World War II: American Support of China (1937-45)


Figure 1.--It was American support of China that caused the Japanese to attack the United States bringing America into the War. Beginning with the Flying Tigers, small numbers of Americams were deployed to China. Reopening the Burma Road began an important American objective.Here we see an American flyer, I think immediayely after the War, I think in a port city.

Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationslists after the Japanese invasion received little outside help at first. There was, however, considerable sympathy for China in America. Here Madame Chiang, a Chinese Christian and Wellesley graduate, played an important role. American support was a first diplomatic. This shifted to financial and eventually material support. Japan escalated its operations after the fall of France (1940) by seizing the French colony of Indo-China. The United States escalted its protests. The Pacific fleet was moved to Pear Harbor. American diplomatic protests escalated to embargoes of strategic materials. The United States implemented serious embargoes on oil and scrap metal. The oil enbargo was especially important and meant thast Japan would either have to withdraw from China or find another source of oil. This meant that Japan would have to declare war. The United States also began funelled supplies to the Chinese through Burma. In addition, the United States launched a secret effort to provided China a modern air defense--the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers). Its main task was to protect the Burma Road. President Roosevelt signed an executive order 1940 which permitted U.S. military personnel to resign so that they could participate in a covert operation to support China (May 1940). The All Volunteer Group formed became known as Chennault's Flying Tigers. This covert operation provide the Chinese a creditable air capability for the first time. The Flying Tigers did not, however, go into action until after Pearl Harbor. Their operations were legendary, but could not precent the Japanese from seixing Burma from the British. This cut off China from Allied assistance. The only exception was supplies which could be flown in over The Hump (The Himilayas) from India. This consisted primarily of supplies to support American air operations in China. American entry into the war, however, meant that Japan could no longer focus its military operations on China.

Foreign Assistance

Chiang received little outside help at first. There was some Soviet assistance. There was also some NAZI assistance until Hitler fecided to cooperate with the Japanese.

American Sympathy

There was considerable sympathy for China in America. Here Madame Chiang, a Chinese Christian and Wellesley graduate, played an important role. So did American missionaries.

Diplomatic Support


Financial Support


Military Support

American support was a first diplomatic. This shifted to financial and eventually material support.

Indo China

Japan escalated its operations after the fall of France (1940) by seizing the French colony of Indo-China. The United States escalted its protests.

American Response

The Pacific fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor. American diplomatic protests escalated to embargoes of strategic materials. The United States implemented serious embargoes on oil and scrap metal. The oil enbargo was especially important and meant thast Japan would either have to withdraw from China or find another source of oil. This meant that Japan would have to declare war.

Military Supplies

The United States also began funelled supplies to the Chinese through Burma.

Flying Tigers (April 1941)

President Roosevelt after hearing from Claire Chennault, who Madame Chiang Kai-Shek had hired him to train Chinese pilots, decided to help China build a modern air force. He signed an executive order 1940 which permitted U.S. military personnel to resign so that they could participate in a covert operation to support China (May 1940). This is significant because it was was the first direct American military action to impede Axis aggression. It was taken in the atmospshere of the fall of France and the president deciding to run for a third term. Subsequent Japanese actions beginning with the occupation of northern French Indo-China obly confirmed the President's decision to aid China. And the Magic intelligence from the cracking of the Japanese Diplomatic (Purple code) made it clear that the Japanese public protestratuins of a desire fir peace were a diplomate charade (September 1940). President Roosevelt approved the transfer of Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighters to China. They would be included in the Lend Lease Program (1941). The planes were originally slated for the British RAF which was just beginning to brace for the Battle of Britain. America woud eventually produce a phenomenal number of aircraft. At this time, howevr, production was still limited and the U.S. Army Air Corps struggling to obtain needed new aircraft. The President also secretly approved the formation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG) to fly the P-40s. These were the first modern fighters ever deployed in China. The AVG's main task was to protect the Burma Road so that supplied could continue to reach China. The all-volunteer AVG became known as Chennault's Flying Tigers. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (December 1941) before the AVG could go into action. It thus no longer had to be a covert operation. Although very small, provide the Chinese a creditable air capability for the first time. Initially part of the AVG was deployed on both ends of the Burma Road. The Japanese invasion of Burma forced the Burma contingent to redeploy to China. It also cut off supplies over the Burma Road. The AVG continued to operate with supplies flown in from India over the Himilayas. The P-40s flown by the AVG were on paper no match for the fast, manueravble Japanese Zeros, but they were more robust and had armor protecting the pilots. Chennault developed battle tactics that enabled the Tigers to deal with the Zeros, but their major goal was to intercept the Japanese bombers hammering Chunking. ThecArmy Air Corps and U.S. Navy did not take the AVG seriously and did not adapt Chenault's tactics until losses in the Pacific forced them to adjust tactics. Eventually the AVG was formed into the U.S. 14th Air Force. Some of the Tigersjoined up, Others left China. Many of the new crews honored the AVG by also painting the shark's mouth image and referring to them selves as the Flying Tigers.

