Figure 1.--These Siberians were taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942. Notice how different they look than the confused and shattered Red Army soldiers the Germans took prisoner in the earlier battles. These nen and boys knew both the nature of their enemy and although prisoners reflect the determnination of the Red Army that the Ostheer now faced. Source: Bundesarchiv, Coblenz.

Since the 1939 border fighting with Japan, Stalin had maintained a poweful army in Siberia. The importance of this well-equipped and trained force increased as the Wehrmacht smashed whole armies. The German destroyed a substantial part of the Red Army as Barbarossa unfolded, in part because Stalin had ordered them to take forward positions along the frontier. With the onset of Typhoon and the NAZI drive on Moscow, the need for fresh troops became critical if Moscow was to be saved. A German journalist, Richard Sorge, in Japan was a secret Soviet agent. He reported that Japan had decided not to attack the Soviet Union and had opted to strike south (early October). Here President Roosevelt's strong position against Japanese agression was a critical fator. Sorge's report can be over emphazized. During War countries reveive all kinds of reports. How could the Soviets be sure Sorge was correct or for that matter trustworthy. After all Stalin before Barbarossa had ignored numerous reports warning him of the coming NAZI invasion. It is likely that Stalin had other sources of information. Of course another factor was the desperate military situation that made up Stalin's mind. The Siberian divisions were well-trained and equipped and aucostomed to operating in winter weather. The Soviets rushed about 40 divisions west to participate in the defense of Moscow. They were to serve as a critical element in Zuhkov's counter offensive.

Undeclared Border War with Japan (May-September, 1939)

Large scale clashes occurred beginning May 1939 between Japanese and Soviet forces on the Mongolian plains along the border with Japanese-held Manchuria (Manchukuo). Neither side declared war. The Japanese released photographs of captured Soviet soldiers (July 1939). The conflict was little reported in the West. An offensive planned and executed by Marshall Zukov ended in a decisive voctory for the Soviets. The Japanese were forced to seek an armistace (September 1939). The clash was, however, of imense strategic significance, significantly affecting the strategic conduct of World War II. It was undoubtedly a factor encouraging Stalin to respond favorably to NAZI initiatives for a Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939) to ensure that the Soviet Union would not face a two-front war. Hitler ignored the Soviet performance and instread saw the inept Red Army offensive in Finland as evidence that the Soviets could be easily defeated. The Japanese Army concluded that further attacks on the Soviets were unwise. This was an important factor in attacking south in 1941 at America rather than north at the Soviet Union. It was also a major factor in refusing entrities from Hitler in 1942 to attack the Soviet Union, feeing the Red Army from what may have been a disastrous two-front war.

Siberian Reserves

Since the 1939 border fighting with Japan, Stalin had maintained a poweful army in Siberia. The importance of this well-equipped and trained force increased as the Wehrmacht smashed whole armies. The German destroyed a substantial part of the Red Army as Barbarossa unfolded, in part because Stalin had ordered them to take forward positions along the frontier. With the onset of Typhoon and the NAZI drive on Moscow, the need for fresh troops became critical if Moscow was to be saved.

Soviet Intelligence

A German journalist, Richard Sorge, in Japan was a secret Soviet agent. He reported that Japan had decided not to attack the Soviet Union and had opted to strike south (early October). Here President Roosevelt's strong position against Japanese agression was a critical fator. Sorge's report can be over emphazized. During War countries reveive all kinds of reports. How could the Soviets be sure Sorge was correct or for that matter trustworthy. After all Stalin before Barbarossa had ignored numerous reports warning him of the coming NAZI invasion. It is likely that Stalin had other sources of information. While we now know a great deal about American, British, and German intelligence during World War II. A comprehensive history of Soviet inteligence has not been written. And given the shifts in Russian politics, it is unlikely that the NKVD/KGB archives will be opened for years to come. We know that the United States knew a great deal about Japanese move becuse of the Purple Decrypts. We are not sure just how the Soviets knew about the victory of the Strike South Faction in Japan, but we suspect that Sorge was not their only source. Of course Japan and te Soviet Union signed a Neutality Pact (April 1941), but we doubt that after Barbarossa that the Soviets gave a great deal of credence to such treaties. Of course another factor was the desperate military situation that made up Stalin's mind.

Movement West

The Siberian divisions were well-trained and equipped and aucostomed to operating in winter weather. The Soviets rushed about 40 divisions west to participate in the defense of Moscow. (We have seen estimates of only 27 divisions, but 40 divisions is the number most often cited. The transfer began in the autumn. There wre limits on the quanity of men and material that could be moved over the Trans-Siberial Railway. The transit itself took about 2 weeks abnd then tin=me was needed to deploy.

Soviet Reserves

Many historians in describing the battle before Moscow suggest that the Siberian divisions were the primary reserve� forces available to the Red Army as the Germans drove toward Moscow. This would be a mistake. Wgatever number if Siberin divisions is used (27-40), it was a relatively small number of divisions given the enormity of the battle underway. The battle before Moscow was the largest battle odf Sorld War II (much lrger than Stalingrad). Hundreds of divisions were involved. And they were only a fraction of the new divisions that the Soviets had raised since the Germans launched Barbarossa. Wehrmacht planners calculated that the Soviets would be able to raise 300 new divisions. The Wehrmacht did not have an intekigence capabikity to make an infomed calculatuon. They simply estimated that two divisions could be formedcfrom each million people of population. As a result of these calculations, OKW believed that the Red Army reserves had been largely depleted and that victory was within their crasp. As with many Wehrnacht assessments, they were terribly wrong, understimating Soviet capabilities. The Soviets by the end off Secember had raised an incredable 600 divisions. Some of these divisions had been ithrown into the calderon of battle and had already been destoyed. Others were in the southern fronr. Others were not yer ready in early December, but many were. Stavka (Soviet high command under Zukov)would have had at its disposal 285 rifle divisions, 12 reformed tank divisions, 88 cavalry divisions, as well as 174 rifle and 193 tank brigades. The Soviets had moved 70 divisions from the interior Military Districts to the Moscow area. And they had raised 194 new divisions and 94 new brigades. Thus it can be been that the Siberian divisions were only a small part of the force that Stark was amassing to strike the Germans. This overemphasis on the Siberians is in part because Western historians have largely had access to German sources. And the Germnans generally underestimationg the sophistication of Stavka and lay their defeat at the hands of Hitler and the weather. The Russians are fond of pointing out that it does not take a rocket scientist to know that it gets cold in Russia during the winter. In fact the offensive before Moscow was a carfully crafted military operation nf not a just a matter of throwing Siberian reserves at the Wehrmacht. Despite the size of the operation, the Soviets managed to keep it a complete secret from the Germans.

Importance of the Siberians

This is not to say that the Siberians were not important, they were. While in the totality of the battle, they were a fairly small force, they were extremely high quality units and not raw recruits. The Siberian divisions had ski-troop battalions. Many learned to hunt as boys and were acustimed to the outdoors, even in winter conditions. They tended to be skilled maresmen, much like the Finns. Unlike the Germans (and many other Red Army units), the Siberians were capable of figting in winter conditions. And unlike the Germans, their equipment functioned in winter conditions. They were trained to fight in the snow and even make use of it. Thus thecSiberians played a key role in Stavka's offensive.

Created: 10:19 PM 9/14/2008
Last updated: 10:19 PM 9/14/2008