Figure 1.--This photograph was taken at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Chinese Training Center at Kunming which became operational as the supplies began reaching China over the Ledo Road (January 1945). The caption read, "HQ Chinese Training Center, U.S. army, China: Always glad to see the GI and anxious tonbe his pal, is the Chinese Gsiao Hie-te (little boy). Shiwn here with his Pong-you(friend) is Technical Sergeant Raymond R. Hiugh, Illinois, curently serving with headquarters of the Chinese Training Center which is engaged in teaching Chinese officers and troops modern methods of warfare." The Kunming Training Center had an air component. I believe that in the background is Chinese symbol used on Nationalist aircraft. The photograph is undated, but appears tohave beenb taken at the end of the War, probably during September 1945. Notice how wll fed and clthed the boys are. Source: U.S. Army Signal Corps.

Much of the Japanese Army after the beginning of open hostilities (1937) was deployed in China. After initial defeats, the Chinese developed the tactic of retreating to remote interior regions where the Japanese could not get to them. Chiang was very reluctant to commit his troops to open conbat with the Japanese after the first year of the War when many of his best units were destroyd. Even so, after, Japan launched thePacific War, the bulk of its army continued to be deployed in China. This was a conundrum for the Japanese. America was the greatest threat, but there was only so many men that could be deployed to small Pacific islands and the Japanese had trouble supplying the garrisons once established. Another problem for the Japanese was that there were a large number of Pacific islands and they could not be sure which ones the Americans would attack. America war planning initilly involved China as a major fighting ally. After the Japanese closed the Burma Road by seizing Burma (April 1942), there was no way of getting large quantities of supplies into China. American planners conceived of training and equipping 30 Chinese divisions through Lend Lease for an offensive against the Japanese in China. But this was not possible without the Burma Road. At the same it soon became clear that Japan could be attacked by twin island hopping campaigns, the Army in the South Pacific and and the Navy in the Central Pacific. Difficulties between Chiang and Stilwell and American seizure of the Marianas providing alterative air fields for bombing Japan caused American planners to reassess objectives in China. As a result, American plans to train and equip the Natinalist army were scaled back. There were, however, two important trining centers. The most important was in India where Chinese units could be supplied. American officers trained and equipped Chiinese divisions involved in Burma operations at Ramgarh in India. A second center was ooened at Cummin in China, but could not be fully supplied until the Burma Road was opened.

Japanese Army Deployment

Some authors denegrate Nationalist China's contrinytion to World war II. And the critics inclue some of the Americans like General Stillwell that worked with the Chinese. Whatever the inadequacies of the Nationalist forces, it should not be forgotten that most of the Japanese Army after the beginning of open hostilities (1937) was deployed in China. After initial defeats, the Chinese developed the tactic of retreating to remote interior regions where the Japanese could not get to them. Chiang was very reluctant to commit his troops to open conbat with the Japanese after the first year of the War when many of his best units were destroyd. Even so, after, Japan launched the Pacific War, the bulk of its army continued to be deployed in China. merican forces thus faced only a fraction of the Japanese army. This was a conundrum for the Japanese. America was the greatest threat, but there was only so many men that could be deployed to small Pacific islands and the Japanese had trouble supplying the garrisons once established. Another problem for the Japanese was that there were a large number of Pacific islands and they could not be sure which ones the Americans would attack.

American War Planning

America war planning initilly involved China as a major fighting ally. After the Japanese closed the Burma Road by seizing Burma (April 1942), there was no way of getting large quantities of supplies into China. American planners conceived of training and equipping 30 Chinese divisions through Lend Lease for an offensive against the Japanese in China. But this was not possible without the Burma Road. At the same it soon became clear that Japan could be attacked by twin island hopping campaigns, the Army in the South Pacific and and the Navy in the Central Pacific. Difficulties between Chiang and Stilwell and American seizure of the Marianas providing alterative air fields for bombing Japan caused American planners to reassess objectives in China. As a result, American plans to train and equip the Natinalist army were scaled back.