Pearl Harbor (December 1941)

A Japanese carrier taskforce composed of six carriers on December 7, 1941, executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It was a brilliant tactical victory for Japan, but perhaps the greatest mistake in modern military history as it brought a suddenly united America with its vast industrial capacity into the War. The Japanese launched 360 aircraft which in 2 hours struck Peal Harbor just as the American sailors were waking up on a sleepy Sunday morning. The strike sunk or heavily damaged six of the eight American battleships, thrre cruisrs, three destroyers, and most of the Army Air Corps planes on the island. America was at war.

Japanese Conquest of Burma (January-May 1942)

Yhe Japanese were determined to close the Burma Road. The Flying Tigers operations were legendary, but could not prevent the Japanese from seizing Burma from the British. The Japanese moved troops through their nominal ally--Siam (Thailand). They quickly seized the main port of Rangoon and then moved north toward Mandaly. The British regrouped as Burma Corps. The Chinese sent an expeditionary force south--the Chinese Army bin India (CAI). The Jaoanese reinforced with troops thst had been involved in the Malay/Singapore campaign defeated both the British and Chinese. The British retreated west into India as did some of the CAI. Burma Corps principal objective was to get to safety in India. The Japanese seizure of Burma cut off the only remaining land route through which the Allies could supply Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. China became eligible for Lend Lease assistabce in 1941, but the Japanese closure of the Burma Road meant that it now could not be delivered in the quantities anticipated. The Japanese during the fighting in Malaya and Burma developed a reputation for jungle fighting. Their success was in part due to their ability to survive with very limited logistical support, allowing them to move through the jungle.

The Hump

The only exception was supplies which could be flown in over The Hump (the eastern Himilayas) from India. This was undertaken by the Army;s Air Transport Command. This was, however, costly and dangerous. It severely limited what could be delivered. Flying the route over such high mountins woukd have been dangerous in peace time. It was nuch worst during the war. They sometimes encountered zero vuisability and without the aid of modern instrumentation. Planes crashed into mountains. They also had to contend with Japanese Zeros. So many planes went diwn that there were special teams to go in to rescue downed airmen. They usually had to parchute in to reach remote areas. One of those resurers writes, "The doc ... crashed through the branches and landed with ahud on the ground .... 'That one didn't look too good,' Brennr panted s we ran. But Doc Austin Lamberts was in pretty fair shape, He was standing therecalmy watching the native who was climbingthe tree retrieving his parachute. 'Hi!' he said. 'Where's the patient?' His coolness was remarkable. 'He's over there in that hut,' I said. 'His foot is pretty awful shape. I hope you brought your saw withbyou.'" [Diebold] Quite a number of planes were lost. The supplies delivered were primarily used to support American air operations in China--the 14th Air Force.

American Air Operartions in China (1942-45)

American objectives in China were initially to keep China in the War to occuply the bulk of the Japanese Army and then to provide air fields from which Japan could be bombed. The new B-29 bombers brough Japan in range of air fields in southeastern China. B-29s were deployed to China but the difficulties of supplying them and the results of inital operations were disappointing. The American raids were conducted at high altitude and disrupted by the Jet Stream which was at the time unknown. American interest in retaking Burma was largely dictated by the need to reopen the Burma road so the Chinese Army and the 14th Air Force could be supplied. These priorities changed abruptly after the American conquest of the Marianas June 1944). This provided air bases for the B-29s that could be much more easily supplied. In addition, a Japanese offensive in southeastern China overran airfields that were slated for B-29 facilities (September 1944).

