering douby that the B-17 Flying Fortresses were not capavle of deep penetration raids without escorts, the Luftwaffe settled the issue once and for all over Schweinfurt. Schweinfurt with its ball bearing plants remained a target that the Americans really wanted. The 8th Air Force attacked the city with 291 bombers (Ocober 14). This was more than the first raid (August 17). The city is located in Bavaria and thus this was a deep-penetration raid. The Luftwaffe scrambled 300 fighters scrambled to attack the American bombers. Bad weather in England undid plans to mitigate German fighter resistance. The Americans reported the most intense German opposition yet experienced. The Germans shot down 60 bombers, the largest Ameericam losses of the War. This American B-17, the 'Lazy Baby', came down in neutral Switzerland. It was part of the 305th Bomb Group and was heavily damaged over Schweinfurt and crashed on a field near Aesch less than a minute after crossing the Swiss border. Notice the Esso filing station. Before the War, Switzerland imprted its oil from America and coal from Britain. This ended with the fall of France. Theinability of Germany to provide the energy needs of its Gro�raum meant that the economies contracted, limiting the ability of the NAZI war econmy to exploit the European economy.

If there was any lingering douby that the B-17 Flying Fortresses were not capavle of deep penetration raids without escorts, the Luftwaffe settled the issue once and for all over Schweinfurt. Schweinfurt with its ball bearing plants remained a target that the Americans really wanted. The 8th Air Force on October 14 attacked the city with 291 bombers, more than in the first raid (August 17). The city is located in Bavaria and thus this was a deep-penetration raid. Bad weather in England undid plans to mitigate German fighter resistance. The Americans reported the most intense German opposition yet experienced. The Luftwaffe scrambled 300 fighters scrambled to attack the American bombers. The Germans shot down 60 bombers, the largest American losses of the War. The Luftwaffe lost 38 fighters, but mamy of the pilots bailed out and returned to duty. The B-17s had crews of 10 men. Thus 600 flyers were killed or taken prisoner. The American named the day Black Thursday because of the disterous losses. Initial reports from the airmen indicated much higher German losses. The ball bearing plants were hit, but back in production in 6 weeks. Despite the American focus on ball bearings, the German armaments industry was not disrupted by a ball bearing shortage. The factories were repaired and substitutes were found. Ball bearings were also imported from Sweden and Switzerland. Speer estimated that persistant attacks on the ball bearing plants could have disrupted German war production. The German defenses, however, were too strong and the 8th Air Force bombers to vulnerable to continue the attacks. Eaker finally concluded that deep penetration raids were not feasible without fighter escorts wjhich were not yet available. The British were planning Opperation Berlin, but would have to do so without American deep-penetration raids for support.

Schweinfurt

Schweinfurt translates swine or big ford, deriving its name before a brifdge was built. It was a medievel daing to the 8th century located in the Lower Franconia (eastern) region of Bavaria on the right bank of the navigable Main River. The Main is spanned by several bridges at Schweinfurt. It was 27 km northeast of W�rzburg. Schweinfurt became part of Germany's rapid industrialization in the mid-19th century. The first railway conection was completed (1852). Schweinfurt developed as an important center for the production of ball bearings. This would have horrific consequences for the city after America entered World War II. Schweinfurt produced most of domestic production of ball bearings for the German War Economy. Ball bearings were used in a wide range of military and support vehicles and equipment--especially tanks and aurcraft. As a result, factories such as the Schweinfurter Kugellagerwerke became a target of American strategic bombing raids. Schweinfurt with its ball bearing plants became a target that the Americans really wanted. Schweinfurt is located so far to the south and east of the industrial Ruhr, anoher Allied targetg. It was thus a deep-penetration raid meaning the bombers had to contend with the full force of the Luftwaffe defenses.

German Preparations

As RAF Bomber Command began intensifing bombing operations with the new Lancasters and the American 8th air Forse began their buildup in 1942, the Germans began to realize the hitherto limited bombing campaign wold become anotherr major theater of operations. The Luftwaffe's response was the Kammhuber Line. Armament Minister Speer clims he raised the subject with Hitler (September 10, 1942). Speer was particularly concerned about tank production at Friedrichshafen and ball bearing production at Schweinfurt. [Speer, p. 365.] He claims tht Hitler ordered increased anti-aircraft FLAK protection.

First Raid (August 17)

The American intelligence assessment from the first Schweinfurt�Regensburg raid (August 17) was that ball bearing production had been reduced some 34 percent. The bomber force was split for the separate attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg. The target in Schweinfurt was the ball bearings plants. At Regensburg it was an irctraft assembly plant. Speer maintains that the raid could have had disaterous consequences had the bomber force not been split. [Speer, p. 371.] Speer considered relocting the bllbearing plants as well as others at Berlin-Erkner, Cannstatt, or Seyr. He decided gainst it as moving he plants would have meant disrupting production for months. peer was aware of the american losses, but had no idea about the size of the allied bomber force. The American lossess suffered delayed an immediate second strike. This had to be postponed so the losses could be replaced.

Mission Planning

As a result of the heavy losses in August, 8th Air Force planners developed new tactics to mitigate Luftwaffe fighter resistance. The planners made several changes based on lessons learned during the first mission. Planners increased the number of fighter escorts. They did not have the range to accompany the bombers into the Reich, but could cover the outward and return legs of the raid. The entire force was sent against Schweinfurt and not split with another target.

Second Raid (October 14)

The 8th Air Force on October 14 attacked the city with 291 bombers, more than in the first raid. Bad weather in England undid plans to mitigate German fighter resistance. Some 229 of the attacking force hit Schweinfurt and the ball bearing plants in two groups. The first group bombed s at 1439-1445 hours. The second group followed 1451-1457 hours. [McKillop] The Americans reported the most intense German opposition yet experienced. Schweinfurt had imposing FLAK defenses. In addition the Luftwaffe scrambled 300 fighters to attack the American bombers.