Ramgarh Training Center in India (1942)

Chaing ordered the Chinesr 5thArmy south into Burma to assist the British when the Japanese invaded. They were led by Gen Stillwill who failed to coordinate with the British. The defense of Burma turned into another Allied disaster. After some sharp defeats, Stillweell and the Chinese joined the British is a harrowing retreat through jungle, mud, and rain (May 1942). The Japanese seized the port of Rangoon first, but then the Burma Rod and much of northern Burma. Some of the Chinese retreatedback to China, but a substantial part of the Chinese 5th Army fought a fightingretreat across very diffiul teraine to Indua. After 3 months of almost continuous fighting and a retreat mostly on foot of some 200 miles without adequate food, water or medical care, the Chinese like the Brutish were exhausted and in bad shape. They had lost most of their equipment. They were trained and equipped at Ramgarh in India. Ramgarh was a town in Bihar province ofeastern India, in an area of rolling, unforested hills and arid plains. The British turned over the Ramgarh facility and infantry, artillery and tank training grounds were developed. They supplied the food and the silver rupees used to pay the troops. The Americans provided radios, signal equipment, rifles, field pieces, tanks, trucks and instructors. Thousands of Chinese soldiers were flown over the Hump to learn the use of these tools.It had a major asset, a rail connection which meant that American supplies could reach the Chinese soldiers there. In fact, they were the best supplied Chinese soldiers in the War. The average man gained 20 pounds. The men who retreated into India were reinforced by men flown in on the supply planes returning from Chunking. The Chinese were not only requipped, but given intense combat trining at Ramgarh. The Chinese trauned abd supplied at Ramgarh were prepat=red with one one objective in mind. It was create a modern combat force which could slug it out with the Japanese nd with the British, drive the Japanese out if Burma and reopen the Burma Road. The Ramgarh Training Center was a secret operation. Its existence was only disclosed until after the war. Most of the men became part of the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions which became recognized as the two best division in the Nationlist army. [Sweeney]

Kunming Training Center in China (1945)

General Albert Coady Wedemeyer , in January 1945, established the Chinese Combat Command and the Chinese Training Command (January 1945). This was when the first American supplies began reaching China through the Ledo Road. The Chinese Combat Command was led by Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, was designed to improve the American advisory effort more effective and address the Chinese practices and attitudes that had impeded the war effort. McClure had a more dufficult task them Stillwell. Given his training effortbin India, he could more effectively control thevtraining effort. He also had only two divisions to work with and a larger pipline of support. McClure had acces to supplies over the Ledo Road, but until a port was secured inn China, 'supplies could not be delivred in masive quantities. McClure's strategy was leverage. He wanted every Chinese ALPHA Force commander down to the regimental level to have an American adviser. A system was developed to deal with Chinese commanders who refused to accept the advice of his Amerivan adviser. Conflicts would be referred to their next higher Chinese and American superiors. If not resolved at a lower level, conflicts would ultimately be resolved by Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer. A Chinese commander who adamently refused to accept Ameican advice would be replaced or American support would end for his unit. As the training and advisory effort developed, Mcclure was never had sufficent personnel to get advisers to the regimental level. He did get advisers posted to all 36 divisions, 12 armies, and 4 group armies of the ALPHA Force.. This meant some 3,100 soldiers and airmen who served as advisers and liason personnel, all linked by radio. Each advisory team had about 25 officers and 50 enlisted men. They were chosen from different arms (signnals, infantry, armor, artillery, engineers) and services so that technicians were available on ordnance, logistics, and engineer specialties were available. Advisers also furnished technical assistance to the Chinese in handling artillery and communications, weak ares in the Natiinalist Army. American military medical personnel worked with Chinese medics, nurses, and doctors who often had only limited formal training. Nirses often lacked any training at all. Each advisory team had an air-ground liaison section, operating its own radio net to provide air support. This was some thing the Nationalist Army lacked because the Nationalist air Force was o small and xat first primarily fovused on interdicting Japanese bombers. The American advisers moved with the Chinese forces in the field. They attempted to improve training. They also worked with their Chinese counteroarts on tactics. They were howevr advisers and in no case were the Americans in command of Chinese units. Their eddictiveness depended primarily on their expertise and ability to develop an positive reltionship with Chinese counterparts. There wre severalm factors that mitigated against the success of this effort. A major problen was corruption. Commandersmight divert supplies meant fir their men for their own personal benefit. Also Chiang was intent on conserving forces for his expected postwar struggle against the Communists. [Kraus] A major problem were supply shortages, even food. The Ledo Road and reopening the Burma Road helped, but without a sea port, the Nationalist Army could not be fully supplied or relief aid to the Chinese people was not possible in the quantities needed.

Sources

Kraus, Theresa L. "China Offensive" The U.S. Army Campaigns of World war II (U.S. Army Center of Military History).

Sweeney, John . 'Ramgarh Now It Can Be Told'. S/Sgt. John 'Red' Sweeney was a Senior Instructor with the U.S. Army Infantry Section, Chinese Training and Combat Command, Ramgarh, India.

Created: 10:18 AM 5/12/2015
Last updated: 5:07 AM 1/8/2016