Building-up the Nationalist Army

Much of the Japanese Army after the beginning of open hostilities (1937) was deployed in China. After initial defeats, the Chinese developed the tactic of retreating to remote interior regions where the Japanese could not get to them. Chiang was very reluctant to commit his troops to open conbat with the Japanese after the first year of the War when many of his best units were destroyd. Even so, after, Japan launched thePacific War, the bulk of its army continued to be deployed in China. This was a conundrum for the Japanese. America was the greatest threat, but there was only so many men that could be deployed to small Pacific islands and the Japanese had trouble supplying the garrisons once established. Another problem for the Japanese was that there were a large number of Pacific islands and they could not be sure which ones the Americans would attack. America war planning initilly involved China as a major fighting ally. After the Japanese closed the Burma Road by seizing Burma (April 1942), there was no way of getting large quantities of supplies into China. American planners conceived of training and equipping 30 Chinese divisions through Lend Lease for an offensive against the Japanese in China. But this was not possible without the Burma Road. At the same it soon became clear that Japan could be attacked by twin island hopping campaigns, the Army in the South Pacific and and the Navy in the Central Pacific. Difficulties between Chiang and Stilwell and American seizure of the Marianas providing alterative air fields for bombing Japan caused American planners to reassess objectives in China. As a result, American plans to trin and equip the Natinalist army were scaled back. There were, however, two important trining centers. The most important was in India where Chinese units could be supplied. American officers trained and equipped Chiinese divisions involved in Burma operations at Ramgarh in India. A second center was ooened at Cummin in China, but could not be fully supplied until the Burma Road was opened.

Ramgarh Training Center in India

Chaing ordered the Chinesr 5thArmy south into Burma to assist the British when the Japanese invaded. They were led by Gen Stillwill who failed to coordinate with the British. The defense of Burma turned into another Allied disaster. After some sharp defeats, Stillweell and the Chinese joined the British is a harrowing retreat through jungle, mud, and rain (May 1942). The Japanese seized the port of Rangoon first, but then the Burma Rod and much of northern Burma. Some of the Chinese retreatedback to China, but a substantial part of the Chinese 5th Army fought a fightingretreat across very diffiul teraine to Indua. After 3 months of almost continuous fighting and a retreat mostly on foot of some 200 miles without adequate food, water or medical care, the Chinese like the Brutish were exhausted and in bad shape. They had lost most of their equipment. They were trained and equipped at Ramgarh in India. Ramgarh was a town in Bihar province ofeastern India, in an area of rolling, unforested hills and arid plains. The British turned over the Ramgarh facility and infantry, artillery and tank training grounds were developed. They supplied the food and the silver rupees used to pay the troops. The Americans provided radios, signal equipment, rifles, field pieces, tanks, trucks and instructors. Thousands of Chinese soldiers were flown over the Hump to learn the use of these tools.It had a major asset, a rail connection which meant that American supplies could reach the Chinese soldiers there. In fact, they were the best supplied Chinese soldiers in the War. The average man gained 20 pounds. The men who retreated into India were reinforced by men flown in on the supply planes returning from Chunking. The Chinese were not only requipped, but given intense combat trining at Ramgarh. The Chinese trauned abd supplied at Ramgarh were prepat=red with one one objective in mind. It was create a modern combat force which could slug it out with the Japanese nd with the British, drive the Japanese out if Burma and reopen the Burma Road. The Ramgarh Training Center was a secret operation. Its existence was only disclosed until after the war. Most of the men became part of the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions which became recognized as the two best division in the Nationlist army.

Kunming Training Center in China

Kunming

Allied Command Structure

The Allies moved to establish a unified supreme Allied command in Asia which they named the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). American General "Vinger" Joe Stilwell (1883-1946), Commanding General of CBI, became deputy commander. Stilwell had served in World War I. After the War he served in both the Philippines and China. Whole in China he learned the language. He was thus a logical choice for working with America's Chinese ally. He had difficulty from the start dealing with Chiang. He played a major role in the CBI theater, but was eventually recalled. Chiasng thus won the personal conflict with Stilwell. In the long run, however, Chiang's refusals to persue some of the reforms pushed by Stilwell would result in the defeats suffered in fighting ahinst the Communists affter the War. Stilwell was replaced by Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler (November 12, 1944).

Chiang and the Japanese

Once America entered the War it soon became evident that Japan would loose the War. Generalissimo, Marshal Chiang Kai-shekwith an eye on the Communists in the North, was reluctant to commit his force to costly attacks on the Japanese. The Allies attempted to persuade him to take the offensive against the Japanese.