Losses

If there was any lingering douby that the B-17 Flying Fortresses were not capavle of deep penetration raids without escorts, the Luftwaffe settled the issue once and for all over Schweinfurt. The 8th Air Force tactical modifications failed. Several minor mishaps and the increasing operation efficiency of the German defenses, both FLAK batteries and fighters devastated the American bomber force. Most of the attacking force was hit. Of the 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses raiding force, 60 were lost. This was the largest American losses of the War.An additional other 17 made it back to Britain, but were were damaged so severly that they had to be scrapped. Another 121 had varying degrees of battle damage, but could be repaired. This amount to the loss of over 25 percent of the attacking force. Losses in aircrews were also enormous. The B-17s had crews of 10 men. There were 650 aircrew lost, 2,900, over 20 percent of the men committed. Thus aircrews were killed or taken prisoner. The Army Air Firce historical record reports that loses of this magnitude meant that the 8th Air Force could not return to the target for 4 months. "The fact was that the Eighth Air Force had for the time being lost air superiority over Germany". [Cate and Craven, pp. 704-05.] The Luftwaffe lost 38 fighters, but mamy of the pilots bailed out and returned to duty. The American named the day Black Thursday because of the disasterous losses. Hitler was elated when he received reports that the wrecks of downed ameican B-17s were cattered all over the countryside around Schweinfurt. He describedit as a 'great victory for our air defenses'. [Speer, p. 372.]

Allied Fighter Escorts

There were no Merlin engined P-51 Mustangs squadrons available for long-range escort. The P-47 Thunderbolt was inadequate because of its limited range. As a result, once the bombers crossed into the Reich they were exposed to attacks by German fighters. An escort of 24 squadrons of RAF Spitfires equipped with drop tanks was provided on the first and last leg of the mission. [Clostermann] The Germans at the time, however, were withdrawing much of their fighter defenses behind the Kammhuber Line and out of France and the Low countries. This in itself was an accomplishment, although not at the time a major goal of the 8th Air Force. As planning for D-Day intensified, it would however become a major goal of Gen. Eisenhower' Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SCHAEF) planners.

Damage

Initial reports from the airmen indicated much higher German losses. Speer was very concerned about the damage done to the ball bearing plants and the fall in production. The ball bearing plants were hit, but back in production in 6 weeks. Despite the American focus on ball bearings, the German armaments industry was not disrupted by a ball bearing shortage, although Armaments Minister speer tells us that it came very close to doing so and that a sustained campaign could have done just that. [Speer, pp. 371-74.]

Assessments

The factories were repaired and substitutes were found. Ball bearings were also imported from Sweden and Switzerland. Even during the War, an intense debate appeared between the Americans and British targetting teams. The British believed that the American focus on ball bearings was incorrect. RAF Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, believed that the American intelligence assessment that ball bearings were the critical node in the German war economy was deeply flawed. As a result, Harris declined to commit Bomber Command to the American effort. Harris called ball bearing targets a false 'panacea'. [Mc Farland and Newton, p. 197.] After the War, most assessments agreed with Harris. [Webster and Frankland, pp. 64-70.] Speer's Armament Ministry had built up a huge supply of ball bearings. And they were obtaining new shipments from other areas of the NAZI Gro�raum, especially northern Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. The factories in Sweden and Switerland because of their neutral status were beyond the reach of the American air offensive. Historians contend that even if the raid has succeded, the impact on the NAZI war effort wouth have been minimal. [Murray and Millett 2000, p. 313.] One assessment even contends that stocks were at all-time highs. [Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, p. 75.] Armamament Minister Speer provides a different assessment. He maintains that austained attack on Schweinfurt and other ballbearing production factories woulf hve cripped weapons production. [Speer, pp. 371-72] We suspect that the ball bearing stocks reported by various authors was a German response to the possibility of Allies focusing the bombing campaign on ball bearings. Speer goes into great detail about the ball bearing crisis and his efforts to deal with it such as using slide bearings and securing imported supplies. [Speer, pp. 372-74.] He reports that he and his staff were astonished that the American attacks ceased. What he was not aware of was how badly the 8th Air Force was damaged and their ability to pursue the ball bearing campaign. Araments Minister Speer estimated that persistant attacks on the ball bearing plants could have disrupted German war production. The German defenses, however, were too strong and the 8th Air Force bombers too vulnerable to continue the attacks. Eaker finally concluded that deep penetration raids were not feasible without fighter escorts wjhich were not yet available. The British were planning Opperation Berlin, but would have to do so without American deep-penetration raids for support. The German fighters could be moved from airfield to air field within Germany, but not immediately. Thus fighters deployed in the south to protect Bavarian cities could not orotect Berlin. There was also the day/night fighter issue.

Sources

Boog, Horst, Gerhard Krebs, Detlef Vogel. Germany and the Second World War Volume VII: 'The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia, 1943-1944/5' (London: Clarendon Press, 2006).

Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate. eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II (1983).

Clostermann, Pierre. The Big Show. (London: Cassell Books, 1951).

McFarland, Stephen L. and Wesley Phillips Newton. "The American Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany in World War II", in R. Cargill Hall, ed. Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment (1998).

McKillop, Jack. "Combat Chronology of the USAAF: October 1943".

Murray and Millett (2000).

Speer, Albert. Richard and Clara Winston, trans. Inside the Third Reich (Avon Books: New York, 1970), 734p.

Webster, Charles and Noble Frankland. (H.M. Stationery Office, 1961), 332 p.






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Created: 5:35 AM 9/8/2016
Last updated: 5:36 AM 9/8/2016