Cairo Conference (November 1943)

President Roosevelt met with Chiang Kai-shek at a conference in Cairo (November 1943). I do not yet have details on the results of this conference.

Reconquest of Burma (1944-45)

The Allies gave priority to the European Theater. Allied units in India replused Japanese attacks, but did not have he supplies are strength to enter Burma. American war production by 1944 had reached levels that material was reaching India in quantity. Besides reinforcements and building up supplies, the allies set out to dispel the belief that the Japanese could not be degeated in the jungle. Here two remarkable commanders, Frank Merrill and Orde Wingate played important roles. The Allies thus began the reconquest of Burma (Spring 1944). The British wanted their colony back. The Americans wanted to reopen the Burma Road so that Lend Lease supplies could be delivered to the Chinese. Some preliminary operations were conducted in 1943. General Stilwell in the north led an American-Chinese force down the Hukawang Valley toward Myitkyina, an important communications center and Japanese strongpoint (May 1943). A small American force, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), a reinforced U.S. Army regiment known as "Merrill's Marauders," circled and attacked from the south. Stiff Japanese resistance and the beginning of the monsoon season (June) prolonged the operation and the Japanese in Myitkyina held out several months (August). The British "Chindits" commanded by Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate launched guerilla operations. They parchuted into Japanese held territory near Kotha ( March). They successfully disrupted Japanese communications in central Burma and were supplied by air A British Commonwealth force meanwhile attacked a Japanese force defending Akyab, a Bay of Bengal port. The Japanese further west attacked and almost took Imphal and Kohima in eastern India. The British managed to hang on until reinforcements arrived and the Japanese force was virtually destroyed (June 1944). Thus as the monsoon broke, the British were able to persue the retreating Japanese. The American victory in the north made possible the construction of the Ledo Road. The British defeat of the Japanese in the south meant that the Japanese did not have the strength to attemp to counter attack the Americans in the north.

Reopening the Burma Road (1945)

The Allied strategic plan included reopening the Burma Road in part to support the bombing of Japan from Chinese air fields and in part to build up the Chinese Army. Both of these plans were eventually dropped, but plans to reopen the Burma Road continued, an example of strategic military inertia. The Allies still did not have Rangoon or Mandalay, key components of the old Burma road. They did control northern and western Burma. Thus they could reach the northern streach of the Old Burma Road by constructing a new road from Ledo in India to connect with the Burma Road. The Ledo or Stillwell Road was not only a all-weather road capable of handling heavy trucks, but also a fuel oil pipeline. The road began at Ledo in Assam, India. This was a rail-heads of the Bengal-Assam railway in the valley of the Upper Brahmaputra during that time to Burma Road connecting to Kunming, China passes through Lekhapani, Jairampur, Nampong and Pangsau pass, India-Burma (Myanmar) border. Supplied landed at Indian ports could be shipped by rail to Ledo. The Ledo Road was built under Stilwell's direct supervision. The project was prospected by the British when both India and Burma were colonies, years before World War II. The British did not, however, have the resources to build the War. This changed after America entered the War. The Japanese drove the British out of Burma cutting the Burma Road (1942). General Stilwell's Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank D. Merrill was an early proponent and Stilwell bought on to the idea of building the Ledo Road to connect with the old Burma Road to get supplies to China. It was an enormous engineering poroject envolving inaccessible, disease infested jungle and mountaneous terraine. Construction of the road within India began in 1943.

Final American Operations in China

American planners after Stilwell was recalled, reorganized the command structure. The American forces in the CBI theater were divided into U.S. Forces, China Theater (USFCT) and U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) (October 24, 1944). Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan was given command of USFIBT. Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was given command of USFCT. Wedemeyer inherited Stilwell's position as Chiang's Chief of Staff. General Wedemeyer abnd his staff attempted to reorganize and train Chiang's forces for an offensive against the Japanese to secure a port. This never occurred. Wedemeyer was more diplomatic, but encountered the same problems that Stilwell had experienced. Supplies did begin flowing over the Ledo Road. And they supported Chinese operarions that did help to distract substantial Japanese forces.

Assessment

American entry into the war, however, meant that Japan could no longer focus its military operations on China.

Sources

Diebold, William. Hell Is So Green: Search an Rescue Over the Hump (2011), 272p.







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Created: 11:40 PM 11/24/2006
Last updated: 5:46 AM 6/9/2015